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 1 
Introduction 
“And of His signs is that He created for you from yourselves mates that you may find 
tranquility in them; and He placed between you affection and mercy. Indeed in that are 
signs for a people who give thought.” –Qur’an Surat ar-rum (30:21) 
 
 In 1995, the above Qur’anic verse was added (with little fanfare) to the top of the form 
marriage contract issued by Jordan’s government-run Sharia Courts, which are responsible for 
regulating the family life of the 97% of Jordanians who are Muslim. The addition of the verse 
highlights the sectarian and confessional role of the state Sharia Courts, which operate in parallel 
to a number of analogous courts for the different Jordanian Christian minority communities. The 
verse comes from an early chapter of the Quran that was revealed after the monotheistic 
Byzantines were defeated in 615 CE at the hands of the Zoroastrian Sassanians. Reassuring the 
beleaguered early Muslim community, the revelation posits a rational and ordered universe under 
God’s sovereign dominion that operates on the basis of fixed, immutable principles, which often 
exceed the surface appearances that so often beguile humans. It prophesizes that just as humans 
will rise from the dirt of their graves on judgment day, so the monotheists will rise again in their 
battle with the polytheists. The “affection and mercy” (mawida wa raḥma) of Islamic marriage 
that wedding contracts now emphasize emerges from God’s creation of humans “from dirt,” and 
their subsequent ‘dispersing’ or ‘multiplying’ (30:20). The phrase also carries with it the promise 
of transcending “the diversity of your languages and colors” (30:22), potentially uniting all 
humans in a community that transcends race, ethnicity, nation, and tribe. Believers are instructed 
not to mourn ‘Rome’s’ (ar-rum) loss, because only a society founded on Islamic principles and
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relationships could truly aspire to permanence. Yet as this dissertation argues, there are powerful 
forces that militate against the idea of marital relations as an unambiguous source of social unity. 
In fact, the Quranic verse at the top of the contract has an uneasy relationship with the 
rest of the form, which epitomizes the conflicting notions of kinship and personhood that make 
up the subject of this dissertation. On one level, the verse is a completely anodyne statement that 
any believer would readily agree with: that marriage and the concomitant “affection and mercy” 
between the spouses represent one of the innumerable facets of God’s benevolence and the 
miracle of His creation. Yet one could just as easily imagine an emphasis on individual rights 
and self-actualization or, conversely, an emphasis on the social reproduction of the community 
as a whole, entailing a need to attend clearly and unromantically to the property and labor 
relations that enable such social reproduction
1
. In fact, this is precisely what much of the rest of 
the contract concerns itself with—ironically putting the rest of the document at odds with the 
verse’s idealization of a form of companionate marriage in which the two spouses instantiate 
“tranquility” in a relationship of “affection and mercy.” The existence of such contradictions 
within the contract form foreshadows how conflicting ideals of kinship and personhood 
alternately dissolve into one another and reassert their fixity and antipathy to alternative modes 
of relating.  
In this dissertation, I track how a diverse set of institutions (like the Sharia Courts alluded 
to above) have promulgated a range of social engineering projects with different ideological 
agendas in an attempt to manage the collectivities they encounter and to produce new types of 
                                                 
1
 Indeed, most of the contract is dedicated to dealing with both broader processes of social reproduction and the 
participants as individuals with at least potentially divergent interests. As I will discuss in Part II of the dissertation, 
the contract consists of a single page form, binding a man and a woman (identities painstakingly documented) in a 
marital relationship that involves a pre-set alimony should the relationship fail, the permission of the bride’s male 
guardian, any requirements the bride might stipulate (for instance, asserting her right to work, her right to an 
autonomous dwelling, or her right to forbid her husband from taking another wife), and the signatures of two 
witnesses and the judge.  
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people and communities. Yet rather than thinking of such attempts to re-work personhood and 
community in terms of increasing individuation (or its “failure”) I point instead to more subtle 
re-workings of the person and the family in contemporary Jordanian society and beyond. As the 
title of the dissertation implies, I found that the most vocal and articulate of these modes of 
relating at the time of research was a form of companionate marriage championed by Islamists
2
 
(working inside and outside of government) that I term, “Affection and Mercy,” following the 
Arabic mawida wa raḥma. Ironically, as such Islamist revivalists reach back to ancient texts, 
they find themselves acting as some of the most effective agents for the promulgation of modern 
individualism and the dissolution of pre-modern modes of sociality associated with tribal, non-
state forms of social organization. However, as we will see, despite attempts to re-center 
attention on the affective needs of individuals—Muslim or consumer or otherwise—broader kin 
groupings are not simply ceding their prerogatives. Instead, companionate marriage, 
individualism, and tribalism continue to coexist in productive tension, with companionate 
marriage emerging as more of a compromise between more divergent modes of kinship and 
personhood than a fully coherent mode in its own right. 
 As in most places, the close examination of Jordanian marriage practices yields an 
incredible amount of insight into how people structure and contest the social worlds they inhabit. 
The Jordanians I met, for all of their diversity, were nearly unanimous in thinking of marriage as 
a key moment for the social reproduction of families, communities, and Jordan itself as a nation-
state. What’s more, marriage has repeatedly presented itself as a target for institutional initiatives 
and projects because it is so central to property relations, labor relations, notions of personhood, 
and political affiliation. To transform marriage is to transform the very foundations of legitimacy 
                                                 
2
 While the term Islamist (islāmī) can be prejorative in both English and Arabic, I merely use it to differentiate those 
who see Islam as a political project from those who adopt some notion of secularity (cf. Asad 2002) but still 
consider themselves to be observant Muslims. 
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within Jordanian society, ensuring marriage’s continued relevance and centrality to broader 
conversations about the politics, economy, and culture of Jordan. This dissertation is about 
people in Jordan getting married, the institutions and political movements that seek to remake 
those people through marriage, and the continuing importance of the extended kinship networks 
that these movements seek to marginalize.  
The organizations I studied, which included the Sharia Courts, the Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation (HUDC), and an Islamic charity called The Chastity Society 
(jama‘iyyat al-‘afāf ) are persistent. They have demonstrated a willingness to invest decades of 
trial and error into their efforts to reshape Jordanian marital and family life—with some success. 
These institutions and political movements have not set out to transform marriage 
disinterestedly. What they offer and what they demand of individuals and their families reflect 
their broader respective social visions. For their part, Jordanians have alternately resisted and 
embraced these initiatives, at times using marriage to strengthen kin-based relationships and 
identities or, alternatively, at times using marriage to replace kin bonds with relations based on 
political, ethnic, national, or religious affinity. Jordanian kinship networks continue to be able to 
not only survive these initiatives, but even at times to co-opt them for their own ends. The 
resilience of extended kin groups can be partly ascribed to the various programs’ lack of 
coherence, but it can also be attributed to the multi-faceted nature of the marriage process in 
Jordan and even to the rising standard of living in rural Jordan, which has tended in recent years 
to increase individuals’ dependency on their kinship networks for financial assistance. 
 While the idea of marriage as a key facet of social reproduction was once a theoretical 
mainstay of classical anthropology (Bourdieu 1977; Evans-Pritchard [1966] 1990; Levi-Strauss 
1949; Morgan 1871; Needham 1973), my interest in marriage grew largely from my engagement 
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with my Jordanian interlocutors, who treated marriage’s importance as commonsensical and 
forced me to reckon with the consequences. From the perspective of most of the families I met 
while living in Jordan, marriage represented a huge financial burden
3
 that was nonetheless 
necessary to promote and sustain the family itself. Housing would have to be obtained. The very 
space of the relationship (and the family) would have to be constructed from scratch—and 
gendered, classed, and charged with the proper ethnic and political affinities. They would have to 
engage other families and enter into various forms of exchange and indebtedness, most notably 
the presentation of a significant bridewealth (mahr) payment to the bride and a promise of 
significant alimony in case of divorce. Finally, there would be a wedding to serve as the 
communal recognition and legitimation of this reproductive relationship between a man and a 
woman and their respective families.  
 The immense cost of marriage—especially weddings—may be familiar enough to an 
English-speaking readership. Yet the focus on legitimacy needs to be emphasized since 
American and British notions of kinship and filiation tend to focus so heavily on their 
“biogenetic” component (Carsten 2004; Holy 1996; Schneider 1972; Strathern 1992). In the 
Arab world, however, the anthropologist Morgan Clark has demonstrated forcefully through his 
study of Islamic legal opinions on New Reproductive Technologies (NRTs) that the Arabic 
concept of nasab (otherwise similar to English-language concepts of filiation and 
‘consanguinity’) is “dependent on being conceived and born within wedlock, not mere 
‘biogenetic’ relatedness.” “Sexual propriety,” and the nuptial rituals that constitute the idealized 
legitimate sexual relationship’s social recognition are, “A material condition with regard to 
                                                 
3
 In her ethnography of Cairo’s popular quarters, Diane Singerman showed that marriage is the largest 
“intergenerational transfer of wealth” for most working-class Cairene families (1995:74-75). Both anecdotally and 
based on Salem’s (2012) working paper showing that Jordanians report spending on average JD 9,000 on marriage 
(the average salary is JD 300 per month), the same can be said for Jordan. 
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kinship relation” (Clarke 2009:198). Men in most of the region are not obligated (legally or 
religiously, whether Christian or Muslim) to recognize their illegitimate children. Furthermore, 
since citizenship is conferred on the basis of the father’s nationality alone, children born out of 
wedlock risk not only lack of paternal support, but citizenship and the attendant right to the 
support of the state
4
. The fear of statelessness, in turn, is all too real for many Jordanians, a 
country with two million registered Palestinian refugees, 1.4 million Syrian refugees and a 
dwindling Iraqi refugee community. Such juridical strictures are obviously matched by a 
complementary set of norms, which entail an intense commitment to aggressively legitimating 
sexual relations.  
For most Jordanians, both kinship and the marriages that are so central to legitimate 
filiation cannot possibly be a merely “natural,” “private,” or “domestic” matter5. Marriages are 
exceedingly public affairs and, without them, mere biological “facts” and especially “blood” (the 
core symbol of contemporary Anglo kinship ideologies) would remain necessary but insufficient 
to establish a bond of legitimate filiation. This attitude contrasts sharply with kinship ideologies 
that tend to erase kinship’s social construction while working to relegate it to its own “domain” 
(Franklin and McKinnon 2001; Yanagisako and Collier 1987; Yanagisako and Delaney 1995). 
As feminist studies of kinship have demonstrated forcefully in recent decades, this ability to 
contain and delimit the powers of sexual reproduction within the bounds of a specific domain 
like the household (or the natural order itself) is a formidable technique of social control. 
Jordanian society, of course, is no exception in lending itself to such techniques of social control, 
                                                 
4
 Hasso (2012:11) discusses the ramifications of citizenship laws in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates that only 
recognize the children borne of women married to their citizens as citizens. Catherine Warrick (2009) devotes a 
chapter to the topic in Law in the Service of Legitimacy: Gender and Politics in Jordan.  
5
 Mirroring Clarke’s account of his research in Lebanon, I was repeatedly asked by concerned Jordanians how 
Americans could possibly know who their father’s were given the levels of sexual license they saw depicted in the 
media. However, my invocations of paternity testing were universally dismissed as woefully inadequate to the task 
at hand, an even more dismissive attitude than the one documented by Clarke in urban Lebanon (2009:200-204) 
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but it is important to explore how precisely Jordanians choose to partition their social worlds—
rather than applying a priori social domains lifted from contemporary life in the English-
speaking world. Jordanian understandings of legitimate filiation are notable for their insistence 
on cutting across certain domains, linking the biological and the social as well as the domestic 
and the public. Taken together, the resulting juridical strictures and norms push Jordanians to 
invest an enormous amount of time, money and prestige in every step of the marriage process 
from the house to the bridewealth and the wedding. 
As I quickly found, the most thriving institutional initiatives for the transformation of 
marriage were concentrated on exactly these major expenses: housing, bridewealth, and wedding 
celebrations. Powerful forces in Jordanian society like the Islamic Movement, the Jordanian 
government, and major banks were committed to the transformation of marriage. As elsewhere 
in the region, marriage has become a site for what Frances Hasso has called, “postcolonial legal 
and pedagogical projects absorbed with managing, developing, and protecting the national 
family’ (2011:3). These were the kinds of social engineering projects I set out to study. In her 
comparative sociological study of marriage and family crisis discourse across the Middle East, 
Hasso terms the prevailing logic, “corporatist,” implying a sort of “vision” which, “posits 
families, states, or communities as naturally hierarchical systems in which members 
harmoniously play their assigned roles” (2011:14). Yet the manner in which banks, the Islamic 
Movement, and the Jordanian government set out to order these nested hierarchical systems 
could quickly put them at odds—both with each other and with the families they sought to 
reorder. I explore the tensions between competing visions of the family by using each of the 
three major financial outlays required for marriage (housing, bridewealth, and wedding 
celebrations) to look at specific institutions that have become caught up in transforming 
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Jordanians through marriage: the Housing Corporation, the Sharia Courts, and the Chastity 
Society, which is most famous for its mass weddings.  
Marriage as a Site of Social Engineering 
 In fact, aspects of this broadly corporatist vision should be relatively familiar to a 
European and American audience—as should the attendant sense of anxiety and crisis around 
marriage, the family, and social change. Changes to marriage and the family have been central to 
the winding path that has taken us from the feudal world of the Ancien Regime to the 
increasingly globalized and technologically-enhanced aspirational consumer worlds of the 
contemporary capitalist North. This makes my descriptive task both easier and more difficult, 
since similarities may prove alternately revealing and misleading. On the one hand, if the 
Foucauldian vocabulary of governmentality, biopolitics, and pastoral power seems apt, it is 
because the same Napoleonic codes that inspired Foucault’s social theory were enthusiastically 
picked up and reproduced in the Middle East by local elites as early as the mid nineteenth 
century
6
. Yet as Partha Chatterjee has argued, the nature of the colonial state in many ways 
exaggerated key features of the forms of statecraft we associate with modernity. Because the 
introduction of liberal democracy would have compromised colonial rule and the color line, 
colonies could never fully follow the same capitalist developmental trajectory as, say, France
7
. 
Instead, Chatterjee argues that indigenous resistance to colonial powers and their postcolonial 
inheritors retreated from the heavily regulated “public” and “exterior” domain of the colonial 
                                                 
6
 A range of scholars working in countries across the region have written intersection of the Napolenonic Code and 
family law in the Middle East, most explicitly Amira Sonbol’s (2008) work on marriage contracts. The Code 
Napoléon was the model for laws of “personal status,” which have proliferated across the region since the 19 th 
Century.  
7
 Recent historical works focusing on colonial Egypt have documented what this confluence of religious, racial, and 
gender boundaries under colonial rule did to cultivate particular colonial subjectivities (Jacob 2011) and particular 
colonial approaches to extant scientific disciplines (El-Shakry 2007). These studies show that the states that emerged 
under European colonial rule that constituted and then drew from these forms of knowledge and subjecthood were, 
as a result, of a qualitatively different nature from their creators.  
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state into the “interior” domain of the colonized society, finding strength in its spiritual and 
familial dimensions (1993:3-14). Even if Jordan escaped the comprehensive colonial 
reorganization of countries like India and neighboring Egypt, its postcolonial history has shown a 
similar tendency to turn to this domestic and interior domain into not just an instrument of social 
control but also a wellspring of institutional legitimacy
8
.  
 As Jacques Donzelot has shown in his study of the history of the shifting relationship 
between the state and the family in France, the nature of the family in Europe was fundamentally 
transformed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The transformation came as a result of a 
“tactical collusion” between families troubled by “adulterine children, rebellious adolescents, 
women of ill repute—anything that might be prejudicial to their honor, reputation, or standing” 
and states worried by “the squandering of vital forces, the unused or useless individuals” 
(Donzelot 1977:25). Especially in the aftermath of the French revolution and subsequent 
displacements, the physiocratic ethos of those in power (which sought to use the state to 
maximize production and minimize consumption) was brought face-to-face with widespread 
vagabondage, prostitution, and general social unrest. The social planners of the time hoped that 
men would be enticed back into the factory by being given back their patriarchal position as 
chief breadwinners for the family. If the man were diligent, the thinking went, his wife would be 
given the opportunity to retreat from the dangerous and demeaning toil of the factory into a more 
domestic domain. The wife, meanwhile, would have every incentive to keep a watchful eye on 
her husband lest she find herself back at the convent, a sort of religiously-inflected workhouse 
                                                 
8
 Yoav Alon (2009), Andrew Shryock (1997), and Joseph Massad (2001) have all written extensively about 
collusion between the British, East Banker Tribesmen and the Hashemite monarchy. Edited volumes by Philip 
Khoury and Joseph Kostner (1991) and Pierre Bonte, Édouard Conte, and Paul Dresch (2001) provide broad 
regional overviews of kin group-state relations in the region. Potentially useful individual country comparisons 
include Baram’s (1997) work on Iraq, Paul Dresch’s (1994) work on Yemen, Mounira Charrad’s work in North 
Africa, and the work of Evans-Pritchard (1949) on Libya. Jessica Watkin’s (2014) work on tribal mediation in 
Jordan covers aspects of the history of these institutional arrangements right up to the present. 
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that had emerged in response to the simultaneous abandonment of large numbers of girls and a 
high demand for industrial labor. Donzelot refers to this as “familializing the popular strata.” He 
writes, “the woman was brought out of the convent so that she would bring the man out of the 
cabaret” (Donzelot 1997:40). In post-revolutionary France, marriage would serve as a tool of 
social control for the maximization of society’s vital energies. 
Of course, the role of marriage as a tool of social control (trading male patriarchal 
prerogatives for greater labor discipline) is rarely articulated so baldly. As Michael Shapiro 
notes, this exchange of patriarchal prerogatives for labor discipline is generally submerged 
beneath a “mythic values story instead of a money story” (2000:279). Yet the ‘money story’ 
remains unavoidable. The modernizing state needed the money that the labor power of the 
popular strata would produce. Meanwhile, the popular strata needed the basics of life: food, 
shelter, social security, and protection. As Donzelot continues, in the attempts to compel the men 
back to work, the wife “was given a weapon—housing—and told how to use it: keep the 
strangers out so as to bring the husband and especially the children in” (Donzelot 1977:40). The 
result was to be a hybrid of barracks and hovel. The social housing of the period employed the 
hygiene of the latter with its attention to segmentation and separation of functions. However, the 
aggregation of the poor in barracks (a veritable ‘invitation to riot’) would be halted. Instead, 
husband and wife would be awarded their private bedroom, the nucleus around which the 
children and the rest of the small household would turn. The house would be just big enough to 
separate parents and children, but not so big as to enable sub-leasing to ‘strangers.’ As an added 
benefit, threats to public order could be punished with the confiscation of housing. 
Responsibility for actualizing this schema was foisted upon the wife. As Donzelot writes, “if the 
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husband preferred the outside, the lights of the cabaret, and the children the street, with its 
spectacles and its promiscuity, this would be the fault of the wife and mother” (1977:44-45).  
The same kinds of pressures which inspired the elites of Western Europe to enlist women 
in the reorganization of the family were also operative to the East, in what was then the Ottoman 
Empire. As the historian Eugene Rogan argues, after suffering a string of military defeats at the 
hands of the Russians and the Hapsburgs while fighting off internal insurrections, the Ottoman 
regime found its sovereignty challenged. It was also running out of money and seeing its territory 
and the base of workers necessary to exploit it shrink. This was the Ottoman instantiation of 
what Michel Foucault has called “the emergence of the problem of population.” No longer would 
the patriarchal family merely “model” all other relations of authority. Rather, the family would 
become “an element internal to population… a fundamental instrument in its government” 
(Foucault 1991:99). The result of this attempt to revitalize the empire, known as the Tanzimāt or 
“reorganization,” came in the form of a series of administrative reforms. The reforms sought to 
professionalize the army, reform land tenure, expand the bureaucracy, and impose a “personal 
status code” (code du statut personnel): the French term for the set of regulations governing the 
family. Significantly, what the Ottomans had previously considered insecure frontier regions not 
worth governing became key resources for a state in search of new revenues and subjects to 
support its growing bureaucracy. Thus much of present-day Jordan, which had remained outside 
the Ottoman administrative fold for most of the empire’s history, came to be increasingly 
integrated for the first time in the late nineteenth century (Rogan 1999:3-8). 
The Tanzimāt’s focus on the family, however, was neither novel nor solely a product of 
“western” influence. To the contrary, as Judith Tucker has shown in her work on Palestinian and 
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Syrian Sharia Courts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
9
, local judges and muftis had 
already been grappling with the problems of the family for centuries. In the process, they had 
built up a large body of legal commentary that subsequent generations continued to reference and 
debate. This corpus of exegetical texts was supplemented by the organization of scholars into 
four major guilds or schools (madhāhib), of which the Hanafi School enjoyed the most patronage 
under Ottoman rule. Yet their explicit concerns were primarily moral and ethical rather than 
governmental. They sought to promulgate a model of gender complementarity in which women 
were nurturers and men served a protective, breadwinning role. In place of the physiocratic 
concern for maximizing the vital energies of the territory and population in service of the state, 
Sharia practitioners seem to have limited their concerns to social harmony and the protection of 
certain vulnerable categories of person (especially women and children) against the depredations 
of the powerful—even as they maintained a relatively rigid status hierarchy10.  
In the words of Mounira Charrad, such family law is “a mirror of the polity” (2001:109). 
Emphasizing the strength of tribal forms of political organization in the North African Maghrib 
as well as their perdurance, she focuses on dominance of the Maliki School of Islamic 
jurisprudence and how its adoption was tied to its being the best suited of the four schools to 
mediate between the universalizing aims of Islam and the particularistic commitments of the 
tribes. She emphasizes the ways in which “the thrust of Islamic law in general is to permit the 
                                                 
9
 Since Jordan has historically been more agriculturally marginal, it does not have a long indigenous court tradition 
despite being no more than a few hundred kilometers from some of the oldest known states and urban 
agglomerations. With the expansion of agriculture and state control into present-day Jordan in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the denizens of Syria and Palestine brought their courts with them, hybridizing those traditions 
with the more kin-oriented traditions of the previous inhabitants. Over the course of the twenieth century, more than 
half of the population of Jordan has come from people driven from Palestine and Syria. For a more thorough 
treatment of this hybridization of different strains of law, see Jessica Watkins’ (2014) work on the persistence of 
tribal law and Ahmad Uwaid ‘Abaddi’s (2006) Bedouin Justice. 
10
 The historian Judith Tucker (1998; 2008) has written extensively on the Palestinian Sharia Courts of the pre-
modern era. While, as elsewhere (cf. Gerber 1980), court officials seem to have tended to side with the “weaker” 
party (especially women and orphans), they often did so in ways that reified the social hierarchy. For instance, 
Islamic legal scholars devoted a good deal of effort to defining the precise dietary and sartorial needs of women 
from different “classes” (Tucker 1998:42-43). 
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control of women by their male relatives and to preserve the cohesiveness of patrilineages.” She 
also argues that Islamic law generally, “tolerates a fragile marital bond” and “identifies ties 
among agnates… as the critical bonds for individuals even after marriage” (Charrad 2001:31). 
Through a three-part comparison of the implementation (or lack thereof) of a reformed and 
liberalized family law in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco respectively, she correlates reform with 
a stronger central state and less reliance on tribes for social control. The inverse of this is that a 
weak central state dependent on tribes for support will likely struggle to reform its family law in 
the face of opposition from a mix of religious authorities and tribal power brokers. That has 
certainly proved true historically in Jordan (cf. Welchman 1998). Yet, as Charrad herself notes, 
there are also important disjunctures between Islamic and tribal law in North Africa (and 
elsewhere) and there are longstanding Islamic legal traditions that take aim at precisely the tribal 
prerogatives she identifies. 
For instance the historian Amira Sonbol (2008), who has conducted extensive archival 
work on marriage contracts in the Nile delta going back to the fourteenth century BCE, shows 
how Islamic and pre-Islamic legal structures provided women with ways to contest the 
prerogatives of tribes and their male relatives. She documents the ways in which women in what 
is now Egypt were treated as legal persons and rights-bearing subjects in ways that Western 
women would not be for over 1000 years. She portrays women representing themselves in court 
and often having their prerogatives upheld by the courts against recalcitrant husbands. Women 
often stipulated elaborate conditions in their marriage contracts (as they continue to do in Jordan 
to this day), which provided grounds for divorce and the payment of bridewealth/alimony. 
Sonbol argues that the introduction of French legal theories to Egypt both through direct colonial 
rule under Napoleon and later indirectly via the Tanzimāt reforms of the late Ottoman Empire 
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weakened the status of women in the region. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, ability of 
Egyptian women to stipulate conditions for their marriages was curtailed and wifely “obedience” 
became legally enforceable.  
  As Hasso argues, the reordering of marital life in the Middle East in the postcolonial era 
has generally been less a function of “more democratic and antipatriarchal orientations” than of 
“governance agendas… [that] compete with the still relevant values and norms associated with 
shari‘a and tribal authority systems, themselves often in tension and responsive to sociohistorical 
conditions” (Hasso 2011:25). In fact, Sharia and tribal authority systems may even provide the 
raw materials for new governance agendas. Hasso develops a useful contrast between the Arabic 
words for “family,” usra and ‘ā’ila. The former connotes, “a modern spatial understanding of 
confinement” and the nuclear family, while the latter represents a more relational mode of family 
associated with patrilineal extended kin groupings
11
. In general, the tendency has been to posit 
the usra as the replacement for the ‘ā’ila. However, this has been complicated in the case of 
countries such as the United Arab Emirates (and Jordan) where sovereignty has been seized by 
the most powerful ‘ā’ilas themselves (2012:26). As in Charrad’s North African example, Jordan 
would seem to bear out the hypothesis that a tribal coalition led by a monarchy is unlikely to 
undergo a major reform of its family law through legislation. Nonetheless, despite the obvious 
collusion with a state dominated by extended kin groupings, the Sharia courts, the broader 
Islamic revival movement, and the even broader Islamic political discourse they help to format 
all become sites of struggle between the-family-as usra and the-family-as ‘ā’ila. 
Scale and Scope of the Study: Marriage and Ethnic Identity 
                                                 
11
 There is a certain skittishness about the use of the word “tribe” to describe these patrilineal extended kin 
groupings because many are still working (implicitly or explicitly) within a progressivist unilineal evolutionary 
framework where such “traditional” forms of social organization are supposed to give way to more “modern” forms. 
I choose to thwart this form of chronopolitics by using the term “tribe” and its many more euphemistic renderings 
interchangeably. 
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 The idea for conducting an ethnographic study of marriage in Jordan emerged during my 
time in the Peace Corps, when I was an English teacher in a recently sedentarized Bedouin 
community in the south of Jordan from 2006 to 2008. I returned in 2010 for preliminary 
fieldwork with a plan of study. In order to allow myself the flexibility to move between rural 
patrilocal compounds and urban institutions engaged in the transformation of marriage, I based 
myself in the province of Madaba, a one-hour commute from the capital where the HUDC and 
the Chastity Society were based. Having obtained permission from these institutions and an 
invitation to live in a village near Madaba, I returned the following summer for sixteen months 
of fieldwork with a seasonal plan. A subsidiary benefit of choosing Madaba was its mixed 
Jordanian-Palestinian demographics, which are common in the north of the country but rare in 
the south where I had previously been based. Amidst the dominant East Banker tribes in the area 
(Shawabkeh, ‘Ajarmeh, Aziydeh, Fayez-Sakhur) who had traditionally claimed the land12, were 
a mix of Palestinian tribesmen (Saba‘awi and Ta‘amiri) and more settled Palestinian folk, who 
tended to live in the town of Madaba itself or the more recently incorporated Madaba refugee 
camp, which was built in 1956. There is also a sizeable Christian population in Madaba—
although I only encountered them to a limited extent. I lived on a hilltop where a third of the 
community saw themselves as Palestinian and the rest considered themselves Jordanian. My 
neighbors were tribesmen who had married Palestinian wives while down the block were 
Palestinian men who had married Jordanian wives
13. Madaba accentuates Jordan’s ethnic 
                                                 
12
 Not all land claims relied on claims of autochthony or claims reminiscent of Lockean ideas of ownership through 
the mixture of the land with one’s labor. In an interview with a senior member of the Fayez-Sakhur tribe, he insisted 
that I note that the Sakhur had come from the desert and taken the area by force in the early twentieth century 
because it was the best land available. Lest I doubt him, he invited me to his family compound of mansions where he 
showed me where he had hosted various members of the royal family and boasted of his close kin ties to a recent 
head of the General Intelligence Directorate (the mukhabarat or secret police).  
13
 That being said, the patrilineal bias was such that (for instance) a young man with a Palestinian mother and 
paternal grandmother could belittle his cousin for being Palestinian with minimal cognitive dissonance so long as his 
father had the proper tribal lineage. 
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diversity and upsets overly-simplistic East Banker/West Banker dichotomies as Palestinian and 
Jordanian families intermarry, take collective ownership of the land, and find themselves 
increasingly woven together through webs of mutual obligation. 
 These shifting ethnic and kinship affiliations have attracted the attention of powerful 
institutions that see great geopolitical import in their development. Leaked US embassy cables 
indicate that US officials have become quite involved in engaging local kin networks in their 
efforts to aid the intensely pro-US Jordanian government in thwarting the opposition Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political party, Islamic Action Front. Both the embassy and regime loyalists were 
clearly concerned that the IAF would expand from its perceived base in the Palestinian refugee 
camps in places like Zarqa (deemed by the embassy a “hotbed of Islamist Activity” and the 
IAF’s “natural constituency”) to more “tribal” areas like Madaba. It is these rural areas that have 
traditionally helped fill parliament with independent pro-government candidates who see their 
function as fighting for their constituency’s share of largesse. Usually, such candidates run 
primarily on their last names to signal their tribal affiliations to potential constituents (Antoun 
2006; Shryock 1997). Of particular concern to the embassy in the 2007 mayoral elections in 
Madaba was a member of the Shawabkeh intent on running with the IAF. In the cable, embassy 
officials claimed, “Observers count 8000 votes as his base - 4000 from his family and home turf, 
3000 Palestinian votes from IAF sympathizers in the camp, and 1000 scattered IAF votes among 
other demographics.” The problem the embassy and regime loyalists found themselves in was 
that the two “independent tribal candidates” had threatened to throw their support behind the IAF 
candidate “if regional power brokers support the other.” While some of these power brokers go 
unnamed, the cable goes on to report: 
Local Christian power brokers told poloffs [Political Officers] that they had the 
support of key figures close to the central government, including former Prime 
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Minister Faisal al Fayez, and claimed some Muslim candidates are prepared to 
ally with them in order to stop the IAF. However, they will not launch their 
campaign without a green light from the government - which is to say, the 
General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Such a go-ahead does not appear to be 
forthcoming. A well-placed observer and supporter of Shawabkeh told poloff a 
Christian candidate could not win because moderate Muslims would align against 
said candidate, even if that meant supporting the IAF. "Christians can be king-
makers in Madaba," he said, "but not the king" (Amman Embassy 2007). 
 
The cable is merely an artifact of what residents have long assumed: that the US embassy is 
closely monitoring (if not outright manipulating) the ethnic and tribal dimensions of local 
Jordanian politics and that the status quo depends to a great deal on the ability of the General 
Intelligence Directorate and the rest of the state apparatus to strategically punish and reward 
different families to build sustainable governing coalitions along kin lines. However, the long-
term viability of this divide and conquer strategy and the ethnic and kin-based categories it has 
helped to reify are dependent on the ways in which everyday people in Jordan come to construct 
their own social worlds. The cable tempers the somewhat common assumption in Jordan of the 
embassy’s omnipotence. Clearly, “power brokers” treat the embassy’s political officers as fellow 
power brokers. But they also talk back. Take, for instance, the major IAF backer who taunts the 
embassy official by saying, “Christians can be king-makers in Madaba, but not the king.” 
Understanding these various competing efforts to remake Jordanian politics requires careful 
attention to the making and breaking of kin bonds through research grounded in everyday life, 
emplaced communities, and face-to-face interactions. 
During the first summer, I limited myself largely to the village, paying special attention 
to how village sociality is constructed and reproduced before branching out to study institutions 
that shape those realities through the systematic pursuit of their own highly elaborated social 
visions. I helped oversee the construction of the house I would be living in for the rest of my 
time there, availing myself of the wedding season in the evenings to allow for further participant 
 18 
observation. All told, I estimate I have attended over seventy weddings and engagements in 
Jordan since 2006.  
During the fall and spring, I began research at the HUDC, returning to the village in the 
evenings to the usual talk of real estate speculation, construction, farming, and, of course, 
marriage. While I had initially hoped to study a royal initiative to build 100,000 housing units in 
five years called Decent Housing For Decent Living, the corporation had placed the project on 
hold by the time I returned, encouraging me to focus on archival work. Through the archives, I 
came to understand how the construction projects of my neighbors and myself were shaped by 
the corporation’s subtler project of engineering the creation of a housing market in an attempt to 
alleviate shortages.  
During the winter, I conducted fieldwork at the Sharia Courts, where I attended over 100 
marriage contract signings. I paired this mode of participant observation with archival work on 
Jordanian marriage contracts. I collected and coded a representative sample of 377 marriage 
contracts taken from the Amman Courthouse covering the years 1926-1953, the period during 
which the court had jurisdiction over all of central Jordan, including Madaba, and a 
representative sample of 433 contracts taken from the more recent Madaba Courthouse, covering 
the years from its opening in 1954 to 2011. I also spent time working with the Jerusalem 
courthouse registers (1517-1917).  
During my final summer and fall, I continued to attend weddings and conduct participant 
observation at building sites while studying the Islamic Charity ‘the Chastity Society.’ I attended 
their mass wedding and training course for newlyweds, allowing me to speak with beneficiaries, 
volunteers, and leaders of the organization—many of whom were prominent members of the 
 19 
IAF. I also took advantage of their thriving publishing enterprise, which has produced study after 
study tracking what they term a “crisis of marriage.” 
While I met powerful leaders of the East Banker and West Banker communities, with 
various ties to the Islamic movement, the security services, and some of the most powerful kin 
groupings, I tried to chart a middle course between the two communities and vying power bases 
by focusing my attention on the struggles of everyday people. I found that the everyday lived 
realities of most Jordanians are shaped by kin and non-kin relations that bridge these putatively 
ethnic divides and point to alternative possible futures. The ethnicization of these tensions and 
the resultant political malaise are not inevitable. In this regard, despite the fact that many of the 
most powerful people in Jordan clearly benefit by promoting virulent interethnic mistrust, I 
tended to see the embassy officials, senators, parliamentarians, and sheikhs I met as seeking to 
marshal forces that were hopelessly beyond their control. Despite their (often cynical) 
machinations, however, I have gone out of my way to present my research in a way that carries 
the least risk of revealing the identities of anyone who is not a published interlocutor and 
intellectual. I would hope that readers would avoid trying to “out” participants as the region’s 
instability and ever-shifting alliances could potentially put people at risk when their main 
intention in talking to me was friendliness, hospitality and a curiosity about the world around 
them. 
Positionality 
“Are you married?” 
“Why not?” 
“When do you want to get married?” 
 
From the beginning of my time in Jordan, first as a Peace Corps volunteer and 
schoolteacher and then as a graduate student researcher, I was struck by the frequency with 
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which such questions were posed to me. At various points, I responded with bemusement, 
annoyance, dread, and even relish. Sometimes the subtext was playful, even flirtatious. At other 
times, such questions were underpinned by a good deal of suspicion. At still other times, I felt 
like people were asking about my marital status to size me up. Finally, there were those times 
when such questions were posed out of commiseration, borne of the assumption that any normal 
young man would experience bachelorhood as a form of suffering. I will deal with each of these 
four subtexts in turn. Taken together, talk of marriage became an opening into a world that I 
could never have imagined prior to my engagement with it. More importantly, the longer I stayed 
in Jordan, the more I came to agree with my interlocutors that marriage was in fact the primary 
problematic I should be dealing with: that marriage was the lens through which everything else 
made sense and, hence, an important topic to be broached, preferably within five minutes of 
meeting someone. Here, my positionality becomes incredibly salient. By that I mean the strange 
set of privileges and opportunities that led me (a white, able-bodied cisgendered male from an 
upper middle class academic background) to Jordan. It was through the attempts of my Jordanian 
interlocutors to piece together who I was and what I was doing in their community that I became 
aware of how marriage was utterly central to all forms of social attachment in Jordan.  
Why, after all, was someone with my education and obvious social advantages working 
as a Jordanian schoolteacher with a salary of about $300 per month? My stated—sincere—
answer (that I felt a moral obligation to better understand the human toll of the geopolitical 
machinations of my government and its regional proxies) was alternately touching and 
suspicious: was I a bleeding heart or a spy? But even assuming my sincerity, such an answer did 
nothing to explain how I had the luxury of satisfying the moral demands I had apparently placed 
upon myself as an individual. How could someone take such a detour from the “normal” life 
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course: childhood, adolescence, marriage, and, finally, adulthood and the assumption of my own 
fatherly duties? It is crucial to understand that this was the point of departure for most of the 
relationships I formed in Jordan that undergird this account.  
  I should immediately add that almost no one who asked about my marital status was of 
the appropriate gender or age to actually marry me. Those who asked were generally male peers, 
children, or older women. Yet the question often did contain within it a hint of wanting to pursue 
a longer-term relationship. If nothing else, marriage to a US citizen would extend citizenship to 
the wife and then her family. Such questions were often paired with others like, “would you 
marry a Jordanian?” “Do you have a sister/aunt/cousin?” “How can I marry an American 
woman?” Needless to say, this was wonderful fodder for teasing. Friends might try to set me up 
with an elderly spinster from the village or I might try to set them up with my grandmother. Such 
joking reflected a social context in which most marriages were still arranged—or at least 
presented that way to outsiders. A young man might artfully express his resignation that he 
would only be able to marry ‘when salt emits light’ (lama yanawar al-miliḥ) or at least, ‘when 
the apricots are ready’ (fī al-mishmish), to the laughter of everyone around him. An older woman 
might snap back, “enough! The apricots are here! We’re going to marry you [off]!” 
 Yet the interest in marriage was not just source of mirth. To the contrary: this was 
potentially deadly serious business. Here I was, a single male, barging into a relatively insular 
community. Was I a threat? Might I become overwhelmed with masculine passions, taking 
advantage of some vulnerable member of the family and, in so doing, ‘spoil their house’ (yikhrab 
baythum)? My employer in those early years, the Peace Corps, was highly cognizant of just this 
concern when placing me and other volunteers in small, conservative villages throughout rural 
Jordan. As our superiors declared during our orientation in a bland hotel conference center in 
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Northern Virginia, “you’re all virgins now… well, at least those of you who aren’t married…” 
According to local sensibilities in Jordan, marriage, sex and procreation were intimately bound 
together in ways that had a powerful impact on gender relations. As a result, gender was a 
constant topic of conversation among the volunteers—and an inability or unwillingness to 
conform to local gendered expectations of behavior was widely cited as a reason for quitting 
among the approximately 50% of volunteers (equally male and female) who did so during those 
years.  
 However, just as often the interest in marriage simply reflected the fact that talk of 
marriage provided a canny way to size people up. My very perplexity at the question in those 
early years probably gave away a lot about my family background, our social and economic 
class, and my own long-term prospects for social advancement. My interlocutors were often 
highly cognizant of a new model of family: rather than having as many children as possible, I 
was told that “westerners” now delayed marriage, having two or even just one child but then 
investing large amounts of time and money in them. Meanwhile, such interlocutors would 
continue (with characteristic self-deprecation), ‘we just let our kids run around in the streets. 
Nobody cares because the more kids you have the more of a man you are.’  
Unlike the villagers who would ultimately so graciously invite me into their dense matrix 
of kin ties, I was disconcertingly unattached. These were communities where most men spent 
their whole lives being referred to relationally, transitioning from ibn fulān (the son of so-and-so) 
in childhood to abu fulān (the father of so-and-so) once they had given birth to their first child14, 
thereby solidifying their status as adults. To be unmarried and far from home, aside from 
embodying a kind of assumed helplessness (unable to cook or clean, so the belief went), further 
                                                 
14
 In keeping with the more general patrilineal bias of Jordanian kinship, if a man’s first child is female, his name 
will change to reflect his eldest son’s name as soon as he has one. 
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implied a kind of supreme vulnerability: without kin, who would protect me now or, more 
ominously, when I grew older? Needless to say, I was often genuinely touched when my hosts 
would tell me that I was like family and that they would stand up to protect me should any harm 
befall me.  
This takes us full circle to the final subtext: commiseration. My hosts’ inquiries were 
based on the (in retrospect clearly correct) assumption that my family was engaged in a strategy 
of delaying my marriage to avoid downward social mobility while investing in my further 
education and career advancement. This often led my hosts to pose questions that left me 
dumbfounded by how clear of a glimpse they could get into my family’s finances back in 
America—even without ever meeting another member of my family. The uncanny 
perceptiveness of my villager interlocutors served as a reminder that, even as I often felt I was 
living in a different world, my own life back in America remained strikingly legible in ways that 
opened up space for meaningful dialogue. People might tease or be suspicious or just overly 
curious, but much of the talk about marriage I engaged in came from a place of genuine concern. 
For Jordanians, marriage indexes forms of social disruption that have come with broad macro-
level social transformations that people refer to using terms like “modernization” (taḥdīth) and 
“globalization” (‘awlama). With a current median age of marriage of 23.8 for women and 28.7 
for men, it is not always clear whether there is even a marked change over time in marriage 
patterns (Salem 2014:193), yet nonetheless such statistics have still come to give voice to a sense 
in the region in the past two decades that there was a “crisis of marriage”. In a sense, such 
numbers have historically been both cause and effect of a bevy of social engineering projects 
seeking to build new kinds of people, relationships and communities that have exerted a 
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powerful transformational effect on Jordan for over a century. Such projects alternately sought to 
catalyze or halt transformations to sexual mores, subsistence strategies, and political alignments.  
 My concern for the everyday struggles of my Jordanian interlocutors led me to marriage 
and, from marriage, to a set of social engineering projects that sought to remake their everyday 
lives by transforming their marital relations. By tracking these contradictory and conflicting 
projects, I became aware of a mode of world-making centered on marriage to which my peculiar 
positionality had previously left me oblivious. In many cases, the worlds that these projects are 
intended to prefigure are certainly not worlds that I would expect most of my Anglophone 
readers to want to emulate, yet I would argue that this only accentuates the salutary demystifying 
effects of exploring these unapologetic attempts to instrumentalize marriage. As these projects 
unromantically attempt to remake gender, labor, and property relations, they reveal how 
heterogeneous and malleable these relations are—and how they can and cannot be remade. In 
place of overblown nostrums about the uniform adoption of a global monoculture or the stubborn 
resistance of the “local,” we can instead imagine subtle reworkings of kinship and personhood to 
create all sorts of different partial, overlapping worlds that impinge on each other but also resist 
homogenization. 
Worlding Jordan 
 
 The term world in this context is intended as a technical term: the simultaneous context 
for and product of worlding. This is the process by which human societies create and equip their 
immediate surroundings (umwelt). Rooted in Heidegger’s conception of the relationship between 
history and technē, the term draws our attention to the fact that each society creates its own 
world and that it does so with the physical and conceptual tools immediately at hand. In recent 
decades the concept has proved useful in postcolonial studies (Spivak 1990; 1999), feminist 
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anthropology (Haraway 2008), geography (Benjamin and Raman 2012; McCann et al 2013) and 
ethnographic theory (Da Col and Graeber 2011; Descola 2010; de Pina-Cabral 2014). I have 
found the concept useful because it focuses my attention on the tools immediately available to 
Jordanians and the historical processes by which those tools became available. It requires that 
those seeking to understand current institutional arrangements in a place like Jordan must look to 
their historical antecedents—because this is the world that has molded the institutional actors 
themselves. In the case of Jordan, this means careful attention to Islamic, tribal, Ottoman, and 
British precedents. The term also forces me to acknowledge the fact that the analytical tools I 
bring to my work have developed in a somewhat different world and that my capacity for 
understanding Jordanian society will be seriously limited if I fail to grasp the historical process 
by which these tools developed and came to be at my disposal. The point of historical analysis is 
to bring back into view the hidden pre-conditions and assumptions underlying the creation of the 
worlds we see today. 
 The worlding of Jordan in the aftermath of two world wars and the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire has witnessed large swaths of semi-arid steppe transformed into nation-states 
and ever-larger urban agglomerations under the guidance of the Ottomans, the British and then a 
whole bevy of international ‘development’ experts. Starting with the Balfour Declaration and the 
Sykes-Picot agreement, Jordan was cut out of the broader Ottoman territory and given over to the 
Hashemite Dynasty, longtime allies of the British Empire who helped overthrow Ottoman rule in 
World War I. In the 1940s, it became its own country at the same time that its most desirable 
territory to the west was being eaten up by the Zionist movement and the indigenous population 
of that territory was being pushed into Jordan. By the 1970s, tensions were rising between the 
indigenous population of Jordan to the east and the newcomers from Palestine to the West, most 
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of whom had fled Israeli forces in either 1948 or 1967. Over time, Palestinian and Jordanian 
populations have come to make up even portions of the population
15
 and the Hashemite 
monarchy has promoted its brand of soft-authoritarian rule as the only way to mediate between 
the competing interests of the Palestinian and Jordanian populations.  
 Over the course of centuries of Ottoman rule, governance was generally more vigorous 
towards the north, along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and the coast to the west: the famed 
‘fertile crescent.’ Towards the south and the east, one would pass the fertile lands of Syria and 
Palestine into ever more arid steppe, eventually reaching the Hijaz (present day Saudi Arabia), 
where the more urbane and sedentary peasant populations of Syria-Palestine gave way to 
nomadic Bedouin (badū). For most of the history of the empire, most of what is now Israel, 
Palestine, Jordan and southern Syria fell under the administrative control of the wilayah 
(province) of Damascus. In reality, effective administrative control south of Damascus was 
limited to the coast in the sanjuqs (districts) of Lajun, Nablus, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza and Ramla 
(the latter two were theoretically detached from the province of Damascus in 1742). These 
districts were prosperous enough to pay taxes to the empire (all dutifully preserved in notebooks) 
and support towns with rudimentary manufacturing industries and courts (Cohen 1973:144-172). 
Across the Jordan River, moving from the West Bank (Palestine) to the East Bank (present-day 
Jordan), Ottoman control quickly dissipated. Without much to tax, there was little reason to 
provide security or courts. The chief concern of the Ottomans was to pay off the local tribesmen 
to “protect” the annual haj pilgrimage to Mecca and provide camels, lest they decide to raid it 
instead (Rafeq 1966:70-72). 
                                                 
15
 Demographics are notoriously politicized in the region—especially where Palestinians are concerned. The 
Jordanian government refuses to even conduct an official count of Palestinians (Brand 1995:46-47; Yitzhak 
2004:74).  
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Already in the nineteenth century, the region was in the midst of the modern state-
building project known as the Tanzimāt, which would lay the foundations for the future 
Jordanian state. On the southern frontier, the reforms meant major initiatives to pacify raiding 
groups on the periphery, reorganize taxation, convert communal property regimes into an 
individual freehold property regime, and individuate its subjects to hold them personally 
responsible for their actions. Following a number of unsuccessful attempts to pacify the region, 
the Ottomans slowly began to extend communications infrastructure (roads, bridges, a ferry, 
railroads, telegraphs) and a security presence east of the river. They encouraged refugees from 
places like Chechnya and Circassia to settle and farm the area and only recognized the land 
claims of those who held a title and paid taxes. The apparent stability helped attract merchants 
(Rogan 1999:1-20). In 1867, Mehmed Rashid Pasha finally succeeded in appointing 
administrators and judges in Salt (Rogan 1999:69). There was, of course, resistance. Karak 
revolted in 1910, burning all of the property records (Fischbach 2000:31-32). The “Great Arab 
Revolt” of 1916-1917 cemented the alliance between Jordan’s future Hashemite rulers and the 
British war effort against the Ottomans.  
With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, old identities of profession (peasant, 
Bedouin) and confession (Sunni Muslim, Christian) gave way to new identities, which were 
increasingly tied to the emergent nation-states the European powers were carving out of the old 
empire. The most infamous impetus for this was the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and 
France to divide the Ottoman Empire between them. Britain received Iraq, Transjordan and 
Palestine (which would be promised as a Jewish homeland). France, meanwhile, took the 
northern swath of the empire, which would become Syria and a new, French-backed Christian 
homeland in the region: Lebanon. Jordan would become the buffer between the emerging Jewish 
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homeland and Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Barr 2012; Hourani 1991:318-322; Wilson 1987). In time, 
Jordan would become a major destination for refugees fleeing conflicts in most of these 
neighboring countries. However, even before Jordan’s indigenous population was joined by 
refugees from its more urbanized and heavily governed neighbors, the British were zealously 
pursuing their own state-building project. As Eugene Rogan argues, much of this (land reform, 
individuation of subjects) was a continuation of the Tanzimāt and what he calls (following 
Michael Mann) Ottoman “infrastructural power”: bureaucratic technologies allowing for the 
greater ‘penetration’ of ‘society’ to increase tax collection and support ever-larger military 
apparatuses (1999:3-13). The British would later continue these efforts with an aggressive land 
registration campaign in the west of the country (Fischbach 2000) and successive changes to 
Jordanian family law and the “personal status law,” which placed ever-greater emphasis on the 
individuation of citizens (Welchman 1988).  
From the 1920s onwards, Jordan and its leadership could not help but be drawn into the 
midst of the controversy in neighboring Palestine between the indigenous Arab population and 
Jewish settlers. Conflicts over land sales and future infrastructure projects only escalated as the 
relationship between the two groups increasingly soured. All the while, the British sought to buy 
the quiescence of the Hashemite Emir Abdullah however they could (Wilson 1987:103-127). Yet 
buying the Emir’s quiescence would be far from sufficient to allow for the orderly management 
of Britain’s post-World War II withdrawal. Having failed to broker an agreement between the 
competing sides, Britain simply left. Fighting broke out and the settlers quickly gained the upper 
hand against the indigenous population. In response, neighboring Arab governments occupied 
the primarily Arab portions of Palestine. Egypt was left with the Gaza strip and Jordan annexed 
the West Bank. In the process, two-thirds of the Arab population of Palestine became refugees, 
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settling primarily in Arab controlled parts of Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Under the 
direction of the United Nations, the various sides reached an armistice agreement in 1949 
(Hourani 1991:358-363). However, the conflict continues to define Jordanian politics. 
While the British Mandate in Jordan ended in 1946, it was replaced by a rentier state 
dependent on foreign aid, military aid, and remittances with close ties to Britain and the United 
States. Relatively easy access to funds without the need to tax its population has allowed the 
Hashemite state to build up an elaborate security apparatus while distributing its largesse to a 
coalition of supporters: primarily those hailing from the East Bank, but also important capitalists 
hailing from the West Bank (Baylouny 2008; Brynen 1992; Peters and Moore 2009). 
Increasingly denied its agricultural base to the west and obliged to accept more and more 
refugees from those areas, Jordan has developed what Pete Moore (2004) has called a “Political 
Economy of Acronyms.” The United Nations was involved from the beginning, accommodating 
refugees and acting on their behalf. The various agencies of the UN have been joined 
subsequently by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, USAID, innumerable trade 
deals, and “special economic zones.” Throughout, the Hashemites have worked to maintain, “a 
highly disparate regime coalition that consists of a Syrian/pre-1967 Palestinian merchant elite 
and Transjordanian tribes” (Peters and Moore 2009:257). Even the mechanisms (public 
employment for East Bankers and business advantages for the West Banker ‘merchant-
industrialists’) have remained remarkably constant (Peters and Moore 2009:265; Massad 
2001:10-17).  
Yet there has also been a good deal of antagonism between East and West banker 
communities. Palestinian nationalists assassinated King Abdullah I at al-Aqsa mosque in 
Jerusalem in 1951. The killing sparked rioting by the king’s guard in the old city and sporadic 
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attacks on Palestinians east of Palestine in Salt and Amman (Wilson 1987:208-209). When 
Jordan lost the West Bank in 1967, tensions increased greatly. Palestinian fida’iyyīn (guerrillas) 
continued to operate out of Jordan, calling the legitimacy of King Hussein into question. 
Beginning in 1970, King Hussein travelled to tribal meetings, rallying support for his cause and 
transferring funds from the military budget to the tribes so that they could buy weapons. 
Following an attack on the king’s motorcade, Bedouin units began shelling two refugee camps in 
Amman. Meanwhile, King Hussein went to demand that the tribes of the south evict the 
fida’iyyīn. Ultimately, foreign journalists put the death toll for the civil war, known as “Black 
September,” between 7,000 and 20,000. Following the war, officials commenced with a wave of 
newspaper closings, mass arrests, and a purge of Palestinians from the bureaucracy. By the 
1980s, the Palestinian portion of the armed services had fallen from over half to less than a 
quarter (Massad 2001:204-245).  
The war and the subsequent purges of Palestinians from the government bureaucracy led 
to resentments. This included nativist “Jordan for Jordanians” sentiments, but also the sense that 
the East Banker population had abandoned their Muslim and Christian coreligionists and fellow 
Arabs (Massad 2001; Shryock 1997). To some degree, at least, this was mitigated by an 
explosion in employment opportunities in the Gulf Region. Talented Palestinians leveraged their 
educational credentials and Arabic language skills to move into lucrative positions in the oil 
industry and subsidiary development projects, funneling billions back into Jordan in the form of 
remittances. Thus there emerged a Palestinian community that could be divided into four parts. 
First, there were the poor camp-dwellers who were most averse to adopting a Jordanian identity. 
They made up the nucleus of the new urban underclass. Above them lay the middle-class of low-
level government employees and small merchants, who were more apt to adopt a Jordanian 
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identity. Next were those most successful in the bureaucracy or business and hence more 
enthusiastic about the Jordanian project. Finally, there were those most integrated into the world 
economy, for whom their Jordanian passport was primarily a passport of convenience. The latter 
group, however, was hit hard in 1991 following Saddam Hussein’s defeat in Kuwait. In 
retaliation for the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s support for the invasion, Kuwait 
expelled all Palestinians, leaving many with nowhere to go besides Jordan (Brand 1993:49). 
If the Palestinian population has largely been sustained through aid, remittances, and 
government support for well-connected merchant-industrialists (cf. Reiter 2004), the native 
Transjordanian population has been sustained by the military—and selling their lands to 
Palestinians. Members of the armed services in Jordan enjoy access to steady pay, free 
education, subsidized housing, healthcare services, special stores stocked with low-cost goods, 
and retirement benefits. The pay may not be good, but it has always been sufficient—at least for 
those who own their own homes. The dual nature of the economy for Palestinian Jordanians and 
native Jordanians adds an important economic dimension to these identities. Jordanian and 
Palestinian identities have increasingly been mapped onto the division between public and 
private sector employment
16
. Yet despite direct governmental support, the East Banker 
population has also been the most restive in recent years—especially when inflation (often 
brought on by the influx of new refugees and their money) threatens to erode the social position 
of public sector employees (Baylouny 2008:288-291). Furthermore, because they predominate in 
the public sector, native Jordanians are hit especially hard by Jordan’s frequent economic 
liberalization pushes—and tend to experience them as a morally inflected sleight. As in most 
places, Jordanian public sector employees consider the stability afforded by their steady (if 
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 See also Joseph Massad’s account in chapter four of Colonial Effects (“Nationalizing the Military”) for a fuller 
discussion of how Palestinians came to be consciously excluded from the military.  
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modest) prerogatives to be their just compensation when compared to groups who are allowed to 
strike it rich in high-risk/high-reward economic pursuits centered on investment and remittances. 
It would be a mistake to explain East Banker-West Banker tensions solely in economic terms 
when clearly both sides have invested a good deal of their identities in particular moral, political, 
and historical accounts.  
As Andrew Shryock (1997) has shown, current events are zealously read back through 
centuries of conflict between farmer communities to the west and the nomadic desert tribes to the 
east. Prominent politicians construct coalitions through genealogical claims, publishing their own 
histories and family trees to endow ancient rivalries with contemporary relevance. The 
Hashemite monarchy for its part has zealously promoted this and inflected it with its own mode 
of patriarchal rule, which allows it to play the various factions off against each other, alternately 
providing succor and treating them as ‘unruly children.’ Shryock terms the resultant political 
form, “dynastic modernism,” in recognition of the manner in which, “modern institutions and 
technologies are resources leaders (and their subjects) can use to organize, resist, revitalize and 
dominate ‘traditional’ identities” (2000:67-72). Within the schema provided, Palestinians are to 
be interpellated through a self-narrative of loss and betrayal by Arab regimes while native 
Jordanians are urged to see themselves as gracious but overwhelmed hosts (Brand 1995:52). 
With the death of King Hussein, this has found a particularly relevant embodiment in kinship 
relations as torch has been passed to King Abdullah II, whose marriage to a Palestinian woman 
(Queen Rania) becomes emblematic of the ongoing effort to work through Jordan’s ethnic 
tensions through the idiom of marriage.  
 Armed with a large security apparatus and substantial government revenues from abroad, 
the Hashemite monarchy has little need or incentive to extend democracy or civil rights to the 
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population. Parliament becomes little more than a calculative device for determining which 
coalitions are well-organized enough to warrant the distribution of largesse (Brynen 1992; Peters 
and Moore 2009; Shryock 2000). The situation is analogous to Egypt where the anthropologist 
Diane Singerman notes in her study of the lower classes (known as the sha‘b), “the government 
has reduced the realm of politics to distribution… From their end of the bargain, the sha‘b 
participate in formal politics [by consuming]” (1995:39). So while elites may criticize the 
materialism of the common people as they find themselves subject to demands from foreign 
patrons for fiscal discipline, it is a crisis of their own making. Because access to a decent 
standard of living is the price people extract from elites for quiescence, they are highly sensitive 
to even small fluctuations to the cost of living. This leaves the regime’s international backers to 
determine the price they are willing to pay for quiet in Jordan. 
 If (as Singerman argues) politics in the Middle East under various pro-US authoritarian 
regimes becomes increasingly reduced to questions about the distribution and consumption of 
resources, and marriage represents the key moment for transferring resources from one 
generation to the next, then it should come as no surprise that marriage crisis discourse has swept 
the region. It certainly would not be the first time. In For Better or Worse: The Marriage Crisis 
that Made Modern Egypt, Hanan Kholoussy (2010) documents how anxieties about colonialism, 
economic turmoil, and social change converged on the topic of marriage to create one of the first 
vibrant national publics within Egypt. She argues that marriage crisis discourse in turn of the 
century Egypt allowed an emerging Egyptian middle class to see its anxieties mirrored in print 
for the first time. Debunking such discourse or revealing it to be a form of false consciousness 
starts to seem like missing the point.  
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Marriage crisis discourse is a symptom of marriage’s far-reaching implications and its 
sensitivity to any lapse in the state’s ability to facilitate a wide range of possible forms of 
consumption. Furthermore, when we see the centrality of extended kin groups (tribes) to the 
maintenance of the political order, drawing attention to the government’s role in facilitating 
marriage starts to seem downright canny. The financial outlays associated with marriage are 
needed to facilitate different modes of family alliance-building. This makes those outlays some 
of the most ideologically fraught forms of consumption for most Jordanian families. Whether 
they have sought to weaken or strengthen such modes of alliance-building, a range of 
individuals, families, institutions, governments and even international bodies have all taken part 
in these long-term processes of trial and error to hone family configurations that serve as ever 
more effective modes of social control. In fact, many of the strategies of control through 
marriage that I describe were first developed in Europe, making this a story that is not just about 
a distinctive Jordanian or Arab “World” but also about a broader shared world in which East and 
West continue to objectify their sense of difference at the same time that they enthusiastically 
borrow from one another.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
In part one, I focus on how issues of debt, labor, and property have interacted with 
processes of urbanization, industrialization, and state formation to transform gendered 
conceptions of space within and beyond the home. Historically, communally defended lands 
populated by peasants living in stone houses and Bedouins living in tents gave way to public 
housing projects and government land sales. In the 1980s, such welfare state programs gave way 
in turn to World Bank assisted squatter-settlement standardization programs and then the current 
era of neoliberal “public-private partnerships” and debt schemes. The Housing Corporation has 
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emerged as the culmination of decades of government policies for dealing with the housing 
needs of the rapidly growing indigenous population of urbanizing peasants and sedentarizing 
Bedouins—along with sizable landless refugee populations from Palestine and, more recently, 
Syria and Iraq. Of the institutional sites I studied, the Housing Corporation was perhaps the most 
reluctant social engineer of Jordanian family life—although this did not prevent its activities 
from affecting the marital prospects of today’s youth. Hamstrung by a lack of funds for locally 
appropriate housing initiatives, employees of the Housing Corporation repeatedly found 
themselves bumping up against the contradictions between the ready-made model housing 
solutions on offer from Western development experts and the local population’s expectations 
about marriage and family life. I show how issues of debt, labor, property, and gendered space 
(with all of their shifting, contradictory and ultimately unstable distinctions) have increasingly 
been impacted by liberal conceptions of distinct and coherent private (khās) and public (‘ām) 
domains. 
In Chapter one, I analyze how Jordanians have come to construct marital space. I 
describe the efforts of contemporary family units to organize house construction in the context of 
a historical account of government housing policy and pre-modern modes of domesticity. At the 
same time that male refugees were encouraged to work abroad or start their own businesses in 
rapidly urbanizing zones of the capital region, the rural indigenous male population was 
encouraged to maintain their ancestral land claims while working in the public sector, especially 
the military. I compare pre-modern modes of domesticity associated with goat hair tents woven 
by women with their peculiar gendering of labor, property, and space with contemporary 
building practices. As men have been enticed to work further and further from their home 
communities, contemporary building practices have replaced non-monetary subsistence patterns 
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centered on the communal defense of land with concrete houses built with male wage labor on 
government-recognized “private” property.  
In chapter two, I use the archives of the Housing Corporation to track how communal 
lands were converted into private property to facilitate the Corporation’s attempts to constitute 
and expand a housing market. Desert wasteland became valuable urban real estate for a 
generation of newlyweds in the 1980s and 1990s—many of whom had overgrown the refugee 
camps that hosted their parents. I argue that, in the process of overseeing these particular modes 
of enclosure, the government planners were alternately challenging and bolstering the idea of 
property as an object of collective communal defense, often connected to housing patterns 
marked by the prevalence of multi-generational patrilocal compounds
17
. Nowadays however, 
available land is increasingly scarce. Many indigenous Jordanians have been selling their lands 
to Palestinian newcomers for generations. As a result, Jordanians as a whole increasingly find 
themselves at the mercy of banks when they want to start a new household. The high cost of land 
and the bank’s demands for interest force people to choose between celibacy and foregoing the 
longstanding ideal of the sole male breadwinner to re-imagine women’s place both within the 
classical domestic domain and beyond its threshold. 
In part two, I examine changing contractual dimensions of Jordanian marriage practices, 
focusing on the traditional wedding delegation (jāha) and government Sharia Courts, which are 
responsible for drawing up and enforcing marriage contracts and their attendant bridewealth 
payments. As Hasso has argued, marriage contracts are powerful “technologies of governance” 
(2011:45) that presuppose and entail particular gender relations and family dynamics. Central to 
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 Even the World Bank could support some of these schemes, like the Military Housing Corporation’s program 
offering generous benefits to encourage government retirees to build houses in their rural communities of origin, 
surrounded by their extended families. As one report boasted, this “re-ordered social groups in a more natural 
fashion” (Shelter Unit 1987:24). 
 37 
the current corporatist order is a model of “gender complementarity” and male guardianship 
(qiwāma) that, despite drawing on traditionalist and Islamic antecedents, is practically ensured 
by the “rationalized family law of most postcolonial Middle East and North African states” 
(Hasso 2011:4). These rigid juridical standards become highly relevant when it comes to 
women’s consent to marriage, but also in settling disputes and adjudicating the financial duties 
of the husband and the state toward a given woman and her children.  
In chapter three, I show how both the oral contracts of wedding delegations and the 
written contracts of the courts produce types of moral agents that are complex and distributed 
across multiple individuals, putting them somewhat at odds with ideals of individual autonomy 
and romantic love. Yet if the bride and groom are all but lost in the pageantry surrounding the 
delegation, contemporary courthouse rituals exert a powerful individuating influence on 
participants as they become increasingly concerned with documenting individual consent. 
However, much as the Jordanian bureaucracy has worked only haltingly to transform communal 
property arrangements into private, freehold property, so too has the state only somewhat sought 
to individuate its subjects through the court bureaucracy and the marriage contracts they issue.  
In chapter four, I turn to other, more subversive effects of novel court procedures. Court 
procedures produce all manner of categories that enable and facilitate new forms of individual 
voice (within the bounds of the contract ceremony) and collective voice (through the circulation 
of statistics about marriage and the accompanying social criticism). In particular, the spinster and 
the woman divorced before consummation emerge through the knowledge practices of the courts 
and further research facilitated by those courts drawing on techniques like the survey. Yet the 
abstracted and individuated moral agents produced by the courts do not always win out over the 
moral agents produced by delegations. Increasingly, they struggle with each other for legitimacy. 
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In part three, I take up the final ritual for ensuring a legitimate marital bond: the wedding. 
I compare three types of wedding: the “traditional” three-day outdoor wedding, the new 
distinctly urban abbreviated two-hour affair in a wedding hall, and mass weddings being 
promulgated by the Islamic movement. Once again, issues of debt and labor figure 
prominently—as do struggles over the construction of moral authority, gendered space, and the 
boundary between public and private. While the wealthy increasingly pursue closed off 
weddings in elite hotels that intimidate their poorer relatives into not attending, there is a 
concomitant revival of interest in traditionalist wedding practices—especially among those with 
ties to the security services or rural political ambitions. The Chastity Society, in turn, portrays 
traditional weddings as promoting all manner of masculine excess: too expensive, too violent, 
too salacious, and too gaudy. Weddings too reflect many of the animating desires, fears, 
suspicions, and tensions which drive the proposal and the building of the home. Chief among 
these is the problem of legitimacy, which here requires harmonizing a self-sustaining 
correspondence between filiation and political order. 
In Chapter five, I analyze how Jordanians use weddings to promote competing forms of 
legitimacy. The feast, as a grand act of shared commensality, helps create a sense of kinship and 
‘shared substance’ (Kelly 1993) through food. The assembly of people, in turn, reifies family 
bonds at the same time that it helps constitute broader networks of patronage. In choosing a brief 
inexpensive wedding, a five-star hotel wedding or a multi-day outdoor extravaganza, Jordanians 
make choices about what kind of families they want to be, what kind of children they want to 
have and, of course, who they hope to exclude.  
In Chapter six, I use the Chastity Society’s mass weddings to explore why weddings have 
become a privileged site for competing notions of legitimacy, pitting Islamist, liberal, and tribal 
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ideologies against each other. I argue that weddings help people work through the contradictions 
between widely shared corporatist familial ideals and the increasing inability of the Jordanian 
economy to provide the material preconditions for those ideals due to rising commodity prices 
for things like housing and food. This kind of flexibility in Middle Eastern gender roles is 
nothing new (cf. Charrad 2001; Mir-Hosseini 1999; Sonbol 2008; Tucker 2008). Yet the precise 
modes through which changes in gender roles are catalyzed, perpetuated, and (at times) 
abandoned reveal the remarkable plasticity of social worlds in the region and beyond. 
 Jordanian institutions may be impacted by many of the same broad political and 
economic forces as those institutions more familiar to an Anglophone readership, but the former 
are not without their specificities. For starters, key aspects of the postcolonial order in Jordan 
like the Muslim Brotherhood and particular politically powerful extended kin groups grew (of 
necessity) from precisely those social domains that British colonial institutions defined 
themselves in opposition to—namely religion and the family. So while an emphasis on legitimate 
filiation is quite widespread and always has important implications for property and labor 
relations, it takes on added political salience for governance agendas based on Islamism and 
tribalism. As a result, Jordanian families struggling to meet the material preconditions of their 
own reproduction do not necessarily reproduce the increasingly familiar American and European 
model of the autonomous, self-actualizing individual or, at their most collectivist, the isolated 
nuclear family. While such a model (the usra) is instantly recognizable even among the most 
provincial Jordanians, a more expansive model (the ‘a’ila) remains dominant within the central 
halls of power and along the margins. Where generations of social scientists have confidently 
predicted the decline of the extended kin group and the rise of ever more individuated, self-
actualizing consumers, this study sounds a note of caution. Jordanian modes of making and 
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breaking kin bonds—kinning and dekinning (Howell 2006)—remain creative, complex and 
difficult to reduce to a simple narrative of progress towards the spatially confined nuclear family 
or usra and the autonomous individual and away from the broader and more relational ‘a’ila.  
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Part I: The Home: Building a House and a Housing Market 
 
Chapter 1: The House 
 
After a week in which my friend Omar’s family compound had seen a flurry of activity, 
with a new concrete and steel rebar structure springing from what had been a vacant lot, I saw 
him on the street, greeted him, and took the opportunity to teasingly ask him when he was going 
to get married. As a man in his mid twenties with a prestigious job in the military
18
 who was the 
eldest son in the family, he immediately grasped the subtext and smiled back, “I want to wait 
until I finish the house.” Continuing with a line he had probably been using all week, he winked 
a bit and said, “I want to bring a girl the size of the house,” reflecting the local common sense 
that the more prestigious the house, the more prestigious (bigger, so to speak) a bride he would 
be able to marry. A year later when he finally got engaged as the house was nearing completion, 
he eagerly described his bride to me in terms of her job (an engineer), her salary, and the 
combined household income he was looking forward to when her salary was added to his 
sizeable military salary and benefits package. His good news here was accompanied by a 
palpable sense of exhilaration and relief at the prospect of being able to support a large and 
prosperous household that would meet the high expectations that his family and neighbors had 
for him.  
Despite the ubiquity and banality in Jordan of this kind of status competition and 
conspicuous consumption around housing and its direct connection to the marital prospects of
                                                 
18
 To get a sense of how normal this involvement with the military is, consult the list of occupations for the men 
involved in marriage contracts in the appendix and Table 14. Over a quarter of men in the Madaba sample of 
marriage contracts were employed by the security services. 
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young men, it is all based on an incredibly novel set of assumptions—which in many cases are 
not even half a century old. In Part I of the dissertation, I will argue that the quest of the 
Jordanian middle and upper classes for bigger, more elaborate, and more permanent houses is 
transforming gender and kin relations across the country—not least because of the economic 
activities that are increasingly required to actualize such houses. When Omar’s respective 
grandparents married half a century ago, they initially lived in goat hair tents made by the female 
relatives of his respective grandfathers on patrimonial lands they claimed on the basis of having 
worked it themselves and their collective willingness to defend it with force if necessary. To the 
degree that family relations have now grown to conform to the model of men like Omar and his 
father (creatures of an external “public” world) who perform wage labor, acquire capital and use 
it to house women (here associated with a cloistered, “private” or “domestic” realm), the 
contemporary Jordanian home reifies this conceptual gendering of space, materializing it in the 
built environment.  
Yet money and commodity circulation increasingly suffuse village sociality to the point 
where even this model of men housing women is growing outdated. There is something quite 
novel in Jordan about a man who would describe his prospective fiancée to another in terms of 
her occupation and salary—although it is increasingly the norm. In contrast, a number of Omar’s 
uncles and grandparents remarked to me at various points that, “I never touched money until I 
served in the army.” The statement was intended to emphasize that their access to money—even 
as military aged males—was viewed thirty to fifty years ago as a challenge to the preexisting 
gerontocratic order in which senior men had claimed (not always convincingly) the right to 
dispose of the family’s capital as their sole prerogative. One man, to emphasize the shift in 
expectations around gender, age, and money continued, “my [ten year-old] son doesn’t even ask 
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for a schilling anymore. He says ‘give me two schillings!’ Seriously!” Yet such complaints 
among older generation of changing expectations about the role of money and other commodities 
in mediating relations between generations and genders tended to fall on deaf ears. That is 
because current expectations that increasingly valorize market relations even within the 
household were at least partially encoded in the spatial, labor, and property relations of the home 
and the family itself, lending these emergent expectations an aura of fixity, which proved quite 
convincing to the younger generation. As living standards and commodity prices rise while 
wages stay stagnant, there is a growing literature in English and Arabic detailing the ways in 
which this is affecting people’s marriage prospects in the Middle East. Fewer and fewer men are 
able to provide a house and financial support to a wife (if women even necessarily want that), 
leading to the possibility of higher marriage ages or even growing populations of people who 
never marry at all (Adely forthcoming; Badraneh 2009; Badran and Sarhan 1999; Hasso 2011; 
Masarweh 2010; Schwedler 2010). Most intriguingly, as land prices and living standards 
continue to outpace wage increases, the entire edifice of housing as an expression of masculine 
competence begins to crumble as women and women’s labor comes to the fore once again as 
undeniably central to the construction and maintenance of the physical space of the home.  
Part one of this dissertation is located at a point of doubled liminality: on the threshold of 
the home itself as well as its construction, which is arguably a key obligatory passage point for 
social reproduction in any community. When the succeeding generation constructs its homes 
differently, it is also constructing its families differently. To track this transformation in the 
relationship between gender, labor, property, and space, I attempt to trace two phenomena in this 
section: chapter one considers the construction of a house while chapter two considers the 
construction of a housing market. Chapter one focuses on house construction through 
 44 
ethnographic research in rural Jordan, building on a growing literature on “house societies” 
(Bahloul 1999; Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995; Levi-Strauss 1987) and a number of previous 
studies which foreground the construction of those houses (Dalakoglou 2010; Melly 2010; van 
der Geest 1998). Chapter two focuses on the construction of a housing market through 
ethnographic and archival research at the Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
(HUDC), building on a growing literature that has shown how economic markets are quite 
literally constructed—much like houses (Callon 1998; Mackenzie 2009; Zaloom 2006). Initially, 
market relations in what is now Jordan were of limited import to daily life, with men and women 
traversing gendered space and engaging in common and divergent forms of more or less 
gendered labor to sustain the life of the community. Over the course of the twentieth century, 
public market relations remained masculine even as they proliferated with the coming of 
urbanization, influxes of refugees, labor migration, the expansion of the military, land 
registration, and new financial instruments like the interest-based mortgage. The result was the 
increasing confinement of women to the physical house as men were drawn out of the home in 
order to sustain the household through their participation in the labor market. Increasingly 
however, the rising costs and expectations associated with the home and market relations that 
undergird that home’s construction are pulling women into the workforce, reworking notions of 
personhood, gendered space, labor, and property in the process. 
Chapter one uses the structure of the conjuncture between the tent (which was a common 
form of housing in Jordan as late as the 1960s) and the various implements of “public policy,” to 
produce a strange funhouse-mirror effect that emphasizes the peculiarity of contemporary houses 
and housing markets and their role in radically shifting the gendering of labor, property, and 
space in Jordan in a relatively short time. When tracking between the experiences of Omar and 
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those of his grandparents’ generation, ideas of public and private serve as an important pivot for 
recent shifts in the gendered political economy of the Jordanian household and its ramifications 
for broader national and international political economies. These shifts in logics of gender, labor, 
property, and space are leading to the transformation of the modes through which so-called 
public and private “spheres” or “domains” (cf. Cannell and McKinnon 2013; Chatterjee 1993; 
Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Franklin and McKinnon 2001; Strathern 1988) are co-constituted.  
‘Oikonomy’ of Hair, Mud, and Stone 
The emergent liberal notion of public and private as a contradictory mixture of 
oppositions (between individual and collective, interiority and exteriority, market and state) is 
now fully present in Jordan due to the increasing use of the terms ‘ām (‘public’ or more literally 
general) and khāṣ (‘private’ or more literally particular or special). Jordanians now speak of 
privatization (khiṣkhiṣa) and the public sector (al-qatā‘ al-‘ām) just like everyone else who 
encounters the logics of neoliberal globalization and its avatars. In fact, the Housing Corporation 
is one of the numerous bi-bi-bis (PPPs: Public-Private Partnerships), which are now proliferating 
across the Arab world and elsewhere. Yet such conceptions of public and private remain in 
tension with older local conceptions that remain embedded in the physical structure of the 
household and its peculiar gender, labor, and property relations. This means that certain aspects 
of these older conceptions continue to exert significant effects—even among young people like 
Omar. First, I will attempt to provide a brief sketch of the tent’s structure and its animating logic. 
Then, in contrast to the highly abstracted notion of public and private which these organizations 
now promote, I will discuss the home’s relationship to literal ‘bread and butter’ issues: the 
production of wheat, barley, milk, and meat. From these, I will turn to the home’s relationship to 
a still quite tangible set of concerns around interiority and exteriority, visibility and invisibility. 
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In the second half of the chapter, I will contrast this pastoral mode of dwelling to modes of 
dwelling heralded in the latter half of the twentieth century by the arrival of government jobs, 
concrete houses, and a veritable army of consultants and experts eager to bring their own Anglo-
American notions of labor relations, domesticity, and property to the region.  
The goat hair tent is a vexed but central image in a diverse array of ideological depictions 
of Arab heritage and culture. It simultaneously serves as a focal point for certain strains of 
nationalism and chauvinism (see the widespread popularity of Bedouin soap operas in the 
Middle East) while being a central trope in orientalist imaginaries of the region. The Bedouin 
tent has arguably served the same functions in orientalist discourse that the tipi has in certain 
racist depictions of Native Americans by rendering its inhabitants primitive, close to nature and, 
above all, easily separated from their land and any resources it might hold. Of course, such 
discourses in fact obscure the subtle but widespread transformation of the landscape by both 
Native Americans (Berkes 1993; Cronan 1980; Peacock and Turner 2000) and Bedouins long 
before the arrival of white settlers and resource extractors. My goal here in highlighting the tent 
is to draw attention to precisely the broader ecology in which it is implicated. While I 
acknowledge the problematic uses to which the image of the tent has been put in the past, I 
would argue that the tent can also help put into sharp relief the peculiarities of the gendered 
political economy of public and private promulgated by various facets of contemporary global 
governance like the World Bank, State Department, and United Nations.  
The basic architectural principles of the Bedouin goat hair tent are relatively simple. The 
tent forms a vaguely rectangular shape that is achieved by stretching a piece of fabric over a 
more or less rectangular grid of poles that are held perpendicular to the ground by the tension of 
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the ropes and the fabric pushing downwards on the poles, arrayed so that a longer center pole
19
 
(al-wasiṭ) is flanked by two shorter poles stretching the length of the tent. I have actually spent a 
fair amount of time visiting with friends in Jordan who put up such tents (now made out of 
burlap sacks or repurposed United Nations Refugee Works Administration tent fabric rather than 
painstakingly woven goat hair) while tending crops on land rented far from their permanent 
homes. I have been told that passing the growing season like this in a tent can be a good way to 
save on gas and take advantage of the cooling summer breezes. 
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 One classic index of sheikhly status was the number of these center poles in one’s tent. More center poles meant 
more room to accommodate guests, which meant the need for more surplus to meet the obligations of hospitality.  
Figure 1: A diagram of a hypothetical tent. It uses some of the most common terms and 
emphasizing the bodily metaphors and deixis used to discuss the house and its constituent 
parts. However, there is a lot of variation in terminology—especially when it comes to the 
names of the poles. For instance, the sāḥa is often called the mu‘and. The pole on each side in 
the middle is usually referred to as the kāsir, but some people use the term ‘āmr—despite the 
fact that this term is more commonly used to refer to poles in the rear. Zāfir is another term 
for these rear poles. Meanwhile, even the terms which evoke parallels with the body are not 
universally used. For instance, “the hand” (al-iyd) is sometimes called the muqaddim while 
“the foot” (al-rijil) is often called the fāhiq.  
 48 
 I used to make a point of asking elderly Bedouin men in Jordan about the names for the 
constituent parts of the Bedouin goat hair tent—not the least because everyone seemed to enjoy 
teaching the foreign anthropologist the obscure minutiae of a bygone era. A number of elderly 
men were even kind enough to draw me diagrams. At first, I thought it would be useful as a 
conversation-starter that might lead comfortably into stories, jokes and ad hoc social theorizing. 
Indeed it did. It soon became clear that there was also a great diversity of experiences and 
terminologies that people would express through their narrations of the tent. Nonetheless some 
aspects were ubiquitous: the tent was always conceived of as divided into two parts: the 
masculine shiqq and the feminine muharrim. But was the shiqq on the right or the left? A man 
once told me it varied by tribe: his tribe put the shiqq on the left. Seeming to contradict his 
thesis, he then added, “but the path here is on the right so I put the shiqq on the right so [male] 
guests wouldn’t walk by the muharrim.”  
Nevertheless, there was a certain spatiotemporal ordering of this gendered polarity that 
seemed to transcend the countless individual experiences of the tent. For my part, I was taught 
and later experienced the tent as a male. The long sides of the tent would usually be raised up to 
some degree. The front flap (usually known as the stār) would be parallel to the ground while the 
back flap (usually known as the ruwāq) would only be raised enough to allow the wind to enter. I 
was told in no uncertain terms: dogs and children enter through the ruwāq. Men must enter 
through the front
20
. Ideally, a man should approach from the back side of the tent, which allows 
the family to be shielded from his gaze by the lowered ruwāq. When he is within earshot, he 
should call out “peace be upon you” (salām ’alaykum), “O protector, O family of the house!” (ya 
sātir, ya ahl-al-bayt!), or some other greeting. With permission granted, the visitor should 
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 I have no idea what instructions a woman in my position would have been given, but adults of both genders in 
fact exclusively entered through the front.  
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approach one of the rear corner poles known as the “foot” (shādiḥ al-rijil) or al-fāhiq while 
making sure to give the various ropes, which are staked in the ground around the sides, a wide 
berth. Passing the stake jutting out from the front pole (known as the “hand”—shādiḥ al-iyd), the 
male guest could expect to find his hosts waiting to greet him.  
Similar accounts of gendered space could be provided for other types of homes both in 
Jordan and in other times and places. When I have gone for strolls amongst the ruins of the stone 
houses of the peasantry from the early twentieth century, my Jordanian friends have always 
described them in terms of the same gendering of space. The examples could be multiplied 
across the Mediterranean
21
 and across the Arab world.
22
 Domestic space is treated as though it 
were polarized into male and female aspects (shiqq and muḥarrim) while the home forms a 
feminine pole (am-mḥarrim) in relationship to the masculine exterior. Admittedly, this is 
contradictory. To use the language of Susan Gal’s (2002) essay “Language Ideologies 
Compared: Metaphors of Public/Private,” this is a kind of “fractal recursion and erasure” which 
happens to be associated with most extant discourses on public and private. In fact, members of 
both genders move throughout the house and throughout the community over the course of the 
days, weeks, months and years. Yet so firm is the ideological commitment to the maintenance of 
these polarities that people can speak of the masculine and feminine portions of the home and 
then in the next breath declare the home to be wholly feminine vis-à-vis the masculine market, 
suq, bazaar, or agora. I will return to the gendering of space within the oikonomy
23
 of hair, mud 
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 Cohen (1989) offers a relatively nuanced account of women’s movement through various gendered spaces in 
ancient Greece drawing on a combination of archaeological and textual evidence. Herzfeld’s (1985) ethnography of 
a town in Crete finds a gendering of the town square itself. Of course the most famous example of the Mediterranean 
house literature is Bourdieu’s (1977) research on Kabyle homes in North Africa.  
22
 The gendering of domestic space both internally and in relationship to the exterior is a recurrent theme in 
ethnographies and histories of the Arab world (cf. Ghannam 2002; Khater 2001; vom Bruck 1997).  
23
As Timothy Mitchell (2002) has argued, the notion of the economy is a mid-twentieth century European invention. 
It presupposes a nation-state as its locus and demands technocratic management. It is “a distinct social sphere.” Prior 
to the twentieth century, economy was used primarily as a term for practices of maximizing efficiency (Mitchell 
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and stone, but I would like to begin by describing the activities of a family that, at the time of my 
research, continued to herd goats and engage in household food production. I hope to use the 
account to highlight some of the most striking recent changes in the gendering of property and 
labor relations and their ability to reify new ideas of public and private.  
 
Subsistence, Property and the Gender of Work 
                                                                                                                                                             
2002: 81). It is derived from the ancient Greek oikos or house: the original locus of the term. My use of oikonomy is 
meant to re-center economy away from the nation-state and towards the home—at least for the first half of this 
chapter. This is in keeping with the broader Mediterranean sensibilities I am trying to foreground and should not be 
taken as any sort of invocation of “The Western Cannon”—most of which was stolen from elsewhere anyway. Of 
course, the conflation of the two through the term economy recalls Foucault’s later work on “biopolitics” and 
“Governmentality” (1991).  
Figure 2: A scurrilous diagram of a neighboring tribe’s tents. It was drawn by a nineteen-year-
old to mock them. It features a donkey, pickup truck, a plethora of children, and empty jerry 
cans of water out front. The muḥarrim is twice the size of the men’s quarters and features 
chickens running around and an old woman smoking tobacco. The diagram of the men’s 
section lays out the way status is reflected in seating patterns with the rā‘ī al-bayt (patron/ 
shepherd of the house) in the center facing outwards with his family on the left and his guests 
on the right.  
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I arose as usual around six in the morning but, instead of going off to work, I set off with 
my neighbor Abu Aseel for a day of goat herding. He was tall, cheerful and friendly and, having 
retired from his job as an administrator, enjoyed passing his days tending his flock. He had been 
suggesting this (half seriously) for a long time and we had always agreed to herd together come 
spring. The previous evening, we had finalized plans to actually herd goats together the 
following morning. At seven, I went downstairs to meet him. He was holding the goats while his 
wife (Um Aseel) milked them and he told me to sit with a glass of tea and wait for him to finish.  
Such a marked but simultaneously partial division of labor has been historically 
widespread. Martha Mundy, writing about Yemen in the 1970s, argues, “here as in most 
highlands, the division of labor stresses the defensive role of men and, correspondingly, the 
reproductive and domestic roles of women.” In particular, Mundy points out that women in 
highland Yemen were intimately involved in production but “[did] not direct ploughing, 
irrigation, or building of irrigation channels and of walls separating fields” (1979:163). This is 
consistent with my ethnographic data for Jordan. To this day, I regularly see women in the most 
“conservative” parts of rural Jordan working side-by-side with their husbands, sons, and fathers 
in the fields or among the livestock. Historically, across the Eurasian landmass, the ability to 
shelter family members (especially female family members) from such labor
24
 and cloister them 
has been a form of inconspicuous consumption, which demonstrated indisputable status as 
members of the nobility. Nonetheless, labor was and is still gendered. For instance, I was 
repeatedly told that it was shameful (‘ayb) for a man to milk an animal25. In many ways, of 
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 The cloistering of elite women is a widespread phenomenon that has been written about in different times and 
places. One particularly rich vein of scholarship on the underlying operative pre-modern social distinctions has 
focused specifically on women’s inheritance strategies in highland Yemen (Gerholm 1985; Mundy 1979) 
25
 One common context in which I heard about the shamefulness of a man milking was when my friends sought out 
shepherds to tend to animals that they did not have time to watch. Syrian men were preferred for such work 
precisely because they were willing to milk the animals as well as tend to them.  
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course, Um Aseel was not so different from a rubit bayt or “housewife”26. She relied on her 
husband for access to money and, by extension, the market while remaining at home in a space 
that was gendered female. Nonetheless, a normal housewife would be spared this level of 
intimate involvement in the earliest stages of food production. The more notable economic 
transformation has been on the male side of the gendered aspects of labor and property relations: 
Abu Aseel’s ability to use his independently obtained salary and pension to provide food and 
shelter and render Um Aseel’s intensive involvement in food production less and less integral to 
the household’s survival. What is unprecedented is the way in which this prerogative was 
expanded globally to encompass a much larger section of the male population in the post-World 
War II era
27
.  
The weather was pleasant as we set off with about 10 head of goats. We descended the 
steep path leading away from the densely-packed settlement and towards Abu Aseel’s grazing 
areas. We moved through his nephew’s olive trees quickly lest the goats take the opportunity to 
eat from them. Once we reached the valley, we followed the dry riverbed toward Sid al-
mishmish. The grass was lush and green and littered with patches of yellow, purple, red and blue 
flowers. Various herbs gave off a pleasing smell. Sid al-mishmish itself was a place where the 
riverbed gave way to a steep limestone cliff followed by a gorge filled with limestone boulders. 
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 The term rabit bayt is completely absent from my sample of marriage contracts until the 1950s when it suddenly 
becomes the default designation for women’s employment. In my sample of contracts from the Amman courthouse 
stretching from 1926-1953, it does not make a single appearance. The majority of women (71%) do not have any 
occupation recorded, which is primarily indicative of a lack of interest in their economic activities and, relatedly, the 
assumption that women’s economic activities would likely mirror those of their husbands. The prevalence of the 
latter assumption is consistent with the fact that most of the remaining women are classed on their marriage 
contracts (using ditto-marks) as “peasant” or “farmer”—just like their husbands and fathers. Three of the 377 brides 
were seamstresses. No doubt those three represent a fraction of women who performed such work but their contracts 
do show some very limited interest on the part of court officials in women’s economic activities during this period. 
In contrast, nearly 70% of Madaba brides (spanning the years 1953-2011) have their occupation listed as 
“housewife.” The shift to “housewife” in court documents represents a notable shift not necessarily in women’s 
labor, but at least in its social recognition.  
27
 The expansion of a highly gendered conception of wage labor that brought with it a freedom from the constraints 
of kin bonds is central to the political potency of transnational feminist projects like the “wages for housework” 
campaign described by Sylvia Federici (2012). 
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We slowed to allow the goats to begin grazing. Abu Aseel pointed to a patch of wheat about 2-3 
meters wide and about 10 meters long and cautioned me to make sure the goats did not eat from 
it as it belonged to our neighbor Sweilem. A goat would edge toward the wheat. Abu Aseel or I 
would pick up a rock and toss it at the patch of wheat the goat was eying and the goat would 
back up a little.  
I had always thought the shepherd was supposed to protect the livestock. I was surprised 
to discover that we were actually primarily concerned with protecting the plants from 
overgrazing. I have to admit that on this point I had paid too much heed to the ways that 
urbanites have been portraying Bedouins for over a thousand years. As a scholar from an 
aristocratic Jerusalem family once gleefully exclaimed to me—quoting the 13th century historian 
ibn Khaldun—yajid al-‘arab yajid al-kharib (“where the tribes are found, destruction is found”). 
There is a common view of pastoralists and other nomads as, if not exactly savages, antithetical 
to civilization, cultivation and building. The image is of hordes who take what they need and 
move on, leaving the landscape exhausted. Instead, I was learning about a complex set of 
overlapping property rights, which rendered the land neither communal nor private: the 
protection of certain portions was a collective responsibility—but only really due to one person’s 
insistence
28
.  
Once the goats had moved beyond our neighbor’s wheat, we sat on a boulder and I asked 
Abu Aseel about the land tenure arrangements in the area and the economics of his goat herding. 
Facing away from the gorge, he gestured at the steep slopes on either side. He explained that this 
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 Andrew Shryock has studied the roots of this confusion in some detail and presents a convincing explanation. He 
observes that, among the Balga Bedouin, property is generally believed to be obtained by seizing it from another 
group, being granted it in return for political support or as part of “marital exchanges or as terms of reconciliation 
between groups in conflict” (1997a: 42). The mistake is that, despite the open acknowledgement that the land was 
obtained collectively and is constantly defended collectively, various sub-groupings and members can assert much 
more specific rights—at times by simply working a particular bit of land more intensively.  
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land was mushā‘ (often glossed as “communal” land) which was technically state-owned (lil-
dawla) but available for grazing and collecting firewood. He grazed his goats on it for free eight 
months out of the year. On top of the ridge to our right sat a new farm owned by “the Pasha,” a 
wealthy capitalist from Amman who was starting to build a mansion. The land had been 
purchased from Sweilem and presaged the increasing suburbanization of the area as people 
abandoned barely profitable agricultural ventures and cashed out to the tune of millions of 
dollars. The valley running perpendicular to us was owned by Abu Aseel’s mothers’ brothers, 
who rented about 500 square meters to Abu Aseel for 60 dinar
29
 a year. There he was able to 
plant enough barley to last his goats two months. During the dead of winter, he relied on feed 
(‘alaf) which he purchased for about 60 dinar. Thus every year, he was able to sustain ten to 
thirty goats for the cost of JD 120. Given that goats typically reproduce once per year and that a 
goat could easily fetch JD 200-250 at market at the time, it was a welcome supplement to his 
pension that kept him active and occupied.  
Here, it is important to emphasize that, up to now, I have only spoken of Abu Aseel’s 
attitudes about land rights—not the underlying legal system per se either now or at any time in 
the past. In fact, property relations have been greatly in flux for the past few hundred years as 
tribesmen, Ottoman administrators, British colonial officials, Jordanian bureaucrats and World 
Bank consultants have questioned not only the private or communal nature of various plots of 
land but also the natures of the categories themselves. Michael Fischbach’s (2000) State, Society 
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 At the time of research, most people in rural areas made about JD 300 per month--although most owned their own 
homes. Urbanites tended to make slightly, more but not enough to make up for the high rents they had to pay. The 
official exchange rate was $1.40 for every Jordanian Dinar. However, goods tended to be cheaper in Jordan so, for 
instance, a small can of Pepsi would cost JD 0.25, meaning that JD 100 could buy 400 cans of soda assuming no 
bulk discount. Needless to say, local meat is not one of those cheap goods. Once kilo of local meat cost JD 9-11 at 
the time of research.  
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and Land in Jordan is a thorough study of the documentary evidence
30
 which describes an 
Ottoman land regime in which very little land outside of urban areas was private, freehold land 
(mulkī) and the vast majority of land was the property of the state (mīrī): it was there to be 
improved and used by subjects in return for taxes. By working the land, Ottoman subjects gained 
rights to the fruits of the land (taṣarrif or usufruct31) but the “neck” (ar-ruqba: ultimate 
ownership) continued to reside with the state and served as the basis for taxation.  
While this was beginning to change in the late nineteenth century due to the Tanzimāt 
reforms of the late Ottoman empire, Fischbach argues that it was only with the onset of British 
rule that property relations in Jordan’s agricultural regions really started to shift. He claims that, 
for the British, there were “two fundamental assumptions. The first was that all land was owned 
by someone. The second was that land should be managed efficiently in order to maximize its 
productive potential” (2000: 79). The cadastral surveys the British conducted in the wake of their 
conquest of the Ottoman Empire sought to institutionalize private property with a precision that 
had never been attempted before
32
. All cultivated land was to be assigned by the state to 
individuals—even if the ownership of uncultivated land remained ambiguous. To be fair, early 
results were quite partial. Oral historical accounts of bridewealth in the post-Ottoman era are full 
of examples of land transfers that were not recorded in either government-issued marriage 
contracts or government-issued land deeds (sanads). In fact, to this day the privatization and 
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 Lars Wahlin (1988; 1984) and Shryock (1997a) have questioned the degree to which Ottoman records can be 
trusted—where they still exist (Fischbach points out that the land records for southern Jordan were burned during an 
uprising in Karak in 1910 (2000: 31)). The case for the veracity of the later records is stronger, but there is probably 
a degree to which the British cadastral survey of the 1930s both reconfirmed the existing situation (cf. Shryock 
1997a) but also became a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. By simultaneously registering property to discrete 
individuals, effectively putting a stop to raiding and then distributing titles, government jobs and education to many 
of those same individuals, the British probably tended to ossify social distinctions, labor relations and property 
rights. 
31
 My neighbors told me that, according to the sunna (the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammed), it is 
permissible to pick fruit from any fruit-bearing plant on anyone’s land as long as it is eaten immediately and not 
taken away. 
32
 Mitchell (2002) provides an excellent account of the British cadastral survey of Egypt’s Nile Delta in Chapter 2 of 
Rule of Experts (“Principles True in Every Country”), which emphasizes similar sensibilities.  
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commodification of land in Jordan remains a partial—if increasingly successful—project, which 
the World Bank, United Nations and Housing Corporation continue to promote with mixed 
results.  
Abu Aseel’s use of the word mushā‘ (so-called communal land) and its conflation with 
state-ownership (mīrī land) is telling and reflects the conflicts which have marked the shift from 
tents, grains, and goats to concrete houses and government jobs in rural Jordan. Tribes have 
repeatedly fought to maintain what they call their communal (mushā‘) lands while the Jordanian 
State has argued that these lands, due to lack of recognizable cultivation (at least from the 
perspective of sedentary urbanites and farmers), can be appropriated by the state and privatized 
as necessary
33
. Of course people like Abu Aseel occupy land in a different way: they range over 
a wider area extracting less from each zone they pass through. They seize, they grift, they submit 
and, if necessary, they pay. Such people do not really concern themselves with the finer points of 
property law. They confront land as both individual and collective; public and private. As the 
day wore on, we moved towards the valley running perpendicular to Sid Al-mishmish. I noticed 
Abu Aseel keeping the goats away from particular shrubs which had been over-grazed or “tired” 
(ta’abān) in his words. Around eleven o’clock, we headed back to the house to water the goats 
and eat breakfast. Abu Aseel brought out tea, fresh goat cheese, olives, hummus, and eggs. In 
contrast to Abu Aseel’s labor, I could only be indirectly aware of his wife’s contributions. I 
happened to know that Um Aseel made her own cheese, pickled her own olives and kept 
chickens. Yet her labor was, if not quite invisible, certainly not particularly visible to me no 
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 Controversies over the privatization of communal lands tend to only receive passing references in the English 
media (Ziad Abu Rish’s 2012 interview with Tariq Tell in Jadaliyya is typical). For a sympathetic account of the 
government’s position, see Ranyia Al-Hindi’s (2012) article in Al-rai, “Business man releases road map to solve the 
problem of communal lands.” For a more cynical account, see the unattributed article on Gerasa News (2012), 
“What’s the story of the lands which the Kuwaiti ambassador and the brother of Kilani [president of the board of the 
Amman Municipality] bought!!” 
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matter how much her family appreciated it. In the next section, I will turn from my discussion of 
the gendering of property and labor to a discussion of the relationship between gender, space, 
visibility, and interiority.  
The Seed (Al-Bizr) 
 After weeks of hearing some friends of mine talking about their neighbor, ‘Authba, an 
elderly woman with a reputation for being a character, they insisted on taking me to visit her. We 
hailed the men from the road as we walked by their land and they demanded we come and drink 
tea. Inside the tent, the dirt floor was covered with a brightly colored plastic mat and a number of 
upholstered foam mattresses. I explained that I was doing research on customs and traditions 
around marriage and made small talk. Soon enough, ‘Authba burst into the room with her scarf 
over her face and declared, “I hear there’s a foreigner/stranger (ajnabī) here!” I made a slow 
gesture to stand up while putting my hand over my heart to greet her. She let forth a volley of 
effusive praise and we all laughed at the mock sycophancy. I repeated my introduction and 
explained my research focus on marriage. She immediately launched into a story: “In the old 
days, the man and the woman never saw each other until their wedding night.” She paused for 
dramatic effect. “So on my wedding night, I was alone in the tent and this man walks up and I 
covered my whole face except for one eye.” As she did this, she revealed one of her eyes. She 
continued—raising her pitch by a few octaves, “I said, ‘who are you?’” She dramatically lowered 
her voice as she let her scarf down, “I am your husband, girl!” Everyone burst out laughing 
again. She asked me what I wanted to know and repeatedly proclaimed her “expertise” while 
gesturing with her scarf. In this manner, she held court as she bantered with my friends and her 
sons. Eventually, I asked her about the names of the various parts of the tent. To this day, I am 
not sure what she said, but everyone burst out laughing. The men were too bashful to repeat the 
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precise word she had used, but they explained to me that it was a word for the gap between the 
sāḥa (the piece of fabric separating the putatively masculine shiqq from the muḥarrim) and the 
ruwaq (the back of the tent). It was clear that she had likened the gap to the human pudendum, a 
clever play on the anthropomorphization of the tent and an extension of what one would expect 
to find behind the tent’s “hands” and between its “legs.” My friends would later refer to it as 
simply al-bizr (the seed). As I pondered its possible significance, a teenage girl’s voice rang out 
from the other side of the divide, “Mom! Your TV show is on!” ‘Authba yelled back, “what do I 
want with my TV when I have a foreigner right here!” That was the first time I realized the 
laughter was coming from both sides of the tent.  
 This highlights the inherent difficulties and hazards of rendering the interior exterior and 
the invisible visible. In this case, it is handled expertly by ‘Authba, a gifted performer. She can 
turn it into a joke. However, as we will see, this is not always the case. Such renderings can be 
fraught with misunderstandings, arguments, and violence. As I have been intimating, this is not 
merely a Jordanian problem either. In “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel,” Mikhail 
Bakhtin goes so far as to argue the drive to exteriorize and render visible the interior and the 
invisible is central to the development of literature in general and the novel in particular. I would 
argue that ethnography itself is ancillary to this preoccupation. Bakhtin argues that, “the public 
and rhetorical unity of the human image is to be found in the contradiction between it and its 
purely private content… Although personal life had already become private and persons 
individualized, although this sense of the private had begun to infiltrate literature in ancient 
times, still, it was only able to develop forms adequate to itself in the small everyday genres, the 
comedy and novella of common life” (Bakhtin 1981: 110). In the essay, Bakhtin attempts to 
illustrate the “historico-literary process” through which various forms of time-space have 
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developed in literature and the arts from the Greek Romance to the Rabelasian novel
34
. It is 
important to note, however, that we have not yet arrived at the liberal notion of public and 
private, which shifts markedly by dividing market from state and associating the former with the 
private and the latter with the public. Here, the dialectics of interiority and exteriority, visibility 
and invisibility still predominate.  
Concrete Relations: Building the Cinderblock House 
As an ethnographer, and even more so as a male ethnographer, I was always acutely 
aware of this literary conundrum which Bakhtin has hit upon. When the action was masculine, 
visible, exterior and collective, I was well-equipped to narrate it. But such action failed to 
exhaust the ethnographically relevant data. Much like generations of World Bank consultants, 
colonial administrators and Jordanian bureaucrats, I found myself compelled to consider (if not 
necessarily understand completely) that which was feminine, invisible, interior and individual—
what Bakhtin would call “private.” As he observes, “by its very nature this private life does not 
create a place for the contemplative man, for that ‘third person’ who might be in a position to 
meditate on this life, to judge and evaluate it. This life takes place between four walls and for 
only two pairs of eyes.” Instead, in the following section I will focus on the construction of that 
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 While Bakhtin specifically concerns himself with the development of these processes in “the various histories of 
generic heterogeneity in the European novel,” the distinction is artificial and should most certainly include the 
literature of all western Asia—not just Europe—as well as North Africa. His extensive use of The Golden Ass and 
Augustine’s Confessions merely emphasizes the narrowness of his focus on Europe: both works were written by 
North Africans. Likewise, his discussions of medieval chivalric romances could be compared profitably with coeval 
udhri (chaste) romances of Arabia and Persia like Layla and Majnun. The basic plot of Layla and Majnun concerns 
a semi-historical figure who falls deeply in love with a girl named Layla. His infatuation leads him to loudly and 
mawkishly proclaim his love for Layla in poetry—mentioning her by name. People begin to talk about his strange 
behavior and label him crazy (majnūn). The epithet sticks. When he proposes marriage, the girl’s father cannot abide 
the idea of his daughter marrying a crazy person. Growing out of the oral culture of the Arabian Peninsula, the story 
reaches its point of greatest elaboration in the Persian court culture of the thirteenth century in the able hands of the 
poet Nizami, who draws out its mystical themes by highlighting the parallel between Majnun’s devotion to his 
beloved and the ascetic’s devotion to God. Nizami’s Majnun wanders the desert and only encounters Layla in secret 
but chaste encounters. When her husband dies, Majnun is so focused on his idealized image of her that he runs away 
and she dies of grief (Seyed-Gohrab 2009). For a discussion of visibility, invisibility, interiority and exteriority in 
the earlier Arabic version in Kitab Al-Aghani, see Ruqayya Khan’s (2000) “On the Significance of Secrecy in 
Medieval Arabic Romances.” 
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space “between four walls” of interiority and invisibility: the home. Yet while my primary focus 
will be on the logistics of actually building a house from cement, steel, water and gravel, I hope 
to use the concrete house’s juxtaposition with the pastoralist oikonomy of goats and tents to 
highlight the peculiarities of recent shifts in property, labor and spatial relations—specifically 
with regards to gender and the creation of the conditions of possibility for male individuality and 
autonomy within a market context.  
Previously, homes were a form of women’s wealth bound up in a subsistence economy 
where money played a relatively small role in mediating day-to-day social relations
35
. With the 
adoption of concrete houses, the home became men’s wealth as males abandoned agriculture, 
joined the army and bureaucracy (or went abroad to work in industries like construction), and 
increasingly used their personal salaries to pay for the materials and labor necessary to build 
them
36
. As British and American military advisors and development consultants poured into 
Jordan in the mid-twentieth century and set about “modernizing” the country, women became 
increasingly interiorized, invisible and distant from economic power. As we will see in the next 
chapter, part of this involved development consultants becoming convinced that there were 
“individual owner-builders” who needed to be empowered through the creation of a “private” 
housing market. The elusiveness of actual individual owner-builders has not served as any 
obstacle here. Despite the fact that house construction remains a collective endeavor concerned 
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 Because weaving was effectively dead as a local pastime in the various areas I have lived and worked in Jordan, I 
can only access this history through interviews with old women and the work of other ethnographers. The best 
account of “world construction in weaving” (1986: 221) that I have encountered is Brinkley Messick’s “Subordinate 
Discourse: Women, Weaving, and Gender Relations in North Africa.” 
36
 In Colonial Effects, Joseph Massad (2001) thoroughly documents the fact that the British and, subsequently, the 
Jordanian government have sought to use the provision of military jobs to Bedouins as a tool for sedentarization and 
the creation of Foucauldian national subjects. Massad is particularly reliant on the paper trail surrounding the 
exploits of a British administrator by the name of Glubb Basha. To this day, the man enjoys a good deal of renown 
across Jordan where, by all accounts, he established himself as a sort of stranger-king for years at the interstices of 
the British Empire, the Hashemite Monarchy and the upheaval of World War II before being thrown out of the 
country by the late King Hussein in 1956).  
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with fashioning the physical house as a corporate body for the married couple and their progeny, 
Jordan’s political economy has nonetheless increasingly been designed to serve “him”37—the 
individual owner-builder. 
‘For a Relative’ 
In order to have housing while doing research, I made an agreement with a friend who I 
will call Harun to build a two-room apartment for the purposes of learning about house 
construction with the understanding that his teenage son would add on extra rooms once he had 
finished his studies and found a job. Then he would be able to get married and move in. 
Effectively, the agreement was that, instead of trying to find a place to rent, I would spend that 
money to build a new structure. Based on previous research, I was confident that it could be done 
for less than JD 5000. I had yet to begin work at the HUDC archives, where I would learn of 
their decades-long project to empower the “individual owner-builder” to build their own 
homes—and I would probably have scoffed at the premise of someone building their own house 
alone even if I had not attempted it first. Yet over the course of the house’s construction I would 
learn just how collective house construction remains in rural Jordan to this day.  
The process began normally enough by soliciting bids from various subcontractors 
(mu‘alims). Harun and I settled on the lowest bidder: an Egyptian by the name of Ahmed who 
agreed to organize all of the labor of constructing the pillars, roof, and walls for JD 700
38
. We 
began by going to meet with him in a downtrodden section of Madaba city. He flagged us down 
on the street and took us into an alley with a strong, rotten stench. We headed up the stairs to the 
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 The use of a male gendered pronoun here is purposeful and reflects the gendered assumptions of those who 
invented the category of the “individual owner-builder.” For more on this, consult the discussion of the category in 
“Private Housing Suppliers Survey” of the National Housing Strategy (Shelter Unit 1987: 10-26).  
38
 The other bids were JD 800, JD 850, JD 900, JD 1200 and JD1500. The latter bid was fully premised on the buyer 
having a whole year to collect the money to pay. In effect, it was a loan as much as an offer to work as a contractor.  
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second floor where we found about thirty pairs of flip-flops and shoes strewn about. Ahmed led 
us into a dilapidated room with a TV, some worn mattresses, and a few mass-produced plaques 
baring verses of the Qur’an. A number of young (and not-so-young) men sat around. Two sat 
listening to music on their mobile phones through headphones while an older man fiddled with 
his prayer beads and another young man flipped through satellite TV channels. A bottle of 
orange soda quickly appeared and the men began to discuss the materials that would be needed. 
Harun presented a piece of paper that another foreman had written for him. Ahmed spoke at a 
rapid pace, swerving between his Mansouri dialect (they were all from the Egyptian city of 
Mansour) and an approximation of Jordanian Arabic. They went through the various quantities 
of materials one by one as Ahmed fired off multiplication problems. He agreed with the various 
figures and launched into a brief discussion of steel and cement procurement. After no more than 
ten minutes, everyone had finished soda, concluded business, and taken their leave. 
Harun explained on the way back that he did not trust the foreman at all. Sure, Ahmed 
was building a house for a cousin’s nephew, but the foreman was totally transient. On the bright 
side, Harun reckoned himself too poor to be swindled. He claimed that the biggest problem was 
that workmen would steal materials. This was why the family would have to be careful to buy 
only as much as he needed and make sure it was delivered and supervised in such a way that 
thievery was kept to a minimum. The first step would be to get the steel. He would buy it by the 
ton in the form of a kit that included everything from rebar to nails and wire. The next day, once 
the steel frames were set up, the merchant would have the sand, gravel and cement delivered. 
Harun was able to provide some evidence of a need to be wary: a Qatari had built himself a 
home in the area without ever visiting and the neighbors reported seeing trucks coming every 
night to take away truck after truck of materials.  
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The next day, we went to the largest cement dealer in town to price materials. Most 
notable was the fact that, in the last six months, three new cement factories had opened and the 
state monopoly was now a thing of the past (Lafarge had been the sole purveyor of cement in the 
country for the last decade on the basis of its ownership of the two formerly state-owned plants). 
Harun was taken aback to discover that the “Cement of the South” (which he and his family had 
relied upon for decades and considered better than the cement made at the northern plant) no 
longer existed as such. However, he was mollified when the trader explained that the government 
had introduced an industry-wide quality rating. Yet while the trader was quoting the going price 
for cement paid for in cash, such a distributor would be unlikely to offer good terms for a loan. 
So with the materials priced, Harun went to buy the materials from his friend, neighbor, and 
distant uncle Abu Hashim. He generously quoted the same prices as the Madaba distributors and 
agreed to deliver the materials bit by bit on an installment plan
39
.  
Abu Hashim’s store was emblazoned with a large green sign advertising Lafarge cement 
and the words “building supplies” (muwād al-buna’) written in Arabic. To the left of his store 
were hundreds of bags of carefully stacked cement and down the road there was a cinderblock 
factory run by an Egyptian man supplying Abu Hashim’s customers with blocks—which could 
be purchased from Abu Hashim on credit. The interior of the store came in three sections: these 
included a storage area for white cement and an office for receiving customers with wood 
paneling, a small desk and a chair (perhaps 6-8 square meters—very cramped). Finally, there 
was the shop itself, which overflowed with tools and basic supplies for plumbing, painting and 
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 Our need to pay for the initial materials on an installment plan was related to a complicated mix-up with my bank 
in the United States (TCF), which decided to cancel my ATM card without informing me. Harun was able to cover 
some, but not all, of the shortfall because he did not have a lot of liquid assets. However, such headaches are 
probably typical when people need a lot of cash at once. It may be difficult to coordinate all factors without such 
debt. In any event, there was nothing more ordinary than one’s building projects eventually involving Abu 
Hashim—although I should emphasize that it was very generous of Abu Hashim to offer Harun and me credit on 
such good terms.  
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wiring. Out front, there was a wall of paint cans about a meter high and two meters long. Atop 
the paint cans sat a water cooler and a thermos of Arabic coffee. Abu Hashim could almost 
always be found out front. He was a light skinned man with a light brown mustache, kind eyes, 
and a headscarf. He always wore trousers and a long-sleeved dress shirt, which would be rolled 
up to reveal his muscular arms. Next to him sat his assistant: an Egyptian youth who served 
coffee, carried supplies, and drove the truck for deliveries. 
There were two reasons to buy from Abu Hashim: proximity and his willingness to 
accept interest-free debts in a Muslim community where riba is frowned upon. While the debate 
about riba and its relationship to interest and usury is complex and beyond the scope of this 
chapter, a few points are key. Specialists on the topic like the anthropologist Bill Maurer are 
absolutely correct that Christian connotations render these words less than ideal as potential 
translations (2001: 9). Yet at the same time, these words are ubiquitous whenever the subject of 
riba arises in the literature on Islamic finance and they are more often judged to be similar rather 
than different—despite the objections of certain politically connected religious authorities. 
Usually, there is some agreement that riba includes the exchange of a smaller amount of money 
at one point in time for a larger amount of money later. Whatever riba actually is, the sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammed are clear on its permissibility: “God curses the man who takes riba, the 
man who pays riba, the two witnesses and the scribe.”  
When I asked about his customers, Abu Hashim readily mentioned the importance of 
proximity but neglected to mention the role of money lending. As we sat one day, he told me 
what I suspected: with Ramadan approaching in the midst of the building season, an initial burst 
of activity had given away to rather slow-going. There was no ḥarika (movement). He explained, 
“Summer is a busy season because people come back from the gulf and they want to build. Kids 
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are out of school so they can help.” He predicted a flurry of activity once Ramadan was over. Of 
course, it would be difficult to make money in the building supply trade if everyone offered such 
soft terms for loans as Abu Hashim had. The following example represents a different side of the 
business: 
The customer arrived and asked for an ‘awāma (a sort of plastic shutoff valve for 
water tanks). The Egyptian assistant ran inside to find the parts and put it together. 
The owner asked for five dinar and the man pleaded, “for your relative…” The 
owner muttered about it being difficult and the man accepted the ‘awāma and 
left—presumably with the intention of paying later. After he had left I asked, 
“where is he from?” The owner pointed across the street: the house with the green 
windows.” He then added, “he’s military so he gets paid at the end of the month.”  
 
Of course, most people’s need for credit was less urgent than that of the man with a broken water 
tank, but a steady stream of people had enough of a need to build that they found their way to 
such provincial suppliers. If they could pay in cash, the customers of such establishments would 
be in a better bargaining position and would likely go to buy their supplies in the nearest town 
from the main suppliers. But since they could not, they had to pay a premium to such local 
proprietors—who inevitably knew exactly how every customer fit into the local kinship 
structure, what their job was, whether they would pay back their debts, and when they would be 
able to pay them back. In this sense, the building supply store was primarily a money lending 
operation—although one that was fully in accordance with Islamic law since it was based on an 
exchange of material goods for money—not money for money.  
Enter “the Egyptians” 
 Obviously, the figure of Abu Hashim forces us to reconsider the idea of an individual 
owner-builder. At the time of my research, such building supply stores were virtually 
ubiquitous—and they all relied on the same business model centered on monetizing one’s 
kinship bonds and meticulously precise local knowledge by lending money in the manner with 
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which Jordanian Muslims were most comfortable. However, kinship remains integral to the 
construction of houses in a number of other highly significant ways. Despite most Jordanian men 
having some ability to use cash to hire transient migrant labor, the local construction industry in 
Jordan depends on the labor inputs of the entire family to provide proper food, supervision, and 
coordination. Furthermore, as construction shifts from the coarseness of gravel and steel to the 
softer and smoother surfaces of stucco, tile and paint, the labor becomes less anonymous and 
disposable and becomes increasingly based on the intimate ties of kinship. Yet even in the 
earliest phases when dealing with foreign guestworkers, there were attempts by all involved to 
take some of the anomic edge off of the relations—most notably through shared commensality.  
Figure 3: Workmen are laying the roof of the apartment. It would eventually consist of a 4x4 
meter kitchen (on the left) and a 4x4 meter room on the right with a 2x2 meter hallway and a 
2x2 meter bathroom. During the second phase, Harun’s family added three more rooms in front. 
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 The workers (hereafter referred to in the problematic, othering, local idiom of “the 
Egyptians”) showed up about forty-five minutes late at 7:45. Because it was summer and Harun, 
his sons, and the rest of the family had to take care of the morning’s harvest no matter what, I 
had been charged with being at the site to receive the workers with tea and provide anything else 
they might need. Immediately, the requests started flowing. They seemed to have shown up with 
no tools whatsoever with the exception of two devices for cutting and bending steel rods. They 
first asked for a hammer (which I went and found) but then clarified that what they really wanted 
was a sledgehammer (or perhaps shaqūsh meant sledgehammer in their dialect rather than 
generic hammer). They wanted to know where the “owner of the house” was and all I could say 
was that he was on his way. While I was looking for a sledgehammer and trying to make tea, 
they announced their displeasure with the nails. I went over and served them tea. One man was 
on the roof demolishing the cinderblocks that sat over the steel rebar of the columns from the 
first floor. Because they were building on the roof of a preexisting structure, there was no need 
for blueprints or consultations. The workers were simply extending the existing columns
40
. The 
other two were cutting the lengths of steel to form the columns. After drinking the tea and 
granting that I could (if nothing else) make a good cup of tea, they moved to the roof where they 
rigged up a table to bend the short lengths of steel into rectangles. They would take six long bars 
and twelve rectangles to make a column. After spacing the rectangles along the length of the six 
rods, they would use steel wire to attach four of the rods at the corners and the remaining two in 
the middle of the long sides. While the foreman worked on this task, his two assistants 
hammered boards together to make the molds for the concrete they would pour the next day.  
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 The only question of design that came up while working with the Egyptian crew was where to put the wall 
between the hallway and bathroom. Harun simply used his foot to draw a line in the debris on the ground and the 
block-layer’s assistant cleared a path for the wall.  
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 By this point, it was about thirty minutes into the process of building the house and, as I 
found, workmen would need at least this much attention for the remainder of the process. When 
they requested a broom, I once again ran next door to Harun’s brother. As I was on my way, a 
man began honking loudly because a truck was parked in the road. I said I did not know who 
owned the truck, so he kept honking until the owner emerged from Mahmud’s house. I went over 
to ask about the broom. This time, I was ordered to sit down and drink tea as they sent a son to 
deliver the broom. They asked, “how are the Egyptians with you?” I whined that they seemed to 
think I was a building supply store and recounted the whole list of things they had requested to 
Mahmud’s guest. Just then, Harun called to ask how many Egyptians there were so he could 
bring the right amount of breakfast. I said three and then told him about the problem with the 
nails. I explained that, from what I could tell, they had nails that were short and thin along with 
nails that were long and wide but that they wanted nails that were long and thin. Mahmud told 
me what such nails were called and added “just like Harun’s” at which point they started 
laughing hysterically at the idea of treating nails as a phallic symbol.  
 Harun showed up with a breakfast of bread, two kinds of beans (“Egyptians love beans,” 
he said) and tomatoes. He told me to make sure I did not feed them until 10:30 lest they want 
another meal. He presented me with the nails and left to take care of his other business. At 10:30, 
I presented the food and began to make tea. It was clear to Harun (without me having said a 
word) that everyone was annoyed. The Egyptians wanted a ten-year-old who would snap-to and 
run errands for them and bring a steady supply of tea. The problem was that I was actually older 
than them and therefore could not be bossed around the same way. Harun promised to send his 
ten-year-old son the next day to ease things along.  
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All of these requests for food, tea and tools were actually integral to the logic of 
immigration. They would stock up on caffeine and calories at the employer’s expense and then 
go back home in the evening to sleep—saving almost all of the money for their Jordanian work 
visas and their own marriages back home. After all, they had come all of this way for the 
opportunity to make JD 15 as laborers or perhaps JD 20 or JD 25 as a skilled ironworker 
(ḥadād), carpenter (najār), block-layer (tubanjī) or stucco-worker (kāsir). Mahmud and Harun 
understood this, but did not necessarily like it. Mahmud could both complain about the constant 
requests and hard-nosed negotiating stance and then say, “what can they do? They need a 
thousand dinar a year for the visa to work here so Harun here can draw a pension from the 
government and sit here laughing and smoking his water pipe.” However, they were less 
sanguine about the sudden insistence of the workmen a few hours later that they would need 
more cement. Harun exclaimed, “just because I wear a headscarf, they think I’m stupid.” He was 
convinced that they were inflating the amount of cement needed in an attempt to get work for 
one of their friends loading and unloading the extra materials. Nonetheless, in one day, they had 
erected eight columns and laid the mold for the staircase. They would begin pouring the cement 
the next afternoon.  
Ahmed showed up the next day with more workmen and a cement mixer, which they 
used to speed the process of pouring the pillars along. Two weeks later, they were back building 
a mold for the roof to be poured into, placing cement blocks into it, and fashioning the steel rebar 
or ‘aṣāb (nerves). With that, the roof or “back” (ẓuhur) of the house was complete. After the 
roof, we had cinderblocks delivered and the tubanjī set to work laying them along with his 
assistant. In three weeks, Ahmed and his workers had fashioned the steel rebar, poured the pillars 
and the roof, and built the walls: what my neighbors were often fond of referring to as the “bone” 
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(‘aẓim). Rather than continue with a step-by-step account of house building, I want to focus on 
the ways in which, as the project wore on and we began to work on the skin (jilda)
41
, the workers 
became more and more intimately related to the community. Increasingly, Harun did not solicit 
bids from strangers so much as he turned to people with whom he had extensive preexisting ties.  
Exteriorities 
 I could go on for pages about the extensive supervision, support and assistance which the 
various workers expected as they built the house. There is no way they could have worked so 
diligently and so continuously without the constant supply of water, caffeine, food, and tools—
not to mention the frequent need for Harun’s sons, nephews, and me to move multiple cubic 
meters of building materials (cement, tiles, sand, and cinderblocks) into place in preparation for 
the next phase of building. In between the various stages of the process, there was a need to 
water (asgī) the fresh green (akhḍar) cement to help cure it. There was nothing out of the 
ordinary about this either. If anything, it was strange that there was someone as shorn of kin 
bonds as myself caught up in such a project. Virtually everyone in the neighborhood helped at 
one point or other. Much as I have carried cinderblocks, made tea, supervised workers and 
watered cement for my Jordanian friends and neighbors, they proved even more generous when I 
attempted my own building project.  
 With the steel and concrete in place, the men of the village became more and more 
actively engaged in the construction of the house. Harun and Mahmud’s sons set to work doing 
the electrical and plumbing work. They worked with hammers and chisels carving out a path 
through the concrete cinderblocks for the wires and pipes. They had already run plastic tubing 
for the wires through the roof before pouring the cement so they just had to link up the holes they 
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 One extended family I was friends with took this metaphor to its logical conclusion and talked about “dressing” 
(lābisa) the house by adding a stone exterior.  
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had carved out for the electrical outlets with the ceiling while linking up the holes they had made 
for the plumbing fixtures with the floor. They would take a healthy swing at the cinderblock, 
causing the lining of one of the holes in the cinderblock to crumble as it gave way. Then, they 
would take the chisel and work their way through the solid concrete separating the holes that ran 
to the floor. However, the mere fact that one was male was not necessarily sufficient to embody 
this particular sort of masculinity. When I tried to help, I managed to scrape about half of my 
knuckles to the point of bleeding as the chisel gave way with unexpected force, sending my left 
hand careening into the rough ḥajar (concrete or “stone”). I managed to do the same to my right 
hand by misjudging the angle as I swung at the chisel. I also developed some nasty blisters on 
my palm and the inside of my thumb from the motion of the hammer, no doubt exacerbated by 
the fact that the handle was made out of steel. Attempting to keep up, I wrapped my hand in 
medical tape such that each blister was covered. Needless to say, my body was not accustomed 
to such work. As one of the Egyptian workers had exclaimed with wonder one day as they took 
turns feeling my hands, “they’re soft and fair like a woman’s.” Eventually, Mahmud’s son 
Muhammed (age eighteen) arrived. He was faster and better at it than the younger youths. He 
was also less shy about breaking through to the other side. He told me it was the kasīr’s (stucco 
worker’s) job to “clean up.” Once the wiring and plumbing was in place, they mixed up some 
cement on the floor and smeared it over the channels they had chiseled out, making sure 
everything was at least somewhat flush.  
As construction neared completion, the labor involved became less and less anomic and 
more and more driven by bonds of kinship and modes of affiliation based on long-term exchange 
relations. As Mahmud and his sons helped with the wiring and plumbing, Harun made 
arrangements with the kasīr: the person charged with adding the kasāra (the final layer of 
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concrete or stucco) to the exterior and interior of the house. Here, Harun had much more specific 
ideas about who he planned to hire. His village had been hiring people from a particular family 
in Syria to do their stucco for over a decade—largely because they were willing to do the work 
and then take payment in monthly installments. This would probably be one of the first jobs in 
the village for which they were paid in cash. Next, Harun’s friend ‘Abed did the tile (his brother 
Mahmud was very skilled with tile but Harun had already asked a lot of him and his sons) while 
Harun was able to get the windows from a business associate who ran a jama‘iyya (a kind of 
charitable society or NGO) which owned a window factory, a carpentry shop and a blacksmith’s 
shop.  
The Syrian stucco workers in particular related to the village in a manner that only a 
specific kind of long-term indebtedness can engender. Unlike the Egyptian team, which involved 
a shifting cast of characters who tended to be standoffish and quiet, the Syrian stucco workers 
more or less insisted that the family watch them work. When they finally arrived (a day late), 
they said they would only be working two hours that day—but would be looking forward to 
lunch, naturally. It was hard to argue so long as Harun’s brother and a number of his cousins still 
owed them for work they had long since completed. The assistant mixed the “mud” or ṭīn (which 
consisted of water, finely ground limestone—nā‘ima—and cement) and, occasionally, helped his 
uncle apply it to the walls. They watered the cement and set to work, covering a palate with the 
mud and flinging it at the wall with a trowel. Once they had covered the walls with patches of 
this mixture, they applied thicker swathes in bars on each wall so that, once it had dried, they 
could get an even coating. When the mud had been applied, they used marayna (thick beams) to 
level it. Through multiple coats and the use of increasingly fine sponges, the texture became 
smoother and smoother.  
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The addition of stucco represented the completion of the exterior of the exterior and the 
exterior of the interior. Harun here opted for the most utilitarian finish for his son’s future home 
despite the fact that some of his neighbors opted for paint (inside and/or outside) while others 
opted for a limestone “face” (wijih) for the house. Here, there was a clear status competition in 
which people were vying for superiority in a couple of different ways simultaneously. A house 
could be judged on the basis of the stone’s quality42. At the same time, there were people who 
only put stone on the front side of their house or on all of the sides except the back. Some people 
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 High quality limestone is harder and does not turn brownish grey over time like the cheaper, softer stone. 
Figure 4: Shared commensality. Food, water and tea were crucial to the process of construction. I 
once calculated that building a house in Jordan required 100 grams of sugar and 2.25 tea bags per 
square meter.   
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only put stone around their windows and on the corners. Within, Harun once again opted for the 
simple, durable and inexpensive materials favored by the rural Jordanian working class: concrete 
floor tiles, wooden internal doors, a steel exterior door, and aluminum windows. As Harun was 
fond of saying, “everyone cuts ḥalāwa [a sugary sesame paste] according to the size of his tooth” 
(others preferred to describe the calculus of investing in houses by saying “everyone extends 
their legs according to the size of their mattress”). The point was that, to some degree, houses 
seemed to provide almost endless opportunities for improvement so long as the money was there. 
While Harun’s preferred proverb subtly critiqued the overindulgence of some of his neighbors, 
others framed things in a language of compromise and making do with less. Among the wealthy, 
houses are increasingly embellished with elaborate plaster (jibsīn) designs, wallpaper, curtains, 
carpets, and overstuffed couches—especially in guest rooms.  
These forms of surfacing, smoothing and softening constitute the interior exteriors, which 
form the backdrop to so much of the stagecraft of hospitality in Jordan. While such stagecraft is 
clearly discernible in migrant flophouses, construction sites, and building supply stores, it finds 
its fullest expression in the houses that these other sites seek to actualize. As Andrew Shryock 
and Sally Howell have argued, contemporary hospitality and “house politics” are “a mode of 
domination in which families… serve as instruments and objects of power” (2001: 248). This is a 
distinctly masculine form of power that relies on the invisible but essential work of females and 
subordinate males to properly execute the performance. It involves the creation of “tactical 
facades” for “projecting, in a very private place, a very public reputation” (Shryock and Howell 
2001:255). However, this is a notion of public and private which has far more in common with 
the notion of public and private which I have used Bakhtin to epitomize than it does with the 
notion of public and private that will be in evidence in the next chapter. In chapter two, attention 
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will turn away from the activities of households and towards the activities of technocrats 
working for a broad range of development organizations including the UN, World Bank, and the 
HUDC.  
In the latter half of the chapter, the focus has been almost exclusively on the relationship 
between gender and the emergent opposition between public and private as it relates to labor and 
the gendered space of both the home and the home in relationship to exterior male work spaces 
which have grown more important as market relations have become more important. In the 
meantime, property relations have fallen into the background. Yet they have not been forgotten. 
Their erasure is more a reflection of the ethnographic context I have been describing: in rural 
Jordan, residents generally had strong claims to property, which were couched in a language of 
indigeneity. Such claims were legitimated by a nationalistic discourse which often portrayed 
those who hailed from Palestine as less deserving of the rights of citizenship (property, access to 
government jobs, and the ability to organize politically without the fear of persecution) than their 
compatriots from the east bank
43
. Sure, it took Harun months after finishing construction to get a 
building permit
44
, but no one ever had to seriously consider the possibility that they might be 
dispossessed. Not all people were or are so lucky. For many Jordanians (especially those of 
Palestinian descent), property relations continue to be a constant source of sorrow (due to the 
memory of past dispossession) and anxiety (due to the fear of future dispossession). More 
importantly, housing for those who do not build on inherited land is fundamentally different 
from what I have been describing. While it is a real stretch for most Jordanians to assemble the 
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 Shryock (1997b) and Massad (2001) offer the fullest monograph-length accounts of the relationship and tensions 
between east bankers and west bankers from the perspectives of the former and latter respectively.  
44
 We finally succeeded in obtaining the permit in November despite the fact that Harun has been cultivating the 
surveyor for years with food, free tanks of water and small “loans” of a few JD. Harun finally got the house 
registered by showing up at the surveyor’s office at the municipality building and insisting that he get in Harun’s 
truck and go to the governor’s office to sign off on the paperwork. This is apparently typical since my more 
subversively-minded friends at the HUDC (upon learning about my exploits in construction) responded, “sure you 
managed to build a house last year, but did you manage to get the building permit yet?” 
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money to build a house, those who lack land are even more dependent for housing on the help of 
outside institutions like banks, the HUDC and, increasingly, large rental companies.  
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Chapter 2: The Housing Market 
The 1970s and 1980s constituted a crucial time period for the future of housing in Jordan 
during which large swaths of tribally controlled land were transformed into partible commodities 
which could be bought, sold, and circulated due to a sophisticated regime of registration, zoning 
and infrastructure provision. This process of commoditization is at the heart of this chapter. 
Adopting a sort of “methodological fetishism” (Appadurai 1991), I will show how this particular 
regime of value came into being by focusing on an international group of planners
45
 who sought 
to fix what they perceived as Jordan’s housing problem. To do this, I will be drawing on 
Appadurai and Kopytoff’s dialectic of singularization and commoditization because I find it 
deeply consonant with what these planners were attempting. After reviewing some of the 
literature to clarify how these organizations operate and how I became involved with them and 
their reports, I will explain how the interaction between their policies and the political tensions 
between Palestinian refugees and the residents of the east bank were crucial in catalyzing a shift 
in the dominant regime of value in relationship to land, building materials and, ultimately, 
housing.  
In Search of the Individual Owner-Builder 
Needless to say, the Jordan of the reports would be almost unrecognizable to most 
Jordanians. As Michael Goldman (2005) makes clear in his ethnography of the World Bank, 
Imperial Nature, knowledge production at the organization is largely beholden to the
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 These planners moved between private consultancies, various ministries, the Housing Corporation, the Amman 
Municipality, the Housing Bank, USAID and the World Bank. 
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requirements of providing global financial markets with guaranteed high-yield credit-based 
investments. The bank has neither the time nor the resources to focus on anything other than 
generating returns for its investors in the most efficient way possible. Thus major divergences 
between bank reports and anything which local people might identify as “reality” should not be 
at all surprising. For example, where the oral historical register in Jordan at the time of research 
was largely dominated by this narrative of tensions between Palestinian refugees and their 
Jordanian hosts, the country’s two World Bank-financed National Housing Strategies (from 1987 
and 1996 respectively) went out of their way to avoid wading into the controversy
46
--all while 
making proposals which would ultimately transform the relationship between the two groups. In 
the discussion that follows, I will be relying heavily on Goldman’s account along with James 
Ferguson’s widely respected study of World Bank development discourse in Lesotho in the 
1980s, The Anti-Politics Machine. Of course, there is no particular reason
47
 why events in the 
1970s and 1980s in Lesotho (or southeast Asia) should have any particular bearing on events in 
Jordan. The countries are vastly different and separated by thousands of miles—not that this 
would be particularly apparent from the reports, which essentially seem to have employed the 
same framework no matter where they were applied.  
The Shelter Unit 
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 The official position of the Executive Summary of the National Housing Policy on the Palestinian Question 
deserves to be quoted at length: “Whether or not there is a resolution of the political question, refugee camps in 
urban areas at least, are clearly becoming permanent features of the housing stock. Government should therefore 
consider policies for upgrading refugee camps with the view that they will continue to function as permanent urban 
areas even if a large number of their present inhabitants were to leave” (Shelter Unit 1987: 32). What I find 
revealing here is the tenacity with which the Shelter Unit attempts to shield property relations from the contagion of 
‘political questions.’ 
47
 The one notable and important exception is the proximity to a white settler colony. Yet this fact is studiously 
ignored by the Bank’s discourse on both Jordan and Lesotho—despite its outsized impact on everything under 
discussion. As Ferguson argues, it would be silly to give an ecological account of why the Bronx is poor in 
relationship to Manhattan. Yet ecological accounts abound when discussing Jordan or Lesotho. The fact that the 
residents have been pushed off of the more desirable land is treated as incidental.  
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As Goldman and Ferguson argue, it is really beside the point that these reports inevitably 
turn out to be internally inconsistent and factually inaccurate. Ferguson writes, “the statistics are 
wrong, but always wrong in the same way; the conceptions are fanciful, but it is always the same 
fantasy” (1994: 55). Yet at times, little bits of interesting and insightful work are simply included 
along with the more steady stream of the conventional wisdom of development discourse of the 
1980s. Most notably, the report itself (once one dives into the minutia) draws on some really 
perceptive work by indigenous planners working in the Housing Corporation, Ministry of 
Planning, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, and Urban Development Department, who 
had already realized the need to model house construction as the work of households long before 
the invention of the fantasy of the “individual owner-builder” (See Image 5). In fact, one could 
even argue that Jordanian planners were performing crucial interpretive labor as they assisted 
consultants and World Bank officials in facilitating the conceptual slippage between the 
patriarchal household and the idealized “individual owner-builder.” 
Ferguson focuses on the ways in which World Bank reports, as the gold standard of 
“development” discourse, inevitably seek to depoliticize problems by reframing them as 
technical challenges, which can be met through particular “projects” which consist of supposedly 
technical solutions: “roads, markets, and credit” (Ferguson 1994:71). The myopic focus on these 
things helps to stifle discussion about the role of labor, property, and space in promoting and 
sustaining the existing formations of political power by shunting many of the most contentious 
questions about them into the “private” realm of the household and, oddly enough, the market as 
well. Particularly, by pretending that property relationships are a concern of the household and 
the market and outside of the government’s “public” purview (something any Palestinian or Iraqi 
refugee would have some opinions about), these organizations can help rule out certain kinds of 
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political contestation by stipulating submission to putatively apolitical “market” forces, which 
are in fact nothing of the sort.  
 
When I arrived at the Housing Corporation in 2010, I had initially intended to study a 
royal initiative called “Decent Housing for Decent Living” which sought to build 100,000 
Figure 5: Jordanian planners modeling household capacity to build housing. Jordanian 
planners at the UDD perceptively modeled household capacity to build housing in Volume 
7 of the report, entitled, “Existing Housing Situation in Jordan”—only to have it buried far 
from the Executive Summary (where someone might actually read it).  
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housing units in five years. When I returned with grant money in 2011 hoping to continue my 
study of this project (which seemed to be primarily designed to convince Jordanians to take out 
bank loans to buy houses) I found that the project had been cancelled. Of the first 8,000 units, 
they had only sold about 2,500. Luckily, I resisted the urge to panic and continued to spend time 
at the HUDC, arranging meetings and talking to people about what they were doing. Around this 
time, through conversations with people in the policy department, I learned that the HUDC 
maintained a library under the tutelage of Abu ‘Ali, a man who would turn out to be a most 
gracious host. Here, I found shelf after shelf of English-language reports waiting for me
48
, which 
had been prepared by numerous different groups of government planners in conjunction with the 
World Bank and the United Nations. For the employees, these were artifacts from the golden age 
of the HUDC when, flush with money from the World Bank, they exerted a powerful influence 
over Jordanian society. The reports in question attempted to document the struggles over housing 
policy of the 1970s and 1980s in minute detail.  
These reports may claim to comment upon the struggles of the 70s and 80s, but the 
important thing is that they can be clearly studied as indexical traces of those conflicts. It is 
absolutely essential to emphasize what Ferguson calls “the complex relationship between the 
intentionality of planning and the strategic intelligibility of outcomes.” Ferguson continues, 
“outcomes that at first appear as mere ‘side effects’ of an unsuccessful attempt to engineer an 
economic transformation become legible in another perspective as unintended yet instrumental 
elements in a resultant constellation that has the effect of expanding the exercise of a particular 
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 I could never get over the fact that the reports were produced on 8.5” by 11” paper and not A4. Were they 
produced and shipped all the way from America? Or did they have to find a printer in the eastern hemisphere with 
American paper? As for the fact that they were written in English, it is important to remember that most people at 
the HUDC only spoke Arabic and did not really need any English for their job since a couple of key English-
speaking department heads in the office were sufficient for the corporation’s operations to run smoothly. In fact, 
when I had finished with the 24-volume National Housing Strategy from 1987, some of them asked to see my notes 
since they obviously did not have time to read such a long document in a foreign language. 
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sort of state power while simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticizing effect” (1994: 20-
21). A particular ad hoc workgroup of planners known as “the Shelter Unit,” in their search for a 
“Hedonic Index” which would quantify the value of every constituent part of the home, created 
the powerful (if largely fictitious) figure of the “individual owner builder” who later became the 
imagined beneficiary of a generation of housing policy. The World Bank-sponsored Shelter Unit 
is nonetheless merely one constituent of a more diverse set of actors who have worked together 
to help land and building materials achieve the “commodity candidacy” (Appadurai 1991: 15) 
which continues to elude the homes of so many Jordanians.  
Technologies of Speech  
 In the mid 1980s, the Shelter Unit, one of many ad hoc groups of international 
consultants that helped set housing policy during that time period in Jordan, was tasked with 
writing Jordan’s first National Housing Strategy. Despite the seeming importance of the title, it is 
hard to say how much of an effect it had. The report advocated the same things that English-
language reports stored at the HUDC have been advocating for decades. Fitting in with the 
Reagan-Thatcher era, the report discouraged housing projects in favor of more laissez-faire 
policies. The report was especially fixated on issues like ending rent controls, simplifying 
building codes, encouraging more high-density construction, providing infrastructure, and 
making it easier to get formal credit. On the one hand, the people I interviewed at the HUDC 
clearly continue to be flummoxed by these issues: the municipalities refused to subdivide plots, 
people did not want formal credit, and red tape remained. On the other hand, it is hard to know 
how much more the housing situation would have been dictated by these sorts of forces if it were 
not for the persistent orientation towards a specific agenda—which the very compilation of 
report after report helped engender. In either case, the report fits in with the shift away from 
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large-scale public housing projects
49
 of the 1970s, which would continue until the royal “Decent 
Housing” initiative in 2008. What made this particular report notable was that it involved a 
household survey, which helped formulate the concept of the “Individual Owner-Builder” as the 
imagined beneficiary of Jordanian housing policy and a rationale for focusing the Jordanian 
government’s limited resources on engineering a housing market instead of actual housing. As 
the previous sections on homebuilding imply, this was a strange feat, which required that the 
household be collapsed into the figure of an individual and that the web of reciprocal exchange 
relationships between households be ignored. At the same time, the house and its constituent 
parts would be made commensurable and interchangeable through their inclusion in an 
overarching regime of value for commoditized things.  
To understand the emergence of the Individual Owner-Builder, it is useful to follow Matt 
Hull in studying not only development discourse’s “division of the world” or “denotational 
content” but also its various “speech genres,” like the survey (2010:258). The very method of 
interpellation of the household survey helped over-determine the result: an image of a self-
sufficient rational individual actor. As Hull points out, the roles of interviewer and interviewee 
are social roles which must be taught and depend on a whole elaborate series of assumptions. In 
“Democratic Technologies of Speech,” Hull provides an analysis of a specific survey conducted 
by the Ford Foundation in India which is highly suggestive and can easily be read into the 
planning and implementation of the Shelter Unit’s Private Housing Supplier’s Survey as well as 
a lively genre of stories about how “backwards” (mutakhilif) people respond to such surveys. 
There was a tendency to view the survey as a variation on a “school exam.” People resisted or 
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 The exemplar of this era is the thriving Middle Class suburb in West Amman known as Abu Nusair which is now 
home to 70,000 people. When I visited, residents claimed their community was very desirable with high property 
values and very few vacancies. They cited the great infrastructure (buna’ taḥtiyya) and services (khidimāt) like 24-
hour street cleaning as particular enticements.  
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simply could not comprehend the attempts of interviewers to access their innermost thoughts. 
Most notably, there was obviously a belief on the part of some respondents that their responses 
would, in fact, “lead to actions of the researcher’s institution directed specifically toward the 
respondent” (Hull 2010: 268).  
My interest in this particular survey began quite innocently with an off-handed comment 
to Harun and his brothers. Harun asked me about my day and so I began to tell him about the 
documents I was reading at the HUDC. I started talking about some suspicious figures I had been 
looking at in Volume 13 (“Housing and Residential Land Affordability”). Reflecting on all of the 
inter-household and intra-household provision of assistance during the various local building 
projects I had witnessed, I asked Harun if it seemed credible to them that only between 5 and 15 
percent of builders in rural areas received assistance from their relatives during the eighties. 
They recounted their own participation in the construction of various houses in the area that were 
built during that time period and estimated that, perhaps, all but five or ten percent of people in 
rural areas relied on their relatives for assistance. Then Harun continued, “Oh those surveys and 
reports are all lies! They bring the nice girls from the university here. Then they go and talk to 
the old woman (khitiyāra) and she thinks that the state (al-dawla) wants to help her and she says 
she’s poor and needy (miskīn) and no one will help her. But it’s all lies. She thinks the state 
wants to buy her a house.” Surprised by Harun’s statement, I recounted a conversation I had had 
the previous year with an employee at the Department of Statistics who proudly told me that 
their interviewers were all women because women did not lie to each other. Everyone laughed 
and Harun countered, “they use them because they’re girls so they don’t have to pay them a real 
salary. He’s messing with you. Don’t pay any attention to him.” Harun’s analysis highlighted the 
fact that interviewees could often fail to grasp the generic conventions of the survey (for 
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instance, misconstruing a request for information as an offer of assistance), but as I delved 
deeper into the documentation surrounding the survey, it became clear to me that the specific 
problem that Harun described was actually by far the largest preoccupation of the planners. 
There was in fact extensive discussion throughout the report of households’ tendency to 
underreport income with the belief that this would lead to government assistance and all of the 
strategies planners devised to overcome this tendency. 
However, a different kind of misunderstanding seemed to be in play as well: while the 
Shelter Unit conducted what was, at heart, a household survey, they then proceeded to interpret 
the responses as if they offered insights into thoughts and experiences which were “radically 
individual and even interior” (Hull 2010: 268). The confusion was partially derived from their 
attempts to answer a specific set of questions about “the housing market” as cheaply and easily 
as possible. As such, the sample frame, personnel, and many of the questions were naturally 
borrowed from the Department of Statistics’ household survey initiatives. The survey begins by 
requesting basic demographic information about the various members of the household before 
turning to a detailed series of questions about the house itself. Imperceptibly, around the 
twentieth question about the house, the interview script slips into the second person:  
215- Have any improvements to the following been made since 1980? 
216- What following improvements does the housing unit require? 
217- Which of the Following appliances do you have? 
218- Is it possible to reach the following by foot within 15 minutes from your house? 
219- Are you satisfied with your house? (All emphasis added, Shelter Unit 1987: Vol. 18, 
53-54) 
 
Since the only copy of the survey I have found is in English, I have no way of knowing whether 
the “you” is singular or plural—much less what the people conducting the survey would have 
actually asked respondents in Arabic or how respondents would have interpreted the pronoun (if 
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at all). Of course, in the context of centuries of various states and empires encouraging families 
to choose a single older male as their collective representative (See Part 2 “The Proposal”), it 
probably makes little difference.  
So even if interviewees were eager to provide comprehensive, correct information, it 
would be hard to know how to respond to questions like ‘what were the sources of financing?’ or 
‘did any family member help in the construction?’ When one is already speaking on behalf of 
one’s family, what would it mean to ask if a ‘family member’ assisted? Would these be family 
members outside of the household or outside of the community from which the interviewee was 
drawn? In either case, only 279 of the 2246 respondents reported receiving assistance from 
relatives with the building process. But, ultimately, it just did not matter from the planner’s 
perspective. Even this direct participation of other people can be subsumed within their model of 
the individual owner-builder. If one looks beyond the Executive Summary of the report, a careful 
reading of the Housing Suppliers Survey (Volume 9 of the report) reveals that, according to the 
report’s actual (if incredibly difficult to locate) definition of the individual owner-builder, “he 
may even contribute his own labor or skills or those of his family or relatives” (Shelter Unit 
1987: Vol. 9, 5). No matter what the case, within the World Bank’s ontology, there were 
markets, market actors, and the commodities that circulated between the market actors in the 
markets. The rest was extraneous data and, of course, since the World Bank could afford to 
finance the research, they exerted a lot of influence over the research agenda. Within this agenda, 
the “Individual Owner-Builder” was merely a placeholder for the abstracted market actor, 
anyway.  
The Hedonic Index 
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 The erasure of the household as a living, hybrid assemblage of people, labor, property 
relations and space and its substitution with the abstracted individual owner-builder is in keeping 
with “the conceptual polarity of individualized persons and commoditized things” (Appadurai 
1991: 64). In Appadurai and Kopytoff’s processual framework of commoditization and 
singularization, anything can achieve ‘commodity candidacy.’ The issue is what objects take on 
these characteristics, under what circumstances and for how long. The oral historical register in 
Jordan is replete with stories that describe the odd ‘paths and divergences’ through which various 
things (particularly land) became commodities long before the ‘era of government’ in the 1920s 
and the later initiatives of development organizations. I will return to this theme in the following 
section, but for now, one example will suffice:  
Harun: Muath’s grandfather Ahmed had a racing horse he would take to weddings and 
circumcisions back in the days when they had games and races. It was a beautiful horse 
and he would always win. Suleiman’s uncle Saleem asked to buy the horse but Ahmed 
was clever. He said he wouldn’t think of selling it. He said, “this is a racing horse” and 
“look how beautiful it is.” Then Saleem’s brother started talking to Ahmed about buying 
it. Ahmed was clever though. He knew it was really the brother asking. So he kept saying 
he wouldn’t sell it. Finally, Ahmed sold the horse to the man for 32 dunnum of land 
(32,000 square meters). That’s all the land west of the village! The horse died in the snow 
that winter but in the end, Ahmed had to sell it all because of girls.” 
 
Confused, I said, “what?” 
 
Harun: “Well, in those days, if you didn’t have any money, you could give land as mahr 
(bridewealth). So he had a lot of sons and nephews and every time he wanted to marry 
one, he would give away some of his land to her father until he had almost none left.” 
 
 
The story was meant as an object lesson in shifting regimes of value and, of course, as a none-
too-subtle way of impugning the neighbors. The story is part of a moralizing genre of oral 
history that recounts how land, which would now be incredibly valuable, was appropriated via 
cunning rather than right—only to be lost before the trickster figure could derive any real benefit. 
While Harun intended to highlight the naïveté and cupidity of his neighbors, it also reveals that 
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we are not dealing with some pre-commodity age of innocence. Land could be bartered with 
none of the sentimentality of romanticized ideas of gift exchange. People were perfectly ready to 
use every bit of cunning to swindle their neighbors—even if they never got the opportunity to 
become millionaires thanks to the turn of the twenty-first century surge in land values.  
 Yet as the story makes clear, land was not the same kind of commodity that it is now. 
Here, the line between singular people and commoditized things is blurred. Land and livestock 
(much like people) are viewed as a bundle of overlapping rights and responsibilities (cf. 
Strathern 1985; Weiner 1992). This is all the more true when discussing other people’s familial 
relations. Ownership is perhaps an anachronistic concept here. One does not have recourse to the 
state to challenge other claims. One merely has the opportunity to defend various rights against 
other takers. Ahmed (like so many others in these stories) is able to seize property. 
Unfortunately, just as he takes it, it slips through his fingers as his various family members make 
all manner of claims on it. In contrast, a Hedonic Index is an exercise in market research, which 
seeks to understand individuals (who independently control things) in relationship to those things 
via a precise numerical scale of value. It would be easy to dismiss the exercise as rather pointless 
(people could relate a horse to land or whatever in precisely those numerical terms decades 
before the World Bank showed up). However, the index is almost a distraction: even the Shelter 
Unit did not really believe the results. It was the far broader conceptual work of singularization 
and commoditization that was truly transformative.  
 During the latter part of the twentieth century, the World Bank, the United Nations, 
USAID, and the Jordanian government all worked to house a rapidly sedentarizing Bedouin 
population and a large population of displaced Palestinians. They formulated the problem as one 
of creating an efficient housing market, which would provide the credit necessary to meet 
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demand. Yet land and (by extension) anything on it were anything but the freely circulating 
commodities that the Bank assumed they were dealing with. Likewise, people were not the fixed, 
autonomous and grounded (that is singular) “Individual Owner-Builders” that the Bank assumed 
they were dealing with either. As long as property rights were in question, people would be 
forced to see property through the lens of communal defense. Reflecting this sensibility that 
wealth is worthless without people to defend it, I was taught the proverb, “the proliferation of 
men is better than the proliferation of wealth.” With many people loathe to move away from 
their families or use land as collateral (not just for religious reasons but also due to familial 
disapprobation), the dream of an efficient, frictionless housing market was a fantasy. As we will 
see, the Shelter Unit and its backers found themselves dealing with the fact that large amounts of 
marginal agricultural communal (mushā‘) land claimed by a large tribe known has the Bani 
Hasan were sitting next to rapidly growing refugee camps. An organization that asks squatters 
and people who see themselves as inhabiting ancestral lands how much their house is worth may 
at first appear to be getting ahead of itself. Nonetheless, the Shelter Unit and its backers still 
exerted an outsized effect on a key aspect of Jordanian-Palestinian relations by getting deeply 
involved in the registration of land. In fact, they seem to have tacitly participated in the 
legitimation of the refugees’ efforts to permanently settle in Jordan—all while generating profits 
for global financial markets.  
Construction as Seizure 
 For centuries, construction (the material transformation of the landscape) has been one of 
the primary means by which people in the Middle East construe and establish property claims. 
Until now, the account has been anchored west of Amman in the transition zone between the 
Jordan valley and the semi-arid steppe. As attention moves further east towards the Amman-
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Zarqa corridor, there emerges a giant, unplanned, and at times downright illegal construction 
project involving the successive waves of refugees who have sought shelter and legal recognition 
in Jordan. Amman rises from the fossilized coral (limestone) bedrock as it is ground up into 
concrete, pressed into cinderblocks and marketed to families who dream of stable sanctuaries 
where they may safely dwell and prosper. As fathers seek to help build homes for their sons and 
grandsons, the network of concrete structures becomes denser and more interconnected: male 
kinship relations and community are materially instantiated in the built environment as each 
successive generation builds homes for the next generation around the existing structures. Yet 
the assemblage remains partial, incomplete, and vulnerable to seizure. Unfinished structures litter 
the landscape: aspirational concrete pillars jut out from people's roofs. Locals frustrate wealthy 
interlopers by making off with the plumbing in the night. Construction is important, but it must 
be defended, lest other imagined futures begin to manifest themselves. In this section, I hope to 
use a combination of oral historical and archival data to illustrate how the HUDC and their 
collaborators at the UN Shelter Unit and World Bank have gone about facilitating and shaping 
all of this construction in subtle and unexpected ways. However, by and large, their focus has 
actually been relatively singular: the creation of a housing market.  
“Land Was Free” 
 As I have argued, there could not be a proper housing market until land had become a 
different kind of commodity—specifically one which could be defended as property by an 
individual with access to the repressive apparatus of the state. In other words, it had to become 
private property. In the following section, I will interweave my own oral historical data with that 
of Omar Razzaz, whose PhD dissertation Law, Urban Tenure and Property Disputes in 
Contested Settlements: The Case of Jordan (1991) I take to be the definitive contemporaneous 
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account of events. Razzaz would later go on to teach at MIT and run the World Bank’s Lebanon 
office. At the time of research, he was charged with formulating Jordan’s national employment 
strategy. His account will help illustrate how this novel idea of public and private was imposed 
on Jordanian conceptions of land. This transformation of land into private property has at least 
temporarily caused cash to loom in importance while the role of communal defense in securing 
housing has diminished. If cash continues to be the final arbiter of what kind of housing the 
younger generation can obtain, then they will likely continue to consider favorably the 
transformations in the gendering of labor, property, and space described in chapter one. Yet the 
status of land and the nature of property as private prerogative or object of communal defense 
remains open to contestation. 
The fiercest contestation over land in the western part of Jordan near the valley (where I 
was based during fieldwork) happened in the 1930s when the British performed a cadastral 
survey and registered agricultural lands. While both Ottoman law and local practice conferred 
property rights conditional on continued use and improvement of the land, the land near the 
valley received enough rainfall to ensure that someone would be regularly availing themselves of 
the land. This, of course, was and is more and more difficult the further east one goes. Traveling 
east on the road to Zarqa, the landscape shifts from green to brown. In Zarqa, it was not even 
possible to farm the land for three consecutive years: the minimum required to register land 
under the musha’ system (often understood as communal property), which outlived the Ottoman 
and British empires and passed, largely unremarked upon, into Jordanian property law. With the 
post-independence explosion in the size of the state’s bureaucracy (especially in the capital of 
Amman), the construction of a large military installation in neighboring Zarqa and, of course, the 
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influx of wave after wave of refugees, this land went from wasteland to some of the most 
valuable real estate in the Middle East in a matter of decades. 
For the time being, there is a pattern in Jordan that involves men hailing from the East 
Bank (especially in rural areas) who have been absorbed into the security services where they 
continue to act out a sort of defensive role but now serve new masters (the state rather than their 
family). In return, they have been able to shore up their individualistic control of property 
through both the system of private property ownership and their differential access to cash (due 
to their government jobs). As this rural Jordanian middle class of government employees has 
emerged and more traditional forms of female labor in agriculture and animal husbandry have 
increasingly been taken up by foreign migrants, more and more women have become 
increasingly confined to the home as the older rationales for their movement throughout the 
community disappeared. Meanwhile, communities of various refugee groups have tended to 
cluster in urban areas while men travel to the gulf and send back remittances or, increasingly, 
administer the use of gulf capital within Jordan itself. This shift can be summed up in the 
widespread notion in rural Jordan that a Bedouin is a man who lives in a house with no door and 
that, by such a measure, there are very few Bedouin left. Men “these days” can be seen as, 
“barnyard hens… well fed, but domesticated and ripe for the slaughter” (Shryock 1997a: 45).  
 Key to this dynamic is the notion of seizure. In the moralizing genre of stories about land, 
there was always an incredibly heavy taint of illegitimacy. This is to be expected since shifts in 
property relations tended to track closely with social upheaval. New interlopers were disruptive. 
Such disruptions were inevitably reconceptualized later in terms of the emergent Jordanian state 
in relationship to its geopolitical allies and competitors. The stories I recorded had a geographic 
as well as a moral logic. From the east came raiders and extortionists: this was a reference to the 
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fact that, during the 1930s, certain Saudi tribes would decimate the herds of southern Jordanian 
Bedouins and then take cover underneath the British defensive umbrella
50
. From the west came 
swindlers and loansharks: useful villains for a nationalist rhetoric that claims “Jordan for 
Jordanians” to the exclusion of Palestinian refugees. This example from the moralizing genre of 
oral historical accounts of land sales is typical:  
Mahmud: I remember stories from those days in the past but not clearly. It’s like a dream 
to me. I grew up hearing about these things in the 1970s. So people would come from 
Palestine and people would buy all sorts of stuff with land. Dates, olive oil, ḥalāwa [a 
sugary sesame paste], finely embroidered underwear… 
 
I cannot reproduce the uproar that followed, but it was clear to me that one of my neighbors’ 
ancestors had actually traded land for underwear—despite the fact that it seemed like the height 
of folly in retrospect. Mahmud continued, somewhat more seriously now: 
Mahmud: Land back in those days was basically free (balāsh) and the people were 
hungry. People would die from hunger. So these traders would come from Palestine with 
dates, olive oil, preserves and ḥalāwa [a sugary sesame paste]. Imagine if you were dying 
of hunger and someone brought you a tank full of ḥalāwa. You’d be beside yourself 
(imkayif), right? The [neighboring tribe] sold so much of their land for ḥalāwa. 
 
Once again, in keeping with the moralizing genre, it is always about other people and the 
narrative is driven by a combination of licentiousness, venality and cunning on all sides.  
 The imputation of great cunning on the part of the Palestinian merchants is consonant 
with a tendency within Jordanian nativism to see rural east bankers as hospitable and naïve in 
relationship to the depredations of interloping Palestinian city-folk (Shryock 1997a; 1997b). Yet 
I remained skeptical. I tried to imagine things from the perspective of the traveling merchant. 
Operating somewhat beyond the reach of the state, in possession of luxury goods, what exactly 
were his options when the locals wanted things? But from the perspective of the rural east 
bankers: 
                                                 
50
 Alon (2007) weaves together oral and textual evidence to provide a thorough account of the conflicts that defined 
the relations between Jordanian and Saudi tribes during the British Mandate.  
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Harun: You see, these traders were like [a particular figure that neither man had much 
respect for who was once the mukhtār (village head) and also the murābih 
(moneylender)]. See, he had a store and he would lend money and not harvest the debt 
(yidayin wa ma yaḥsid). Then he would wait for a bad year and ask for the money. They 
wouldn’t have anything to give him but their land. Isn’t that ḥarām? But there was a 
Palestinian who did this even more. His name was [so-and-so] Al-Nablusi. He would let 
the [neighboring tribe] buy on credit and then suddenly he would ask for his money and 
take the land as payment. Isn’t that ḥarām? He ended up with 400 dunnum among the 
[neighboring tribe]! He had three sons and they divided it between them. One of them 
was a drunk in Madaba who sold all of his but the other two still have all of their shares.  
 
Based on generic conventions, it is certainly only a matter of time until some misfortune befalls 
the other two or, at the very least, some more of their descendants. But of course, Al-Nablusi and 
the village head (along with their descendants) would probably have to rank as some of the 
luckier traders in history. If they had taken possession of such lands at any other time, it would 
have been the best solution to their disagreements with their customers, but they would not have 
reaped such outsized rewards. They would have either been absorbed into the community as the 
land was re-divided to cover all manner of social obligations or they would have simply been 
pushed off by someone more aggressive with more local support.  
The Proliferation of Men 
 Land is not necessarily valuable. What is the use of having dry, unpopulated space with 
no electricity, roads or sewerage? There is a popular origin myth about the Bani Hassan (who 
will figure prominently in the following account) which tells that the people were hungry and 
thirsty and begged a man from the Bani Hassan to help them find water for their crops. He told 
them that he would find them water: his cow would walk until it found the nearest well. But in 
return, he would get all of the land between the spot on which he stood and that well. That, I 
have been told, is how the Bani Hassan came to own the most land in Jordan: the most land, 
perhaps, but also the most of the most useless land. So imagine their delight when a city 
suddenly began to spring up around them after the waves of Palestinian refugees arrived and then 
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consider the sense of deep betrayal they must have experienced when the government not only 
tried to stop them from selling their lands to the settlers, but actually challenged their ownership 
claims. This struggle is at the heart of Razzaz’s account, along with his insight that it was in fact 
the very undesirability of this land that made it so cheap and hence attractive for those aspiring to 
join the middle class (See Image 6). As far as legally available residential property at the time 
went, 90% of it was zoned for large upper income plots (Razzaz 1994: 16). Many of these plots 
could not be legally subdivided any smaller than 1000 square meters. Meanwhile, the 
government had built Yajouz Road to connect up the two cities of Amman and Zarqa, providing 
a transportation hookup to a large swath of arid steppe with questionable ownership status. This 
helped underwrite the massive expansion of the Jordanian middle class and a particular 
gendering of labor, property, and space. Yet ironically, as the land was connected to 
infrastructure, zoned and registered, it became the kind of commodity that could be traded by 
global financial institutions and, as a result, increasingly valued by those institutions at levels far 
beyond the reach of a typical soldier, bureaucrat, or labor migrant.  
 Razzaz, my oral historical data, the records at the HUDC and my conversations with 
employees of the HUDC all agree that people began to build houses along Yajouz road sometime 
in the 1970s. The materials could be moved into place by vehicle, people could bring in 
generators for electricity, and there was already a network of water trucks because the water grid 
was less than ideal anyway. Sewerage could be handled with septic tanks. Members of the Bani 
Hassan enthusiastically sold plots to all takers using a sale contract (ḥujja) without the 
government title (sanad), which has been required since the Ottoman tanzimat reforms. The 
Jordanian government objected vociferously to such sales, but the Bani Hassan were 
unrepentant. They watched as tribesmen in the west made millions selling land that was 
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registered, zoned, and provisioned with water and electricity. Razzaz records one man who 
reasoned, “Islam tells us… if an unjust father treats his sons differently, feeding one and starving 
the other, the hungry son is permitted to seize his share, even if he has to steal it from his unjust 
father to survive. This is all we are doing” (1994:18). When the government tried to demolish the 
houses of the Bani Hassan in 1983, they took up arms, shot at the security services and burned 
military vehicles. When tribesmen were rounded up, their families rioted outside the jail. Various 
attempts at reconciliation followed and building and demolition continued, but with a new rule: 
if the roof was finished, the house was to be left intact.  
By 1985, the area was in the midst of a building boom. People would wait until Thursday 
afternoon when the police went home for the weekend. If they could finish the roof before the 
police returned, the authorities would allow the structure to stand. Razzaz reports that people 
clustered together, often based on kin ties or common place of origin. He gives the example of a 
“Hebron” community51 which would take up a collection to bring in more gravel for their road 
every year and, of course, Razzaz emphasizes the sense of security which living together 
engendered. There was also a major emphasis on the host/guest relationship. The “hosts” from 
the Bani Hassan made promises to continue to help the buyers defend their rights long after the 
sale had been made, although this was no substitute for the certainty which came with official 
registration and title deed (sanad) in addition to the more traditional hujja or sale deed. One 
tribesman explained to Razzaz, “We do not think of a ḥujja as a regular sales contract. It is more 
like a marriage contract, binding both the buyer and seller for good” (1994:24).  
Razzaz understood the concerns of the government perfectly: he reports that discussions 
with officials inevitably devolved into “a barrage of anecdotes.” He continues, “the situation was 
always described as chaotic, a ‘grave threat to law and order,’ a ‘potentially explosive situation 
                                                 
51
 Hebron is the name of a Palestinain village in the West Bank that has been occupied by Israel since 1967. 
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where disputes between neighbors, heirs, and contesting claimants, could turn bloody and set the 
place on fire’” (Razzaz 1994:26-27). In contrast, initially learning about the conflict through 
development reports, it was hard for me to even explain what I was reading about to the veteran 
HUDC employees who regularly invited me for tea and coffee to discuss my findings. Based on 
the World Bank reports, I had zeroed in on the question of property rights and putatively 
apolitical initiatives of housing market “rationalization.” I wanted to ask them about squatter 
settlement standardization, but I struggled to even figure out the Arabic word for squatter, which 
I could not find in any dictionaries. I asked a friend and sociologist who worked down the hall 
from me in the HUDC, “what do you call someone who builds on land they do not own?” This 
led to a conversation about land tenure I could not really follow since it was my first real 
encounter with the Arabic technical vocabulary of property law. What was clear from his 
perspective was that (no matter the law) land was there to be developed. After being told by a 
number of bilingual friends that there was no Arabic word for squatter, someone suggested the 
word ‘ashwa’ī. With connotations of informality, spontaneity, and randomness, ‘ashwa’ī was the 
Arabic word that the HUDC had used to describe Yajouz road. Once I told my friends at the 
HUDC that I was interested in sākin ‘ashwa‘ī (chaotic housing), they had a lot to say and began 
explaining the whole process to me as one of “straightening out the lines,” “widening the roads” 
and “organizing things.” The property relations were an afterthought. These were increasingly 
dense settlements with no road signs, unreliable roads, and no services. To make matters worse, 
they were inhabited by people who disobeyed the government. The settlements were closed off 
and inscrutable and this worried employees at the HUDC.  
It was into this breach that the World Bank stepped. With everyone increasingly 
accepting that the Palestinians were not leaving Jordan and would expand beyond the refugee 
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camps and eventually fill in between Amman and Zarqa, the World Bank offered the following 
solution: Jordan would take out a loan from the bank, subdivide all of the plots in the squatter 
settlements, officially register the plots, provide some infrastructure, and then make the residents 
repay the loans. The plan was a wild success. The Bani Hassan could sell their land, the 
government created all sorts of jobs and opportunities for patronage, and, whether or not any 
given individual could pay back the loan, there was a delimited commodity asset which could be 
seized as collateral to either encourage repayment of the loan or sell to clear the balance sheet. 
As a veteran of that era in the organization recalled, “it was great for everyone… except maybe 
the people who are still paying off the loans…” Of course, from another perspective, this was the 
last land within physical reach of regular employment opportunities in the capital that was 
sheltered from global commodity markets due to its questionable ownership and zoning status 
and lack of infrastructure. Increasingly, Jordanians must compete in the same housing market as 
oil sheikhs, technocratic nouveau riche, hedge funds, and even their upper middle class 
neighbors who have high enough salaries to pay off a mortgage while still having enough money 
left over for food.  
Conclusion: They Will Take It 
 In tracking changing conceptions of public and private in Jordan, I have tried to 
parochialize the division and simultaneously point to the fact that much of what Jordan’s young-
skewing population (the median age is 26
52) thinks of as “traditional” gender roles (with men 
working outside the home to house women within it) are in fact far more fleeting. I have tried to 
connect this to shifts in labor, property, and spatial relations to emphasize the shortcomings of 
essentialist explanations and the superior explanatory power of more constructivist approaches. 
To avoid any impression of a unilineal evolutionary or teleological conclusion, it is useful to 
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 The median age in Jordan is due to high population growth—not low life expectancy.   
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consider the “Decent Housing for Decent Living” initiative that first brought me to the HUDC, to 
highlight the cracks and fissures in this status quo model of gender relations. As I argued in the 
introduction and throughout the previous chapter, a certain sort of masculine ideal has emerged 
in Jordan which has valorized a certain kind of public man (cf. Carver 1996) who could 
singlehandedly go out and earn the money necessary to provide for his household and, thereby, 
assume a sort of sovereign control which came with differential access to cash and full 
confidence in the state’s willingness to defend his property. This was, in some ways, 
unprecedented. Many of the ties entailed by older notions of property relations were sundered. 
Housing became stationary and suddenly switched from being women’s wealth to men’s wealth 
(although, as we will see in the next chapter as we examine bridewealth conventions, women 
often continue to own the furniture). Most notably, for the first time, large numbers of previously 
impoverished men suddenly discovered that they could afford to provide housing and food for 
their wives and obviate the necessity that the latter circulate through the community. In this, they 
began to partake in a classic premodern marker of nobility across the Eurasian landmass. 
However, it may not last much longer.  
 The global financial crisis has done little to cool down the Amman real estate market. 
With profits from historically high oil prices working their way into the economy via 
remittances, banking, and direct investment (Parker 2009), not to mention the likelihood that 
cement and steel will continue to be expensive due to high energy prices, there is little reason to 
believe housing will get any more affordable. This was the context in which the “Decent 
Housing” initiative emerged. When the Jordanian government first announced that it would 
provide 100,000 housing units that could be purchased on JD 100 per month installment plans, 
demand was extensive. Over 60,000 applications were distributed in two days. Applicants were 
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required to be over 18, make less than JD 1000 per month, and not be a beneficiary of any other 
housing project. Once they had received their new dwelling, they would not have been allowed 
to sell or rent it (Ghazal 2008).  
The program was beset by problems from the beginning, though. The government was 
never totally clear about how it planned on financing the program. When the program was 
announced, the government made clear that it would only provide JD 15 million of the JD 5 
billion project from its own treasury (Petra 2008). In 2009, the popular newspaper Al-Ghad 
published accusations of corruption or, in the subtler phrasing of Jameel Al-Nimry, “a ‘conflict 
of interest’ between public responsibility (musuliyya ‘āma) and private benefit (munfa’a khāṣa).” 
After a 25-day bidding period, the contract for the project was awarded to a company with close 
ties to the minister of public works. Its director was given a monthly salary of JD 8,000—a 
princely sum even for an American manager. Due to the resulting outcry, the offending minister 
was removed from his position—and placed in charge of the Foreign Ministry (Al-Nimry 2009). 
By the time I was in Jordan doing fieldwork with the marketing department, the government was 
offering mortgages
53
 for apartments which would run from JD 110 for an 88 square meter home 
to JD 168 for a 133 square meter home.  
The marketers understood what a tough job they had in front of them. A member of the 
team told me, “we’re not just selling houses. We’re trying to change the mentality.” Her 
coworkers quickly agreed: “they don’t want a mortgage.” “They all want to live on the ground 
floor.” “They want to have a lot of kids.” “They want to have a garden.” “They don’t want to live 
next to strangers.” “They don’t trust54: they want to build it themselves so they know it is done 
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 Some of these mortgages were offered by “Islamic” banks, which used financial instruments that have been 
certified as “sharia-compliant” by particular religious authorities.  
54
 In light of the pervasive concern about corruption in Jordan at the time, the lack of faith in the structural integrity 
of the dwellings was especially salient. It was a common concern when people I knew explained their lack of 
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properly.” At the end of the day, even with the government providing land and subsidizing the 
loans by paying part of the interest and offering guarantees to the banks, the initiative still 
required households to pay half of a soldier’s income for housing when many homeowners 
already struggle to provide their families with chicken more than once a week. In return, 
applicants were being offered close quarters in four-storey apartment blocks on the edge of town. 
By the time I returned in 2011, the problems with the project were widely known and everyone 
had an explanation. Employees emphasized the problems with the banks (“the bank has no 
heart”) and still others argued that the lack of infrastructure and services (no mosques, no 
schools, no stores) had rendered the housing uninhabitable and that “we have to build 
communities—not just houses.”  
As I discussed the issue with one engineer, however, I got a much more jaundiced 
answer. I began to lay out my concern that the entire model of the Jordanian household that I had 
come to know seemed completely unsustainable: with salaries so low, a large percentage of the 
population could only hope to sustain their current lifeworlds by avoiding the need to pay rent—
and the only way to avoid paying rent was to continue occupying whatever sort of diminishing 
familial patrimony they had left. With the country becoming increasingly crowded and more 
outside capital pouring in, higher property values seemed inevitable for the foreseeable future. 
This was presenting couples with a choice: postpone marriage and house construction—possibly 
altogether for many—or accept serious downward social mobility by choosing to rent or take out 
a mortgage. In fact, with women now making up the majority of university students, it seemed 
like the ultimate solution was that women would start working in large numbers to defray the 
                                                                                                                                                             
interest in the Decent Housing initiative. Far from a vague sense that a corrupt government would build corrupt 
(fāsid) houses, a lot of people were incredibly explicit and specific about their concerns. I also know I was not alone 
in hearing such suspicions because an engineer at the corporation once told me (without prompting) about how he 
had personally made sure that the correct quantity of steel rebar was in place when the cement was poured—
precisely the kind of precaution one would take at a time when iron was trading for JD 600-700 per ton. 
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cost of housing. Engineer Samir smiled at the prospect and said, “they do not like it, but they will 
take it.” He began to enumerate all of the complaints I have already listed, adding in plenty of his 
own like “they don’t want to walk up the stairs,” and lingering on the politics of women joining 
the workforce before concluding, “they do not like it, but they will take it.” At the time, it 
seemed logical enough to me that when faced with a choice between celibacy and downward 
social mobility through debt and renting along with women’s increasing involvement in the 
workforce, “they will take it.” That is: households will devote more of their time and money to 
paying for housing and women going to work will be a big part of that. It seemed like I was 
doing salvage ethnography of the patriarchal household. Yet it is also possible that patrilocal 
clustering to defend a shared patrimony (with force if necessary) could provide an alternative 
future—especially as Jordan’s 1.4 million Syrians despair of going home and decide to put down 
roots like the Palestinians before them in Yajouz. Either way, once Jordanians again transform 
their gender relations, I would argue that they will like it and they will find it difficult to imagine 
that it was ever any other way.  
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Part II: The Proposal: Personhood and the Construction of Moral Agents 
 
Chapter 3: The Delegation 
 
 A wedding delegation or jāha is, at least in theory, a relatively straightforward affair. The 
delegation from the groom’s family would55 all pile into cars and drive to the home of the bride’s 
family, where the two kin groups would meet. Each contingent might be as few as thirty people 
or, in some cases, hundreds of people. Upon arrival, the delegation from the groom’s family 
would divide by gender. While the women would head for the muḥarrim, the men would be 
ushered into a guest room or a tent that had been rented for the occasion. A line of men from the 
bride’s family would be waiting to greet the guests. Each guest from the groom’s family would 
move down the line shaking hands and exchanging greetings with each of the representatives of 
the bride’s family. They would then take their seats in facing rows of chairs and wait for the rest 
of the guests to file in. When everyone was settled, the representative of the bride’s family would 
offer a cup of coffee to the representative of the groom’s family. Demurring, the latter would rise 
and declare his family’s interest in entering into a marital relationship with the family of the 
bride by marrying ‘what’s her name?’ or ‘your noble daughter’ or some other circumlocution to 
avoid saying her name. After agreeing to a bridewealth payment (which is envisioned as a sort of 
alimony should the marriage end in divorce), the representative of the bride's family would 
respond by accepting the offer. As the culminating gesture in the pageantry surrounding the 
delegation, the representative of the bride would again proffer a small cup of coffee to the
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 When describing rituals as people tell me they are supposed to happen (rather than as I actually witness them), I 
use what I like to call the "ritual subjunctive"—as opposed to the “ethnographic present” (Fabian 1983)—to 
highlight the inevitable gap between the ritual ideal and particular instantiations. 
 104 
representative of the groom’s family. By drinking the cup of coffee, the representative of the 
groom’s family would seal the agreement. Then those assembled would recite the opening verse 
of the Quran. With that, coffee would be served for all the attendees followed by tea, Pepsi, and 
sweets. The ullulation of the women would erupt in the muḥarrim. When the delegation or jāha 
was finished, the groom’s family would file out, shaking the hands of the greeters once again, 
and return home--often to the sound of celebratory gunfire.  
 The delegation is about distribution, with cognition, agency and, ultimately, personhood 
itself being parceled out across the extended kin group and divided between two parallel rituals 
along gendered lines. From here, amidst taboos around naming and cloistered goings-on 
happening in separate rooms in parallel, agency and personhood are aggregated (on the male 
side) in the figure of the senior male at the peak of the ritual’s drama and then dissolved once 
again as the ritual moves on to shared commensality, mutual leave-taking, ullulation, and 
celebratory gunfire. Increasingly though, with the expansion of Sharia courts into Jordan over the 
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the jāha is not the only ritual for the creation 
and recognition of marital bonds. If the delegation is about the distribution of cognition, agency, 
and personhood itself through an elaborate set of ritual acts, Sharia court procedures tend to exert 
an individuating influence by becoming increasingly concerned with recording the ostensibly 
uncompelled volitional acts of embodied individuals. For the most part, the antithesis between 
the two procedures produces very little concern or cognitive dissonance. Often, the rituals are 
concurrent, with a court-affiliated notary waiting in the next room at the jāha to conduct the 
contract-signing ceremony while the delegation waits. When legitimating marital bonds, most 
Jordanians will use all available rituals. However, the delegation and court procedures 
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nonetheless construct different kinds of moral agents. When these different kinds of moral 
agents
56
 come into conflict, the results can prove downright explosive.  
In chapter three, I contrast the different ways in which delegations and court procedures 
distribute agency, cognition, and personhood. The first half of the chapter will focus on the 
preparations and pageantry surrounding two delegations I witnessed during fieldwork, focusing 
on the collective familial ritual effort necessary to produce a legitimate marital bond. The second 
half of the chapter will draw on a combination of oral history, participant observation, archival 
records, and statistical analysis
57
 to show how the Sharia Courts came to introduce form 
marriage contracts and other bureaucratic technologies into Jordan marriage practices. I will 
argue that the construction of moral agents through marriage proposals has changed over the 
course of the twentieth century as the information infrastructure around the proposal has come to 
rely more and more on the individuating technologies of the Sharia Courts. Turning to the work 
of historians of Islamic law, I note that this tension between the courts and extended kin 
groupings evinces a number of continuities with our understanding of pre-modern Islamic 
jurisprudence—implying that, while these newer bureaucratic technologies certainly have 
consequential intrinsic qualities, many of them also extend and deepen the reach of preexisting 
tools of Islamic jurisprudence and administration.  
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 My concept of "moral agent" is heavily indebted to two sources: Donald Mackenzie’s (2009) idea of the 
"economic agent" and the Sharia's concept of the wakīl (agent): in the case of the tribal delegation the two "sheikhs" 
who represent the bride and groom respectively. What I hope to maintain by echoing Mackenzie is the assemblage's 
materiality, its emphasis on distribution and its at times cyborg-like dimensions. Mackenzie's theorizations of 
economic agents tend to highlight the mechanical extension of the human while leaving open the possibility that the 
machines are taking over. Of course, there is also another important dimension of the comparison: these are agents 
with purposes. Yet whereas Mackenzie's agents are unproblematically "economic" (they seek to make money), mine 
seem to serve very different purposes: they all make claims on people's reproductive powers in the name of 
collectivities founded for the provision of mutual aid to people joined by bonds of more or less indissoluble kinship. 
Thus the "moral": while this may not exhaust the category of moral, it certainly fits within it and furnishes a 
relatively transparent analytic category that could be easily translated back into Arabic.  
57
 My engagement with statistics and my attempts at statistical analysis are merely a dimension of my participant 
observation. As with my engagement with oral history and archival sources, my engagement with statistics takes its 
cue from the knowledge practices of those I hope to understand.  
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In chapter four, I will map out some of the ramifications of the specifically Islamic aims 
of the information infrastructure that has emerged to collect and disseminate information about 
marriage in Jordan. I will show how this information infrastructure has become an active 
participant in the production of new types of moral agents while working to dissolve older types 
of moral agents associated with the delegation. The Sharia Court's procedures and—
increasingly—its statistics are reifying specific categories of individual moral agents who are 
endowed with new forms of individual and collective voice that enable them to articulate new 
forms of social criticism. In narrating an unfolding struggle over the ritual template of the 
marriage proposal, I hope to show that the more familiar individuating ritual template of the 
courts is no more or less a logistical feat than the tribal marriage delegation. In Jordan, both 
continue to coexist in productive tension. 
“The problem is women” 
I was sitting with my friend Abu Riziq
58
 the night before his son Riziq’s wedding 
delegation and khuṭba (engagement party) trying to gauge his feelings about his son’s impending 
engagement and marriage. We sat on the roof of his son’s future home drinking tea as Abu Riziq 
fielded phone calls and made final preparations. Such negotiations are, of necessity, fraught with 
mistrust, awkwardness and the potential for humiliation. From the beginning, I had seen how this 
stage of the process had weighed heavily on Abu Riziq. When he was building a magnificent 
house for the future couple, he was in his element as he considered every possible detail down to 
the colored nightlights (“for sex,” he said). Now, however, his son’s marriage required 
negotiations over bridewealth (which is normally divided in two: the amount to be paid upfront 
or muqaddim/ma‘jil and the amount to be paid in case of divorce or mu’akhir/mo’jil), 
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 In Jordan, parents are referred to as Abu (father of) or Um (mother of) their eldest son or, barring a son, the eldest 
daughter.  
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engagement festivities and the like—not to mention determining the suitability of the girl herself. 
Aside from his ongoing concerns about the bridewealth and arrangements for the various 
festivities (balancing contractual aspects with verbal agreements) he explained that such a distant 
marriage required a lot of sensitive inquiries: “she could be blind, she could have a genetic 
disease, she could have bad morals. We had to ask around a lot.”  
It is no accident that the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was moved by his study of 
North African Berbers to compare matrimonial strategies to a game of cards (1977: 58). Due to 
the potential for embarrassment and generally muḥarrim (protected) status accorded to women, 
no one person completely comprehends the situation. As an anthropologist, I shared many of the 
cognitive challenges faced by Jordanians themselves as I attempted to interpret the events 
unfolding around me. For the most part, marriage negotiations happened in closed family spaces 
that I rarely visited. Furthermore, due to my desire to be hypercorrect
59
, I tended to avoid using 
women’s names in conversation—preferring to use various circumlocutions instead. For 
instance, I could figure out where someone’s wife came from by asking a man about his nasayib 
(in-laws) and figure out where his mother came from by asking about his khawāl (maternal 
uncles). Of course, women were themselves somewhat removed from the discussions occurring 
on the men’s side. The result was a potentially large number of side agreements emanating from 
every match—especially when multiple intermediaries are involved who do not even know each 
other. Given how much remains tacit and diffuse, a certain degree of partitioning or distributed 
cognition (Hutchins 1995) becomes essential to facilitating a marriage.  
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 Respecting a woman's muḥarrim (protected) status requires a complex set of avoidance rituals involving the gaze 
(minimize looking), the hands (no touching: instead of shaking hands, the hand is placed over the heart), and the 
voice (avoid using female names, limit conversation to essential business matters). Such rules were generally 
relaxed so long as there was a significant age gap and I was well-known to the family. Nonetheless, to utter a 
woman's name among her male relatives expresses a social closeness—to which one might or might not be entitled 
and about which I was inclined to exercise caution.  
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Abu Riziq told me that the match had been made via one of his wife Um Riziq’s maternal 
aunts. This aunt had a friend and coworker in the school where she taught (who happened to be 
her paternal aunt) who told Um Riziq that their paternal aunt had a daughter in university ready 
for marriage. Following this initial contact, a number of discrete meetings had taken place to 
arrange the details. He made a point of telling me that, unlike the old days when the bridewealth 
was negotiated at the actual delegation, this had all been arranged in advance and would be 
purely a formality. Just then, he got a phone call from the father of the bride. After an exchange 
of effusive praise, they began to discuss the arrangements for the delegation. Abu Riziq 
complained that he was doing his part to keep the event “simple.” He had only invited his 
relatives on his father’s side and not those on his mother’s side. However, he claimed he was 
unsure if anyone was coming since various people were inevitably mad at various other people 
and/or upset that various other people had not been invited. It quickly became apparent that they 
were arguing about who would be responsible for the all of the different expenses associated 
with the delegation. Abu Riziq had already agreed to spend 100 Jordanian Dinar
60
 on sweets and 
Pepsi for the event. However, the family of the bride wanted him to contribute more for chairs. 
Abu Riziq responded by listing all of the things he had already bought to facilitate the marriage 
(focusing on the house) and complaining that, given the nature of his work in construction, he 
was unsure how his family would survive through the winter when such work is unavailable. He 
openly considered doing what would be ḥarām (unlawful/forbidden) by taking out interest loans 
to facilitate the whole thing. 
The father of the bride tried to defend his position by focusing on what he had spent. Abu 
Riziq was none too impressed. When the father said he would be renting a suit for JD 100, Abu 
Riziq snapped back, “I could buy a suit for that much.” When he got off the phone (having 
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agreed to pay for more chairs), he seemed more incensed by the consumption habits of his future 
in-laws than the financial imposition. “The problem is women,” he said. I pondered the seeming 
non-sequitur and stared back at him waiting for an explanation. As I suspected, there was a 
whole extra layer to the dispute: “She wants to spend JD 20 on a slip. Do you understand? JD 20 
for underwear! I’ve never paid any attention to clothes61. What’s the point? If you buy nice 
clothes, they’re worthless after a year anyway since the style is always changing. But these 
women get together and they all ask each other [adopting a feminine voice], ‘oh and where did 
you buy that? How much did it cost? What Salon did you go to?’ ‘Oh, I went to a Salon in 
Shmeisani [a wealthy neighborhood in the capital city]. I went to al-bissa al-nayima (the 
sleeping kitty).’” Abu Riziq's complaints about his future in-laws with their effete and feminized 
urban consumption patterns emphasize the complexity of the exchanges which surround any 
match and the ways in which they inexorably draw in a wide range of family members into more 
or less onerous relationships.  
By now, it should be apparent that Abu and Um Riziq's son Riziq and his future wife are 
rather incidental to this story in many ways. The account will only continue to drag in even more 
actors. The delegation and the two “sides” it constructs are rather sprawling agencements (Callon 
2005; MacKenzie 2009) in which agency
62
 is highly distributed. At first glance, the whole ritual 
seems to work to bolster the position of the most senior male. However, upon further 
investigation, it becomes clear that many people can only occupy that position through an almost 
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 Generally, the groom's family is expected to provide the bride's clothing. In some cases, it even gets counted as 
part of the bridewealth. I have seen a number of recent contracts which listed JD 500 for clothing as part of the 
upfront bridewealth payment. At the same time, I have also noted resistance among the employees of the Sharia 
Court to including it. In my experience, unless the families were of high social status, applicants were counseled 
that, "the clothes are between you." 
62
 I acknowledge that the word “agency” carries a fair amount of baggage with it, but I can think of no less-
problematic alternative term. I would only ask that the reader to remember that I, following Saba Mahmood, use the 
term with the understanding that “it is crucial to detach the notion of agency from the goals of progressive politics” 
(1995:14). For a thorough discussion of issues of agency and resistance among Bedouin women, I recommend Lila 
Abu Lughod's (2000) Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Piety in a Bedouin Society.  
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complete surrender of self. Following Donald MacKenzie, it is necessary to avoid “focusing 
exclusively on what one might call action’s glamorous agential peaks” (2009:22).  
The Procession (Al-Farida) 
The next afternoon, we assembled at 2:45 to prepare for the trip to the bride’s house to 
make the request. Despite Abu Riziq’s dire predictions, there were soon about 25 men assembled 
and even more women and children sitting in their area. Abu Riziq had rented a bus for the 
women who could not fit in the cars. All told, the procession involved a bus, two vans, and about 
eight cars. As the procession began to move, the women began clapping and singing. It was hard 
to make out exactly what the words were since the voices of the children tended to overwhelm 
the older women who actually knew the songs but it was clear that they mostly consisted of 
lightly risqué
63
 teasing of various men. This was most clear when a girl began one of the verses 
“…and bring Geoff…” only to have everyone halt abruptly to consider the propriety of the 
previous statement. Her father chimed in and they continued with the song—switching next to 
sing about him.  
Arriving, the guests filed into the tent that had been set up for the occasion. We were 
situated on a hill overlooking high-rise apartments on all sides in a relatively open area. After we 
were all seated, Abu Yehea (the most senior representative of the community) addressed the 
representative of the bride: “The messenger of God (peace be upon him) said, ‘A woman is 
normally sought as a wife for her lineage, wealth, beauty, or religiousness, but choose a religious 
woman and you will prosper.’ We are from the such-and-such tribe and we have come to you 
[the such-and-such tribe] to ask for—what’s her name Abu Riziq?" “Noor.” “Noor to marry our 
son Riziq.” With that, the representative of the bride’s family stood up and asked, “do you accept 
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 There are divergent opinions on whether various wedding songs have sexual connotations. So, for instance, some 
people think that there are sexual overtones to the women’s song about getting ready for “the Indian needle” while 
others say that it “doesn’t mean anything at all. They’re just words to fit the meter of the song.” 
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the bridewealth and terms we agreed on?” Abu Yehea nodded and drank the cup of coffee he had 
been poured to signify his acceptance. With that, they recited the opening verse of the Quran and 
began pouring coffee for everyone. Soon, the house erupted with the women’s ullulation and the 
male relatives of the bride began passing out kanāfa (a sweet cheese-based pastry) and Pepsi. I 
made small talk with my neighbors (who quizzed me on what had just happened to make sure I 
had grasped the significance of each part in the ritual) and was soon put into service entertaining 
Riziq’s army buddies, who were relative strangers at the event.  
Within an hour, we were hurrying out to the car for the ride home. There was some 
shifting of places such that my friend Abu Riziq’s sisters ended up riding with their brother Abu 
Mahmud and me. We also ended up with the drum—ensuring a festive ride home. As we began 
to move, we heard celebratory gunfire in the background as Abu Riziq’s sisters sang songs about 
their brothers and me--highlighting their traditional matchmaking roles as sisters and female 
relatives. When they weren’t singing, they were pointing to every non-veiled woman on the 
street and saying, “look. There’s your girlfriend, Abu Mahmud!”  
 
Figure 6: An abbreviated family tree including those descendents of “Musa.” It only 
includes those relevant to the ethnographic account.  
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“He came to me like a thief in the night” 64 
 The jāha seemingly distributes agency and cognition while having a hyper-individuating 
effect on a handful of older male figures. Such a man is called a sheikh, wijih al-jama‘a (the face 
of the group) or simply al-kabīr (the big man). In the ethnographic literature on Melanesia, the 
concept of the “big man” has come in for some useful reconsideration and critique. Roy Wagner 
describes an outdated view of the big man as “an emperor of social friction who uses society 
against itself to reinstate the essential individual at the top of the heap.” It is indisputable that 
some men are able to live up to this ideal. However, I appreciate the manner in which Wagner 
seeks to draw our attention to other ways of thinking about the relationship between individual 
and society or collective. He argues that we must keep in mind the possibility of a genealogical 
view of personhood in which “person as human being and person as lineage or clan are equally 
arbitrary sectionings or identifications of this enchainment, different projections of its fractality” 
(Wagner 1991:163). For instance, in this particular case, I found little evidence outside the 
delimited bounds of the jāha that Abu Yehea in his role as “sheikh of the such-and-such tribe” 
was more than a projection of other agencies. Abu Yehea had no ability as a mere individual to 
find a suitable match for Riziq--much less marry the couple. In fact, he could only take on his 
position as sheikh through his surrender of self to the judgment of the group. This fits with a 
larger pattern in which people are defined relationally
65
 rather than as bearers of distinctive and 
coherent identities. Relevant here is the tendency of Jordanians to refer to each other as Abu 
(father of-) and Um (mother of-) their eldest son. At the same time, Jordanians tend to refer 
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 The diagram is highly abbreviated and is only meant to display relations between people mentioned in the 
ethnographic vignettes by name. Siblings are ordered from youngest to oldest (left to right). A full family tree of the 
descendents of “Musa” would include upwards of seventy people. “Karāma” is a name used out of respect on 
printed materials like wedding invitations to avoid writing the name of an unmarried girl. Here, I use it because, 
while all names have been changed, I want to highlight the fact that I was never directly told certain people’s names.  
65
 In “Intimate Selving,” (1999) Suad Joseph gives a broader illustration of this phenomenon based on fieldwork 
conducted in Beirut. She shows how brothers and sisters come to see themselves relationally through a long process 
of socialization in the home environment. 
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constantly to their membership in groups named after particular apical ancestors—from each of 
whom buds a distinct shajirat al-‘a’ila (family tree). Thus personhood itself is distributed. So, 
for example, a fight between Abu Yehea’s grandson and a neighbor angry with the boy for 
peeping into his house was described to me by the latter as “the problem with Abu Yehea’s 
house.” 
When we arrived home, I went to greet Abu Yehea's brother Abu Fatima who had been 
unable to attend the delegation. We soon turned to discussing the engagement and the finer 
points of matchmaking in Jordan. What was interesting about this conversation is the way in 
which it focused on the need to keep women from the same family together through repeated 
exchanges and also on the need for marriage exchanges to ultimately be reversed (a family that 
gives a wife to another family should, eventually, also take a wife from them). Abu Fatima 
pointed out a very practical reason (at least from a male perspective) for arranging a series of 
marriages from related women given the patrilocal settlement patterns which predominate in 
Jordan: “If the mothers are all sisters, then our sons will be able to go into any house they want 
and not be ashamed.” 
We went over to join the festivities at Abu Riziq’s house: so much for his earlier claim 
that he wanted a “simple” delegation and no engagement party at his own house. Since the party 
was exclusively for the family, the in-laws would likely never be the wiser. The men were once 
again seated on the roof of his son’s house chatting, smoking and drinking tea. I took the 
opportunity to engage Abu Riziq in conversation about the whole affair. I began by asking if he 
could write down the hadīth or saying of the prophet that his cousin Abu Yehea had used to 
make the proposal. First, however, Abu Riziq made clear to me that that was not the sīgha 
(formula) that he would have used. He continued, “Abu Yehea is older so I couldn’t say 
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anything. If I were making the request, I would have said, ‘we’d love to request a pony from you. 
But a pony which eats with her hand—not a pony which eats with her mouth.’ But there are 
many of these formulas. They all mean the same thing. There’s no difference. It’s like 
‘welcome,’ ‘hello,’ and ‘good morning’: they’re all greetings. How would you make this kind of 
request Salameh [Abu Mahmud]?”  
Abu Mahmud, however, instead explained the history of his own marriage and what his 
older brother Abu Riziq had said to his bride’s father (their father’s brother): “Abu Riziq said, 
‘He doesn’t have a house, he doesn’t have a job, he doesn’t have any money, and he can’t give 
you any bridewealth but you can have him if you want.” Abu Riziq explained, “Salameh [Abu 
Mahmud] is a troublemaker now, but he’s not like before. Salameh was a wild animal. He would 
go and sleep in the caves. He would do whatever he wanted. He was like February: hot/cold, 
hot/cold. He’s a lot like that young man over there." At this moment, Abu Riziq pointed to Abu 
Mahmud’s brother-in-law ‘Uthman: a young man who was obviously courting Abu Riziq’s 
daughter and would later marry her (see the family tree above). Abu Riziq continued, "‘Uthman 
came to me like a thief in the night.” Abu Riziq smiled as he adopted a groveling, sycophantic 
tone and, looking at ‘Uthman, said “How are you doing uncle. I’d like to marry your daughter, 
uncle. I don’t have any money, uncle.” Everyone laughed at this, but nobody laughed harder than 
‘Uthman himself.  
The conversation soon took an unexpected turn as people began to enquire more about 
the family of the bride and Abu Riziq mentioned that, “ten years ago, there was nothing in [their 
rapidly developing neighborhood in Amman]. Now you see how it’s all built up, right? Well, that 
old man has a lot of land. The men will get five dunums each (5,000 square meters).” This raises 
an interesting question about the degree to which the vagaries of the Amman real estate market 
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are driving marital strategies. Is this an opening gambit by Abu Riziq meant to give one of his 
younger daughters the option of marrying someone with tens (or more likely hundreds) of 
thousands of dollars worth of property and, by extension, ensuring some of his grandsons a place 
to build their homes?  
The forces driving the marriages of young men like Riziq, Uthman, and Salameh far 
exceed the men themselves—or even the senior males who act out the ‘agential peak’ of the 
ritual drama surrounding the delegation. This applies, differentially, in distant marriages like 
Riziq’s and closer marriages like Uthman’s and Salameh’s. Whereas the latter two matches 
obviate many of the cognitive challenges posed by the former by offering matches where the 
woman and her family are well-known to senior males, they also introduce higher stakes for 
various relatives and junior males—who may have their own reasons for promoting a particular 
match. Women may want to ensure they marry in such a way that they can reside with close kin 
who can serve as allies. Young people may develop intense affective bonds and demand that 
their families accept their choices. Entire families may decide a close marriage is preferable 
because it obviates the need to observe higher standards of modesty and/or preserves family 
property intact. More distant marriages introduce different economic considerations (like the 
possibility of acquiring land and titles through savvy marital strategies), but might also be shaped 
by many of the same considerations as a close marriage—although motives become more opaque 
as the number of interested intermediaries between the two families increases. No matter what 
the arrangement, though, it is very hard to imagine such a ritual for the creation of a marital bond 
as an exchange between individuals (whether the couple or the senior males) operating with full 
information and the absence of constraint. 
“I would have spit in their faces” 
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 Yet this type of marital rite is an exchange nonetheless and as such it seems important to, 
following Marilyn Strathern, ask about The Gender of the Gift. Continuing with some of the 
Melanesian literature on personhood, it is important to note that, “the multiple, paritable nature 
of persons’ constitutions is revealed in its internal relations. In the mother’s case, this is made 
explicit in (say) the further contextualization of herself within enveloping male exchanges. It is 
only in retrospect that identification with the mother can be revealed as having had an effect on 
the life of the nurtured object of her regard” (Strathern 1988: 321). The key point is that gender 
is less an identity and more of a relationship. This relationship can involve bodies, it can involve 
things, and it can even involve relationships themselves: marriage itself can become gendered. In 
the conclusion of the previous vignette, there was a focus on patrilineal (agnatic) parallel cousin 
marriage (the matches between Abu Mahmud and Um Mahmud and Uthman’s impending 
marriage). The following vignette will focus on a matrilineal (uterine) marriage involving Abu 
Fatima’s daughter. Notably, the sheikh’s claim to speak on behalf of the group becomes far more 
contentious on the men’s side when the marriage is designed to strengthen female kin bonds. For 
some, the ritual’s near-failure even calls the entire legitimacy of the match into question. 
We arrived at 6:45 in the evening to await the arrival of the visiting jāha at 7:00. When it 
got to be about 7:30, we were informed that they were still a good hour away—and probably 
more with the traffic. I did my best to try and figure out the relationships between the attendees, 
quickly ascertaining that the bride and groom were cousins through the mother’s side. Finally, at 
9:00, the guests arrived. This was late even by Jordanian standards. Everyone stood as the 
dignitaries filed in and the younger men stood in the doorway and greeted the guests. For the life 
of me, I could not tell who the groom was supposed to be. We sat down and Abu Yehea (the 
elder brother of the bride's father), welcomed the guests and poured them coffee. Attention 
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focused on two elderly men who sat at the far wall facing the door. The man in charge took the 
coffee and said, “okay, let’s get on with this. We’re here to discuss the marriage of [name of 
groom] and… what’s her name?” A number of people quickly said, “Fatima.” The old men then 
began to talk about all manner of unrelated things: the weather, goats, and similar pabulum. At 
some point, Abu Yehea interjected: “we still haven’t discussed the bridewealth.” The old men 
asked, “how much are you asking for?” I was pretty sure this was not how it was supposed to 
work. Abu Yehea told them 3000 Dinar and they protested that it was too much and began trying 
to negotiate. 
The tension was so thick you could cut it with a knife, yet it was also totally sublimated 
beneath a polite veneer. One of the other guests joked that he had asked for far less for most of 
his daughters—with the exception of the one who married through the matriline (for whom he 
required far more). Most people looked uncomfortable. Nonetheless, soda and sweets were 
passed around and the trills could be heard in the distance. The gathering dragged on to the point 
where I felt like I was being rescued when my friend Abu Tariq beckoned towards me from the 
doorway. When I went to visit Abu Tariq's house the next day, he said not to write anything 
about it because it was completely wrong. I protested that sometimes people can learn a lot about 
what’s right from what’s wrong. Abu Tariq began to enumerate the shortcomings of the 
delegation for me. He noted that the other side arrived late and tried to negotiate the bridewealth. 
He said that, if he had been in his cousins’ places, he would have spat on their faces and kicked 
them out. He also claimed that the blame should go to his cousin Abu Yehea—who as the 
family’s representative was responsible for the debacle. Intrigued, Abu Tariq's sisters (who were 
sitting with us) asked for more details. When Abu Tariq added that they talked about goats 
everyone roared with laughter. Of course, I would later realize that there was more to Abu 
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Tariq’s displeasure than mere felicity to the ritual template. The way Abu Tariq saw it, Abu 
Fatima, with two daughters and no male heir, was allowing his wife and her family to take land 
away from the family. Abu Tariq said, “Abu Fatima’s wife is laughing at him. She’s just happy 
he has some goats to keep him busy, but there’s no nātij (product, productivity) so he can’t 
marry another woman and have a son.” As it stands, at least66 half of his land and other assets 
will go back to his wife’s family via his daughter when he dies.  
While it is useful to enquire about the "gender of the gift," I must strongly emphasize that 
the Melanesian comparison can only be taken so far because what these authors oppose to the 
“Melanesian” conception of personhood (the so-called “Western” conception of the person as 
individual) finds its own forms of expression in contemporary Jordan in courthouse procedures. 
In this section, I have described the jāha in relative isolation from any sort of Islamic context 
because the delegation or jāha is, of course, a continuation of a pre-Islamic ritual practiced today 
by Muslim and Christian Jordanians alike. In many ways, the jāha fits uneasily with an 
increasingly articulate and textually-based Islamic revival that has produced zealous advocates 
for concepts like the individual, the collective and society. Energetic adherents of the 
Aristotelian tradition, they see their most cherished ideas as anything but hegemonic as they fight 
what they perceive as a prevailing culture of jahiliyya (ignorance) and shirk (polytheism). Saba 
Mahmood describes adherents of the Islamic revival as providing an “account which privileges 
neither relational nor the autonomous self so familiar to anthropologists… but a conception of 
individual ethics whereby each person is responsible for his or her own actions” (2005: 173). The 
jāha and the cultural logics it represents and instantiates must contend with forces like the 
Islamic revival that seek to exert an individuating influence. For members of the Islamic 
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 Assuming his wife outlived him, it would be more than half since his wife would also be entitled to a share 
according to Islamic law.  
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movement, individual choices take on a moral weight that they are seen to lack in either a purely 
tribal context or the laissez-faire, anything-goes, individualistic context they perceive to be 
emanating from the West. Nonetheless, in Jordan, the Sharia Courts are often foremost in 
counteracting tribal forms of moral agent like those constructed through the delegation with their 
emphasis on individual responsibility. 
Court and Contract 
 The Jordanian Sharia Courts have grown out of a certain kind of a search for order. Yet 
their attempts to exert an individuating influence, to clarify the terms of marital agreements, 
enumerate the bridewealth and prevent the eruption of open tribal conflict have never been 
completely successful. To the degree that the courts have had this effect, it is a result of 
concerted effort over a long period of time. From Ottoman times to the present, courts have 
insinuated themselves more and more deeply into people’s lives. Once an arbiter of last resort, 
Islamic courts now have the opportunity to have their representatives interact with virtually 
every married couple in the country. Yet to quote Ian Hacking, the Islamic regime of 
enumeration, record keeping, fact-finding, and arbitration has had “subversive effects” as well 
because, “enumeration demands kinds of things or people to count. Counting is hungry for 
categories. Many of the categories we now use are byproducts of the needs of enumeration” 
(1982: 280). As the marital exchange has been abstracted into a relationship between embodied 
individuals over a numerical quantity of bridewealth, it has yielded new moral agents. Aided by 
a new kind of artifact (the publicly stored contract which records a legally enforceable alimony 
payment) the marriage contracts of the Jordanian Sharia courts have become entangled in 
conflicts between the types of collective moral agents constructed by the delegation and the 
various embodied individuals court procedures tend to reify. In the next chapter, I will track the 
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ever deeper and more systemic ways in which the information infrastructure of the contemporary 
Sharia Courts are influencing Jordanian family life—especially as new procedures for the 
aggregation, storage, and circulation of data about marriage produce their own novel forms of 
collective voice and social criticism through statistics.  
Contracts on the Margins 
 Jordan’s marginal status in the Ottoman, colonial, and postcolonial periods has shaped 
the development of its Sharia Courts and their techniques for the legitimation of marital bonds 
and the collection, storage, and dissemination of information about those relationships. 
Historically, the courts repeatedly came into conflict with tribal marriage customs embodied in 
the delegation as they expanded their geographic jurisdiction to encompass Jordan in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rather than abating, such conflicts have continued as 
the courts have expanded their reach more deeply into the lives of Jordanian citizens. For 
instance, using itinerant notaries to encourage people to register their marriages represents both a 
compromise with local custom’s constructions of gendered space and a challenge to those 
constructions. Yet the greater problem for the courts has always been enforcing their writ when 
conflicts emerge. The courthouse’s ability to construct new kinds of moral agents does not mean 
those moral agents will win out against older ones. While such conflicts between differently 
constituted moral agents are not necessarily the norm, they can range from the mundane to the 
spectacular. Such conflicts provide an opportunity to better understand the conflicting forms of 
moral agents that these two contrasting procedures for the social recognition of marital bonds 
help produce.  
Associated with urbanity, Sharia courts have generally taken considerably more interest 
in individuals in general and women in particular than tribal wedding delegations like the ones I 
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have described. In certain urban centers in the Middle East, the practice of writing marriage 
contracts actually goes back to pre-Islamic times. Highlighting such continuities between pre-
Islamic and Islamic contractual procedures, the historian Amira Sonbol (2008) uses contracts and 
other court records to great effect to show how women in what is now Egypt were treated as 
legal persons in ways that Western women
67
 would not be for over 1000 years. She portrays 
women representing themselves in court and often winning against recalcitrant husbands. Her 
archive of marriage contracts shows that women often stipulated elaborate conditions in their 
marriage contracts, which provided grounds for divorce and the payment of the mahr 
(bridewealth/alimony). Working closer to Jordan with a focus on Ottoman Syria and Palestine, 
the historian Judith Tucker (1998; 2008) notes that jurists saw themselves as continuing a 
reformist project epitomized by the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet Muhammed.  
Arguably, key aspects of this reformist project (especially in the realm of marriage) were 
aimed at preventing abuses by powerful senior males and extended kin groups against figures 
like the girl of marriageable age—who were perceived by jurists as particularly vulnerable to 
exploitation. These jurists “took the notion of consent seriously” (Tucker 2008:43) and worried 
extensively about the malign influence that senior males might have on a woman’s marriage 
prospects (Tucker 1998:40-52). One of the four nineteenth century Palestinian jurists who 
Tucker profiles in In the House of the Law, “waged a campaign of sorts” against the various 
ways in which rural women often saw their mahr eaten up by their families and, especially, 
senior males (1998:54). Once married, jurists place the responsibility for the provision of the 
wife’s maintenance (nafaqa) squarely on the husband. If the husband was unable or unwilling to 
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 Sonbol makes a convincing case that, to some degree, the introduction of French legal theories both through direct 
colonial rule under Napoleon and later indirectly via the late Ottoman system and particularly the tanzimat 
(reorganization) reforms of the nineteenth century weakened the status of women. She notes, "this mention of 
'giving' the bride's 'body' to the groom constitutes the most important difference between French and Islamic 
contracts" (Sonbol 2008:109). 
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pay, the court would go so far as to empower the wife to borrow money on his behalf in the 
market—and then compel him to pay it back (Tucker 1998:58-62). Palestinian jurists in Ottoman 
times also took aim at more explicitly tribal customs that “reduced women to chattel, whose sole 
worth lay in their usefulness to immediate family honor or gain” (Tucker 1998:70). Among the 
more frequent targets in this regard were ‘marriage by capture,’ ‘bartering brides’, and attempts 
to annul marriages on the grounds that a bride’s broken hymen invalidated her claim to virginity 
(Tucker 1998:67-69). In each of these cases, a vulnerable individual becomes the rationale for 
checking the prerogatives of the broader kin group and its members. 
 The situation was certainly somewhat different in Jordan at least until the end of the 
nineteenth century
68
. Surely, going to the trouble of recording a marriage with the courthouse in 
Jerusalem (about half a day's journey on-foot from the westernmost point in what is now Jordan) 
must have seemed a bit superfluous to people living across the river in Jordan where--by most 
accounts--the Ottomans could not even seem to prevent brigandry, tribal warfare and extortion. 
From the sixteenth to the late nineteenth century, a single Ottoman Sharia court in Jerusalem was 
theoretically responsible for all of what is now Jordan. Nevertheless, one could go to a 
courthouse and have one’s marriage recorded using a simple formula explaining that ‘so-and-so 
in the presence of their legal agent (wakīl shira‘ī)’ was present for a marriage involving some 
amount of bridewealth/alimony. Much like Sonbol's Egyptian contracts, the contractual 
arrangements in the Jerusalem registers could be quite detailed for important people. Yet even 
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 Lynn Welchman's (1988) review of Jordanian family law draws attention to a number of key divergences between 
the Jordanian and Egyptian cases in the twentieth century. Strikingly, it turns out that the JLPS (Jordanian Law of 
Personal Status) lacks a number of the colonial-era practices that Sonbol critiques (namely with regards to 
preventing women from stipulating requirements in the contract and being compelled to obey their husbands by the 
state): requirements are not only allowed but have a dedicated space on the contract form and ideals of female 
"obedience" (ṭā'a) are unenforceable. At the same time, Welchman observes, "there appears to be an interesting 
tendency, in the JLPS in particular, towards achieving equality of the spouses under the law with regard to the 
claims they may raise, although this takes the form, paradoxically though it may seem, of provisions benefiting the 
husband rather than the wife" (1988:872).  
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after new courthouses were built in Salt, Ajloun and elsewhere, there is very little evidence of a 
rush to take advantage of them. Even with the consolidation of the courts in the 1920s under 
British colonial rule, they seem to have merely continued their visible but by no means 
ubiquitous presence in the marriage process (unless one believes that there were only about four 
to five thousand marriages happening every decade in central Jordan in the 1920s and 30s).  
During this period, the courts worked primarily through a system of itinerant notaries known as 
the ma’dhunun69.  
 For some families, the ma’dhun may have seemed like a wonderful way to conduct the 
marriage contract without requiring the women of the house to leave the muḥarrim or protected 
space, yet not everyone has been so sanguine about the process. These men were (and are) 
respected members of the community recognized for their piety and learning. In general, 
employees at the Sharia Courts explained that the more muḥāfiẓ (conservative) families preferred 
to use the ma’dhun rather than take a female family member to the courthouse. Even here, 
however, there were sensitivities involved that continued to cause friction at the time of 
fieldwork. For instance, while the contemporary courts have tried to introduce a rotation for the 
ma’dhunun, I often observed in my fieldwork that people would discard the business card they 
had been given by the courts and choose a ma’dhun who was a friend of the family. In doing so, 
families challenged the state’s attempt to mandate that female members interact with a strange 
man of the state’s choosing. In one case, a man boasted to me that his family was powerful 
enough to get married using the ma’dhun with whom they had a preexisting relationship—
despite the fact that the most recent enlargement of the Greater Amman Municipality had pulled 
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 My information on the history of the itinerant notaries comes from a mixture of oral history and the documents 
themselves. Many of them come from families that are still respected in the area to this day. For a few, I can even 
track their peregrinations from village to village as they move along discernible circuits that I continue to use to 
travel to this day. 
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them into a completely different administrative district from the courthouse with which the 
notary was associated. There was one kin group in particular that was widely understood to share 
a collective familial dislike for the entire concept of the ma’dhun: the Saba‘awi tribe from Bir 
Saba‘ in Palestine. As I heard a surprising number of times from members of the group and 
others in the community, this family preferred to go to the courts rather than bring a 
representative of the government into their homes. Various Saba‘awi explained to me (often with 
some pride), that their family had not even used the courts until the 1980s.  
 Even members of groups that were quicker to adopt the use of government-issued paper 
contracts expressed some skepticism about the whole process, implying that it was invasive, 
coercive, and infringed on the family’s independent prerogatives. One man suggested, it was the 
introduction of public services like schools in the 1950s and 1960s which made the marriage 
contracts so important: “you take your child to school and the principal asks, ‘where is your 
family notebook
70
 (daftar al-‘ā’ila)?’ You go to the Interior Ministry and they ask you ‘where is 
your marriage contract?’ Then they send you to the Sharia Courts.” Here, three post-
independence state-building projects conspired to push families to incorporate the Sharia Courts 
into their marital arrangements: the move towards universal compulsory schooling, the 1951 
Jordanian Law of Family Rights (the basis for the revamped contract form) and Law 32 of 1966, 
which established the contemporary Civil Status and Passport Department and the system of 
family notebooks for which they are responsible. Over time, most families have responded by 
opting to get official marriage contracts. Even the earlier Saba‘awi practice of going to the courts 
for a certificate (tasdiq) of marriage to obtain the family notebook has fallen into disuse.  
Graphic Artifacts 
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 When children are born, they are added into their father's family notebook. Upon marriage, they are moved from 
their father's family notebook to a new family notebook for the newly formed family.  
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 The contemporary marriage contract is, in fact, far more than a mere record of marriages. 
The contract is a pre-printed form which, to quote Matthew Hull, “precipitate[s] the formation of 
shifting networks and groups of people inside and outside the bureaucracy” (2003: 291). There is 
much to be gained by studying sajilāt and marriage contracts as what Hull has called “graphic 
artifacts.” Hull argues that, for too long, there has been a tendency to treat bureaucratic 
documents as merely more stable instantiations of the spoken word without paying attention to 
the broad diversity of genres of bureaucratic communication and the fact that, “each genre has its 
own pattern of use, distinct formal discursive characteristics, orienting frameworks, interpretive 
procedures, temporality, and sets of expectations through which readers produce and make sense 
of it.” This is to say nothing of qualities of the document like size, shape, and the way in which it 
is allowed to circulate (Hull 2003: 292-293). Following Hull, it is useful to inquire about local 
“graphic ideologies” that, like semiotic ideologies (Keane 2003) and language ideologies 
(Silverstein 1979), have constituted Islamic court documents as socially meaningful artifacts. To 
the degree that the courthouse is largely a site for the production, storage, retrieval, and 
interpretation of graphic artifacts, it implies that sajilāt and marriage contracts play an important 
role in catalyzing these new forms of moral agent
71
. 
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 All of this begins to paint a picture of the sajilāt and contracts as a tantalizing source of data for social history 
which, nonetheless, defies a naïve reading. As Dror Ze’evi, Annelies Moors, and Judith Tucker argue, contracts 
cannot be taken at face value. Ze’evi writes that the sajilāt are in fact “carefully constructed legal narratives in 
which the legal aspect, although invisible to the reader, is still the essence of the record” (1998: 38). This legal 
aspect, however, is itself open to investigation as there is no reason to believe that a single uniform set of precepts 
prevailed across the Ottoman Empire and much reason to suspect hybrids of Islamic law and parochial custom 
(Layish 1991). Ze’evi explores some of the problems with various methodologies for studying contracts. 
Quantitative methods are problematic because we have no way of knowing what kind of sampling of the larger 
population they provide. Most importantly, numbers like bridewealth and age may actually reflect public 
perceptions of what court officials want to hear—not the details of actual historical marital arrangements between 
families. The use of court records to construct narrative history is at least as problematic. The sajilāt and contracts 
provide a sort of factual Rorschach test: a series of disjointed bits of information that verily cry out for narration. 
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, we can actually be pretty sure that the various scraps of data that we find in 
court records were carefully curated to construct a ‘legal narrative’—the conventions of which we almost certainly 
fail to comprehend at the moment. 
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The moral weight of court procedures and their ability to produce new kinds of agents 
became apparent to me long before I arrived at the courthouse. When I expressed an interest in 
marriage and social change in Jordan, I was repeatedly told by men of the increasing prevalence 
of zawāj ‘urfī (literally customary marriage)—or the related, zawāj friend (note the code switch). 
The terminology reflects the shifting familial dynamics and assumptions about governance that 
this chapter is meant to interrogate. "Customary" here simply refers to the fact that no copy is 
registered with the government. But in the context of rapid urbanization, sexual revolution and 
the decreasing power of the extended family in certain quarters, the meanings attributed to 
different kinds of archival procedures surrounding contracts are not the same as they would have 
been 100 years ago. I was told that both customary and “friend” marriages were marriages 
which, while ostensibly Islamic (with witnesses, a contract, etc.) were fundamentally exploitative 
since, crucially, the signing was conducted in secret and the contract was not registered with the 
government—thus giving the woman very little recourse if her “husband” grew tired of the 
relationship.  
Yet there is an increasing polarization of what such a relationship looks like, with 
“customary” marriage standing in for the threat of tribalism leading to women’s exploitation 
while “friend” marriage stands in for the threat posed by liberalization and westernization. With 
“customary” marriages, it is assumed that couples are not registering their marriages with the 
state because of illiteracy, suspicion of the state, or adherence to traditional patriarchal values. 
With regard to the threat posed by “friend” marriages, two relatively novel scenarios figured 
prominently—both of which could be taken directly from a racy Egyptian soap opera. In the 
frequent impassioned denunciations I heard of marriages involving these relative cosmopolitans 
that were nonetheless either secret or merely unregistered, my interlocutors differentiated 
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between cases where 1) “This is something that happens among the ‘open-minded’ (infitāhī). 
You have college students and a kind of love story (qisat-al-ḥub) and they want to have relations 
so they make an agreement with their friends acting as witnesses” and 2) “This is a form of 
exploitation. You have a boss who wants to have relations with his secretary. But he’s married 
and he’s afraid of his wife so he won’t marry the secretary. But he also doesn’t want to commit 
adultery (zinā). He wants to ease his mind so he makes her sign a piece of paper. When he's tired 
of her, he can tear it up. He thinks he can laugh at our Lord but really he’s only laughing at 
himself.”  
 For residents of a highly bureaucratized society, it is easy to take for granted the idea that 
a piece of paper could bring the repressive powers of the state to bear on a recalcitrant husband--
or forestall the imposition of those repressive powers. No doubt, that is part of the appeal of a 
secret marriage contract that can be pulled out should the couple be discovered. Yet in Jordan, as 
elsewhere, this has only been accomplished through a long period of negotiation as various 
precedents have emerged for understanding the complex entailments of court documents. Even 
government-backed legal documents may prove no match for the prerogatives of the extended 
kin group. The anthropologist, sometime intelligence officer and sometime opposition politician 
Ahmad ‘Uwaid ‘Abaddi offers one example of this process of negotiation in his doctoral 
dissertation: 
In the summer of 1980, a Bedouin (A) became betrothed to a Bedouin girl (B) for 
a stated bridewealth (mahr). The contract (aqd al-nikah) took place according to 
shari’ah law (which made her legally his wife), but the mahr was still as yet 
unpaid to her father (C), so according to the ‘awayid [customs] they were still 
unmarried). 
 
(A) had sexual intercourse with (B) while she was living at her father’s home 
before the wedding had taken place. After a few months it appeared that she was 
pregnant. Her father was furious, and, went to the civil courts to complain. They 
rejected the case since it was within the shari’ah’s jurisdiction. The shari’ah 
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refused to hear the case, since (B) was legally (A)’s wife. (C) finally went to the 
Muhafiz [Governor] of Amman to report the incident. The Muhafiz took action to 
prevent the dispute from getting out of hand, and referred the case to three 
arbiters. By chance, I was in his office for my fieldwork. He invited me to act as 
the fourth arbiter. The final decision we arrived at was that: 
 
“although A’s action was theoretically legal, correct behavior is not to have 
intercourse with the fiancée until after a public wedding (urs)… Since (A) 
committed this act secretly at (C’s) house, (A) must pay all the outstanding mahr 
[bridewealth] and should send a big jahah to (C) and make a feast of conciliation, 
with food, contributed by the notables of the two parties. He also had to pay a fine 
of 300JD for hurmat al-bayt [inviolability of the home] of C. He was required to 
swear an oath that he had not had sexual intercourse with (B) before the marriage 
contract was signed, so as to secure her and her sisters’ reputation, otherwise the 
sisters chances of marriage would suffer because of his action. (A) must take B to 
his house, as a wife, immediately after the Jahah” (Al-Abbadi 2006: 103) 
 
A couple of things are striking about this passage. First, the bureaucracy appears completely 
uninterested until the matter rises to the level of a threat to public security. However, once 
activated, government officials are forced to contend with the gap between “theoretically legal” 
and “correct behavior.” A whole string of obligations and entailments involving various 
networks and groups of people emerge: the bridewealth, the wedding, the father’s sense of 
entitlement to hurmat al-bayt and the sisters’ reputations. As late as 1980, these are ultimately 
determined not according to sharia but rather according to an explicitly tribal framework which 
relates these prerogatives to the enactment of non-documentary as opposed to documentary 
rituals. When faced with a potential riot by the outraged family of the bride, the governor is 
quick to rule that the wedding and the transfer of bridewealth take priority over the paperwork.  
 Even when I was conducting fieldwork in 2012, the governor’s office continued to serve 
an integral role in solving problems for which the documentary procedures of the courts were ill-
equipped. One of the most notable sources of tension was the Court’s requirement that a female 
virgin must have her legal guardian (wāli ‘amr) present to sign his consent to her marriage on the 
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contract
72
. The early 21st century system of the creation and legitimation of marital bonds is 
striking for its individuating tendencies and the ways in which it keeps the extended family in 
check. The Islamic regime of marital obligations highlights individual consent: without the 
consent of both bride and groom, there can be no marriage. The contract works to constitute 
explicit undeniable indexical linkages (signatures, thumbprints and stamps) between all of the 
concerned parties and a written rendition of the agreement. The codification of male privilege 
remains through the requirement for the consent of the wāli ‘amr, but in a much more limited 
sense: once a woman has ceased to be a virgin, she can act on her own behalf as her father no 
longer has any legal standing. Even as a virgin, the broader prerogatives of her extended family 
are completely unrecognized. For a virgin to marry, she needs nothing other than the consent of 
her guardian (wāli). Yet whereas a woman is supposedly represented (if at all) by the nebulous 
figure of the sheikh in the delegation, the wāli is an incredibly well-delimited figure in 
contemporary Jordanian law. It is her father. In the absence of her father, her guardian is her 
brother. In the absence of her brother, it is her father's brother and, should there be no father's 
brother, following the patriline by degrees of separation potentially ad infinitum. While reform-
minded Muslims envision the guardian as defending the woman’s rights by checking the 
excesses of a preexisting tribal order that they view as backwards and oppressive towards 
women
73
, difficulties may emerge when a woman and her guardian disagree about her marital 
prospects. Without this concurrence between the woman and her guardian, the Sharia courts 
generally refuse to involve themselves, necessitating the intervention of the governor’s office. 
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 As Sonbol notes, there is actually a difference of opinion on this point among the various schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence: Malikis and Shafi'is require a male guardian's consent for all first marriages while the Hanafi school 
allows women to marry on their own behalf once they have reached majority (bulugh). As is generally the case, the 
current Jordanian family law privileges the Maliki view.  
73
 Sonbol's treatment of pre-Islamic marriage contracts and her convincing arguments about the continuities between 
pre-Islamic and Islamic contracts in what is now Egypt seriously problematizes this characterization (2008:87-94).  
 130 
When I met Muhammed (an employee at the governor’s office) while visiting with a 
friend from the Sharia courts, he immediately drew the connection between my interest in 
marriage and his office. As everyone knows, the governor's office is where people go when they 
want to elope. We sat together discussing the basics of the procedure: "If you want ‘zawāj 
shara’ī’ [note: this means both a Sharia marriage and a legal marriage], you need the permission 
of the girl’s guardian (wāli ‘amr). But sometimes, a boy and a girl run away from their parents 
and they come to the office of the governorate and the governor marries them to prevent a tribal 
conflict. Then they have to leave and go live somewhere else. They’re married, but it’s not an 
Islamic marriage.” Another guest was incredulous, but Muhummed explained, “See, she’s 
already been opened [lost her virginity]. Then they come to us and we try to fix the problem 
before it widens.”  
Khaled: But it’s not shara‘ī (legal/Sharia-compliant)? 
 
Muhammed: No. It’s not. [Turning to me] Who told you about this? Did 
[Muhammed’s cousin] tell you about this? 
 
Me: I mean, I’ve seen it. This one time I was sitting with Hussein [a contract 
writer and key consultant] and he got a phone call. There was a case like this at 
the Governorate office. There was a problem between the families but the father 
had agreed to come and give permission so Hussein hurried over to give them a 
shara‘i marriage. Maybe you remember this case? It was a few months ago… 
 
Muhammed: Yes. I do.  
 
Me: So how many people marry this way every month? 
 
Muhammed: It differs. We get more when the weather is hot. It warms the 
blood… I’ll give you an annual rate: 8-10 per year. 
 
Me: Only in Madaba? What about other places like Amman? It must be more, 
right? 
 
Muhammed: See, you have to remember that this is a tribal area. Amman is 
different. It’s more like America with autonomous families. In Amman and Zarqa, 
they have different procedures (ijra’āt). Normally, there, a girl will go with a man 
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for a while. Later she wants her rights and she goes to the police and says he 
raped her (ightaṣabha). Then it’s a case of rape (ightasab) and it’s a criminal case 
and it has to be solved using criminal procedures. Here if, God forbid, there was a 
rape, it would widen quickly. The whole tribe would stand up. There would be 
killing. So we have to solve the problem quickly. If a girl disappears, they go to 
the police immediately. The police come and they talk to her mother. Normally, 
the mother knows who her lover is. The father doesn’t know but the mother does. 
Then the police go and find her lover. They bring him to the police station and 
talk to him. Then we bring the two to the governor’s and we marry them. It’s not 
a legal solution (hāl qānūnī) it’s an administrative solution (hāl idārī). To give 
you an example: if, God forbid, someone from the Showabkeh [tribe] khaṭifa 74 
(kidnapped/eloped with) someone from the Azaydeh [tribe], there would be tribal 
clashes (mushājira ‘asha’iriyya). We would have to find them quickly before the 
problem widened. Each area is different with it’s own customs and traditions and 
so the procedures of each governorate is different. 
 
Unable to accept certain tribal mores but not powerful enough to suppress them, the Sharia 
Courts are forced to yield some of their jurisdictional prerogatives to the Governor’s office to 
this day. The attitude of Muhammed and the Governor’s office more generally is at odds with 
that of the courts insofar as it elides or outright dismisses concerns over individual consent (of 
the woman, but also her father and her prospective husband). Yet this was viewed by such 
officials (whatever their religious commitments) as a necessary compromise with the regime of 
personhood epitomized by the jāha. Here, the Jordanian state reveals itself to be unsure as to 
whether or not (and to what degree) every group member's sexual liaisons are a collective 
concern.  
Conclusion: 'The strong among us ate up the weak' 
  Such tribal sensibilities are far from hegemonic in the Jordanian context. In fact, plenty 
of people find them constraining and backwards in relationship to what they see as a progressive 
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 There is an urgent need for more ethnographic research about khaṭifa. As Cynthia Werner's (2004; 2009) 
exemplary ethnographic work shows, "a number of ambiguities make it difficult to determine whether or not a 
kidnapping case is 'consensual' or 'nonconsensual.' There is no single question that gets at this issue" (2004:82). 
Currently in Jordan, there is growing controversy about Jordan's Article 308, which allows an accused rapist to 
avoid prison by marrying the woman. While some women's groups are now organizing to change the law, others 
argue that changing the law will take away women's ability to lose their virginity in order to force their parents to 
accept a particular match that they would otherwise oppose (Hattar 2012).  
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and empowering Islamic revival. For most Jordanians (and most contemporary Muslims in the 
Arab world), Islam does not exist in a void: it enters the world historically in a context of 
extreme ignorance while promising avenues for progress. As I will argue in part three, in the 
language of the contemporary Islamic movement, this pre- or un-Islamic world is a world of 
jāhiliyya (ignorance), defined by male forms of desire, aggression, and sociality run amok. In 
Jordan especially, tribalism is an especially salient manifestation of this jāhiliyya. In contrast, the 
Islamic golden age of the Prophet Muhammed and the rightly-guided caliphs is taken to 
represent a particular historical moment which transcended the base injustices which came 
before it and after it. Ja'far ibn Abi Talib, one of the companions of the prophet, famously 
described the shift thusly: 
"We used to worship idols and eat carrion flesh; we practiced fornication, we 
disregarded family ties, we neglected the duties of hospitality, and the strong 
among us ate up the weak. Thus we continued until Allah sent us a Messenger of 
our own number, of whose descent we know, and whose truthfulness, faith and 
chastity are unquestioned. He summoned us to Allah, to believe in Him as One 
God, to worship Him, and to repudiate what we and our fathers worshiped apart 
from Him in the way of stones and idols. He bade us tell the truth in our 
conversation, observe good faith in ties of kindred, be faithful to our hospitable 
duties, and refrain from eating the forbidden foods and blood. He forbade us to 
practice fornication and to use false speech, to eat up the property of orphans and 
to slander chaste women." 
 
In quoting this passage, the Muslim Brotherhood thinker Said Qutb adds that, since this 
description was uttered in the presence of two envoys from the Quraish (the foremost tribe 
amongst the erstwhile persecutors of the early Muslims) and they did not object to Abi Talib's 
account, "this must be a true and reliable description of the former state of affairs and of the 
new" (2000 [1953]: 174).  
It is no accident that the passage turns on the repudiation of what 'we and our fathers 
worshiped... in the way of stones and idols.' As early as Al-Kalbi's eighth century scholarship on 
 133 
pre-Islamic religion, The Book of Idols (Kitāb Al-Aṣnām), Muslims have drawn a strong 
connection between pre-Islamic idolatry and tribalism. According to this account, Mecca was a 
market town and cult center that hosted a number of tribal totems representing the various 
patrilines
75
. Due to its religious association, it was supposedly a sort of island of tranquility in the 
midst of a Hobbesian war of all against all. The world of the "Age of Ignorance" was, I have 
been told repeatedly, a world in which families would bury their newborn daughters alive lest 
they suffer the shame of having them kidnapped and raped in subsequent raiding. In the stories 
contemporary proponents of the Islamic Revival tell themselves about themselves, the Age of 
Ignorance was an era of male privilege run amok which could only be corrected by divine 
intervention in the form of God's messenger Muhammed.  
 For those who support the contemporary Islamic revival, ignorance is a recurring 
problem that must be defeated once again. Just as Al-Kalbi narrates the devolution of Abrahamic 
monotheism into a perverted and exploitative state of perpetual warfare, Qutb and other 
contemporary Islamic activists see themselves as heirs to a luminous Islamic tradition, which has 
become tarnished over the years and needs revitalization. As we will see, employees at the 
Sharia courts took this duty to protect the weak (here defined as women and children) quite 
seriously. The system of guardianship is deeply paternalistic, but its proponents justify it as a 
necessary response to the realities of power differentials within actually existing family 
structures. As employees of the courts made clear to me, women and men may be equal before 
God, but the exigencies of their lives require that they be treated differently by the courts. In 
promoting such a rationale for the formation and expansion of Sharia Courts, the production of 
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 Ghada Karmi (1996) challenges this mainstream view of pre-Islamic Arabia, arguing that there was in fact a 
diversity of kin forms prior to the advent of Islam and that Islam catalyzed a shift away from matrilineality and 
matrilocality.  
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increasingly abstract and individuated moral agents like the virgin and the guardian continues to 
challenge and be challenged by the forms of personhood that the delegation embodies. 
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Chapter 4: The Courthouse 
 Where the tribal delegation no doubt seems picturesque and unfamiliar, the procedures at 
the courthouse might initially appear quite mundane and commonsensical to those otherwise 
familiar with bureaucratic state societies. Yet a closer examination reveals the deeply subversive 
effects
76
 of the contemporary system for the collection, storage, aggregation, and dissemination 
of information about marriage. Whereas the last chapter focused on the individuating tendencies 
of marriage contracts and court procedures more broadly, this chapter will focus more on the 
ways in which the knowledge practices of the courts array these individuals in a very precise 
configuration that enables the emergence of different kinds of people. The knowledge practices 
of the Sharia Courts have tended to replace the more or less chimerical figure of the tribal sheikh 
with that of six key individuals (the legal guardian, the wife, the husband, two witnesses, and the 
ma’dhun) and a very particular kind of paper trail. The technological shift from the jāha to the 
written and government-stored contract has further enabled the aggregation of information about 
marriage in the form of courthouse statistics. These statistics, in turn, have aided and abetted the 
further abstraction and elaboration of particular categories of person. Over time, courthouse 
officials have developed an increasingly specific analytic vocabulary for talking about 
participants in marriage contracts and related knowledge practices. As these knowledge practices 
themselves have helped reify such categories of person (inciting the production of ever more
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 Following Foucault but also diverging from him, Hacking (1982) argues that Foucault followed a polarization in 
the governance of life between anatamo-politics (focused on the individual body) and bio-politics (focused on the 
species body). He cautions against an overemphasis in the erotics of the former at the expense of paying proper heed 
to the mundane and subtle but nonetheless pervasive powers of the latter, which he describes in terms of “subversive 
effects) 
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research, statistics, and analysis) they have helped enable the construction of new forms of moral 
agents endowed with new forms of individual and collective voice.  
Towards a Textual Polity 
Drawing on an analysis of 877 marriage contracts from central Jordan written between 
the years of 1926 and 2011, and the over 100 marriages I witnessed in a Jordanian courthouse in 
2012, this chapter continues to contrast the tribal delegation with the emerging regime of 
enumeration and record keeping around marriage. After a discussion of the spatial layout of the 
courthouse and the office of the contract-writer, I will explain the ritual template associated with 
the contract. This idealized ritual template will then be contrasted with oral historical, archival, 
and ethnographic examples that highlight the particular kinds of infelicities (Austin 1975) 
associated with extended kin group family dynamics that contemporary court officials seek to 
overcome. As in Brinkley Messick's The Calligraphic State, these court procedures are 
implicated in the foundation and perpetuation of a sort of "textual polity" which remains in 
productive tension with the kinds of politics embodied by the tribal delegation. In the latter half 
of the chapter, I will show how these textual practices produce radically new--not to mention 
unexpected--grounds for political contestation. Dissident intellectuals associated with the Islamic 
movement are increasingly using the court's own statistics to call into question the legitimacy of 
not just tribal forms of marriage, but also specific court procedures and the Jordanian state itself.  
'Put your hand in the hand of your father's brother': Court Procedure in Theory 
 If there are many contrasts between the tribal delegation and court procedures, there is 
one I would like to caution against: a simple opposition of orality and literacy (cf Goody 1986; 
Ong 1982). To follow Messick in exploring the ways in which Sharia constitutes a "textual 
polity" means attending to the material and embodied dimensions of both the spoken and written 
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word in ways that, until recently, Western scholars have been reluctant to. Such a political 
assemblage requires "both a conception of an authoritative text, involving structures of 
authorship, a method of instructional transmission, institutions of interpretation, and modes of 
documentary inscription, and a pattern of textual authority" (Messick 1993: 6). Scholars like 
Goody and Ong (who rely on a parochial teleology in which Euro-American textual conventions 
represent the developmental apex) mistake the Sharia's practical concerns about felicity for 
evidence of a cultural time-lag. In fact, as Messick argues, Sharia's suspicion of writing as 
somehow lacking has direct analogues in the logocentrism of the Western canon stretching all 
the way from Plato to Saussure to Ong himself. Perhaps a language like Arabic, which relies on a 
script without vowels (known as harikāt or movements), might exaggerate this by empasizing 
the interpretive labor of recitation—but only slightly. All written languages force the speaking 
subject to make editorial decisions
77
 to some extent as she vocalizes and thereby animates the 
text (Messick 1993: 25-26). What makes Sharia distinctive is the way in which the legitimacy of 
a text tends to be constituted through its relationship to particular kinds of face-to-face 
interactions and complex practices for modulating presence and absence as well as proximity and 
distance in response to sophisticated readings of gendered and age-based power dynamics within 
families. To fail to attend to the hybrid oral-literate character of court procedures (or see them as 
necessarily part of a social configuration which represents an intermediate stage on the path to 
full literacy) is to fundamentally lose the plot. 
 The local courthouse was tucked away near the marketplace on a quiet side street in a 
large two storey concrete structure faced with white stone. The first floor consisted of a series of 
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 Adding vowels to a written word can substantively change its meaning. For instance, the plaque in Hussein's 
office contained a special diacritic over the first letter lest people confuse ra'īs al-kutāb (the head of writing) with 
ra'īs al-kitāb (head of the book). Such ambiguities are ubiquitous in Arabic although context generally mitigates the 
problem.  
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mostly empty storefronts with only the one on the far right being used (there, two retirees sold 
forms and photocopied documents for a fee). To access the court, citizens would mount the dark 
staircase in the middle of the building, passing an ashtray and arriving at the second floor. There, 
they would be greeted by a guard from the General Security forces sitting at a weathered wooden 
desk in a small foyer bathed in the glow of fluorescent lights reflecting off of walls painted an 
institutional shade of white. The courthouse itself consisted of a single long corridor with rooms 
branching off on either side. Two narrow doorways defined the foyer where the guard sat. To the 
right, there were (moving clockwise) the break room, the head of writing's (ra'īs al-kutāb) office, 
a storage closet overflowing with files, the accountant charged with collecting fees, the 
storeroom (al-mustawda') for the contracts, "the pen" (al-qalam) where the scribes worked, Head 
Judge Sayyed's office, the office of the accountants in charge of executing inheritance cases, and 
Judge Ahmed's office. To the left of the foyer there were rooms for (again moving clockwise), 
Judge Abdullah's office, the head accountant's office, more storage, the head of implementation's 
office, and a room where the female guard passed her days sitting behind a desk next to a black 
cage that was perhaps two meters long and three meters wide. The court was a strikingly self-
contained disciplinary apparatus, with mixture of tools for working on both the individual body 
(like the prison cell and the guards) and the population as a whole (through the collection, 
storage, and reproduction of documents and aggregate information about the community). 
 Ideally, those hoping to marry were expected to arrive with the groom, bride, her father, 
two witnesses (optimally one from each "side"
78
), ID cards for all involved, the family notebooks 
for the two sides, the results of medical tests for genetic risk factors and a marriage request form 
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 In fact, witnesses were often drawn at random from the crowd of courthouse applicants, which would (under 
normal circumstances) make them quite difficult to find if the contract was ever called into question. This was 
ameliorated to some degree, however, by the incredible standardization and precision of the contemporary court 
procedure and the more or less unassailable integrity of contemporary court officials--who are generally too distant 
from the affairs they handle to be considered interested parties.  
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from the storeroom on the first floor. Assuming a relatively standard marriage involving a virgin 
"girl
79
" over the age of eighteen marrying a man with no other wives, there was no need to gain 
the permission of a judge or have a scribe write out special letters. The couple and their families 
could proceed directly from the copy machines on the first floor to the office of the head of 
writing (ra'īs al-kutāb). There, a sheikh (in the religious rather than tribal sense) was ready to 
officiate. His office was somewhat spacious with a large wooden desk, computer, printer, filing 
cabinets and coffee table. The walls were lined with armless pleather chairs. Normally, the 
sheikh would sit in the far left of the room behind the desk and I would sit to his right. I would 
introduce myself, explain that I was studying marriage and ask if I could observe. No one ever 
objected
80
. At first, the sheikh would begin by filling out an elicitation form, which would later 
be painstakingly hand-copied by a scribe onto the actual contracts using his beautifully formed 
yet legible and precise penmanship. The documents themselves provided most of the relevant 
personal information
81
 (name, age, place of birth, place of residency, marital status, occupation, 
national ID number), but the sheikh would usually double-check. One potentially touchy subject 
was the individuals' "social status": the sheikh would ask, "have you been engaged?" If not, a 
man would be classified as a [celibate] bachelor (‘azb) and a woman would be classified as a 
virgin (bikr). If someone had been engaged, it was up to court officials to determine if men were 
currently married, widowed, divorced or divorced before consummation and whether women 
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 In the parlance of the contemporary courts, virgin, never-married woman and girl are synonymous.  
80
 People did, however have interesting theories about why I was there. My favorite was, "that's the supervisor from 
the US embassy." Everyone involved was aware that US imperialism makes my research possible, but that did not 
mean that people were necessarily pessimistic about its outcomes. Most believed that my honest attempts to 
understand Islam could only have positive effects: perhaps it would increase cross-cultural understanding, help 
humanize the victims of US military aggression in the eyes of my countrymen, or even lead to my personal salvation 
by showing me the true religion.  
81
 I could go on at length about the various manipulations which documents prevent, but given space constraints I 
will mention only the most notorious: lying about the bride's age, pretending the groom is gainfully employed when 
he is not (although this is still possible to some degree under the current documentary regime) and trying to mask the 
existence of particular individuals lest they become subject to taxation or conscription.  
 140 
were widowed, divorced or divorced before consummation. Unsurprisingly, any socially adept 
contract-writer would try to make some sort of comment or joke about a few other aspects of the 
paperwork while filling it out to lighten the mood a bit and put everyone at ease.  
 With the basics out of the way, the sheikh would ask that the door be closed so he could 
begin the proceedings in earnest. He would usually ask the woman a number of times if she 
consented to the marriage, following the initial "do you agree?" with increasingly pointed 
formulations: "No one is coercing you?" "You're not being required to do this?" "You're sure?" If 
there was a large age difference, the man had another wife or the woman was still in school, the 
sheikh would explicitly raise these as possible objections that the bride might have before 
moving on. Next, the sheikh would ask about bridewealth and requirements--making sure to note 
whether or not the bridewealth had been received. Then, the sheikh would instruct the bride, 
groom, witnesses and guardian to sign the relevant forms including the sheet for eliciting the 
details of the contract (blue ink) and the three copies of the official contract (black ink): one for 
the woman's side, one for the man's side and a "stable copy" (al- qasīma thābita) which would 
remain in the courthouse.  
With that, the sheikh would begin to recite the formula (sīgha) for marrying the couple. 
He would start with a verse from the Quran (30:21). "In the name of God the compassionate and 
the merciful: 'And of His signs is that He created for you from yourselves mates that you may 
find tranquility in them; and He placed between you affection and mercy. Indeed in that are signs 
for a people who give thought' (trust in Almighty God)." The sheikh would then transition to a 
popular hadīth: "and the messenger of God (peace be upon him) said, ‘A woman is normally 
sought as a wife for her lineage, wealth, beauty, or religiousness, but choose a religious woman 
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and you will prosper
82.’ He would then ask the groom to "put your hand in the hand of your 
father's brother
83
" so that the bride's father could repeat the following formula: "I married you, 
my son [so-and-so], to my [virgin] daughter [so-and-so] for the agreed upon bridewealth and 
according to the book of God and the practices of God's messenger (Peace be Upon him)." Then 
the groom would be asked to repeat, "and I married your [virgin] daughter [so-and-so] for the 
agreed upon bridewealth and according to the book of God and the practices of God's messenger 
(Peace be Upon him)."  
After completing the formula, the sheikh (and myself) would congratulate the men and 
shake their hands. The Sheikh would tell the groom, "a thousand congratulations! Remember 
today's date: the date you cast off ‘azubiyya (bachelorhood/celibacy). The sheikh would ask the 
couple if they prayed. Normally, the bride would say yes and the groom would stammer out 
some sort of excuse. Sheikh Hussein (the contract-writer with whom I worked most closely) was 
fond of seizing on this and chastising the young man by referring to a popular hadīth which 
teaches that, "marriage is half of religion but prayer is the other half" before smiling, turning to 
the bride and instructing her, "you need to buy a whip and get him up every morning for the 
dawn prayer." As a final admonition, the sheikh would warn them that they were now married 
and that they should beware of divorce. He would explain that the contracts would be available 
for pickup the next week and then instruct them to pay a 35 Dinar fee "for the state" and 
"whatever you want" for the employees. 
Much of the court procedure is concerned with constituting and preserving evidence of 
the presence of the participants in all of its fully embodied dimensions. Here, the face, voice and 
hands figure prominently. Messick’s work on Yemeni court practices exaggerates and 
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 This is exactly the same formula that Abu Yehea used in the jāha 
83
 While many men do marry the daughter of their father's brother, the employees at the courthouse explained that, 
by marrying a man's daughter, all young men become their fathers-in-law's nephews.  
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accentuates some of the constitutive features the Jordanian case. He defines the muwajaha (the 
unimpeded face-to-face encounter) as the primary mode of governance in pre-republican Yemen. 
He notes a whole genre of social criticism which turned on derivations of the Arabic root h-j-b 
with its connotations of seclusion, concealment and, of course, veiling (hijjab) to critique the 
tendency of rulers to grow distant from their subjects. Messick writes, "proper and just 
'masculine' conduct is enacted through the regular presentation of one's face and through the 
secure medium of speech" as opposed to a "feminine" mode, which "relies on the concealment of 
the face and works through the dangerous medium of writing" (Messick 1993: 173). This 
gendered structural opposition of the masculine seen and the feminine unseen also extended to 
types of evidence. According to Yemeni legal manuals and mirroring aspects of the distribution 
of cognition described by Abu Riziq in the first part of chapter three, "contracts... conversion, 
witness evaluation and death" were the purview of men while "female virginity, childbirth, 
menstruation, breast feeding, and [female] physical defects under clothes" were part of the 
domain of women (Messick 1993:180). While Messick falls into the use of the English-language 
public/private dichotomy, it would perhaps be better to preserve the original Arabic vocabulary 
of zahir (seen) and batin (unseen) to keep close to the analytic categories of key social actors 
and, notably, the deeply embodied dimensions of that vocabulary. 
Infelicities 
 What renders contracts believable and admissible as evidence under Islamic law is not 
some fetishistic regard for the written word but, to the contrary, a recognition of the way in 
which a contract emerges from an agonistic and highly visible face-to-face encounter and carries 
with it the undeniable indexical linkages of stamp, fingerprint, handwriting and/or signature 
which connect it to the bodies of known individuals and, by extension, the outward performance 
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of volitional acts by the various principles (Messick 1993: 209-230). These, in turn, are 
connected to the hand which gives and the hand which receives. The best way to illustrate this 
orientation of court procedures towards the prevention of subsequent conflict is to focus on cases 
where participants disagree openly and vociferously about the nature of the their relationships. 
Such conflicts (which I refer to here as infelicities) help illustrate the powers and limits of court 
documents and procedures. J.L. Austin developed the idea of infelicities to understand how 
utterances like ‘I do’ (in the context of a marriage ceremony, say) can actually ‘make it so’ or 
fail to—given certain “felicity” conditions. A focus on infelicity highlights the both the strength 
and frailty of social orders in the face of various “abuses” and “misfires” (1962:14-15). To 
borrow from a more materialist tradition, one could also look at these infelicities as 
“breakdowns” in the “information infrastructure” of the courts. As Susan Star argues, such 
infrastructure, “becomes visible upon breakdown… the server is down, the bridge washes out, 
there is a power blackout. Even when there are backup mechanisms or procedures, their 
existence further highlights the now-visible infrastructure” (2000:382). By focusing on tension, 
conflict, breakdown, and infelicity, it is possible to see the courthouse’s antagonism towards the 
power of extended kin groups and their delegations as well as the coexistence of the two rival 
rituals for contracting a marriage.  
At the most basic level, there were moments during fieldwork when the requirements of 
presence created more or less insurmountable obstacles to those hoping to marry. These ranged 
from the silly to the tragic. At the latter extreme was the case of the Syrian bride trying to marry 
a Jordanian man and escape the civil war tearing her home country apart. The Syrian embassy 
had sent her brother (her legal guardian) back to Syria to get some documents. While en route, he 
was apprehended by the police and held incommunicado. The groom tried to put on a good face 
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and initially told Hussein that, “her father is dead, her brother is in Syria, but her cousin (father’s 
brother’s son) and mother are here.” Hussein said that none of these would suffice. “Would you 
let your mother marry your sister?” he snapped. The man then snapped back, explaining the 
situation and ending by pointing to her (rather lanky) cousin in the hall, “they held that man for 
one month! He was 100 kilos (220 pounds) before!” It was only by obtaining written proof from 
the Ministry of the Interior that she had no male relatives from her immediate family in the 
country that she could be married--"in the name of the court." At the more ridiculous extreme 
was the case of the man who declared that the woman's guardian was "really fat... too big to fit 
through the staircase.” More intermediate were cases where fathers were far away on business 
for long periods of time. Mirroring the logic of the tribal delegation, families would generally try 
to cover up this discrepancy by multiplying relatives--as if a mother, two brothers and a father's 
brother should make up for the lack of the father. I never saw this gambit succeed.  
 The insistence on physical presence and face-to-face encounter is tied to particular 
assumptions about power relations and constellations of interest within the family. Of course, the 
courthouse as an interactional space for contracting marriages is a rather recent phenomenon
84
 
(see figures 8, 9, and 10 in the first appendix). Men and women could encounter more or less 
coercive conditions in the setting of the contract. While even their presence in the courthouse 
(normally surrounded by mother, father and other relatives) might not seem like the ideal context 
for judging consent, it probably opens up more opportunities for dissent than the setting 
established within the home for the traveling contract-writer. A man once emphasized this to me 
by relating stories 'from long ago,' of families who dealt with reluctant brides by having a sister 
impersonate her recalcitrant sibling and consent to the marriage from behind a door or screen to 
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 Precisely mirroring recent developments in Yemen (Messick 1993:195), there is a movement of Jordanian court 
activities from people's homes to officially sanctioned, single-use spaces (courts) in keeping with a broader 
movement among many political actors worldwide to implement a Weberian division of person and office.  
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fool the ma’dhun into believing the marriage was lawful. Such stories emphasize the fact that 
Sharia (much like other systems of law) is forced to operate at the level of surface-level facts (the 
seen) while refusing to delve deeply into motives, intent and the subtleties of indirect speech--
thus Hussein's insistence that women loudly declare their intentions in contravention of other 
gendered ideals of feminine comportment. At times, Hussein would say, "raise your voice my 
sister!" Yet the system of guardianship still relies on the assumption that the interests of the bride 
and her guardian are aligned, if not unproblematically, then at least more so than they are with 
any other figure who could be defined in the abstract for legal purposes.  
 Of course, no one believed for a second that a woman's interests necessarily coincided 
with those of her guardian. In fact, employees at the Sharia Courts often took it upon themselves 
to shame and cajole wayward guardians. Such men were often accused of "selling their women" 
and neglecting their financial obligations to them. Employees were aided in such activism by 
court procedures that required additional paperwork (in other words, threw up additional hurdles) 
for marriages which were known to involve a high probability of abuse and exploitation: 
polygamy, young brides, and marriages involving foreigners. Yet despite their attempts to drag 
out the process and give women the opportunity to voice their displeasure, I never saw it happen. 
In fact, I remember a number of cases where the male staff of the courthouse seemed much more 
scandalized than the women in question. In one particular case that sticks out in my mind, 
Hussein created hours worth of paperwork for a particular guardian who had married one of his 
other sisters to a man who later proved to be quite abusive. In this case, however, the sister 
seemed happy to be marrying a wealthy old man who would likely be dead soon anyway--
thereby freeing her from her brother once and for all.  
 146 
  If the face, voice, and hands are intimately connected to the validity of the contract, so 
too are the conditions of its storage. The system of three contracts distributed amongst the two 
sides with a final "stable copy" held by the court was designed to render documents like marriage 
contracts more convincing as evidence. However, as the following exchange illustrates, both 
employees and applicants of the court were quite nuanced in their appraisals of putative 
evidence: 
Two women (a mother and daughter) walked into Hussein’s office. The mother 
wore jilbāb (a kind of hood which drapes down to the stomach and back) and a 
matching dress with a green floral pattern. Her daughter was about nineteen and 
wore a hijjāb. The daughter began, “There was a familial problem and they 
divorced me.” Hussein replied, “ignore it.” (la taruddī: lit. "don't respond"). He 
then began to ask a series of questions to settle certain matters of fact while trying 
to put their minds at ease: 
 
Hussein: Is there consummation (dukhūl)? 
Women: Yeah 
Hussein: Is there pregnancy? 
Women: No 
Hussein: What does your husband say? 
Mother: He didn’t say anything. But he only responds to his father. 
Hussein: Ignore it. Did you marry his father? 
Mother and Daughter (smiling a bit): No 
Hussein: Then ignore it. What’s the bridewealth? 
Mother: You had 3000 upfront and 5000 delayed. 
Hussein: And you received it? 
Daughter: No. I didn’t receive anything. Even the clothes! 
Hussein: If he divorced you all of that is on his head. 
Mother: But there are connections (wasṭāt)… Can you make sure he hasn’t 
already divorced her?  
Hussein: No, Haji. There aren’t any connections. That’s impossible. No one can 
be divorced without knowing it.  
Daughter: I’m military. Thank God nobody is coercing me [to marry] (fīsh ḥada 
yaghaṣibnī) but I have been engaged before—I divorced before consummation.  
Hussein: Don’t be afraid. If you’re a lawful woman and a woman of the people, 
don’t be afraid. 
Daughter: How am I going to bring my possessions? 
Hussein: Ask. And if he doesn’t respond bring the police. 
Mother: That will destroy everything. There’s nothing without connections… 
Hussein: What’s his name?  
Mother: ________  
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Hussein: Oh. His relatives are in “the pen” [al-qalam: they are scribes]. Don’t 
respond (la taruddī). The judge won’t respond to him. The judge only listens to 
the two partners.  
Mother: But connections! 
Hussein: He’s just a scribe. Don’t be afraid of talk like that… 
 
At this point, Hussein took the unusual step of talking to the employees who were related to the 
man in question (one of whom happened to be taking a sick day) and intimating that "with all of 
these corruption investigations" they should be careful and might want to consider getting a 
lawyer should they choose to involve themselves in this matter. Yet even acknowledging such 
potential weak links in the chain of authentication should not mean reducing such documents to 
mere fetish objects whose power is merely a condensation of arbitrary social relations. Contracts 
are stored in bound books and numbered--making them difficult to remove or replace. The 
handwriting of the contract-writer is distinctive and it would certainly raise eyebrows if different 
copies of the same contract were written in different hands or had signatures which looked 
markedly different from one another. Valid contracts must also bear official seals which, while 
perhaps more vulnerable to appropriation by wayward employees, are also even harder for 
outsiders to forge.  
 More striking than the possibility of forgery, however, is the notion that the contract can 
be understood as false in a certain sense about the prior particulars of the future arrangement (in 
this case that, while the contract claims the bridewealth has been paid, it in fact has not been 
paid) yet still fundamentally valid. The reason is that, once again, assumptions about the felicity 
of documents in Islamic law are always conditional on the manner in which they emerge from 
face-to-face encounters. So while a contract might be taken as sufficient proof of marriage 
(assuming no obvious signs of forgery), this does not mean that the particulars and especially the 
payment of bridewealth will be taken at face value. Nor will the acceptance of the fact that the 
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bridewealth was fraudulently recorded on the contract as already paid invalidate the contract. 
Such moves, while perhaps more in keeping with Anglo notions of contract law, would be seen 
as an unacceptable abridgement of the woman's rights--no doubt compounding the oppression 
(ẓulim) she suffered in being denied her right to bridewealth in the first place.  
 In short, the contemporary system of Sharia in Jordan is deeply concerned with 
establishing particular kinds of evidence of the agreement of particular individuals within a 
particular interactional context and then registering that consent via indexical linkages that 
connect the document to the bodies of those present. The system then relies on the ability to 
securely store such documents and prevent their manipulation by relying on the assumed 
divergence of interests between the two "sides" to create a self-policing system in which neither 
the bride nor the groom's side can alter the document without the other crying foul and 
immediately presenting compelling evidence to back up the accusation of forgery. The 
acceptance of documents as evidence, however, is always done with reservations and this should 
not be taken as a sign of backwards enthrallment with the spoken word but rather as part and 
parcel of the jaundiced view of human behavior characteristic of Sharia practitioners which has 
been gained from over 1300 years of hard-won experience.  
Changing forms of Individual and Collective Voice 
 As Messick himself emphasizes, though, Sharia is a diverse and often surprisingly 
polyglot legal discourse which is highly sensitive to time and place and endlessly adaptable. 
There are crucial divergences between the historical context of the Jordanian case and that of the 
Yemeni case. Where Messick's interlocutors describe a deep history encompassed by the phrase 
The Calligraphic State, my own interlocutors emphasized the neglect of Ottoman rulers and the 
subsequent entry onto the political scene of the Hashemites and the British. More importantly, 
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even during the twentieth century, there has been a good deal of change in Sharia court 
procedures. By focusing on the development of three fields on the marriage contract template in 
my archive spanning the years 1926-2011, it becomes apparent that Sharia courts have come to 
assert themselves more and more in the face of customs associated with the delegation. Whether 
focusing on the development of field for "the agent," the field for "the bridewealth," or the field 
for "requirements," the courts appear to be ever more directly and pointedly targeting many of 
the practices of extended kin groups that Islamic jurists have been criticizing for centuries. 
Foremost among these are questions surrounding women’s consent to marriage, the payment of 
her bridewealth, and the insurance of her proper maintenance after marriage. As they 
problematize such issues, court procedures respond to and facilitate the elaboration of new forms 
of moral agent endowed with new forms of individual and collective voice. While these more 
individual forms of moral agent and voice assert themselves in the interactional space of the 
courthouse, the more collective forms of moral agent and voice tend to work through the 
aggregation and dissemination of statistics and the accompanying social commentary. In the last 
twenty years in particular, the knowledge practices of the courts have contributed to the 
emergence of two new forms of moral agent in particular: the spinster and the person divorced 
before the consummation of their marriage. 
Genealogies of the Contract 
 As explained in chapter three, the first form-contracts in Jordan were introduced during 
the late-Ottoman period in an explicit bid to conform more closely to Western notions of textual 
authority and bureaucratic administration. While my systematic engagement with court records 
begins with the year 1926, my piecemeal and unsystematic knowledge of earlier Ottoman 
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contract forms
85
 leads me to suspect that the trends I discuss hold true beginning somewhere 
around the 1880s. Throughout this section, I recommend referring liberally to Figures 8, 9, and 
10 in the appendix and the accompanying translations. The early contracts are striking for how 
little of the involvement of the couple they evince. In many cases, there is no signature, stamp or 
thumbprint from either bride or groom. For some, the consent of the two parties is not even 
mentioned: we merely learn of an agreement between the wakīl (agent) of the bride and the agent 
of the groom. Yet even the earliest contracts attempt to elicit a fair amount of information about 
the various participants: name, age, place of residence, employment and religion. The early 
contracts already ask about the date of the contract, the witnesses, and the contract-writer along 
with the bridewealth. Yet attempts to properly classify and enumerate nuptial exchanges have 
also had subversive effects as categories proliferate and—at times—come into their own as fully-
fledged moral agents.  
 Perhaps one of the most notable shifts in power relations catalyzed by court procedure is 
the change from wakīl (agent) to wāli (guardian) over the course of the twentieth century and the 
accompanying emergence of the bride as an indispensable party to the marriage contract. While 
the earliest forms tend to downplay the role of the bride, they make no mention of the guardian at 
all. The forms simply request that the contract writer record that the marriage was "accepted as 
legitimate as issued from" agents representing bride and groom. At the bottom of the earliest 
form, there are spaces for the "[agent of] the groom
86
" and the "agent of the bride and receiver 
[of the bridewealth]" to sign. This signified the assumption at the time that bridewealth would 
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 A number of Jordanians have kindly shared marriage contracts with me from their family archives that date back 
to the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries that were issued by the Jerusalem courthouse. I also had an opportunity to 
look through the archives of the Salt Courthouse during my preliminary research, where I found bound notebooks of 
contracts dating back to the 1880s. 
86
 Note that the sample contract from the 1920s in the appendix actually asks for the groom's signature. In the 
earliest contracts, contract writers would add the word "agent" to the form above the stamp, thumbprint or signature 
of the groom's agent as necessary. This changed with the revamping of the contracts in the 1950s and has remained 
the same subsequently: the form is now phrased, "the groom or his agent."  
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not go to the woman but rather to her agent. This was further emphasized through the use of the 
formulaic phrase "received in the hand of the agent of the bride [so-and-so] with her permission" 
following the bridewealth in the majority of contracts. In fact, my sample of 377 contracts from 
the Amman courthouse spanning the years 1926 to 1953 shows that in most cases, the agents 
were what would now be considered guardians (see Tables 17, 18 and 19 in the appendix for 
more information). Over half of brides' agents were fathers. There are also a number of boundary 
cases where the agent might very well have been what the contemporary court would consider 
the guardian given the low life expectancies of the era: 21% of agents were brothers of the bride, 
8% were father's brothers, 1% were grandfathers and 1% of agents were father's brother's sons. 
In 17 cases the bride represented herself and in five cases she represented herself along with her 
father or brother acting in some sort of guarantor capacity. Yet there are a sizable minority of 
contracts in which the agent clearly diverges from the guardian. In fully 11% of contracts, I can 
discern no relationship between the bride and her agent despite the fact that every Arab name 
includes the names of the person's father and grandfather along with a family name. 
Additionally, two contracts list the ma’dhun as the agent and six list the mother's brother—
neither of which has ever had any particular standing in Islamic law. Even where the agent is 
listed as a relative through the patriline, there are clear examples where the father appears in the 
contract as receiver of the bridewealth but not as the agent. Whereas the bride's role as an active 
agent in the contract process is muted in the early years, the groom's position has been more 
pronounced throughout the twentieth century. A full 88% of men in the sample of contracts acted 
as their own agent--clearly reflecting the gendered assumptions about autonomy and consent.  
 Yet a statistical approach and the discovery of regularities should not overly bias our 
understandings of the shifting role of the agent and the emergence of the guardian. Even if 90% 
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of contracts involved the bride’s guardian, her ability to marry without her guardian (for better or 
worse) is significant in understanding the grounds for the social recognition of marriage. 
Moreover, even a single contract can expand the definition of what is possible. In this regard, the 
most striking of the contracts in my sample is contract number 12175. This contract concerns a 
young couple from Mahata (a village which was later incorporated into Amman) who married in 
1952. The man was a 21 year-old carpenter and the woman was an 18 year-old virgin. No 
occupation is listed for her. Yet in this contract, she was not only listed as receiving her own 
bridewealth (a practice which was becoming more common at the time) but also as acting as her 
own agent despite being a virgin—a practice with which current court officials refuse to involve 
themselves. Her father and brother's presence is attested to but, unlike other contracts, they 
served as mere witnesses. It is, of course, hard to know what circumstances led to this unique 
document's genesis, but it should serve as a reminder of how enumeration and record-keeping 
can create new social possibilities. 
 The bridewealth field of the contract shows similar tendencies of regimes of enumeration 
and classification to produce new categories and help elaborate older sets of concerns among 
court officials about the status of emergent moral agents
87
. Up until the 1940s, the category of 
bridewealth is rather boring in the sample. With the exception of three contracts, it simply lists 
the amount of money or gold. The three outliers include: "12 'amm asōda" (black headwraps), 
"Plot of land worth 20 Palestinian Guineas and 15 head of goat worth 10 Palestinian Guineas," 
and "5 plots of land rented for 2 years at a price of 16 lira; 4 lira of wheat, 20 lira of labor." As 
figures 36 and 37 show, the amount of bridewealth paid is surprisingly consistent during the 
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 For more on how women in the Arab world have long pursued complex and intricate strategies 
to maximize their bridewealth and secure it for posterity, see the work of Martha Mundy (1979), 
Diane Singerman (1995:109-121), and Homa Hoodfar (1997) 
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early years—suspiciously so. No matter the currency (Ottoman Lira, Palestinian Guineas, 
Palestinian Lira), the amount of upfront bridewealth remains within a consistent and narrow 
band. It actually converges ever more closely on the number 30 over the course of the twenties 
and thirties before exploding in diversity during the 1940s. The recurrence of one number over 
and over in the contracts implies that the field was being treated by officials and applicants at 
court as pro-forma and not taken seriously. In at least one case, I was actually able to find the son 
of a man who was a party to one such "30 in bridewealth
88
" contracts. Without any prompting, 
the man told me that his father "was an expensive man. He gave 35 dunnum (35,000 square 
meters) of land as bridewealth." When I told him the amount of bridewealth written on the 
contract, he seemed unconcerned with the discrepancy ("a dunnum was like a lira"). In fact, after 
looking through 67 contracts involving members of a single local tribe, I found that every single 
one of them had the same bridewealth (30 Palestinian Guinea received in the hand of her 
guardian with her permission) and there was no evidence whatsoever of the ubiquitous mentions 
of land transfers as bridewealth which I found in the oral historical record.  
 In the 1940s, everything changes, implying an explosion of interest on the part of 
applicants and court officials about bridewealth: suddenly, bridewealth payments are all over the 
map and many include long and involved lists of home furnishings. The following entry is 
perhaps the most precise, but also indicative of the era: "50 Guinea Wardrobe with mirror; 18 
Guinea for 6 chairs; 40 Guinea Carpet; 10 Guinea Bed; 30 Guinea for 2 Wool Mattresses, 2 
Cotton Blankets, 4 Wool Pillows, 3 small tables; 50 Guinea radio; 1 kilo" (I can only assume the 
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 I often asked myself (and anyone who would listen): why 30, 300 or 3000 (the most common numbers)? No one 
had any idea. The number three shows up with alarming frequency for reasons no one can explain. Initially, I was 
convinced I must have been entering the data incorrectly. But after double and triple-checking, I determined that the 
discovery must be an effect of the confluence of the peculiar knowledge practices of both the courts and myself. The 
number three does have a lot of significant resonances: the number of days of the wedding and the number of days 
one is expected to provide hospitality, but no one ever made those connections without my mentioning them.  
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contract-writer got impatient at this point in the list of bridewealth). My initial hypothesis was 
that, as the state grew in power, it would begin recording the arrangements of those outside of 
the cash economy--providing a record of "traditional" bridewealth exchanges. In fact, the early 
contracts show no such evidence. When people do begin enumerating the bridewealth in detail, it 
is not peasants or farmers (those who it turns out are most likely to record 30 whatever) but 
rather those members of the community most closely aligned with the market and the state: 
merchants, soldiers, and government employees. By the 1950s, this practice of listing the various 
objects had fallen out of fashion but the new forms also introduced a new category: tawāba‘a 
(non-monetary bridewealth). These were inevitably recorded in monetary terms (so many dinar 
for clothes, so many dinar for furniture, so many dinar for gold). There seems to have been an 
insistence that some amount of money be placed in the monetary field, which led to the practice 
of writing "one Jordanian dinar" in the field for monetary bridewealth and then enumerating the 
actual bridewealth in the tawāba‘a field. During my fieldwork, nearly a decade after the category 
of tawāba‘a was abandoned, people were still regularly showing up to court and specifying the 
"one Jordanian dinar" in addition to much larger amounts of furniture, gold and clothing, 
implying the depth of the mutual adjustment between courthouse officials and applicants.  
 Much as with the "bridewealth" field, the "requirements" field seems to indicate that 
people tend to abhor an unused or underutilized field on a form almost as much as they abhor 
and overly baroque field. The "requirements" field appears with the 1950s revamp of the 
contracts and, to say the least, never made up a large percentage of the contracts: there are only 
13 contracts involving requirements in the primary Madaba courthouse sample out of a total of 
355. In addition to this, there is a single contract from the Amman courthouse dated 1945 (prior 
to the introduction of a dedicated field for requirements) involving a local trader, which 
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stipulates "2000 Guinea [extra bridewealth] if they leave Amman." Counting this contract as an 
early attempt by applicants and a particular ma’dhun to add a requirement to the contract, that 
makes a total of about 14 contracts out of 732 involving requirements. Yet the very existence of 
the field seemed to exert marked effects. When I broached the topic of requirements, men would 
often scoff that no one should marry someone if they trusted them so little that they felt the need 
to stipulate requirements. Others felt it was an abridgement of their rights to marry four women 
or move around as they saw fit. Yet the mere requirement that court employees ask about such 
issues obviously provoked intra-familial discussion and influenced the course of events as the 
following exchange illustrates: 
Hussein: How much is the bridewealth? 
[Silence] 
Hussein: You agreed beforehand, right? 
Groom: Put one Jordanian dinar… Five thousand dinars gold for the ma'jil 
(upfront bridewealth) and 10,000 mo’jil (bridewealth in case of divorce)…  
Witness (a random person from the courthouse): Blessings, God Willing
89
.  
Groom: Actually I requested it. They said three thousand, but I said five thousand 
Hussein: Requirements? 
[Silence] 
Hussein (not sure if this was serious): Should I put that he can only marry once? 
Uncle: Can you do that? 
Hussein: It just means that marrying a second wife would divorce him from his 
first 
Mother: Put “finish her studies” 
Hussein: She’s in university? What year? 
Bride: Fourth year 
Hussein: Has the bridewealth been received? 
Groom: Not yet. 
  
As this exchange shows, an initial impetus to enumerate and document bridewealth has, over 
time, dragged the government ever-more deeply into internal familial dynamics while opening 
up new grounds for contesting the legitimate role of various moral agents.  
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 This seems like a none-too-subtle insult: there’s a saying of the prophet khifif al-mahr kithir al-baraka which 
basically means “lessen the bridewealth increase the blessing." Men went to great lengths to exert social pressure on 
each other to avoid inflating bridewealth payments. In fact, most men told me not to pay attention to bridewealth at 
all. At the same time, women went out of their way to emphasize the importance of attending to bridewealth.  
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 The increasing interest of courthouse procedures in brides, guardians, bridewealth, and 
requirements puts the courts somewhat at odds with the goals and aims of the delegation. The 
emergent courthouse procedures are designed to foster new forms of ever more individuated 
voice within the interactional setting of the face-to-face encounters so central to all marriage 
contracts involving the Jordanian Sharia Courts. Following on centuries of juridical commentary 
about the depredations that tribal customs are believed to inflict on women, court procedures 
increasingly fixate on questions of consent, the payment of bridewealth, and requirements for the 
wife’s appropriate maintenance after marriage. Whether or not brides (or their male guardians or 
grooms) are able to effectively articulate their individual aspirations through these voicing 
mechanisms represents another matter—one that I am hesitant adjudicate. In many respects, it is 
impossible to do so without also looking at the forms of collective voice that emerge as data 
about marriage is aggregated through statistics and turned into fodder for new modes of social 
criticism that claim to speak on behalf of social categories constituted largely through court 
procedures themselves. 
The Islamic Movement and the Reappropriation of Sharia Court Data 
 The impulse for enumeration, at times coming from applicants and at times coming from 
court officials, has slowly enmeshed the Sharia Courts, the Jordanian state and something we can 
only call "Jordanian Society" within a system of accountability not fully of their own devising. 
An Islamic NGO called the Chastity Society (al-'afāf) epitomizes this trend as it uses the 
published statistics of the courts to highlight and develop two novel moral agents: the spinster 
and the person divorced before the consummation of their marriage. The Chastity Society's 
publications are filled with direct references to the statistics contained in the annual reports 
produced by the Sharia Courts as the Society seeks to raise awareness about what they see as a 
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"crisis of marriage." Certainly, the Chastity Society is quite willing to take statistics from 
anywhere to bolster their case: the Jordanian Department of Statistics, the United Nations and the 
Sharia Courts of neighboring countries all figure prominently in their bibliographies. But what 
makes this form of marriage crisis discourse notably different from earlier iterations
90
 is the way 
in which the Sharia Court's system of record keeping focuses attention on processes of 
governance and the state itself. It also molds the terms of the debate into a more Islamic cast and, 
with the idea of a crisis of ‘divorce before consummation,’ the knowledge practices of the courts 
become the condition of possibility for significant aspects of the emergent marriage ‘crisis.’ 
 One of the first indicators that activists working with the Chastity Society tend to use in 
publications about this "crisis of marriage" is the annual number of marriage contracts. 'Adal 
Badraneh's (2009) The Guide: Indicators of Marriage and Divorce in Jordan (Al-Dalīl: 
Mu‘shrāt Al-Zawāj wa Aṭ-ṭalāq fī Al-Ordan) is typical. He begins with the "First Indicator: 
General Rate of Marriage." This is calculated using the following formula: 1000 x (The Number 
of Marriage Contracts in a Particular Year/Population in the Same Year). Beneath Badraneh 
credits his sources: "Sharia Courts and Churches.” In the early years of the Chastity Society, the 
figures were quite compelling: in Faruq Badran and Mufid Sarhan's (1999) Spinsterhood: The 
Reality, The Causes and The Solutions (Al-‘anūsiyya: -Al-Wāqa‘ -Al-Asbāb -Al-Halūl), the first 
table details a secular decline from a rate of 10.1 marriages per year per 1000 people in 1993 to 
8.1 in 1998.  
 However, by 2009 when The Guide was published, the rate of marriage was increasing 
and, it should be added, the political opponents of the Chastity Society were responding with 
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 In Hanan Kholoussy’s (2010) For Better or Worse: The Marriage Crisis that Made Modern Egypt, statistics are 
notably absent, which does not stop people from complaining about a crisis of bachelorhood or spinsterhood. Yet it 
seems to render the crisis more diffuse. As a result, the culprits seem more like the stuff of quotidian family dramas. 
The colonial state is largely ignored in favor of critiques of over-protective parents, feckless young men, and finicky 
young women. 
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their own reports. In 2010, Professor 'Issah Masarweh at Jordan University (a Christian and self-
described liberal), explained to me that this "crisis of marriage" was little more than an attempt 
by the Muslim Brotherhood to make the regime look bad. He gave me an article he was working 
on for the Higher Council for Population Growth to emphasize this point. In "Delayed Marriage 
and Celibacy among Women and Jordan: Celibacy or Spinsterhood! Is there Reason to Worry? 
Analysis of Marriage Trends in the Last two Decades" (Ta‘akhir Al-Zawāj wa Al-‘Azūbiyya bayn 
Al-Unāth fī Al-Ordan: ‘Azūbiyya um ‘Anūsiyya! Hal Hunāk ma Yabirir Al-Qalaq? Tahlīl Lil-
Itijāhāt fī Al-'Aqidayn Al-Maḍiyayn) Masarweh (2010) Masarweh gleefully throws the general 
average rate of marriage back at his political opponents and argues that the "crisis of marriage" is 
a sort of ideological displacement of broader anxieties about social change in the region--
specifically relating to shifting gender roles, new technology and economic challenges. Of 
course, by the late 2000s, the debate had already shifted with writers from the Chastity Society 
focusing more and more on statistics which divided marriage rates by age (available through the 
Department of Statistics and the Civil Status Office). By focusing only on those over 15, the 
declining rates of marriage reappeared
91
 and the trends towards higher rates of spinsterhood 
(defined by all involved as being an unmarried woman over the age of 25) seemed highly likely. 
By 2011, even Masarweh admitted that the data spoke for itself: there were in fact increasing 
rates of spinsterhood--although as someone committed to fighting population growth Masarwah 
saw this as a positive development and continued to council against any action to facilitate 
marriage
92
.  
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 The distortion is due to a particularly large age cohort (basically an Arab baby boom) finally reaching 
marriageable age. While this increases the overall number of marriage contracts and even the overall rate, the 
decline in the relative number of unmarried--and unmarriageable--pre-teens tends to mask the overall decline in 
marriage rates among those actually capable of marriage 
92
 Masarweh's stated opinions on marriage seemed at odds with the hadīth he used at the beginning of his paper: "O 
young men, whoever among you has the ability should marry; for it helps him lower his gaze and guard his modesty, 
and whoever is not able to marry, should fast." 
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 Keeping track of the number of marriage contracts makes it possible for outside groups to 
hold the state accountable in ways that would otherwise be unthinkable. The issue is more than 
the mere existence of an embarrassing set of figures here or there. The fact that activists from the 
Chastity Society continued to foreground the number of marriage contracts and the rate of 
marriage long after it ceased to unambiguously bolster their argument calls into question a 
simple reading of their appropriation of official statistics as opportunistic. Building on the earlier 
work of Jürgen Habermas, Michael Warner (2002) has proposed the concept of the 
"counterpublic" to describe the ways in which the circulation of media can help construct both 
communities and oppositional associations of critics. I would argue that contracts are one such 
media: the circulation of contracts helps construct various categories of moral agent (the agent, 
the guardian, the spinster, the person divorced before consummation and even, perhaps the 
Jordanian citizen) who can then hold the state accountable to various Islamic standards. It could 
further be argued that quantifying media like contracts (perhaps more than other media) can help 
create such moral agents because, as Theodore Porter notes in Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of 
Objectivity in Science and Public Life, "adequate measurement, clearly, means disciplining 
people as well as standardizing instruments and processes" (1996: 28). As Badraneh makes clear, 
the point of the exercise is to understand "the effect of economic and social factors in 
interpreting this phenomenon" (2009: 36). Yet without a state collecting such data in such a 
minutely disciplined fashion, it would be much more difficult to argue for the existence of a 
coherent "economy" and "society" which should be refashioned in accordance with a specific 
political agenda. In this case, it turns out that the state's systematic collection of data about the 
population serves a coordinating function for potential dissidents, political opportunists and 
malcontents alike.  
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 A second highly abstracted moral agent, which owes even more to the court's knowledge 
practices, is the person divorced before the consummation of their marriage. In recent years, the 
court's Annual Statistical Report (Al-Taqrīr Al-Iḥsa'ī Al-Sinawī) has included a breakdown of 
divorces into four categories: divorce before consummation (aṭ-ṭalāq qabl al-dakhūl), revocable 
divorce (aṭ-ṭalāq al-raja'ī), and two levels of irrevocable divorce (aṭ-ṭalāq al- al-bā’in). In this 
case, two things are striking: the increasing prevalence of divorce (representing a 25% increase 
from 12,000 per year in 2006 to 15,000 per year in 2010) and the increasing precision with 
which people's "social statuses" are being recorded and taken up as sociological categories by 
activists and relatively apolitical citizens alike. This is not to imply that the interest in social 
status is novel. To the contrary: despite the lack of an actual field for social status in the early 
contracts, my sample of contracts from the Amman Courthouse only includes 13 contracts which 
failed to reveal some information about this topic. Yet of the 377, 348 used one of two terms: 
270 brides are classified as virgin (bikr) and 78 are classified as previously married (thayyib). 
Nine are classified with euphemistic circumlocutions like "girl," "woman" or "woman of the 
house." What's striking is that, out of all 377, only four women are classified as divorcees and 
only one woman is classified as a widow: these terms only came into regular use in the 1950s. In 
another case, we learn that the woman was previously married to the same man
93
. The 
circumlocutions are gone now, but divorce before consummation has become a recognized social 
category since the late 1990s, joining the categories of divorcee and widow that came into wide 
use in the 1950s. All of them now appear in court documents as well as every day conversation. 
People who are divorced before consummation occupy a liminal status: they could have lost their 
virginity, but claim that nothing transpired in the time between the signing of the contract and the 
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 Presumably, he divorced her, they separated and he never completed the three utterances of the wish to divorce 
necessary to render it irrevocable. However, he did wait until the 3-menstrual cycle waiting period had ended to 
reconcile with his estranged wife--thus necessitating a new contract and a new bridewealth payment. 
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wedding that never happened. Divorce before consummation is a new and growing category, 
which is attracting attention and focusing broader and more diffuse anxieties: according the 
above chart, it made up over 40% of the total divorces in 2010.  
 
 The category of divorced before consummation represents a new stage in the ongoing 
negotiations between the ritual of the delegation and that of the court-sanctioned marriage 
contract. Unlike the temporal dilation implied by the customary model, which creates a liminal 
waiting period for the couple between the delegation and the wedding when their social status is 
ambiguous, court officials are adamant that the contract itself creates a marital bond. Nonetheless 
they continue to be forced to accommodate the practices of people who insist on treating the 
Figure 7: A pie chart displaying the relative prevalence of different kinds of divorce  
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wedding and consummation as the final constitutive act forming the legitimate marital bond. To 
understand the significance of this compromise, it is important to attend to the role of female 
Islamic activists in working with the courts to construct those divorced before consummation as 
the kind of moral agent endowed with collective voice that can make demands on the courts, 
families, the state, and society more broadly. 
 It would be a mistake to overplay the tensions between Islamic activists and the courts: 
much as the proliferation of categories can be used to critique the Jordanian government, they 
can also be used to critique Jordanian society. In this, activists and the courts can actually prove 
to be great allies. One example is Amal 'Abdeen's Divorce Before Marriage and in the First Year 
of Marriage: Social and Psychological Causes and Effects (Aṭ-Ṭalāq Qabl Al-Dakhūl wa fī As-
Sinna Al-Owla min Al-Zawāj: Al-Asbāb wa Al-Ithār Al-Nafsiyya wa Al-Ijtimā‘iyya)94. Her study 
for the Chastity Society, which she makes clear was possible due to the support of the Supreme 
Judge, attempts to understand the troubling increase in the divorce rate and particularly the 
increasingly prevalent phenomenon of divorce before consummation. After giving some 
background statistics from the usual sources, she gives the results of her survey of 50 women 
divorced before consummation and 50 women divorced in the first year. According to 'Abdeen, 
"the findings indicate that the most important reason for divorce among the divorced is a bad 
match, followed by familial interference, then lack of bearing responsibility, followed by 
subordination of the husband to his mother or another member of his family" (2010: 17). 
‘Abdeen ultimately advocates “consciousness-raising” (taw‘īya) through the media and the 
relevant ministries, including more “guidance for willing individuals” from the courts “before 
the case gets to the Judge,” and, of course, more research (2010:152). Through her use of survey 
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 This was originally written as a master's thesis at Jordan University before being published by the Chastity 
Society.  
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technology, she gives further voice (after a fashion) to the aspirations and concerns of a 
particular sort of moral agent, itself an emergent effect of the knowledge practices of the courts 
as they seek to come to terms with the local practices. 
‘Abdeen provides an eminently contestable diagnoses of "the problem" of divorce before 
consummation in Jordan, but her work is part and parcel of a kind of contestation that has only 
become thinkable through a long-term engagement with particular kinds of knowledge practices 
for enumeration, individuation and data storage. The Islamic Movement may try to position itself 
as a critical interlocutor vis-à-vis the state, but it also seeks to position itself as a moral 
alternative to the "tribal" system exemplified by the delegation which was described in the 
beginning of part two. Islamic activists, like Islamic jurists, work to redistribute agency, 
cognition and personhood itself within and outside of kinship structures. The goal of this chapter 
has not been to deliberate on the best distribution but rather to understand the practical, material 
and embodied means by which various individuals, collectivities, institutions, and political 
movements attempt to wrest people from their preexisting relationships and commitments and 
reconfigure their affiliations. In contemporary Jordan, these court and delegation rituals continue 
to coexist with each other despite the obvious tensions. 
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Part III: The Wedding: Greedy Institutions and the Privatization of Joys 
 
Chapter 5: The Feast 
 
“Tonight we set up the tent. Tomorrow there is dancing and tea and coffee. Then on Thursday 
we will have the wedding procession (fārida). We will drive to… the bride’s house. The bride and 
her mother will come back to [our village] with us. When she is here, we will shoot guns and 
there will be more singing and dancing. Then we will have the groom’s shower (hamām). We 
will eat kanāfa [a kind pastry made with phyllo dough, sugar and cheese] and drink Pepsi95 
(bibsī). After the shower, we will go back to the tent for more dancing and tea. Then comes the 
procession (zafāf): we will carry the groom to the women’s area. Then he goes in and dances 
with the bride. They go to his room. He sometimes serves her some food. Sometimes some juice. 
Sometimes, they wait 3 days. Sometimes it happens that night. Then, on the last day of the 
wedding, everyone eats mutton.” 
-Hamed, describing an upcoming wedding to a foreign anthropologist 
 
As in most times and places, weddings in contemporary Jordan serve as a rite of passage 
tied to the legitimization of marital unions and the children those unions produce. Yet weddings 
in Jordan are also increasingly used to embody particular sets of commitments to competing 
visions of Jordan’s future. The model of wedding described by Hamed (which aligns itself with 
objectified tradition and the prerogatives of the extended family) no longer goes unchallenged. 
With the elite leading the way, a growing percentage urbanites from across the economic 
spectrum have come to prefer abbreviated two-hour weddings at purpose-built wedding halls or 
hotel ballrooms. Meanwhile, participating in a trend in the broader Muslim world, the Islamic 
Charity the Chastity Society has begun organizing mass weddings that are even more pointedly 
and explicitly designed in opposition to traditional models of wedding. The emergence of new, 
competing models of wedding represents dynamism in what could be called, following Lamia 
Karim (2008), an “economy of shame” around weddings and marriage in Jordan, challenging not 
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 In rural Jordan, Pepsi is sometimes used as the generic term for carbonated beverages.  
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just the norms of hospitality at such events, but the very essence of the relations that such event 
are supposed to produce. With the emergence of multiple, mutually antagonistic ritual 
frameworks for marriage, the grounds of social struggle and contestation expand from being 
primarily indexical (who has the most meat and the most guests) to encompass important choices 
about iconically representing one’s allegiance to a certain vision of Jordan’s future and 
accompanying networks of patronage, care, and mutual defense.  
Unfortunately for participants, consciously pressing weddings into the service of such an 
ideological struggle carries with it certain hazards of representation (Keane 1997). For one thing, 
the necessity of actually enacting rituals like weddings ensures that all sorts of exigencies tied to 
their materiality can impinge on the consciously ideological projects that increasingly motivate 
them, like a can of Pepsi or a car in the midst of and otherwise rustic and traditionalistic tableau.  
In Jordan, just as houses and marriage proposals have been and continue to be large communal 
projects that create various kinds of social affinities, debts, and antagonisms, so too are weddings 
endlessly generative sites through which the social order either produces and reproduces itself or 
gives way to something new. In the case of weddings, the chief constraint is currently 
conceptualized as material.  
Looking back at Hamed’s description of the wedding from the perspective of people who 
often make $400 per month or less, the extravagance of the event looms large: the tent, the tea 
and coffee, the gas for the cars, the bullets, sweets, Pepsi, and meat. Such commodities circulate 
globally and, in many cases, track global commodities prices closely: the price of tea, coffee, 
gas, bullets, and Pepsi in Jordan is comparable to that in the United States despite the disparity in 
wages. So while even middle class Americans might balk at the prospect of providing such 
hospitality for hundreds of people, the relative cost for most Jordanians is downright exorbitant. 
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In some cases, most notably when it comes to meat, the high cost of food and land in Jordan 
conspires to make commodities far more expensive in Jordan than they would be in the United 
States: the cost of local meat in the market in Madaba rose from eight dinar per kilo in the 
summer of 2010 to thirteen dinar per kilo in the summer or 2012 (or from $11.28 to $18.33: one 
dinar was $1.41 at the time of research). As a result, the role of meat in weddings represents a 
powerful and oft-remarked upon indicator of the economic restructuring that Jordan is 
undergoing. It is an effective metonym for the ways in which population growth, urbanization, 
refugee influxes, privatization, and austerity create a denser, more crowded polity in which the 
struggle for resources and survival demands ever more in terms of money, time, and energy.  
In the first chapter of part three I argue that, in the context of this broader economic 
transformation, weddings increasingly emphasize ideological struggle and enter the mass-
mediated realm of global public culture. Elites in particular participate in the elaboration of an 
“economy of shame” around weddings through which older notions of honor and shame are 
“instrumentalized” (Karim 2008) to serve a novel, increasingly capitalistic order. In a cruelly 
ironic twist for the rural poor, those with differential access to capital are suddenly able to 
exceed their more parochial neighbors in their fealty to certain aspects of traditional standards of 
honor—both because they can afford it and because they can then use aspects of traditional 
standards of honor against those already marginalized. The proliferation of distinct, antagonistic 
models of wedding and the discourse around them indicates a high degree of self-consciousness 
about the ways in which weddings legitimate not just individual marital unions but an entire 
social, economic, and political order. The increasing focus on the wedding as a tool of 
ideological struggle may even magnify the hazards of representation associated with weddings, 
as it has with other forms of ritualized hospitality in Jordan (cf. Shryock 2004b). Just as promise 
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and hazard are two sides of the same coin, so it is easy to see how the promise of welcome 
entails the hazard of trespass; the promise of affinity entails the hazard of antagonism; the 
promise of honor entails the hazard of shame; the promise of generosity entails the hazard of 
greed. When weddings are expected to legitimate not just individual marital unions but an entire 
sociopolitical order on an enlarged stage, the stakes are perceived as even higher and any 
incidence of trespass, antagonism, shame, or greed is all the more explosive for its publicity. In 
chapter 6, I show how the Chastity Society has taken the wedding ritual as a relatively popular, 
grass-roots phenomenon and reorganized it to draw out these very hazards and opportunities in a 
way that undermines the rural, tribal, traditionalist sociopolitical order with which it contends. 
Yet where the members of the Chastity Society portrayed themselves as freeing youths from 
parochial bonds of debt obligation, their detractors portrayed the Society as nothing but a 
competing network of patronage. Enactments of Jordanian weddings thereby become a form of 
semiotic
96
 struggle over the future of their participants and Jordan as a whole. 
The Wedding as Semiotic Struggle 
 To emphasize the sheer geographic scope of the shift in wedding practices, it is useful to 
contrast the changes unfolding in Jordan with a perceptive study of weddings among Greek 
Cypriots entitled Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean: The Wedding as Symbolic 
Struggle, which the anthropologist Vassos Argryou (1996) conducted in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. He argues that Cypriot weddings, “have been transformed from rites of passage to rites of 
class distinction.” Argryou focuses on four major changes to Cypriot weddings: a shortening in 
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 My preference for the phrase ‘semiotic struggle’ in place of Vassos Argryou’s “symbolic struggle” (1996) should 
be seen not as a critique of Argryou but rather as an attempt to disassociate Argryou’s contributions from the older 
“symbolic turn,” which has tended to produce ethnographic studies that ignore exactly the forms of materiality 
which are crucial to both Argryou and my own ethnographic analyses of ritual. 
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duration, an increasing number of guests
97, the abandonment of the “ritual display of the bride’s 
virginity,” and a polarization of wedding types between two poles. The rural and urban working 
class “village” wedding is increasingly contrasted with a new truncated ceremony preferred by 
urban elites that is hosted in a hotel and eschews a full meal in favor of light snacks and 
beverages (Argryou 1996: 10-11). Both Cyprus and Jordan also have a third type of wedding 
(favored by urbanites who aspire to join the upper classes), which mixes elements of both—
normally involving the division of a more open celebration in a hall for one’s acquaintances from 
a more intimate gathering for purposes of shared commensality. All of this tracks remarkably 
closely to similar changes that have come about in Jordan—arguably for many of the same 
reasons: because wedding celebrations in Jordan, like Cyprus, increasingly express 
“antagonisms, mainly between social classes, but also between villagers and city dwellers, as 
well as between the generations” (Argryou 1996: 171). That being said, at least in Jordan, many 
of these antagonisms are both long-standing
98
 and have their limits—especially when they bump 
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 It is easy to overestimate the lavishness of pre-modern Jordanian weddings. I collected many accounts like the 
following: “My wedding lasted a whole week! People came from all around. Everyone was there. They came from 
Jurayna, Hisban, Mushagar and Ghornata. We slaughtered goats, and sang and danced. There were races. The 
women made bread. It was the sweetest thing!” It is easy to overlook a couple of key points here: the population 
density was very low in the 1950s, the poor quality of transportation infrastructure would have made it difficult to 
have a short wedding, and, most notably, the guests of the wedding performed all of the labor themselves—almost 
always during a lull in the agricultural cycle after the goats had stopped producing milk and the grain had been 
harvested. More intensive questioning often revealed that people’s weddings were modestly sized and heavily reliant 
on guests to bring meat, grain, coffee and sweets—even if those guests might linger with their hosts for days on end. 
98
 Weddings tend to emphasize unity, but disunity, antagonism and conflict generally linger just beneath the surface. 
As A.R Radcliffe-Brown noted, marriage is a “rearrangement of social structure” (1950:43) and it is hard to imagine 
such a rearrangement ever being free of conflict, whether between generations (cf. Boellstorff 1999; Cho 2009; Lash 
2006) or between affines (cf. Bristol-Rhys 2007; Carsten 1997; Nguyen and Belk 2013). More generally, as Nadia 
Yaqub has argued in her review of the prominent place that weddings hold in Palestinian cinema, “the integrity of 
the wedding as a Palestinian event to be conducted in a Palestinian space is disrupted… filmmakers question the 
existence and the efficacy of various binaries (public/private, cultural/political, spiritual/material) and explore the 
ramifications of defying these divisions” (2007:58). While it is the context of Israeli occupation that gives these 
films their rhetorical force and narrative arc, Yaqub points out that weddings often help to build up these kinds of 
binaries independently of such specific political conditions—only to necessarily break them down in order that the 
ritual may successfully affect a change in the social order. Thus while weddings may seem to embody the essence of 
propriety, there is (somewhat paradoxically) generally something at least a bit transgressive about them.  
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up against the continued necessity of maintaining older networks of clientage as well as the 
persistence of the wedding as rite of legitimation and passage. 
My introduction to Jordanian weddings as part and parcel of that rural system of clientage 
was almost imperceptible. As a Peace Corps volunteer, I attended engagements and weddings on 
a regular basis from virtually the moment I arrived since they were one of the primary venues for 
village sociality. All told, I would estimate that I have attended over fifty Jordanian weddings in 
my lifetime. The vast majority have been large, outdoor weddings, which lasted multiple days 
and involved hundreds of guests, dancing, pyrotechnics, and a lot of meat. While such weddings 
are increasingly rare in Jordan, it is easy for a foreign anthropologist to end up at one: they are 
highly open events, they welcome all guests and most importantly, Jordanians immediately 
recognize them as the kind of thing an American visitor can and should be interested in. 
Weddings exist somewhere along the borderlands of a zone of “cultural intimacy” which 
produces a mixture of social solidarity and acute embarrassment vis-à-vis the potentially judging 
gaze of outsiders (Herzfeld 1996; Shryock 2004a; 2004b). Yet despite receiving invitation after 
invitation to such weddings, I am highly cognizant of the fact that they represent a dwindling 
minority of weddings as new commercial wedding halls have continued to open their doors on a 
regular basis across Jordan year after year. It was much more rarely (here, my sample size is 
four) that I attended weddings in such wedding halls that normally lasted a few hours. These 
ranged in size from 80 guests to hundreds. Aside from these two types of wedding typical among 
average working Jordanians, I have attended one mass wedding, which I will discuss in great 
detail in the next chapter. 
It is no accident that I, a foreigner, saw far more of the rarer outdoor weddings than the 
more quotidian indoor weddings. The former are widely believed to epitomize what Jordan 
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University’s resident anthropologist Mahmud Na’amneh calls the country’s “intangible cultural 
heritage” (2009). Matching Professor Na’amneh’s enthusiasm for weddings, colleagues, 
acquaintances and near-strangers frequently invited me to taqlīdī (traditional) or sha‘abī 
(popular) weddings—often promising me fulkur aṣlī (authentic folklore). It would be easy to take 
aim at the authenticity claims of my hosts and point out the irony that these multi-day outdoor 
weddings are becoming fodder or “local content” for what Andrew Shryock has called “a 
cultural interzone that, in Jordan, is framed and continually remodeled using concepts drawn 
from the English language and the globalizing policy discourses that flourish in it” (2004b:44). 
However, it is more fruitful to follow Shryock’s approach and try to understand the struggles, 
accomplishments and even pleasures of Jordanian elites and commoners as they position 
themselves carefully in regards to this cultural interzone.  
Emerging norms around weddings increasingly impose somewhat contradictory 
imperatives on Jordanians, demanding the display of proper deference to tradition before certain 
(predominantly local, lower class) audiences
99
 while simultaneously demanding space for ironic 
or analytic distance in relationship to other (primarily upper-class, cosmopolitan) audiences. My 
own positionality as more of the latter than the former made me intensely aware of the balancing 
act people confronted in this regard. I will begin by describing the kinds of promises and hazards 
of representation with which the lower classes contend (the life cycle, reproduction, bounty and 
scarcity) and how these drive people to either have a multi-day outdoor wedding or a brief 
wedding in a hall. I then turn to the outdoor weddings to which powerful families have invited 
me. Since I have never been invited to a wedding in a five-star hotel, I will avoid discussing 
                                                 
99
 If one is going to go to the trouble of hosting such a public spectacle to emphasize one’s deep connections to 
Bedouin identity, the American anthropologist is one such audience. Aside from the deep complicity of British and 
American colonial projects with the Hashemite monarchy’s promulgation of Bedouinism (Massad 2001), there is a 
widespread recognition that cosmopolitans like myself often crave the kinds of authenticity that the properly-
packaged wedding seeks to enact.  
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them in any great detail, although my primarily middle class friends and collaborators tell me all 
manner of stories about the depravity of such weddings. Gender mixing, drinking and fighting 
figure prominently in many of these accounts.  
The goal is neither to capture the full diversity of Jordanian wedding celebrations (or 
opinions about that diversity) nor is it to fully elucidate the “normal” wedding. Rather, the goal is 
to show how various forms of social antagonism have rendered a few discrete models of the ideal 
wedding as competitors for the status of ideal type and the legitimacy-conferring powers that 
such a status would entail. Given the task at hand, the modest achievements of most Jordanians 
will figure much less prominently than certain feats of ritual acumen and certain notable failures. 
No doubt, weddings remain for many Jordanians a joyous rite of passage tied to sexuality and 
hospitality as well as individual and collective senses of honor with all of the long-standing 
antagonisms and solidarities entailed. However, the very existence of competing models of 
wedding re-contextualizes all weddings, rendering them ideologically charged no matter the 
intent. In this way, the wedding’s power to exacerbate preexisting antagonisms and sunder old 
bonds and block the formation of new relations is greatly augmented. 
“Slowly, Slowly” 
At the time of research, a middle class family needed thousands of Dinar to replicate an 
approximation of the “traditional” wedding immortalized by Bedouin soap operas and folklorists. 
Many middle class families still did. In the first example, much like the description above, the 
initial building of the tent was followed by a night of dancing
100
 on Wednesday and then the zifāf 
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 Most weddings I have attended include some combination of debka and samir. Both are line dances, but while 
the former is associated with the peasants towards the west, the latter is associated with the Bedouins of the east. In 
debka, participants hold hands and perform various sets of kicks and stomps to Arabic pop songs based on drum 
machines and synthesizers. According to local lore, the debka was originally performed to tamp down the roof of the 
house. In samir, participants clap, sway from side to side and stomp while chanting poetry. The goal is to display 
one’s rhetorical virtuosity by composing verses mocking one’s opponents. Because samir is an interactive, agonistic 
genre, it is at odds with a mass-mediated pop culture industry and has fallen into disfavor. However, the introduction 
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(procession) on Thursday and a feast on Friday
101
. It would be easy to point to all of the 
innovations as evidence of its inventedness as tradition and, of course, the footnotes will do just 
that. However, despite it all, some Jordanians still perform weddings which fully replicate older 
models both in broad form and substance: to embed the newly formed household within a 
preexisting matrix of mutual obligations by forming a multiplicity of exchange relations with a 
large number of people simultaneously. People can also have a lot of fun in the process—all 
while studiously reproducing the kinds of antagonisms which old men recalled
102
 as central to 
older weddings: antagonisms
103
 between patron and client, between guest and host, between the 
generations, and even between the new affines.  
The actual procession (zifāf) occurred Thursday night. A group of about fifty people left 
in the afternoon and drove
104
 to pick up the bride from her home and take her and her mother 
back to the village. Following a practice that the old men told me dated from time immemorial, 
the family of the bride did not attend the wedding—since, the logic goes, who could bear the 
thought of celebrating the loss of a sister or daughter to another family
105
? Upon arrival, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
of samir “teams” who produce mp3s that people can chant along with have led to a recent resurgence in popularity 
of the genre. For a fuller analysis of poetry, verbal repartee and mocking in Arab wedding celebrations, see Stephen 
Caton (1993; 2005). 
101
 Some tribes (like the Palestinian bir Saba’ tribes) have the feast on Thursday night.  
102
 Their recollections of weddings of the past were remarkably uniform and in keeping with the ethnographic 
record. See, for instance, Elizabeth Fernea’s (1965) classic Guests of the Sheik. 
103
 This focus on antagonism avoids reducing the pervasive conflict, contestation, and negotiation around weddings 
to self-interest. Instead, antagonism identifies a deeply felt condition marked by a form of mutual repulsion between 
antagon-ists, which often resists articulation—despite the prominence of antagonism within the examples that 
follow.  
104
 Obviously, cars are a relatively recent addition to the ritual. As if to mock the idea of going back to the use of 
livestock like camels or horses to transport the bride, a number of Jordanians, playfully planning my own Jordanian 
wedding, have suggested I bring the bride to the wedding from the airport via camel. 
105
 The underlying mixture of antagonism and mutual dependency between the groups engaged in any marriage 
exchange has been central to anthropological understandings of marriage and kinship ever since Levi-Strauss’ 
classic argument in The Elementary Structures of Kinship that, “mankind has always dreamed of seizing and fixing 
that fleeting moment when it was permissible to believe that the law of exchange could be evaded, that one could 
gain without losing, enjoy without sharing… of a world in which one might keep to oneself (Levi-Strauss 1949:497, 
emphasis in the original). A wide range of anthropologists, many deeply critical of Levi-Strauss’ larger project, took 
up the tension in competitive exchanges between “wife-givers” and “wife takers” as an object of study in the 
following decades (Dumont 1970; Fox 1967; Leach 1961; Needham 1971). This literature is marked by a 
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divided by gender. Going with the men, we were greeted by a delegation of the bride’s male 
relatives, who sat with us and served us coffee and sweets. Soon, we took our leave and, saying 
our goodbyes, left the bride’s family. We drove away from her family’s house to ululation, 
gunshots and honking. Once back in the groom’s village, his family commenced with ululating 
(among the women) and celebratory gunfire (among the men). The men gathered in the tent and 
our hosts (the family of the groom) served us coffee. Once all of the guests had arrived and the 
sun had begun to set, we went to groom’s uncle’s house for the shower (hamam)106. As we 
walked, we sang “popular” rhymes like the following107 while the men hoisted the groom aloft: 
Daraj ya ghazali / Ya Riziqa halali  
Daraj nuna nuna / ‘Arustak Mazyuna 
Daraj nuna nuna / ‘Arustak hanuna 
 
(step O my Ghazelle / O lawful sustenance) 
(step slowly slowly /your bride is pretty) 
(step slowly slowly /your bride is tender) 
 
Shin al-qalayla Shin al-qalayla  
Allah Yil’an hathihi al-layla 
Hana wa irbut baab al-dar 
Hata tatla’ bint mukhtar 
Ikhra’ wa izra’ bayt injan 
Yil’an ras abu za’alan 
Shamim rihat handaquq 
Shila’t qalbi hali fuq 
 
Start a little start a little 
God Damn this Night 
Here tie the door of the house 
Until the daughter of the mayor leaves 
Take off your clothes and plant eggplant 
                                                                                                                                                             
preoccupation with hierarchy, subordination, and the idea of the wife as a form ‘tribute.’ Of course, few today would 
argue that concepts like ‘the exchange of women,’ the ‘wife-giver,’ and the ‘wife-taker’ are universally applicable 
(Rubin 1975; Strathern 1984). As Peletz (1987) provocatively proposes, why not “The Exchange of Men?” 
Nevertheless, the aspect of conflict between the groups involved in marriage exchanges has proved to be an 
enduring theme in anthropological analyses of marriage (see also Carsten 1997).  
106
 I was not actually present for the literal washing of the groom. While I have never participated in this aspect of 
the ritual, I have seen video. 
107
 The first of the rhymes is commonly featured on both state television and the radio—relatively novel modes of 
dissemination for wedding songs.  
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Damn the head of the angry father 
Smell the scent of handagug (an herb used in the wedding feast) 
My heart has risen upwards 
 
As with the description of a future wedding which began this chapter, it is easy enough to 
analyze such a wedding as a classic rite of passage with its corresponding phases of separation 
(the bathing of bride and groom, parading the latter around the village), liminality (the eventual 
sequestration of bride and groom alone) and reincorporation (during the feast the following day). 
One can even see examples of what Victor Turner would call “the reduction of culture into 
recognized components of factors… their recombination in fantastic or monstrous patterns and 
shapes; and… their recombination in ways that make sense” (Turner 1967: 106): the eggplant 
and the “head of the angry father” as phallic symbols, the gazelle as metaphor for an over-eager 
groom, the ‘heart rising upwards’ as a euphemism for sexual release. However, there is no sense 
that there is a temporary embargo on the discussion of social antagonisms at weddings—as 
evinced by the casual discussion of the bride’s family’s unwillingness to attend and, as we will 
see, the anguish the mother is expected to perform in recognition of the “loss” of her daughter. I 
emphasize these points because I want to make clear that I am arguing for a shift in the terms of 
social antagonisms rather than presenting the idea that weddings were once harmonious 
occasions before they became desacrilized and key sites for ideological struggle and the 
expression of status distinction.  
 Under that older system of clientage, the wedding marked a major shift in social persona 
from girl/youth (bint/shab) to woman/man (mira/rājul), which entailed a significant degree of 
freedom to operate independently of one’s parents. Today the shift in the balance of parental 
authority is, admittedly, as gradual as it is interminable—even if most young people still do not 
leave home until marriage unless their education or employment absolutely demands it. With the 
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arrival of mass schooling and formal employment (not to mention rising marriage ages), 
Jordanian youth now have a large number of smaller rites of passage that they experience before 
and after marriage. Graduations, final exams, dorm life, first jobs, distant postings, engagement 
parties, working abroad, and promotions have all become major life events that now compete 
with the wedding for significance in the lives of many young people. Yet the wedding remains 
very important to people as evinced by its size and expense
108
. While final exam scores, 
engagements and promotions are also occasions for festivities, the amount of time and money a 
young person’s family will invest in these pales in comparison to the wedding. Not even funerals 
come close to attracting the level of spending, discussion, and innovation that Jordanians have 
put into weddings in recent decades, which raises one of the central questions posed by the 
dissertation: why are weddings the rite of passage par excellance in Jordan? In the next chapter, I 
will take up this question in-depth and argue that Jordanian weddings loom large in importance 
because filiation remains fundamentally “biosocial” in Jordan and, as Morgan Clarke has argued, 
“legitimacy is a material component of filiation” (2009:198) in this common formulation. Put 
slightly differently, ‘questions of substance’ are inseparable from questions of propriety and both 
must be worked out in very specific ways through wedding rites. 
In the midst of day two of the four-day extravaganza, following a triumphant return, the 
men congregated at the groom’s uncle’s house where they were seated in plastic chairs and 
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 This is significant. The wedding need not be figured normatively as the most important, costly, and elaborate rite 
of passage in a community’s social life. For instance, Turner’s classic study of rites of passage focused on a puberty 
rite, which (ironically) he found more significant to how women worked through the social tensions involved in 
marriage and women’s accompanying migration to their husbands’ villages than the wedding itself. In many parts of 
the world, people deem funerals more significant than weddings, reasoning that one might marry many times over 
the course of a life—but that everyone only dies once. Richard Kisiara (1998) illustrates this vividly in his work on 
the Luo of East Africa when he describes relatives who must store their deceased loved ones in the morgue for 
months until they can afford a proper burial. Gillian Feeley-Harnik describes how, for the Sakalava of Madagascar, 
“royal deaths now involve… proscriptions on work, washing, and the maintenance of personal appearance” that can 
affect over half of the week (1985:5). Depending on the time and place any event from a baptism to a bat mitzvah to 
a confirmation to a quinceañera might prove more significant to the life of a given community than a wedding. One 
could argue that the four-year liberal arts college experience represents one of the longest, most elaborate, and most 
resource-intensives rites of passage ever adopted on a large scale.  
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served kanafa and Pepsi while they sat and talked
109
. When the shower (hamām) was over, some 
of the young men hoisted the groom on their shoulders and began to walk back, clapping and 
chanting as they went. They paused in front of the women’s section on their way as more 
ululating and gunfire erupted. The groom’s father’s brother stood in front of the open gate such 
that the men were prevented from seeing inside the women’s area by the high walls. After a bit 
of chanting, they quickly moved down to the tent. Everyone settled into their seats in the 
wedding tent and the hosts served more rounds of tea and coffee. It was at this point that the 
groom’s father began sitting various relatives down with his son Ali to give him final words of 
advice. I was sitting to the left of Ali’s uncle when his father seated Ali to his right. He leaned 
over and spoke for a while in hushed tones. He then reclined a bit and said, “slowly slowly” 
(shway shway). Ali stood, shook his hand, and walked away. Soon, I noticed Ali telling his 
father, “I’m ready.” Calls went around that it was time for the wedding procession (zifāf) and that 
we were going ziff
110
 Ali. We stood up and began to gather together. Now under cover of 
darkness, Ali was hoisted aloft and we took him up to the women’s section once again. Here, the 
mother of the bride presented herself and there was a brief back and forth between her and the 
men (still chanting the same bawdy rhymes) as she acted out an acute expression of distress over 
the loss of her daughter. The men then set Ali down and virtually thrust him through the gate and 
into the women’s section. 
Such antagonisms are at the heart of the conscious and explicit archetype of the 
“traditional” marriage ceremony. The primary antagonisms expressed through such weddings 
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 Needless to say, Pepsi is a relatively recent addition to wedding rites. However, even kanafa is novel. It is an 
urban specialty associated with the West Bank of the Jordan River—specifically Nablus. However, like Pepsi, it is a 
sweet and widely-enjoyed foodstuff which can be given out as a way for the hosts to honor guests and demonstrate 
their generosity. 
110
 The verb zif means both to conduct a procession and to be married off. Words like zaffa (procession, wedding 
procession) and zifāf are also derived from the common root z-f.  
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and commentaries about them are those between the family of the bride and the family of the 
groom as well as those between the generations and, as we will see, hosts and guests as well as 
patrons and clients. Yet these are the antagonisms of people who are intimately related to one 
another—not the antagonisms of abstract sociological types. They are also part of a heady mix 
highly ambiguous and even contradictory emotions that accompany rites of passage like 
weddings: faraḥ (joy, happiness, wedding), but also ḥuzn (sorrow), and even ghaḍab (wrath). As 
a general rule
111, the bride’s family was not actually outraged by the prospect of their daughter 
marrying. Rather, they were experiencing the same kinds of overwhelming and conflicting 
emotions that mark weddings in other parts of the world while engaging in prescribed activities 
designed to emphasize the bride’s value to them and the great honor that her husband and his 
family should feel at being offered the opportunity to marry her. Far from dampening the 
potential for explosive conflict, however, the highly stylized nature of these expressions of 
emotions merely raised the stakes. These stakes were perhaps the highest when the rules of 
hospitality demanded acts of shared commensality. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that 
this involved a kind of antagonism that was both a product of intense social solidarity (among 
family members) and an impetus to further social solidarity: the creation of new families and 
family members to build new alliances against common foes while mitigating the potentially 
dangerous effects of unchecked antagonism. In so doing, such weddings engage with karām: the 
broader ethic of hospitality, honor, reciprocity and generosity. 
“Is Everybody Full?” 
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 I say this because, when I asked people about the bride’s family refusing to attend the wedding or the bride’s 
mother crying over the loss of her daughter people always seemed eager to emphasize that men used to be angry 
about the ‘loss’ of a sister or that they felt like they should be angry about the ‘loss’ of a sister. I have never recorded 
an empirical example of someone actually expressing this sense of loss as a personal feeling. This is not to imply 
that people never miss their female relatives after they marry. Rather, that sense of loss is tempered by the joy that 
one’s female relative has become a woman, wife and mother with all of the increase in social status that the 
assumption of those roles entails.  
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The next morning came the inevitable feast: the grand unifying gesture of reincorporation 
which ties together the whole wedding and its participants: the sharing of “bread and salt” (‘aīsh 
wa miliḥ)—substances widely reputed to create bonds of mutual protection and obligation 
through the act of shared commensality. Yet if sexuality is a major cause for anxiety with the 
twinned necessities of displaying and hiding it in order to increase the honor of one’s group 
(thereby increasing the size of the group, the resources at their disposal and their ability to 
perform acts of hospitality) then hospitality and generosity provoke similar kinds of anxieties. A 
clumsy display of hospitality, like a clumsy display of sexuality, brings great shame while 
successful displays bring respect and renown. However, it is important to note certain shifts in 
the discourse of honor and shame. Jordanian weddings have become an important site for the 
production of an “economy of shame” in which older notions of honor and shame are 
“instrumentalized” to serve novel, capitalistic ends (Karim 2008).  
In this formulation, the discourse of honor and shame remains for many of the rural poor 
a “symbolic covenant with God” and “moral resource through which they view themselves as 
superior to rich and urban people.” Yet while the discourse of shame has always been a key 
“instrument of social control,” it is increasingly useful as a repertoire of traditions and 
institutions (in the broadest sense) for powerful social actors working at the interstices between 
the kin-based patronage economy and the world of transnational capital accumulation. This shift 
has come at the expense of the power of the discourse of shame to serve as a leveling mechanism 
and a mode of redistribution. Elite actors increasingly co-opt the idiom of tradition and its ritual 
forms to “instrumentally violate local norms of cohesion and community” (Karim 2008:7-9). 
Ironically, elite Jordanians can even bolster the grounds for their differential access to foreign 
capital through elaborate weddings (because of that differential access to foreign capital) at the 
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same time that they can cast aspersions on the honor and authentic belonging of their more 
parochial neighbors. Much like the new systems of microcredit indebtedness
112
 that Karim 
studied in Bangladesh, the new economy of shame in Jordan around weddings produces distinct 
winners and losers and exacerbates the differences between them. This process of transforming 
family honor into capital and capital into family honor in contemporary Jordan increasingly 
plays out through spectacles of commodity consumption like the wedding, which combine 
displays of generosity with displays of modesty. This comes at the expense of other facets of the 
older discourse of honor and shame like the collective defense of land and organized feuding. 
The men began arriving for lunch after the noon prayer on Friday. I took my place in line 
to greet and congratulate the host (in this case the groom’s father) along with the groom himself 
and a number of his uncles and brothers. I exchanged handshakes, kisses and wishes of future 
success as I passed from one greeter to another. Following protocol, I slipped a bank note 
(known as the nuqūṭ: a wedding gift which, at the time of research, generally consisted of a 10 
JD note) into the groom’s hand as I shook it and kissed him on either cheek. The amount of 
money can vary depending on one’s financial means, one’s relationship to the family and any 
number of possible strategies for the production and alleviation of social debt. In principle at 
least, the nuqūṭ is a wedding gift to be returned at subsequent weddings: perhaps for the giver 
himself or kin of his. I once went to a wedding where the groom’s father emphasized this 
principle of reciprocity by joking that, “you [bestowed nuqūṭ] upon us. So now I have to come to 
your wedding and [bestow nuqūṭ] upon you. But I’m an old man and I can’t ride on an airplane 
                                                 
112
 In Karim’s study, she shows how microcredit institutions in Bangladesh have figured out how to turn family 
honor into collateral (by offering poor women “collateral-free” loans and then threatening them with highly 
gendered forms of shaming ranging from gossip to prison and mob violence should they refuse to repay them). 
When Karim terms this a process of instrumentalization, she is highlighting the manner in which preexisting 
institutions (ranging from gossip to “house-breaking” or ghar bangha) become tools of transnational capital 
accumulation above and beyond their better-established role in long-running conflicts between local notables and 
their dependents. 
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so you’ll have to do your wedding here.” The elite take this one step further: at the largest 
weddings, there is a man who stands next to the groom with a ledger entering the names of the 
various guests along with the amount of their gifts. 
 Once assembled, the 150 or so men were treated to heaping plates of mansaf: Jordan’s 
national dish of mutton boiled in a yoghurt sauce served atop bread and rice
113
 with parsley and 
nuts. A man took out a pistol and began to shoot it in the air to announce to everyone, far and 
wide, that lunch would now be served. The brothers and cousins of the groom
114
 first brought out 
about thirty to forty waist-high metal stands and knee-high plastic tables, placing four individual 
servings of bottled water
115
 atop each table. Next, the men returned with giant platters heaped 
with meat and rice
116
. When the platters had been distributed amongst the metal stands across the 
length of the tent, our host exhorted us to eat until we were full. The men arose and clustered 
around the platters in groups of four or five. After saying ‘in the name of God’ (bismillah), we 
rolled up our sleeves and dug in with our right hands, forming the meat, yoghurt sauce, and rice 
into balls and then tossing them into our mouths. While each person limited himself to an 
equivalently sized triangular sliver of the platter, we pushed choice morsels on one another as we 
all ate rapidly. Had the women and small children been served yet
117
? Best to eat quickly just in 
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 For more on Jordanian culinary nationalism and the emergence of mansaf as a peculiarly national dish, see Sally 
Howell’s (2003) “Modernizing Mansaf.” 
114
 In rural Jordan, it would be considered scandalous for women to serve food to large groups of strange men. Thus 
when it comes to weddings and other displays of hospitality, it is incumbent upon men to take on much of this work 
of what autonomist feminists have called “affective labor” (cf. Hardt 1999).  
115
 Jordanians, like people in many parts of the world, can be highly distrustful of the public water supply. So-called 
“health water” (maya-saha) is incredibly popular even among the relatively poor. This sits uncomfortably with 
observations that the public water supply is ostensibly safe and that people often refill bottles of water with tap 
water. 
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 As is often the case, the men prepared the meat while the women prepared the rice. 
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 There is a widely-remarked upon set of norms about the order in which people are supposed to eat at feasts. In 
most cases, women and children eat as they prepare the food. When it is ready, the male guests are served first. 
Then, the food is taken to the women’s section. Hosts are expected to eat last so that they can ensure the comfort of 
their guests and in case there is not enough food to go around. However, I have been reassured at feasts that the 
women and children were already eating in an attempt to make guests relax and take their time. Who knows whether 
or not they were telling the truth. 
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case. Relatives of the groom’s family circulated through the room, encouraging us to eat, 
offering bread and more yoghurt sauce. Upon finishing, the guests signified their content by 
saying, “praise God” (al-ḥamdulillah) and went to wash up. Meanwhile, the groom’s father 
walked through the scrum of men waiting for soap and water anxiously asking, “are you full? 
Are you full? Is everybody full?” When the guests were seated again, the groom’s brothers and 
cousins began serving tea and coffee as people slowly wandered off to other obligations, wishing 
the groom and hosts well as they left.  
 When I asked my hosts why they had chosen this type of wedding rather than the 
truncated indoor wedding, they seemed confused: why would they do anything different unless 
they were too poor to properly provision their guests? They simply saw their son’s wedding as 
the way any self-respecting man would mark such an occasion: with singing, dancing, and acts 
of generosity. However, it is hard not to interpret this wedding as making a number of powerful 
statements about the family’s allegiances and commitments when placed in a broader context, 
which includes radically different models for weddings. When compared to other popular or 
“traditional” weddings, the primary mode of comparison is indexical: how many days? How 
many guests? Most importantly: how much meat? In the subsequent examples, however, whole 
new axes of comparison emerge. Increasingly, the wedding is not a simple index of one’s honor 
and generosity within widely agreed upon “traditional” terms but rather an icon of the hosts’ 
adherence to or rejection of that tradition—as opposed to other possible visions of Jordan’s 
future which might give precedence to nationalism, liberal capitalism, or Islam over older tribal 
patronage networks.  
“In his Face” 
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 If middle class families like Ali’s struggle to continue having reasonable—if modest—
weddings along the same lines as their ancestors, the wealthy and the poor must contend with 
various challenges as well. When looking at what constitutes success and a failure for people 
from the socioeconomic extremes, it is important to note the complex ways in which different 
kinds of wedding both take on and subvert various class resonances. To do so, however, will 
require that I overcome a certain amount of “ethnographic refusal” (Ortner 1995) on my part. I 
have received nothing but kindness and warm hospitality in my travels across Jordan. All 
invitations should be cherished and it would be ungrateful of me to criticize my hosts—
especially when they have such humble means when compared to my own. However, as Argryou 
points out, traditionalist weddings and the honor that they can confer on their hosts turn on the 
assumption of the existence of a kind of uncalculated generosity that is all the more cruel 
because it, “disregards economic inequality and proceeds as if generosity and ‘good heart’ were 
the only relevant factors” (Argryou 1996: 78). Yet a “good heart” is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for a successful wedding. First I will ask the reader to imagine that, at times, 
I encountered young men who simply lacked the means to perform the proper wedding. To the 
degree that I can surface suppressed narratives of their marginalization within the Jordanian 
wedding complex, one must imagine the even greater degrees of marginalization to which lower 
class women and children may be subject. Their silence in this chapter is designed to be 
unsettling.  
To critique the system as a whole without casting aspersions on my hosts, I will try to 
help the reader imagine a comparison of two brothers of humble means who chose radically 
different types of wedding (a multi-day outdoor feast and a two-hour event in a wedding hall) 
and then lay out how their neighbors might respond. Next, turning away from this mode of 
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highly distanced, obscured writing on those who do not fit into the system, I will compare two 
large, outdoor weddings hosted by transnational elites to show the opportunities that such 
weddings promise. In providing the ‘local content’ for Jordan’s ‘cultural interzone,’ Jordanian 
elites and commoners are driven at least as much by the logics of consumer capitalism with its 
global dreamscapes and prestige goods as they are by their more parochial commitments. At its 
most cruel, this combination of kin structures and transnational capital accumulation can prove 
“toxically synergistic” (Karim 2008:15)—especially for the poor who must conform more 
assiduously to its shifting strictures. This leads to all manner of anxieties as social actors seek out 
protected, legitimacy-conferring signs which they can use to guard against attacks on the forms 
of legitimacy which wedding rituals must enact. This attempt to mobilize new forms of 
consumption fits seamlessly into the wider economy of shame, serving alternately as shield or 
bludgeon.  
“This is a Simple Wedding” 
 Mahmud and Mo’tasim, despite being brothers, chose very different styles of weddings. 
Their parents divorced when they were children and their father has not supported either them or 
their mother financially since. Even after their mother’s remarriage, they were heavily reliant on 
their extended kin for support. Forced to leave school and support themselves from a young age, 
they went in different directions. While Mahmud was drawn to agricultural labor, his brother 
Mo’tasim primarily worked as a shop boy in various urban centers in Jordan118. Neither one of 
them had much formal schooling, but Mo’tasim continued to work on his English and follow 
cosmopolitan fashions—developing a reputation as something of a dandy in the process. So 
when the time came for the two of them to marry, they opted for markedly different weddings.  
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 The urban-rural contrast is not accidental: as I have argued in previous chapters, urban labor, property and kin 
relations in Jordan are far less dependent on these complex norms of hospitality than they are in rural areas.  
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To be clear: neither could have possibly carried out an elite wedding at a five star hotel. 
Even if they had the money (which they most certainly did not), their relatives and friends would 
have been too intimidated to attend
119
. Working-class villagers across Jordan were unanimous on 
this point: “it’s not comfortable,” was a common refrain. One man wondered, “can you smoke in 
a hotel wedding? I don’t know. I would be afraid to smoke.” Yet another asked, “what are you 
supposed to wear? If I was the only one wearing a headscarf and robe, people would laugh at 
me.” However, while Mahmud opted for the “village” wedding, Mo’tasim opted for something 
different: he rented a wedding hall for two hours and, rather than serving his guests dinner, he 
only served them coffee, Pepsi and sweets. The two approaches provoked markedly different 
responses. While Mahmud’s attempt at a traditional wedding provoked mockery and 
condescension, Mo’tasim’s wedding happened and was never discussed again. The comparison 
highlights the economic factors provoking what I call (to the amusement of my Jordanian 
interlocutors) the privatization of joy/the wedding (al-faraḥ). Part of this is about gaining the 
ability to better insulate oneself from the effects of social inequality. The other part is about 
gaining the ability to express one’s uniqueness through wedding ritual.  
 When the subject of Mahmud’s wedding was first broached, his uncle Abu Saleem was 
mostly annoyed. His first reaction was, “Mahmud doesn't even live here. When I invite people, 
they're going to ask, who's Mahmud?” Nonetheless, he and his brother Nasser agreed to host 
despite the huge amount of effort such a wedding entails. They brought a sound system, a tent, 
chairs, and plenty of tea, coffee, and assorted nuts and seeds for the guests. Mahmud brought two 
goats for slaughter—each of which must have cost him about a month’s pay. The first night, no 
one danced and there was no poetry. The next night, I got home in the evening and found Nasser 
running behind schedule with the feast. They told me that there were men down in the tent and 
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 See similar complaints in Argryou (1996: 132-137) 
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that I should go sit with them since “there's nobody from us down there.” I arrived to find one of 
Mahmud's friends and one of their second cousins. I served them coffee and sat with them until 
we saw Mahmud's truck arriving with his guests. As they approached, we looked around and 
realized the tent was in shambles. Some children had strewn the plastic tables and chairs about 
and many of the tables were sticky and stained with tea from the previous night. We quickly set 
about rearranging the chairs and tables in preparation for the arrival of guests. The evening 
prayer was wrapping up and the main contingent of relatives and neighbors was beginning to 
arrive en masse from the mosque. Mahmud's brother Mo’tasim tried to get him to sit in the 
appropriate seat on the edge of the tent so he could greet his guests but he demurred. Perhaps he 
was starting to see how the celebration was going to turn out and could not bear to stay. In any 
event, I hardly saw him after that. Since dinner was running late, everyone spent a fair while 
sitting and drinking tea in preparation for dinner. In what would become the leitmotif for the 
whole wedding, guests repeatedly referred to the celebration as a “simple wedding,” the 
condescension virtually dripping from their lips. Time seemed to drag on and on as the food 
failed to materialize. I felt flush with a shame as I imagined what catastrophes might be 
unfolding in the makeshift kitchen above.  
Finally, the plates of food arrived—although it was painfully obvious that the hosts were 
stretching the meat to accommodate the fifty or so men assembled. Each platter had about four or 
five hunks of meat to adorn large piles of rice and yoghurt sauce. Unfortunately, there were 
about six people per platter. As a host of sorts, I begged off offers to eat but relented under 
pressure from Nasser and Abu Saleem. I joined a platter with four other men and a child. Rolling 
up my sleeve, I dug in with my right hand, forming balls of rice and yogurt sauce and placing 
them into my mouth. Normally, it would have been incumbent upon me as a host of sorts to push 
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the meat towards my guests and insist that they eat more. Unfortunately, there was hardly 
enough on the platter and it would have seemed ridiculous to try. Instead, I watched the delicate 
dance of five people competing for four pieces of meat (I had already resigned myself to a meal 
of rice and yoghurt). Despite my modest sacrifice, there was no way around it: the poverty in the 
community was on display for all to see and everyone was implicated in it. The father tore off 
pieces of meat for his son and reassured him, “eat, eat. Don’t be ashamed. Don’t be ashamed.” 
The father probably would have behaved in a similar manner if the platter had been overflowing 
with meat. Nonetheless, his repetition of la tistaḥī (don’t be ashamed) rankled. Again mindful of 
my role as host, I continued to pick at the rice (lest my guests be ashamed that they were eating 
alone) right up to the bitter end when the child was done eating. Who knows what was left over 
for the women and younger children. Then we washed up and came back for coffee and tea. 
Before I had even finished my cup, almost everyone had left.  
The lack of meat was over-determined by recent transformations to the pastoral economy 
discussed in part one, which have contributed to the rising cost of local meat (from eight dinar 
per kilo in 2010 to thirteen dinar per kilo in 2013). Population growth has meant more demand 
for meat at the very moment when arable land (used both for grazing and for growing feed) is 
being given over to urban sprawl. As a result, many middle-class Jordanians
120
 have been 
reduced to eating chicken no more than once per week and sheep and goat meat are now almost 
exclusively consumed at wedding and funeral feasts. While there is some talk of using imported 
meat from Romania (six dinar per kilo at the time of research) or the Emirates (eight dinar per 
kilo at the time of research), people can taste the difference. The most obvious difference in taste 
appears to be the result of freezing the meat for shipping—although it is also no doubt partly a 
                                                 
120
 Baylouny noted as early as 2006 in “Creating Kin: New Family Associations as Welfare Providers in 
Liberalizing Jordan” that the “near poor” were forgoing meat. This phenomenon has subsequently moved up the 
economic ladder. 
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result of the questionable diet of such animals. On top of concerns about the safety of the meat 
and adulteration, observant Muslims must ask themselves whether they trust butchers in far away 
places (as opposed to their hosts) to provide genuinely ḥalāl meat, which has been killed in a 
humane manner and bled fully from the jugular “in the name of God” (bismillah). As a result, 
such products have had a hard time gaining traction in the Jordanian marketplace with most 
people saying something to the effect of “I would rather not serve meat121 than have my guests 
be unsatisfied with it.”  
For the next week, I felt like people were going out of their way to bring up Mahmud’s 
wedding and make invidious comparisons between it and the ideal type. The refrain was always 
the same: it was an ‘urs basīṭ (simple wedding) for nās basīṭa (simple people). One man called 
Mahmud, a “needy youth” (shab miskīn) and referred to his family as “eating wind” (makilīn 
ḥawa’): in other words122, broke. While no one explicitly mentioned the paucity of meat (I was 
probably too close to the hosts to hear a criticism that scathing), I heard plenty about the size of 
the tent and the small number of guests. Another man told me that a “real” Bedouin wedding 
might have, “a thousand people” and “a hundred head [of goats]” (as opposed, presumably, to 
Mahmud’s wedding). It was pointless to bring up the factors that over-determined this outcome. 
Mahmud was not only uniquely unable to meet the minimum requirements of a traditional 
wedding due to a lack of parental support, but he also needed to strengthen ties with distant kin 
all the more urgently to compensate for the lack of parental support and ensure some degree of 
protection against the vagaries of the agricultural economy with its mix of unpredictable weather, 
landlords, and investors. Caught up in a ‘toxically synergistic’ combination of kin obligations 
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 Chicken, while served at the weddings of certain peasant groups for generations, is viewed as being beyond the 
pale by most who would consider hosting this kind of wedding. Those with this tradition are mocked by others who 
claim such people, ‘are what they eat.’ 
122
 I should also note that hawa’ (wind) is a common euphemism for kharra (shit). 
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and entanglements with larger forces of transnational capital accumulation, Mahmud found 
himself spending all of his savings and going into debt while failing to succeed in impressing any 
of the people he needed to impress. While Mahmud had undoubtedly set out to perform his 
newfound role as a generous man, it only emphasized to his neighbors that, wife or no wife, he 
was still a ‘needy youth.’  
 In contrast, Mahmud’s younger brother Mo’tasim opted for a brief, two-hour wedding. It 
happened and I never heard a word about it again. It provoked some grumbling in the run-up—
almost exclusively from his uncles—the same ones who had complained about his brother’s 
wedding plans. The men had two criticisms of such weddings: first, that a guest should be 
entitled to dinner if they were going to go to the trouble of congratulating someone on such a 
happy occasion. Second, the men claimed that putting the men’s and women’s sections so 
closely together often led to needless “problems” (in other words, fights). Otherwise, everyone 
simply stated matter-of-factly that the wedding would happen in a wedding hall. By now, the 
idea that people marry in wedding halls and do not provide their guests with a full meal goes 
without saying. This may violate the rules of traditional hospitality, but it provokes little 
commentary at this point and no outrage. Everyone drove to the village of Mo’tasim’s bride 
dressed in their best clothes, picked her up, and drove in a loud procession with her family to a 
wedding hall where they divided themselves by gender: the women inside and the men outside. 
The men lined up to greet the groom one by one. As the guests shook the groom’s hand, they 
slipped him the nuqūṭ—most likely 10 JD each. After greeting the groom, everyone took their 
seats and listened to the din of music from the women’s room. As we sat, Mo’tasim’s younger 
cousins brought us coffee, Pepsi and store-bought kanāfa. I took each and thanked them 
responding, fī ‘ursak (as in, ‘I’ll repay this at your wedding’) and the inevitable reply, mowjūdak! 
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(you’ll be there!). An hour and a half later, we went home and, as I have said, that was the last I 
heard of it. Mo’tasim had, through his rejection of tradition and embrace of the privatization of 
weddings, successfully managed expectations and avoided public shaming.  
Key to his success was the clear low-risk, low-reward proposition he was offering his 
friends, relatives, and guests through his adoption of the abbreviated model of wedding. He was 
asking very little time of the latter and very little labor of the former. The goal was less the kind 
of social extension and intensification of ties associated with the traditional model of wedding 
and more a sort of modest box-checking which was qualitatively different. For disadvantaged 
young men like Mo’tasim who are working in the contemporary service sector in urban Jordan, 
much like their American compatriots, there is a growing need for the kinds of “weak ties” 
(Granovetter 1973) that they would never be able to afford if those ties had to be cemented 
through healthy servings of meat and rice. At somewhere between eight and thirteen dinar per 
kilo, provisioning a substantial number of men with meat in the hopes of someday landing a job 
paying JD 200-400 per month increasingly seems like a losing proposition—if not the height of 
folly. Today, the actions of people like Mo’tasim are increasingly re-framing the abbreviated 
indoor model of weddings as lower-class rather than cosmopolitan. At the same time, elites are 
increasingly the ones working to keep traditional modes of wedding ritual (and the patron-client 
relationships they entail) alive.  
The Lieutenant 
 Admittedly, the preceding description is a somewhat extreme attempt to write about the 
shameful, repressed and uncomfortable side of the Jordanian wedding complex within its own 
terms, highlighting the marginalization of subordinate males and hinting at the kinds of cruelties 
that women and children may encounter in cases of divorce, abandonment, and illegitimacy. The 
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fact is that economic conditions are militating for an increase in the number of these bad 
weddings that nobody and everybody wants to talk about. Nobody, including this ethnographer, 
wants to be directly associated with bad weddings. From the perspective of most Jordanians, if I 
knew a friend was having a hard time putting on a wedding, would I not be expected to lend him 
some money or take responsibility for some aspect of the wedding? It would make me a low and 
stingy person not to—the very opposite of the persona of generosity and qalb ṭayyib (good heart) 
that I ought to cultivate. While Jordanians from across the socioeconomic spectrum feel the 
increasing effects of poverty and income inequality within their own friend and kin networks, 
they tend to exteriorize and disavow the problem—much like the preceding account. The 
acknowledgement of the exclusionary aspects of the system within the system mirrors my own 
elliptical and defensive explication in the text. To do otherwise is to accept being polluted by the 
contagion of dishonor one describes in others.  
The following account is at the other extreme: Lieutenant Salama’s wedding was a model 
of disciplined image-management which was well-financed, widely supported in the community 
and actually somewhat amazing—even for someone who makes it his business to attend 
weddings. I heard about the wedding through his mother’s family. They were excited to invite 
me to the wedding and made sure to emphasize his good family and rank: he was not just any old 
lieutenant—he was a lieutenant in the Air Force, which implies prestige, a high salary and lots of 
opportunities to travel abroad for training. They even took me to his house: a two story white 
stone-faced home. His relatives enthused about the fact that the kitchen was “on the American 
system” (‘ala al-niẓām al-amrīkī). Yet the wedding itself was studied in its down-home 
parochialism.  
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 We arrived at the wedding to find a tent, which could accommodate 500, reasonably 
filled with people talking amidst plush chairs in a steel-framed tent with a colorful canvas tarp. 
After greeting the hosts, we took our seats and accepted our small cups of coffee from a man 
who had been hired
123
 to dress in traditional garb and fulfill the role of the qahwahjī—a 
dependent quasi-slave who would serve coffee to guests of the pre-modern sheikh. After shaking 
the porcelain cups to signify that we had drunk our fill, we stood up to get a better view of the 
proceedings. We positioned ourselves behind a sea of smart phones intent on recording the 
events unfolding. The older men were up front dancing the sāmir. They stood in a line shoulder-
to-shoulder and swayed slightly back and forth, bending their knees and clapping in time with 
the music and chanting Bedouin poetry in the old dialect. They sang about the hospitality and 
honor of their hosts with a minimum of the mockery and verbal repartee that often marks such 
poetry. As the line of men clapped and swayed, various individuals would break off from the 
group from an excess of enthusiasm and swirl their fine summer capes, walking sticks, or 
ceremonial swords. 
 In a pattern that would repeat itself for the rest of the night, the old men yielded to the 
young men, who were now rested from their previous bout of dancing at breakneck speeds in a 
spiraling, circular motion. As they retook the dance floor, one group was hard to miss: the 
lieutenant’s men formed a distinctive bloc in their army fatigues. They danced the Iraqi chōbī, 
holding hands and stomping in time with the music. Once again, men would break away from the 
group, swinging ceremonial swords and exhorting their comrades to greater levels of exertion. 
Meanwhile, other men strolled around with pistols, shotguns and M16s, shooting in the air to 
express their joy at the happy occasion in a manner that nonetheless underlined their ability to 
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 Note the contrast between the use of wage laborers here and the poor and middle class families who use family 
members to serve their guests. 
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live up to a very specific masculine ideal of aggression, martial prowess, and assertiveness in the 
face of any antagonism. So it went for the rest of the evening: we danced debka, sāmir, and 
chōbi while consuming cup after cup of tea and coffee. When I was shaking from the caffeine 
but could not bear to dance anymore, I found a ride back to my village. My hosts, however, 
would stay out for hours more, catching no more than a few hours of sleep before they began the 
massive task of preparing the next day’s feast. 
 The next day, I arrived early and found the men hard at work over pot after pot of boiling 
meat, which they had set up in a half-finished house. The amount of work that goes into such 
events cannot be understated: I counted at least ten pots large enough for me to sit in atop 
massive gas stovetops. The heat was intense as the men described to me how they had butchered 
the animals at dawn on very little sleep. From my own experience butchering for weddings, it 
would have taken at least 20 men a half of a day to do the job. They were exhausted and still had 
hours-worth of gracious hospitality to enact. Not wanting to be in the way and sweating 
profusely, I expressed my admiration for the hard work they were doing and joined the old men 
chanting poetry by the tent. As night came, the crowd swelled into the hundreds. The dance floor 
was soon covered with over 100 plastic tables. Next, a line of men came out bringing platter after 
platter of meat, each of which was at least a meter in diameter and about half a meter high. My 
video of the procession of platters went on for five minutes. When each table had been topped 
with meat, bottled water, and yogurt sauce, a round of gunfire went off as the hosts invited their 
guests to eat their fill. The crowd fanned out across the sea of platters. Four or five men gathered 
around each platter, urging their compatriots to eat from the huge piles of meat atop rice, parsley, 
nuts and flatbread. When we were done, we went over to wash up and then sat down for tea as 
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people began to drift away. The plates were then whisked away and I thanked my hosts profusely 
for putting on such a wonderful display of hospitality. 
 The lieutenant and his family had succeeded in pulling hundreds of people into exchange 
relations of mutual hospitality, enacting a feast which most would struggle to match, and thereby 
rendering their guests in their debt. The family had done so in a manner that mobilized both local 
kin networks (to provide both labor and attendees) and their highly visible involvement in 
transnational networks: here most notably those tied to the security services with its global flows 
of employment opportunities, military hardware, and training opportunities abroad. The promise 
of access to these different sources of wealth and power conspired to bolster the legitimacy of 
their position within the local system of patronage. These advantageous labor and property 
relations allowed them to continually exceed their neighbors in hospitality, producing a virtuous 
cycle (for the family in question) as the reverse image of the toxically synergistic forces ensuring 
that men like Mahmud would never rise above their station. Yet not all elite wedding spectacles 
cement relations with local kin groups so effortlessly or seamlessly. Access to money and 
foreign sources of power does not necessarily ensure a successful wedding. 
 “A Villa in Dubai” 
In fact, weddings can exacerbate tensions and alienate kin due to their divergent attempts 
to inhabit the emerging ‘cultural interzone’ that necessitates a careful mix of deference to local 
norms and the maintenance of an ironic distance from them. Too much ironic distance can lead 
weddings (and their hosts) to be evaluated negatively as polluted through their connections to 
external sources of power. Clumsily executed weddings can even pollute the very forms of 
tradition whose authenticity elites seek to co-opt. In this final example, which is by no means 
unique, it is possible to discern some of the excesses associated with such weddings and why 
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they might motivate a good deal of antipathy on the part of both individual Jordanians and more 
politically organized groups like the Chastity Society (the focus of the next chapter). This focus 
on the mixture of attraction and antipathy that liberal and tribal values produce is a necessary 
corrective to the current Western fixation on why various facets of the broader Islamist project 
might or might not be appealing. As Roxanne Euben observes, “few observers seem to have the 
same difficulties understanding ‘democracy’ as a value capable of inspiring an action as they do 
entertaining the possibility that Islamic fundamentalists may also seek an intrinsically 
compelling ideal” (1999:14). Thus, to use Laura Pearl’s language, they fall back on “structural 
functionalist” explanations of Islamist appeal—as if there is no need for a symmetrical account 
of the appeal of liberal, democratic ideals (2006:34). Whether labeled western or liberal or 
traditional or tribal, those aspects of weddings marked as specifically un-Islamic also strike 
Jordanians as alternately wholly appealing and wholly unappealing.  
My neighbors told me with pride that the groom, Yassin, “works with a prince” in the 
Gulf. When I got there, they had already set up a traditional goat hair tent and had padded 
chrome chairs stacked in the corner in preparation for the wedding. Yassin wore name brands 
from head to toe: a Burberry hat, a Porche-branded t-shirt and tight, distressed jeans rolled 
midway up his shins. His tight shirt revealed large, muscular biceps (no doubt the product of 
weight training and protein shakes rather than manual labor) and the bottom half of a tattoo. His 
uncles wore white robes and red headscarves. Obviously, one of the main attractions of the 
village wedding (for Yassin at least) was the prospect of shooting guns in the air—as he said 
repeatedly. He had a pistol tucked in his jeans against his back the whole time. Others, however, 
seemed to have different ideas on the matter. While the prospect of shooting guns in the air 
appealed to the men from the city as a way of enacting a certain kind of transgressive masculine 
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aggression, it clearly concerned the neighbors—who were experienced enough with guns to fear 
the possibility of property damage and the loss of life. 
I arrived before sundown and greeted all of the family of the groom (most of whom 
worked in the entertainment industry in the gulf). The feast was limited to the groom’s family 
and the family of the bride—thus, they reasoned, no nuqūṭ so as to keep it in the family. Like the 
family of the lieutenant, the hosts had hired men to dress up in traditional garb and serve tea and 
coffee to the guests out of traditional-looking coffee pots. Sporting white robes with leather 
straps filled with bullets, the hired help circulated with brass coffee urns which they heated atop 
coals. At first, they worked with three porcelain cups (offering each guest a drink and then taking 
the cup back to serve the next person in line once the previous person had indicated they were 
satisfied by shaking the cup) but, as more guests arrived, they switched to plastic—both to 
handle the larger number of people
124
 and due to people’s newfound concerns about the sharing 
of cups spreading disease. Around sundown, the relatives of the bride arrived and the family of 
the groom stood to greet them.  
Soon after, tables were brought out and bedecked with Pepsi, water, and giant plates of 
mansaf. The hosts let off a volley of machine gun fire (to announce the feast). But before the host 
had actually invited people to eat and before the yoghurt sauce had been poured on the meal, 
people rushed towards the food. My hosts described this to me as an embarrassing breach of 
etiquette as we participated in the minor stampede. After dinner, we washed our hands and took 
our seats as we let our food settle. Soon, my neighbors were fulfilling their standard roles at 
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 Etiquette has traditionally dictated that, until the guest shakes the cup, the server must continue to refill the cup. 
So long as the server is armed with two or three porcelain cups, this is all the more true since he cannot serve others 
without getting the cups back from his guests. At times, I have seen men use this fact to emphasize the subordination 
of the server by drinking cup after cup of coffee: holding up the line and daring the server to break protocol and 
chastise the guest for doing so. This is especially common when host and guest are roughly the same age grade but 
the server is younger and known for being impudent towards his elders. Of course, plastic cups foreclose these kinds 
of negotiations over power relations: you get one plastic cup and the server moves on.  
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weddings: dragging people up to dance and trying to get the party started. Over the course of the 
evening they would perform songs allowing for the now-familiar genres of dance, sāmir, debka 
and chōbi.  
As the dancing got underway, Yassin pulled out his gun and shot a few rounds into the 
air. A couple of men did the same over the course of the next twenty minutes. Eventually, one of 
the family’s patriarchs made his way up to the stage and said, ‘Welcome our honored guests. We 
respect you. Dance and enjoy yourselves. We say welcome but if you’re going to shoot welcome 
and goodbye.” With that, the dancing continued as it had before. We stood in a line shoulder to 
shoulder doing the sāmir or daḥiyya. Those who were more enthusiastic would break out of the 
line and try to encourage the dancers to greater levels of exertion. Occasionally people would 
grab at the crotch to tease. The hired singers meanwhile sang to congratulate the groom and 
those who knew the words sang along: in the old days, the participants would have had to 
produce the verses themselves. All throughout, there were occasional bursts of gunfire from the 
dancers as well as from people more towards the fringes. The former tended to shoot pistols 
while the latter favored shotguns and rifles.  
The music stopped and I went to sit down, socializing a bit with some people from out of 
town. The Debka began. Sporadic shooting continued. At some point, our hosts stopped the 
music and the patriarch stood up on stage again, taking the microphone: “Because of God! 
Because of Muhammed! Don’t shoot! Don’t Shoot. Don’t shoot at our houses. Don’t shoot at our 
market! Because of God don’t shoot! Because of Muhammed don’t shoot! By God if you shoot 
[unintelligible]! Don’t shoot!” The dancing went on for hours and it was all good fun. Around 
midnight, someone tried to put a gun in my hand to shoot. My sense of horror at the prospect 
turned to relief as I saw an old man summoning me from the sidelines. I sat down to talk and, 
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once again, we were exhorted to refrain from shooting. This time, it was the groom’s father, Abu 
Yassin. He gave a more articulate, if equally impassioned plea to avoid gunfire. This was 
followed by a volley of 6 shotgun bursts.  
At the time, my video camera was in my friend Abu Samir’s hands and what it recorded 
was him asking repeatedly, “was it in his face?” (fī jakhimu?: basically, is this a direct challenge 
to the man’s authority and honor?) The next thing I knew Yassin, the groom, (believing his 
father had been disrespected) began running towards the shooter before throttling him while his 
relatives ran in to break up the ensuing fight between the groom and his new in-laws. The men 
were separated and the band quickly began playing--although the party never really recovered. 
The man I had been talking to said, “I always like to leave occasions early while they're still 
happy. You don't want to stay too long.” The music briefly paused but the crowd demanded that 
the band play through the fight. At this point, I said goodbye to the older man and I started 
walking towards the site of the altercation, sensing things had calmed down. The music stopped 
(this time for good) and the band said good night. I heard a man behind me exclaim, “praise God 
it ended with happiness. Now let's go home.” I found Abu Samir and he gave me my camera and 
asked if I was ready to leave. We picked up his wife and kids while I asked what happened: “oh 
the people from Amman were drunk. Their cars were full of liquor.” The kids got in the car and 
they pointed to a box on the ground: “that's 700 dinar whiskey! Chivas125,” said one of the boys. 
The wife muttered about drunken troublemakers as well. As we drove out, Abu Samir waved to 
one of the few remaining guests “from Amman.” He waved and says, “this family only drinks 
Chivas!” 
                                                 
125
 At the time of research, Chivas was the only brand of alcohol (whiskey to be precise) with which my largely 
teetotaling neighbors in the village seemed to be familiar. It was used alternately as an index of urban decadence and 
decay as well as luxury and sensuousness. Chivas is in fact a decent upper mid-range blended scotch whiskey which 
does not cost anywhere near JD 700 per bottle—even in Jordan where taxes on alcohol can approach twice the cost 
of the alcohol itself. 
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While the hosts seemed relatively pleased with the event, it is easy to see how such 
weddings could be exceedingly alienating to others: drinking, fighting, and firearms at weddings 
can and do lead to injuries and even deaths—often involving innocent bystanders. Shooting in 
particular is nearly archetypal in Jordan as the epitome of irrational tradition. The exclusionary 
practices and sexual license of elite hotel weddings, in contrast, were seen as foreign imports to 
be treated with suspicion by large swaths of the public. The best illustration of this set of 
anxieties around elite hotel weddings is the fact that, in almost four years living in Jordan, no one 
has ever invited me to such a wedding. No doubt, the five-star hotel is the real zone of “cultural 
intimacy” for cosmopolitans who are increasingly alienated from the rural social networks 
through which I primarily moved during fieldwork. Elite celebrations are increasingly 
inaccessible (behind metal detectors and blast walls
126
 in five star hotels) while the poor 
increasingly wish their guests would stay home and spare them the cost and condescension. 
Perhaps it is even a sign of the increasing levels of inequality within Jordanian society that these 
class antagonisms have led to the emergence of distinct forms of weddings aimed and producing 
qualitatively different kinds of relationships. This emergence of distinct and coherent competing 
models of wedding adds a separate dimension to the social conflicts that have long played 
themselves out through weddings. At stake is the relative legitimacy of distinct pathways for 
enmeshing people in qualitatively different sorts of networks of affinity and alliance aimed at 
realizing qualitatively different futures. 
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 The deadliest terrorist attack in recent Jordanian history targeted five-star hotels. Most of the victims were 
attendees at a wedding celebration at the Radisson hotel in Amman (Fattah and Slackman 2005). By all accounts, 
the vast majority of Jordanians considered the attack an outrage and a particularly low blow. Fifty-seven members of 
the self-proclaimed mastermind Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi’s tribe (the Khalayleh section of the Bani Hassan) 
including his brother and first cousin responded by taking out half-page ads in Jordan’s three major newspapers to 
publicly disown him (Howard 2005).  
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The Islamic movement pushes this to an extreme, railing against both liberal and tribal 
excesses in the realm of marriage and family. A close analysis of their alternative framework for 
weddings will go a long ways towards fleshing out many of the marginalized critiques latent in 
this chapter’s exploration of the wedding as part rite of passage, part exercise in self-
aggrandizement, and part tool of ideological struggle. The Chastity Society no doubt hopes to 
provide beneficiaries with the same things, but it also brings the emphasis of weddings squarely 
back to broader questions of legitimacy at a time when people in many parts of the world 
increasingly see this as almost irrelevant to marriage. While the Chastity Society itself with its 
mass weddings and strident anti-tribal and anti-western stances will never become hegemonic, it 
represents a well-funded and articulate alternative that is not going to disappear any time soon.
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Chapter 6: The Chastity Society 
 
“The success of married life is a success for the whole community, because the 
successful individual is the one able to consolidate the success of his family, and 
the successful family is the one able to consolidate the foundation of an ascendant 
community.” 
 
-Sharia Court Judge Dr. Samir Qabah, ‘And Live with them (f) in Kindness’, pg. 9 
 
In the previous chapter, I explored how families use weddings to promote (and index 
their commitment to) competing visions of Jordan’s future. This chapter poses a closely related 
question: why weddings? Of all the rites of passage (birth, puberty, marriage, and death), why do 
weddings receive such a disproportionate amount of commentary, innovation, and resources in 
contemporary Jordan? The activities of the Chastity Society provide something of an answer. As 
an organization that has distributed millions of dollars to help thousands of Jordanians marry, 
their mass weddings and the accompanying training course for beneficiaries serve as yet another 
example of a clear articulation of a social vision centered on marriage. As its intellectuals like 
Judge Samir make clear, the Society views marriage as central to the foundation of an Islamic 
community. As a result, it is unsurprising that they believe that much is at stake when it comes to 
weddings. Yet while tribesmen and rural patronage networks valorize weddings as helping 
emphasize the importance of reckoning widespread patterns of descent and alliance through lines 
of male filiation
127
, this need not be the primary focus of the rites of legitimation tied up with
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 It would be interesting to study the relationship between the relative investment in different rites of passage and 
the degree to which the society in question can be considered to have a matrilineal or patrilineal kinship system.  
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weddings. In fact, if the Chastity Society’s concerns are any indication128, one of the biggest 
threats to legitimate male filiation in contemporary Jordan (at the level of the individual 
household especially) may in fact be men themselves—as individuals lacking restraint, prone to 
tribalism and other vices that divert resources away from the all-important household-level 
economic unit. In short: men may suffer from jāhiliyya: a state of being that is often likened to 
ignorance with connotations of immoderation
129
. As a result, Jordanians are increasingly 
exhorted to use weddings to enact one of a number of conflicting notions of legitimacy that 
emphasize either privileging the household or the extended kin group at the expense of the other. 
The conflict itself further destabilizes the link between legitimate filiation and property relations, 
labor relations, and political affiliation more broadly, making weddings and a respect for their 
various ritual hazards seem all the more important to the maintenance of the social order.  
The Chastity Society’s mass weddings, training courses, and literature (like Judge 
Samir’s quotation and book title) had a decidedly male addressee. This reflected an assumption 
that men posed the greatest threat to the family’s ability to serve as a foundation for legitimate 
sociality. Challenging the forms of male sociality that were normatively valued in the previous 
chapter, the Society endorsed the two-hour wedding format, transformed it into charity, and 
scaled it up to include thousands from families ideally drawn from across Jordan. All of this 
worked to systematically disrupt the use of weddings to promote tribal affinities, debt relations, 
and patronage networks, portrayed by the Society as greedily preying on household finances and 
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 Frances Hasso (2011) also writes about indigenous critiques of masculine excesses within the Arab world, but 
shows that these may take on either a secular or a religious idiom, making the important point that many of these 
critiques are more a product of women’s contestation of these masculine excesses than innate qualities of a given 
discourse. Here, the focus is more exclusively on how critiques of excessive masculinity are articulated through a 
particular, explicitly Islamist, organization. 
129
 William Shepherd writes in the Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Thought that jāhilyya (now commonly glossed 
as “ignorance” and used to describe pre-Islamic times) also means, “a tendency to go to extremes of behavior, 
whether in violence, revenge, boasting, drinking, or even generosity, and was sometimes even considered a virtue.” 
Citing the Quran, Shepherd turns to verse 48:26 where, “we read the fierce arrogance of jāhiliyya in contrast to the 
‘self-restraint (taqwā)’ imposed on the Muslims” (Shepherd 2013:269-270).  
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all but snatching needed resources from the mouths of women and children. The speech at the 
mass wedding by Dr. Abdul-Latif Arabiyyat, former head of Jordan’s main opposition party (the 
Islamic Action Front) was particularly explicit in its denunciation of “tribal” and “familial” 
weddings. In contrast, he promoted the Chastity Society’s celebration as “the wedding of the 
nation.” As tribesmen and Islamic activists concerned themselves with realizing their positive 
social visions, they competed for the loyalties of the same people and (occasionally) came into 
conflict, making their respective organizational forms reminiscent of what the American 
sociologist Lewis Coser (1974) has called, “greedy institutions,” fighting for the “undivided 
commitment” of their constituents. Arabiyyat made even more explicit many of the antagonisms 
of the last chapter (between different classes, generations, and affines) as well as antagonisms 
between town and country and conflicts between Palestinian refugees and “native” Jordanians. 
He also returned to the central theme of Judge Samir’s lectures and writings: the role of Islam in 
constituting a legitimate order, which binds together the individual, the family and the 
community. 
Tracing the Limits of Legitimacy 
In tracing the limits of legitimacy, I am particularly indebted to the recent work of 
Morgan Clarke. In Islam and New Kinship, he challenges the focus of much of the new kinship 
studies on the presence or absence of a “biogenetic” dimension to kinship and instead points to 
the importance (in the Middle East at least) of the presence or absence of legitimacy. Mirroring 
Euben and Pearl’s move (discussed in the previous chapter) to use Islamic practice to 
problematize liberal democratic orthodoxy, he notes, “the Islamic focus on legitimacy, on being 
born in wedlock, throws into relief the extent to which this element of kinship has diminished in 
importance in ‘the West’, and thus perhaps helps explain the relative prominence of kinship’s 
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‘biogenetic’ element in Western discourse” (Clarke 2009:16). In this chapter, I extend his 
argument by showing that legitimacy here is not merely a family matter because filiation is still 
foundational to all other facets of legitimacy within society. Note, for instance, the powerful role 
that filiation plays in the governance of the Middle East at the highest echelons both de jure (in 
monarchies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the Emirates and Bahrain) as well as de facto 
(the Assads in Syria, the Hariris in Lebanon).  
Yet while the symbolic role of legitimate filiation in constituting the political order is 
important
130
, it is the much more quotidian dimensions of the phenomenon that deserve special 
attention. As I argued in part one of the dissertation, access to housing in Jordan is heavily 
dependent on accepted lines of male descent. A wealthy father can provide his son with land and, 
in many cases, the logistical support and a good portion of the money needed to build a house. 
Those who lack such a father figure must choose between renting or taking out a mortgage—
both of which exhaust the monthly salaries of all but the most handsomely remunerated 
Jordanians. In the wedding, again, having a father or some other senior male relative who is 
invested in a particular young man is crucial for enacting a proper status-conferring marital rite. 
This is to say nothing of the labor that goes into such a wedding, which must be either purchased 
or finagled from a large pool of willing kinsmen. Moving beyond the marriage process, it is clear 
that many fathers play an important role in providing their children with business contacts, 
education, and even employment—and that those young men who lack such a father figure (like 
the brothers Mo’tasim and Mahmud in the previous chapter) suffer for it. Filiation also plays a 
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 I would even go so far as to argue that, for many Americans, a focus on this symbolic importance of legitimate 
filiation at the highest levels of power is distracting, since it reproduces these tensions and concerns as something 
people worry about in “other” “non-meritocratic” societies. In fact, legitimate filiation remains crucial in 
Americans’ (often unacknowledged) projects for multi-generational wealth accumulation that, as in Jordan, tend to 
involve substantial investments of time and money in amassing property and various kinds of social capital 
(especially educational credentials). 
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role in foundational aspects of the modern order that the more privileged members of the 
contemporary global order tend to overlook, like citizenship
131
. Clarke illustrates this most 
poignantly when he relates the stories told by his Lebanese interlocutors about how Palestinian 
refugees, denied citizenship, the right to own property, get an education or join the professions, 
might abandon their children on the steps of an orphanage because it is better to be a Lebanese 
bastard than a stateless Palestinian (2009:81).  
If the ramifications of legitimate filiation extend far beyond the family, the legitimacy-
conferring powers of the wedding do so as well. Commentators in the region are known to refer 
to upcoming elections as the ‘urs waṭani (national wedding) and, while they most likely mean to 
draw a simple parallel between what should be two different types of happy occasion, talk about 
a wedding celebration thrown by a local parliamentarian in one of my fieldsites provided some 
alternative readings. As it happened, I was sitting with two of the MP’s relatives watching the 
cars go by one day when one of them asked, “Have you heard about the lunch at the 
representative's?” I replied in the negative and asked about the occasion. ‘Awadh responded, “He 
wants to marry off his son Muhammed… everyone is invited! His son is going to marry a girl 
from... [the] in-laws of Prince so-and-so !” His uncle Ahmed Sweilem chimed in asking, “is it 
going to be a big occasion?’ to which ‘Awadh responded, “ya salām! (oh yeah!) He's going to 
make mansaf like no other!” However, if that was how his relatives explained the event, their 
neighbors had other ideas: 
Me: Are you invited to Abu Muhammed’s lunch on Friday? 
Abu Saqir: Who's that? 
Me: He's the member of parliament 
Abu Saqir: No. Are you? 
Me: No.  
Abu Saqir: What's the occasion? 
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 Since Jordan, like most countries in the region, only confers citizenship upon the children of its male citizens, 
those born out of wedlock with no father willing to recognize them risk statelessness. 
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Me: His son is marrying from the...  
Abu Saqir: Oh. They're from Amman. They're Prince so-and-so’s in-laws. But it's 
not really an invitation for his son's wedding. It's an invitation for himself. The 
parliamentary elections are coming up at the end of the year. This way he can start 
the campaign early 
 
Whereas Abu Muhammed’s relatives portrayed the event as an act of generosity, a distribution of 
largesse by a pillar of the community with a good heart, others took a more jaundiced view. No 
doubt, Abu Muhammed’s relatives were fully convinced of their account: such acts of generosity 
have a purifying effect, banishing questions about where power or resources come from through 
generosity and, of course, helping to cow curious interlopers into silence. Nonetheless, attacking 
such gestures of shared commensality and wealth redistribution as cynical ploys (electoral or 
otherwise) was quite common in the caddy world of village gossip about weddings.  
Furthermore, lest one think that Abu Saqir’s cynicism was merely a matter of petty 
village rivalries, he interpreted the Chastity Society through the same lens. When I discussed the 
Chastity Society with him, he wanted to know where the money came from, how much the 
beneficiaries paid, how people found out about it and whether one had to be a part of the Islamic 
Movement to benefit. I could tell him confidently that the beneficiaries of the Chastity Society 
paid little to nothing, and that local businesses
132
 and the Jordanian Islamic Bank bore most of 
the cost. I asked the charity’s director, Dr. Mufid Sirhan, how beneficiaries found out about the 
Society and he replied that it was advertised in advance and “everybody knows.” Told this, Abu 
Saqir sniffed, “I’ve never seen an ad. I’ve never seen an invitation. How do people know when to 
sign up?”  
My response, that beneficiaries were heavily concentrated in the refugee camps (where 
the Islamic Movement’s social services are stereotypically concentrated), only heightened his 
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 After the celebration, the Society published a quarter-page ad thanking and listing their donors in all of the major 
newspapers. Many of the businesses in question had names involving phrases like al-nūr or ‘light’ that indexed 
allegiance to the Islamic Movement. 
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suspicion that this was a privilege reserved for supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. The man 
was a veteran of the security services, a proud Bedouin tribesman from the East Bank of the 
Jordan River, an ardent nationalist, and a frequent critic of the Islamic Movement—as well as the 
neighboring tribe and its political representative. Abu Saqir was no secularist, though: as he once 
told me: “If there was a real Jordanian Islamic Movement, I would be the first to join. But there 
is no real Jordanian Islamic movement—just a Palestinian Islamic movement!” It was only when 
I described the educational levels and generally negative attitude among the beneficiaries that he 
became unsure about how it might fit in with the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral machinations. 
Reflecting my own uncertainty, though, I backtracked and offered, “I really wish I could talk to 
the women. They seemed more satisfied with the Society. Maybe they’re the ones who are with 
the Brotherhood” Abu Saqir replied: “girls just want to get married. They don’t care how.” He 
continued, “every man wants a wedding which is three days long with dinner every night and a 
dance team and a big tent.” They want to be that kind of man. If they don’t it is a material (mādī: 
financial) problem.” 
People could be forgiven for seeing the stakes in the contemporary Jordanian marriage 
scene and throwing up their hands: there is no winning. Hosting a big wedding provokes envy. 
Not hosting a big wedding provokes pity. The Chastity Society offers a particular kind of escape 
hatch—although one that seems to be primarily appealing to certain segments of the urban poor. 
But if the Chastity Society is about opting out of certain circuits of exchange based around 
conspicuous consumption among related males, it preserves and augments the position of 
marriage in general and the wedding in particular through a concerted scaling-up of the crowd 
into the thousands and, of course, a rhetoric which places marriage at the center of social life. 
Through its training course and wedding, the Chastity Society unfolded a complex social vision 
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for the largely poor young people who were attracted by the prospect of getting married for free. 
The Society had identified a number of threats to its broader social vision—and wanted to 
counteract them through training. Justifying the skepticism of tribesmen like Abu Saqir 
somewhat, chief among those perceived threats were men themselves and, particularly, their 
perceived lack of self-restraint, which was tied to a belief that they would withhold resources and 
support from their family in the service of the forms of extravagant male sociality valorized by 
many of the celebrations in the previous chapter.  
“Training for Every Institution”  
I arrived at the offices of the Jordanian Engineer’s Association133 at 9:30 for the Chastity 
Society’s annual training course for couples. I greeted the director, Dr. Mufid, who was standing 
with one of the “intellectuals” (muthaqifūn) who his organization publishes: Dr. ‘Adl Latfi. Dr. 
‘Adl was tall, white-haired and kindly. Dr. Mufid soon left me with Dr. ‘Adl, who began talking 
to me about the significance of the course: “There’s training for every institution: the bank, 
teachers, of course the army. The army has lots of training. So there has to be training for 
marriage as well since marriage is the most important institution. It should be as important as the 
medical test [required for marriage in Jordan]. One day, people will go to the courthouse and 
they will bring a medical test and a certificate from a course like this.” In total, there were four 
sessions, the first of which was given by Judge Samir entitled “The rights and duties of the 
Spouses.” I will supplement a more careful narration of his lecture (largely drawn from ‘And 
Treat her with Kindness’) with additional material from lectures given by Muhammed Al-Aswad 
(a tall, slim man in his thirties with an immaculate beige suit with burgundy accents on the cuffs) 
and Mona Kalil (also in her thirties, a dentist and trainer who had studied psychology). Much 
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 The site was unsurprising—as the Engineer’s association is one of the many professional associations in Jordan 
run by members Islamic movement and The Chastity Society is one of the numerous charities associated with the 
movement. 
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like Dr. ‘Adl’s statement about the military and Sheikh Samir’s interpellation of the male head of 
household (‘and treat her with kindness’; ‘his family’) as central to the maintenance of the social 
order, the course had a largely male addressee. Men were seen as expecting too much, 
insufficiently capable of restraint, and prone to divert resources from their families towards 
various forms of male homosociality. These sentiments were reiterated throughout the day before 
a mixed audience, with women asked more or less explicitly at certain points to assert their 
presence. In the final portion of the course, participants were divided up by gender for a frank 
discussion of what they could expect on their wedding nights. The male session was provided by 
a gynecologist named Dr. Nidal Tariq. I highlight the first and the last sessions to emphasize the 
two major sources of authority: Islam and biomedicine, which were nonetheless intermingled 
throughout the day.  
I entered the room and surveyed the crowd. Most appeared to be in their early twenties. 
The women mostly wore colorful headscarves, although a few wore black and covered their 
faces. Some wore floor-length skirts while others opted for the more traditional abāya (a robe 
which runs from the neck to the floor and down to the wrists). The young men wore the latest in 
working-class youth fashion: tight jeans, dress shoes and the kind of button-up shirts made to be 
worn un-tucked. I took my seat and waited. The men’s side of the room was largely silent, while 
a number of women on the other side of the room chatted quietly, producing a good deal of 
subtle laughter. Dr. Mufid entered the room looking incredibly annoyed. “Brothers and sisters: 
no one is to remain except the brides and grooms. Could the chaperones please come to the other 
room we have for you?” He then walked out. A few mothers shuffled out. He came back (more 
annoyed), “I told you a week ago. Please. Look! They’re all sitting here together!” Another 
mother left. Finally, he summoned a young man to come talk to him in the hallway—who in turn 
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summoned his bride. The bride came back in, went over to her mother, and coaxed her out of the 
room.  
It is doubtful that the mothers were reluctant to leave because they feared for their 
daughters’ honor. It seems far more likely that the mothers simply wanted to know what exactly 
it was that this organization was teaching. Perhaps they were right to worry and resist the 
organization’s attempts to shut them out. If the Chastity Society took pains to position itself in 
relationship to the class antagonisms I described in the previous chapter, championing the poor, 
it also positioned itself in relationship to antagonisms between the sexes and generations. 
Broadly speaking, the training sought to take the jahiliyya (ignorance) of unreflexive tradition 
and replace it with scientific knowledge and the correct practice of Islam. Parents, far from being 
allies in this endeavor, were probably better off not knowing—at least from the perspective of 
the activists. 
One of the central goals of the training and the larger social transformation being affected 
by the Chastity Society was the promotion of highly specific gender roles. I focus here on its 
vision of masculinity. To be sure, this vision was grounded in critiques of male behavior with 
deep histories not just in Jordan, but also throughout the Muslim world. As Michael Peletz has 
argued, Islamic masculinities often portray men as quintessentially rational (possessors of ‘aql) 
at one [ideal] level while simultaneously acknowledging their nearly universal shortcomings in 
that regard at another, more practical level. According to Peletz, rationality here is not simply 
“about” gender. Rationality helps define all sorts of socially salient contrasts. It is what separates 
humans from animals. Children, non-Muslims and the weak-minded all lack restraint and thus 
remain vulnerable to manipulation by the forces of evil: bad people, jinn and, of course, the devil 
himself. Religious practice, in a vital sense, is about developing one’s reason to avoid such 
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snares—regardless of gender. As we will see, however, “practical representations of gender 
portray men as less reasonable (i.e., having less ‘reason’), and less responsible than women both 
with regard to managing money and other household resources, and in terms of honoring basic 
social obligations associated with marriage, parenting and kinship generally” (Peletz 1994:152). 
What was potentially scandalous to the parental guardians was the manner in which the 
contemporary Islamic movement in Jordan mobilized these practical representations to highlight 
the propensity of men to put their tribal loyalties, their masculine aggression, and their 
commitments to the forms of male sociality valorized in the previous chapter ahead of their own 
families—thereby undermining the basis for legitimate social relations both within and beyond 
the household.  
Dr. Samir’s talk was entitled, “the rights and duties of the spouses” and it recapitulated 
many of the same critiques that religious scholars have been making for centuries (see chapters 
three and four). He readied the first substantial PowerPoint slide: a wall of yellow text on black 
background. Rather than read from it, he said, “in all things you have to prepare yourself. When 
you want to pray, you must do your ablutions (wuḍū‘). A soldier going into battle must train, 
have a plan, have supplies. A teacher before going to the classroom needs a plan. Marriage is like 
that. In order that you do not oppress.” Turning to the first slide, he said, “the first material right 
(haq mādī) of the woman is the bridewealth. So sometimes, maybe the man gives the woman 
1000 dinar in front of the people and she returns it to him on Sunday?” People nodded along. 
“You know this is ḥarām (forbidden). The Bridewealth is her right (ḥaq: note that this word 
means both “right” and “price”). If she returns it this is what?” The women’s side of the room 
replied in unison, “ḥarām!” “That’s right,” the sheikh continued, “it is what? Unrighteous 
(āthim).” “The bridewealth is… for the woman. Her person remains autonomous (yabqa 
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shakhṣiyyat-ha mustaqila). Many young men don’t understand this.” The sheikh moved on to the 
next slide, which was headed by a saying of the prophet about bridewealth being “to enrich the 
sidqa (trust/friendship) of his wife” and not to create “enmity.” The Sheikh posed a question, 
“does it do to request a high bridewealth?” The room was quiet. “Young men?” Again, silence. 
The Sheikh tried another tack: “How many of you have bridewealth?” Dr. Mufid replied, “they 
all have bridewealth.” The Sheikh continued, “How many of you have bridewealth over 5000?” 
No one raised their hand. “How many of you have bridewealth under 2000?” No one raised their 
hand. Attempting a joke, he asked, “How many grooms think their bridewealth is too much?” I 
saw a number of people glowering. “How many women think their bridewealth is too little?” I 
looked over to see a bit of fidgeting. The sheikh went on to say that it was important that the 
woman be respected but that the bridewealth not be more than the man can afford so that he 
begins to hate his wife. 
He moved onto the second material right: nafaqa (allowance). He asked, “How many of 
the men don’t work?” One nearby man raised his hand a bit but thought better of it. No one else 
raised a hand. The Sheikh continued, “Anything you eat, give some to your wife to satisfy her. 
As you dress, dress her. Not in pants and shirt!” The room laughed at this. Pleased with himself, 
he Judge smiled and continued, “I mean from the same class. The husband is the one who brings 
the wealth and the wife is the one who preserves it.” He switched the slide to the next one: 
“obedience” (al-ta‘a) before continuing: “If a man goes out every day and eats barbequed lamb 
while his wife buys her own bread, is this right?” The room replied, “NO!” The Sheikh 
continued, “and if the wife eats barbequed lamb and the husband eats bread?” The room replied, 
less enthusiastically, “No.” The sheikh said, “Actually that’s fine. As long as he’s satisfied: it’s 
his choice.” Next, he asked, “If a woman’s father gives her 100 dinar, can the husband take it and 
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hide it or spend it? No. It’s her autonomous (mustaqila) wealth.” All of this was, of course, the 
stuff of village gossip in that everyone knew that excessive feasting and “borrowing” money 
from one’s wife constituted forbidden forms of oppression which were, sadly, all too common.  
He switched to his next slide: “The woman leaving the house.” He asked, “Can the 
woman leave the house without permission?” The room replied, “No.” The Sheikh continued, 
“Will you young men give permission?” The room was quiet but one man said, “According to 
the request (ḥasab aṭ-ṭalab). The Shaykh then went through the reasons why women could leave 
the house with or without permission—in direct contradiction of the general opinion among his 
audience: 
-To request their right 
-To request their allowance (nafaqa) 
-To ask questions of scholars 
-Because of emergencies in the spousal residence 
-To receive permission for divorce 
-For familial visits  
 
The judge said that it was important to ask permission anyway and to do so nicely since, “a son 
of people (a good person) would never say ‘don’t visit your family.’” He added that a woman has 
a right to visit her parents every week and her aunts, uncles, cousins, brothers and sisters 
(maḥalim) once a year. Summing up, he said, “There is mercy in the Sharia.” The women let out 
a long and spirited note of ascent: “aaaa.”  
He switched the slide forward and yet another block of yellow text on a black 
background appeared. At the top, it read, “The right of discipline.” Once again, the sheikh 
emphasized the need for male restraint. He explained to the men: “first, talk with excellent 
words. Say that the house is dirty and that you would like it to be clean.” He supplied a number 
of ways a man could register his displeasure while showing the proper degree of respect before 
continuing, “second, distance your face from her (tiba‘id wijihak minha). Let’s say you return 
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and the house is dirtier than ever. Keep away from her so that she knows the reason and knows 
that you want the house to be clean.” He trailed off and paused before continuing, “Third, a 
justifiable blow (ḍarib mubarira). Not with a stick or something hard.” A man from the audience 
chimed in, “a hose!” The sheikh continued, “this is supposed to be light. Just so she knows that 
you are angry.”  
A good portion of the day was devoted to modeling and practicing appropriate forms of 
sociality for married life. As Mona said at the climax of her presentation, “dialogue (ḥuwār)! 
Dialogue is the basis of everything! The salad, the rice, the fried tomatoes; if the food doesn’t 
please you, tell her. Otherwise, it’s all waysting ṭiym134. If the salad doesn’t please you, tell her!” 
In his presentation, Muhammed counseled, “talk with her like you talk with your friends,” as he 
first mimicked the solicitous way men often talk with their friends (‘my lover,’ ‘my age’) before 
barking orders as he mimed a telephone with his hand. “Remember: she has left her father and 
brother!” He continued, “and the male is not like the female—in body, mentality and self.” He 
led the youths in an exercise where they made lists of nice words they could say to their fiancées. 
A few men grumbled and claimed they did not know any while others seemed downright 
enthusiastic. One man became frustrated and exclaimed, “This is something of the heart!” 
Muhammed replied, “you must change then!” When they were done, one group had eight, 
another twenty-four and another eighteen. Muhammed told a man get up and read his group’s 
list. He came to the front and read, “my honey, moon, my age, my lover…” When he was done, 
Muhammed instructed us to clap. A second man stood up to read and looked directly (if 
bashfully) at his fiancée as he read his list and the women giggled. The women were not asked to 
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 Mona’s frequent code-switching into English, while bolstering her authority as a well-educated member of the 
upper classes, was probably unintelligible to the mostly working-class crowd she was presenting to. 
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read their lists, but Muhammed counseled the entire group, “accustom your tongue to them… 
this is not shameful.”  
In all three sessions, men’s wrath was foregrounded and problematized and trainers 
sought to develop strategies and rationales for helping men deescalate conflicts, which could 
jeopardize the marriage. In a certain sense, this merely reflected a set of assumptions about 
power relations and antagonisms between the genders that should be familiar from Chapters 
three and four—especially the work of Amira Sonbol (2008) and Judith Tucker (1998; 2008) on 
pre-modern conflicts between Sharia courts and forms of male privilege otherwise enshrined in 
local custom. There, the diligent employees of the courts were convinced that there was an 
intrinsic potential for the ẓulim (oppression) of women in marriage—and that it was up to pious 
Muslim men like themselves to prevent it. So in the same way that the Sharia Courts have 
designed procedures of guardianship, enumeration, stipulation, and consent, the Chastity Society 
seeks to promote its own interventions in the name of fighting women’s oppression. In this 
particular case, the Society chooses to work primarily on male notions of agency and self-worth, 
promoting the idea that men hold a good deal of the power to nurture or destroy their relationship 
with their future wives. In the case of the courts, it seemed that some women were able to 
manipulate these assumptions and the resultant procedures for their own benefit while others 
were victimized and found that the discursive elaboration of their own powerlessness came to 
contribute to their actual powerlessness. Such observations apply, perforce, in the context of such 
discussions of domestic violence and masculine restraint.  
After the sheikh’s elucidation of the concept of a “justifiable blow,” silence settled over 
the room. The sheikh asked, “how many of you read the Quran daily?” No one raised their hand. 
“Yearly?” A few hands went up. “Who doesn’t pray?” One person raised his hand. He repeated 
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his questions for the women: some read the Quran every day. Most read it every year. They all 
prayed. He said, “it’s important to read the Quran to know about your creation.” The Sheikh then 
said, “there are hormones (hormonāt). Do you know what hormones are? Sometimes she’s angry 
without reason when she’s pregnant, after she gives birth, before she gives birth. She says, ‘I’m 
mad. Why are you wearing black.’ Just say you’re sorry and walk with her.”  
The English loanword hormonāt was repeated throughout the day and, as we will see, 
constituted an important aspect of the repeated appeal to nature (ṭabi‘a). It should serve to 
emphasize Peletz’s caution that rationality and its absence are qualities of both genders. Yet if 
female passions were dismissed as manifestations of hormonāt, they were not seen as in need of 
transformation in the same way that male passions were. As Muhammed counseled the men, 
“mercy is not weakness and it is not against romance.” His PowerPoint slide clarified things 
further, “it’s called the days of fertility.” He claimed that, “According to a scientific study in 
Europe, 90% of divorce happens in this period of the woman’s monthly cycle135. But our lord 
created woman like this. Her body temperature rises by one degree… You need to lighten up on 
her during these days… If she’s angry, let her talk until she’s finished… Memorize the monthly 
cycle of your wife… This is the natural order.” Mona, for her part, told the men at one point, 
“I’m going to talk to you about adrenaline (adrenalīn). So you know what adrenaline is? If there 
is danger it makes you fiyṭ ūr fliyṭ. Understand? Decrease the distribution of adrenaline to the 
spouses… Don’t put gas on the fire! You need to be kind. You want to increase self-acceptance 
and silf-isṭīm. This means watsh yūr wūrds!”  
                                                 
135
 As noted at the end of chapter four, the perception of divorce as a growing issue has some empirical basis to it, 
with court statistics showing a 25% increase from about 12,000 divorces per year in 2006 to 15,000 per year in 
2010. With 6.5 million people, that makes the crude divorce rate as a function of population increasingly in line with 
Western European and American levels of divorce.  
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The sheikh concluded his presentation by saying, “marriage is religious duty for us. 
Prayer is the first duty, but marriage is very important,” and soliciting questions. Not receiving 
any, he began to quiz the audience. He asked, “what are the rights? I want to hear from the men.” 
There was more silence. A few people shouted out: “obedience, respect.” Then a woman said, 
“being able to leave the home.” The sheikh said, “when can the woman leave the home?” Unlike 
the men, who had not written anything on the paper they had been provided, a number of the 
women had taken careful notes—especially on key points like reasons for leaving the house and 
the protocol for the husband striking his wife. Reflecting the broader participation of women 
within the Chastity Society (as authors like Amal ‘Abdeen, presenters like Mona, and especially 
as volunteers) the female beneficiaries gave verbatim accounts of what had been said on these 
topics. Dr. Mufid responded, “See young men? These women have been taking notes on the 
paper we gave them. I will give them prizes after this is over.” A man said, “Thank you for your 
presentation. But you didn’t talk about one important point. Sometimes women bring bad guests 
to the house. Their female friends cause problems. Is this not allowed?”  
As he said this I wondered how many men were starting to see the Chastity Society as a 
‘bad guest,’ which they had unwittingly admitted into their relations with their future wives, 
upsetting the customary balance of power between the spouses. The sheikh replied, “Yes. The 
man can forbid any woman… or man! From coming to the house if he isn’t satisfied with them.” 
With that, the Sheikh said “congratulations, God willing” and the men responded in unison with 
a spirited, “God bless you too.” The women left first to get their refreshments. Once they had 
finished and gone into the designated women’s break room, the men burst forth to get their 
coffee and escape outside where they could smoke. I found about 7 of the 23 men standing in a 
group talking. They all told me they were from the Jerash refugee camp when I introduced 
 217 
myself. Then I listened as they complained about the session, “damn this course. It’s not teaching 
anyone but my ass.” They made fun of the Sheikh’s language and mannerisms a bit and then 
headed back down for the next session.  
“You’re all so Educated!” 
At the end of the day, we were divided by gender for the sexual education portion of the 
course. The men were directed towards a room with a large conference table. When Dr. Nidal 
finally arrived, he brought with him a poster of the human reproductive system and a plastic 
model of the female reproductive system. He was a jovial and rotund man with a white beard and 
a light grey suit. He set up his visual aids and began by saying, “there are the days of marriage 
and the days after. You’re all so educated, young men,” he said with a bit of knowing intonation. 
“What God Wills,” he continued with a devious smile, “you have the internet. You have the 
Satellite. You have Facebook.” The men began to laugh. “All of you are educated.” He turned a 
bit more serious and said, “You should take information from respectful places.” He explained to 
them that, of the religions, “our religion is the only religion that gives the woman her rights.” He 
continued, “and marriage is a religious service/worship (‘abada) in our religion. Marriage is very 
important for Muslims. It’s not like Europe. Now they have marriage between a man and a 
man—a man and an animal!” He continued, “a lot of youths think marriage is just for looking at 
her like a game. No. Marriage is worship.” 
If the day had started with appeals to religion bolstered by appeals to nature, it would end 
with the reverse: appeals to nature bolstered by appeals to religion. I found this appeal to nature 
to be particularly striking, and particularly emblematic of how modern the Chastity Society was 
in its outlook. It did not simply adopt modern technology (PowerPoint) or institutional forms (the 
NGO). The Society also exhibited a marked tendency to substitute nature (in the form of a 
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particular construal of biomedicine) for God as what Marilyn Strathern, writing in After Nature 
(1992) has called, a ‘grounding conceptualization for knowledge.’ Such a shift, a ‘figure-ground 
reversal,’ should not be seen as modern in the sense of contemporary or co-eval but rather as a 
latent potentiality in a myriad of longstanding symbols, tropes, and organizational forms (cf. 
Latour 1993; Wagner 1987). Just as Strathern has argued that nature has ceased to serve this 
“grounding function” for English kinship, the Chastity Society appears to have emerged as a 
creative attempt to stabilize something (‘nature,’ ‘God,’ or whatever). The necessity is simply 
that there be something, “At once intrinsic characteristic and external environment, constitut[ing] 
the given facts of the world and the world as context for facts, thereby providing a ground to the 
life of persons and results of social enterprise” (Strathern 1992:194-195). This seemed central to 
Judge Samir’s search for foundations (epitomized in the epigraph) and carried throughout the 
course—relying alternately on appeals to God and appeals to Nature. Dr. Nidal began his 
presentation by turning to his poster and listing off the various parts of the male anatomy using 
proper medical terms: prostate (muwatha), testicles (khiṣītīn) etc. He explained how the testicles 
contained ḥīywān minawī (sperm), which were released from the penis. The penis, he explained 
is, “like a sponge” which collects blood—growing “from five or six centimeters to fifteen or 
sixteen centimeters.” He attempted to explain the female anatomy as well—skipping rapidly 
upwards toward the birth canal (qanāt al-wilāda) and womb (raḥam).  
With this out of the way, we got to the heart of the matter, “our women, what God wills 
are shy. They’re not like European women you see136. Some of them are afraid. Slowly slowly.” 
This point was emphasized so extensively that at a certain point I stopped writing it down in my 
notes. It was a continuation of Dr. Samir’s attempt to inculcate restraint as a masculine virtue, as 
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 The mention of “European women you see” is a reference to the ubiquity of Western pornography in 
contemporary Jordan. 
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well as a continuation of the nuptial advice given to Ali in the previous chapter, evidence that the 
Chastity Society was drawing on a deep reservoir of “practical representations” of masculinity. 
Dr. Nidal continued, “there was a man down in the [Jordan] valley who tried and tried to enter 
the girl. And finally he tried violently (bil-‘unf) and the girl died.” He continued, “think about the 
girl the night of consummation. You haven’t slept the night of the wedding or the night before. 
And a man can bare more… Some people forget nice words, ‘enough! Cut his head!’” Everyone 
laughed hysterically at this. A young man raised his hand and said, “pray two rakāt (bows) and 
then enter slowly slowly—calmly.” The doctor nodded. Returning to his cautionary tale he said, 
“it was all because he hurried. And it was worst in the old days. People would be looking from 
the windows, they came early in the morning. It was bad. But now they go to a hotel by 
themselves. This is a better way.” 
Talk of consummation quickly led to talk about the hymen (al-bukāra) and its 
significance or, more accurately, its lack thereof to legitimate marital bonds—another long-term 
concern of Islamic reformers stretching back centuries. He said, “there are some women who 
don’t have a hymen. Maybe 10% of women don’t have one. Remember: it is a very small hole, 
but it can grow to 12 or 14 centimeters in childbirth because of the head of the baby. But there 
isn’t always blood. My first daughter didn’t have blood. This is very serious. This could affect 
the other daughters too.” The men were hushed and concerned and nodded. The doctor 
continued, “and my daughter is an absolutely lawful girl. Luckily, we went to the doctor and 
brought a report and the other family accepted it.”  
At this point, he was obviously running out of things to say. He reminded the men, 
“before you join take a shower,” and, of course, he returned to his mantra: slowly slowly. He 
said, “try one or two times only. If no blood comes out, don’t try five times! If there’s a lot of 
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blood coming out, go to a doctor. It’s getting better now… but people used to die. Are there any 
questions?” The director, Dr. Mufid, also asked, “are there any questions?” The room was quiet. 
Dr. Mufid said, “and if any of you have questions later…” One of the men blurted out, “give me 
your phone number!” Immediately, every man had pulled out his phone and began to write down 
the number. Dr. Nidal tried to return to important points: “take [information] from cultured and 
religious sources.” He also emphasized, “give her her right. She is your partner (shārik) in all 
things—even sexual matters. One way or the other it’s important she’s happy. She can go to the 
judge [and ask for divorce on these grounds]… And if she doesn’t have religion she will go 
because of the tension to another by the unlawful (harām) path.”  
Dr. Nidal spoke to us how he had participated in the founding of the organization in the 
1990s when he saw young men putting off marriage and the government’s unwillingness to 
address the problem. He said, “God willing, the situation will develop slowly. We could do one 
wedding every three months with 30 people. That’s 120 in a year.” The doctor talked about the 
financial barriers: “1500 for furniture, 3000 for bridewealth.” He recommended, “a marriage 
fund like social security: put one dinar in it every month and invest it… Dinner alone can be 
3000 dinar!” A young man said, “the Everest hotel [an upscale place for a wedding] is 2500!” 
The doctor replied, “I know, what God wills.” Someone else said, “and her father isn’t content 
until he brings 1000 gold and then the next day he returns it!” Dr. Nidal agreed and said, “a lot of 
people damage their daughters. Now with the phones and Internet and Facebook the men and 
women can meet (ta‘ārif). Thank God! In every house there’s a spinster.” Seeing me writing 
frantically, he said, “what are you writing?” “Notes,” I replied. The men explained that I was a 
researcher and I told him about my project. He asked me whether spinsterhood was a problem in 
the west. I replied, “well, there are many women over 25 who aren’t married, but people don’t 
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see it as a problem.” He asked, “do you have a word for spinsterhood?” and I assented but told 
him the word had fallen out of favor. There was a bit of silence and then Dr. Nidal said, “The 
woman thinks of sex last, young men… Where does she want to go? We’re not like Europe here. 
A woman who is 25 takes a man who is 65.” A young man asked, “if everyone took two 
[wives]? Isn’t this the reason this is permitted in our religion?”  
Dr. Nidal nodded and, betraying his own fondness for figure-ground reversals, explained 
my research to the young men thusly: “What is interesting about Geoffrey’s project is that he his 
doing it in the Western way. The Westerners start with the economic and move to the social and 
the ethical. We begin with religion and move to ethics.” He then launched into his own family 
history. Studying medicine in Germany in the 70s and living on the cheap, he met a “lawful girl” 
and her father “thank god” said, “it is enough that you are a good Muslim.” He described their 
wedding, “we made maqlūba (chicken and rice) for maybe ten or fifteen people and got an 
apartment.” Later, he was inspired to start the charity by all of the unmarried men and women137, 
“when I saw the problems of the girls not marrying and the young men studying until they were 
twenty-four, twenty-five.” Arriving back at the macro-economic level from which he saw my 
research project as springing, he repeated his advocacy of a national marriage fund—which he 
said has been successful in Malaysia: “When a young man turns 18 he gets a thousand or two to 
marry.”  
The Chastity Society is forthright in arguing that its project is, at least in part, a reaction 
to outside influences. In Dr. Nidal’s formulation, this includes new technologies like the internet, 
TV, and Facebook—as well as new values: the diminution of marriage, secularism, and the 
expansion of the bounds for the expression of legitimate sexual desire. However, these values 
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 As discussed at the end of chapter four, the question of whether rates of singlehood are actually rising has 
proved more controversial than the question of whether divorce rates are rising, but here as well evidence does point 
to a modest uptick—although likewise not out of keeping with broader global trends. 
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and technologies confront preexisting antagonisms between the sexes, generations, classes, 
different ethnicities and, of course, various categories of kin. Such outside influences do not 
confront people directly; rather, they are fed through preexisting antagonisms and affinities and 
affect people differentially. These kinds of internal family dynamics can push an Islamist 
intellectual like Dr. Nidal to advocate that young people take what would otherwise seem like 
drastric measures: in this case, using new media to circumvent their parents’ attempts to enmesh 
them in marital stretegies that are less about their development as pious Muslims and more about 
the maintenance and elaboration of extended kin groupings. In other words, the Islamic 
Movement is no mere reaction to a broad-based unsettling of the grounds of legitimacy—it is an 
active participant in that unsettling. Between nature and God; husband and wife; parents and 
children; rich and poor, the Chastity Society positions itself. It is looking for volunteers, for 
people who want to be extricated from kin-based forms of sociality that have proved either 
stultifying or neglectful.  
The Wedding of the Nation 
 On the strength of the didacticism of the Chastity Society’s training, it is easier to 
understand the Society’s symbolic rejection (via the mass wedding) of the forms of male 
homosociality valorized in the previous chapter—especially when supplemented with 
Arabiyyat’s metapragmatic commentary in the midst of the festivities. Tribes and the Islamic 
movement find themselves in competition at times for prospective loyalists. Coser’s paradigm of 
“greedy institutions” likens this form of competition to the “competition among users of scarce 
resources in economic affairs.” He argues that, “various groups having a claim on individuals’ 
energies and time compete with one another to draw as much as they can, within normative 
limits” (Coser 1974:1). Key to Coser’s notion of the greedy institution is that, like Erving 
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Goffman’s notion of the “total institution,” it seeks to transcend modernity’s partitioning of the 
world, in which people “sleep, play and work in different places with different co-participants” 
(Goffman 1961:4-5) or in which a man is “a father, an employee, a trade unionist, and a church 
member” (Coser 1974:4). Where Coser seeks to differentiate his concept from that of Goffman’s 
is the nature of the institution’s action upon individuals. Where the total institution works 
through compulsion and isolation, the greedy institution is liable to work through various 
blandishments, which are used to exhort participants to go forth into the world and act upon it.  
A recurrent theme here is the control of human sexuality. Coser proceeds from a 
discussion of eunichism to an analysis of ‘greedy families’ and finally to an analysis of ‘greedy 
collectivities,’ concluding with an essay comparing the celibacy imposed by the Catholic Church 
to the promiscuity imposed by certain leftist revolutionary organizations like the Communist 
Party, where he shows that monogamy was a more common cause of censure than promiscuity. 
In both cases, the dyadic relationship was seen to detract from the individual’s loyalty to the 
cause, possibly putting the greedy institution in question at risk. For this reason, Coser claims 
that promiscuity and celibacy are “sociologically equivalent” values in their mutual rejection of 
the dyadic marital bond. However, one could take Coser’s insight one step further: if the 
breaking of dyadic bonds can be instrumentalized by ‘greedy institutions,’ why would they not 
avail themselves of dyadic bonds as well?  
Rather than serving as a threatening competitor to the institutional project, marriage 
could just as easily be used to sunder preexisting loyalties and re-orient new adherents towards a 
novel institutional context. In fact, one of Egypt’s most scandalous and notorious Islamist 
splinter groups became famous for attempting to do just that. The self-proclaimed “Society of 
Muslims” (known in the press as takfīr wa hijra or ‘excommunication and retreat from the 
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world’) became infamous in the late seventies not simply for kidnapping and murdering the 
former minister of religious endowments, but also for enticing youths to run away from home 
and enter into “Muslim marriages” without parental consent. At its height, the group included no 
more than a few thousand members living communally in seedy furnished apartments on the 
margins of urban society, but it made terrific tabloid fodder nonetheless (Hasso 2011; Kepel 
2003:86-89). While Kepel argues that the actual events of the case were completely distorted in 
the press, the surrounding moral panic is itself instructive. When Dr. Nidal celebrates marriages 
that blossom on social media without parental involvement and accuses his fellow countrymen of 
“damaging” their daughters by preventing them from marrying, he is courting similar censure—
even if he does so with almost all of the imaginable of the trappings of respectability. 
It is hard to overemphasize the degree to which Chastity Society had the distinctive feel 
of a Kawanis Club gala or some other wholly mainstream charitable event. It promoted its 
agenda for social transformation robustly, but it promoted it with alacrity nonetheless. Relations 
with families were cordial—if at times strained. It was clearly not a sex-negative organization 
like the Catholic Church—nor did it license the sexual hedonism of the revolutionary left in the 
West. In fact, it held up the dyadic relation of husband and wife as integral to its own 
organizational strategy. This strategy only makes sense against the backdrop of broader tribal 
affinities portrayed in the previous chapter, which its intellectuals universally denigrated, 
preferring to idealized the husband-wife bond. The Chastity Society constructed the mass 
wedding to strengthen dyadic bonds between husband and wife at the expense of bonds with 
their extended kin networks.  
“This is strange, isn’t it?” 
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When I arrived at the mass wedding the following week, I found a large number of boys 
dressed up as scouts in matching uniforms, standing for pictures. There were two groups: the 
Jerusalem Troop and the Badr Troop. While they would be helping with the wedding in the way 
that all young boys do (as ushers and gophers), the adult leader gave their mission a special 
urgency. He said, “the Chastity Society is a charitable society that helps people get married if 
they don’t have the money. We are here to help them. We will bring people food and water and 
help clean up. We will also try to fix any problems. This one time, someone started shooting at 
one of these weddings. It wasn’t anything with the wedding. It was a problem from before. But, 
God forbid…” The boys fidgeted and roughhoused a bit as their leader was suggesting that they 
might be called upon to step in and mediate some sort of tribal violence. I smiled at the scene and 
turned to survey the rest of the grounds of the Islamic school that had donated its facilities to the 
mass wedding.  
I inspected the various banners—all of which said “The Chastity Society welcomes our 
honorable guests”—an interesting variation on the ubiquitous wedding banners which read, “The 
sons of ____ welcome our honorable guests.” I reflected on the social and political significance 
of such a shift in the locus of hospitality. Soon, Dr. Mufid came over and took me to the press 
area. There, journalists from local as well as international media (including South Korean and 
Kuwaiti TV) were set up to film the couples arriving. Knowing the event was being filmed, I 
focused on chatting with the male volunteers: four men in neatly pressed shirts, who came from 
the Jerash refugee camp. The men told me they had come at the urging of Muhammed, the 
second presenter from the week before. Like the director, they seemed a bit defensive when I 
asked them specifically how people found out about the organization. They exclaimed, 
“everyone knows about the Society!” “They come to us.” Pushing my luck, I asked what kind of 
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role Muhammed played in the community. They told me he was a mandūb (emissary) for Jerash 
and, more generally, a driving force behind recruitment.  
My elicitation here was quite clumsy and the volunteers knew what I was after 
immediately. On one level, everyone (including the rather suspicious Abu Saqir who was prone 
to denouncing the country’s “Palestinian Islamic Movement”) knew that the camps were full of 
not just of Palestinians but also members of the lower classes from the East Bank desperate for 
housing. That does not mean, however, that there were not sensitivities around the relationship 
between place, ethnicity and political affiliation—and I had just tipped my hand. Asking the 
obvious sociological questions like, ‘yes, I know you are theoretically open to anyone, but 
organizationally speaking, who do you serve? You seem to be drawing a lot from Jerash. Would 
you care to elaborate?’ was rude, even if I tried to dress it up in a way which did not directly 
imply that I was dismissing their political vision as particularistic rather than universalist. They 
saw me reducing them to another patronage network, for Palestinians, Muslim Brothers, camp 
dwellers, or perhaps Muhammed himself. I appreciated their graciousness in changing the 
subject to cars.  
A more or less expensive car festooned with white fabric and flowers (the cars ranged 
from late model BMWs to early 90s Kias) would arrive in the fārida (wedding train), trailed by 
cars honking behind them. Each car contained a male relative of the groom to drive, the bride’s 
mother and the couple in the back seat. The female volunteers would jump to help the women 
out of the car with their long, billowing white dresses and veils while the men would kiss the 
grooms on the cheeks and direct them in the same direction. The couples were supposed to 
gather here and eat their “light dinner” first. Meanwhile, the press would frantically try to catch 
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every moment. In the absence of arriving couples, I continued chatting with the volunteers about 
cars, the difficulties of getting married, and my research.  
Once all the couples had arrived, it was time for the zifāf. In the last chapter, the most 
dramatic zifāf involved Ali being foisted aloft, carried, and shoved through the gate into the 
woman’s section—the last we saw of him before he became a married man in the eyes of his 
community. In this case, the bride and groom walked side-by-side—often tripping over the huge 
dresses, which covered the women from head to toe in gauzy white. They stepped, under the 
glare of international media, into the women’s tent together where they stood on a large stage in 
front of a large crowd of women, surrounded by trilling and the standard wedding music. The 
journalists followed enthusiastically, so much for ‘lowering their gaze’ as the prophet’s 
injunction goes. 
When the journalists were finally pushed out along with the grooms, we began the next 
phase of the procession towards the men’s section. A group of boy led the march—singing many 
of the same songs people sing in the village on such occasions. We were accompanied by a man 
carrying a drum and, as we exited onto the street, a growing number of onlookers and family 
members of the grooms. We were soon taking up the entire street as we walked towards the 
men’s tent. People began to hoist grooms on their shoulders. As we entered the school’s 
courtyard, we were sprayed with foam from shaving cream cans and bursts of confetti. A musical 
team sang popular wedding songs and there was general merriment between the stage and the 
seats. I ran into Dr. Nidal from the lecture the previous week and he greeted me warmly. After 
the dancing ended, we took our seats.  
Muhammed took the stage and welcomed us. He spoke at length about the Jordanian 
Islamic Bank, their services in providing loans for those hoping to marry, and their general 
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contribution to the development of Jordan. He then introduced Dr. Abdul-Latif, who spoke about 
the achievements of the Society. He spoke of the “over 1000 couples” married by the Society in 
the last 19 years and its soon-to-open permanent offices—which would include a library 
dedicated to the social sciences, printing press, scientific [research] center, and a hall for holding 
these mass weddings. He also emphasized that this was “a national wedding” (‘urs waṭani)—that 
it included people from all over Jordan and transcended local and familial bonds to strengthen 
the nation as a whole. People’s attention wandered a bit, but the atmosphere was largely 
respectful. I will return to his speech in greater depth in the following section. 
As soon as he was done, they switched back to music and a Debka team came out to 
perform the famous Levantine wedding dance. The men wore traditional robes with headscarves. 
They held hands and the swirling line dance—left to right, stomp, kick etc. Meanwhile, the boy 
scouts passed out water and off-brand Kit Kat bars. When the team had finished, Muhammed got 
up again and thanked all of the sponsors of the wedding. He then asked Walid Shabsuk 
(president of the society) and a representative of the Jordanian Islamic Bank to present a check to 
every groom as a “prize and support” (ja’iza wa da’am). With this concluded, another round of 
dancing began. This time, some of the grooms left the stage and were carried around by their 
relatives. Circles for different sets of grooms began to form in the crowd. With this, the wedding 
singers sung the grooms out as they were carried away by well-wishers. Familial bonds 
reasserted themselves a bit even within the bounds of the Chastity Society’s own ritual, although 
in highly attenuated form in the final moments. I lingered and spoke with the organizers as the 
chairs were quickly stacked. Dr. Nidal walked up to me and asked me what I thought, “it’s 
strange, isn’t it?” Not thinking about the fact that I was talking to a man who (as he had said the 
week before) was educated in Germany and was surely addressing me as a fellow cosmopolitan, 
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I replied, “No, you have the fārida (wedding train) and the zifāf and the musical team and debka. 
It’s actually a lot like a traditional wedding but with more people.” We parted ways and I began 
walking towards the main road as the couples sped away, honking and blasting music as they 
went.  
Of course, Dr. Nidal was right. This wedding was strange. Rather than enticing 
households to expend precious household resources bolstering extended kin networks of debt and 
patronage through a celebration of male filiation, the mass wedding used economies of scale to 
save on costs while deemphasizing the extended kin group. Most dramatically, these bonds were 
dissolved by the large crowds of (supposedly unrelated) Jordanians. Bu it is also notable that the 
Society, its representatives, and the Islamic Bank could stand in for senior males as financial 
backers. The cost and labor of the wedding were borne primarily by relative strangers to whom 
the bride and groom would theoretically owe nothing in return—even if men like Abu Saqir 
could be rightly forgiven for wondering if the Society did not merely replace one kind of 
patronage network with another. Challenges to more traditional wedding practices continued 
with the training course, as sexual education and marital etiquette were made topics of open 
discussion outside of the family. By acting to check male passions and questioning certain forms 
of male homosociality and male privilege, the Society was not simply challenging tribalism. 
These political forms are too inexorably bound up with deeper moral and aesthetic commitments 
to allow for such a simple line of causation to be drawn—despite the strong feelings on the 
matter of people like Arabiyyat. If the wedding itself had a positive vision, it was largely tied to 
Islam, modernity, and efficiency. Nonetheless, in all of these ways, the mass wedding worked to 
destabilize the grounds of tribal legitimacy.  
“By Themselves and For Themselves” 
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 At the height of the wedding, after Dr. Abdul-Latif had finished thanking the extensive 
list of groups that had helped make the wedding possible, and sharing his vision for the future 
headquarters of the group, he began a didactic explanation of the aims of the ritual. He said, “I 
know, that with the repetition of this work (‘aml), we are building a higher value in this 
community.” As he said repetition, he paused and made a cyclical motion with his hand. He had 
more effusive praise for the brides and grooms and then said, “when I saw them in this hall, I 
said to myself, ‘this is a national celebration!’ People celebrate familially; people celebrate 
tribally; people celebrate by different names, but this celebration is a national celebration—and 
the national celebration isn’t like these other celebrations. We greet in the name of the nation!” 
The emphasis on nation (waṭan) seemed a direct challenge to people like Abu Saqir who would 
portray the Chastity Society and the Islamic movement more broadly as a foreign entity. Rather, 
he wanted emphasize to the crowd his desire to seize the mantle of essential Jordanian identity 
from the tribes.  
More praise and good wishes for the brides and grooms followed and then he said, 
“welcome brothers and sisters and welcome to the group and I say to you that you have built and 
we are building a higher social good. And this is its meaning: leading all of the merit, your 
project succeeds, and your project succeeds in this country, leading change.” Arabiyyat became 
more passionate as he stuttered, “And I-and I-and I... there are places in Salt. There are tribal and 
familial marriages, which waste huge amounts. And all of the other resources go to the 
celebration, making food or for shooting fireworks and bullets for the occasion. And it’s all an 
exorbitant cost. And it’s all an ignorant (jāhil) cost.” He waved his hand dismissively as he listed 
off the excesses: fireworks, bullets, exorbitant cost, ignorant, unrestrained costs. The mention of 
Salt was interesting, as it was a suburb of Amman dominated by families that tend to maintain 
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large patrilocal compounds and the accompanying nuptial rituals described in the previous 
chapter. Its representatives in parliament in recent years have been invariably tribal and tend to 
openly run on their last names (cf. Shryock 1997). However, this was more than an urban-rural 
or urban-suburban conflict. What Arabiyyat was articulating was also quite familiar: for instance, 
a friend and devoted tribesman once rolled his eyes at the sight of men shooting off assault rifles 
at a wedding and said, “each one of those [bullets] costs a dollar, but if you asked them to give 
the money to the couple, they would refuse.”  
Dr. Abdul-Latif, homing in on the theme of selfishness, concluded with a blistering 
denunciation of the “tribal” (‘ashā’irī) forces that he saw arrayed against the attempts of his 
movement to work for the betterment of all. He said,  
Those doing this are doing it by themselves and for themselves. If you told them 
that door was good for the nation they wouldn’t know whether or not to advance. 
But we say when we see this work that we have worked with these previous 
celebrations for a very strong popular charter—that we are celebrating with it, that 
we are celebrating a higher value for the community and the prevention of 
wastefulness, and the image of brotherhood for the group. I’m very sorry 
conversely that I am creating opposition against others but there is selfishness, 
there is self-interest, there is distance from the general meaning of national 
service, there is distance from its representatives and for the youth from the real 
sons of the nation, which deserve respect and deserve a celebration from the sons 
of the nation. To all of you brothers, welcome and respect with your celebration. 
And I say to you, with your help, you are leading khayr (goodness, benevolence, 
welfare) in this country and you, God willing, you will say this country, in other 
places [in the future], sates the hunger of this community, in order to win khayr, 
win its meaning of khayr, brotherhood, and love between the people, and in order 
to raise the purpose of the truth with the permission of the Most High, and bless 
you and peace be upon you and the mercy of God. 
 
Arabiyyat concluded his remarks with a detailed dissection of the self-interested motives 
embedded within the tribal wedding, connecting his organization’s efforts to a broad “popular 
charter” to provide a blistering denunciation of the political order. With that, he handed the 
microphone back to Muhammed and descended from the podium to applause as the latter 
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repeated, “Yes, it is a celebration and a national celebration. Husband and wife; affection and 
mercy: its product is excellent progeny, and a happy house.” Muhammed, homing in on the 
dyadic relationship between husband and wife as key to the Society’s mission continued, “we 
established in the Chastity [Society], bringing delight into the heart of every young man and 
young woman. And we draw for them a smile for tomorrow, a partner; [a partner] of their 
quality, of the chastity of themselves, to call them to their sides. The Prophet Muhammed, peace 
be upon him, said, ‘I love the people for God most beneficent, and love the acts for God which 
bring pleasure to the heart of the Muslim
138.’ He concluded, Yes, it is the wedding of the nation, 
and the wedding for all Jordanians, and now for the second act, an artistic team and popular 
debka…” 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I sought to explore the question of why weddings have taken on so much 
importance within contemporary Jordanian society. Having previously postulated that they could 
be used to produce (and index commitment to) competing visions of Jordan’s future, I wanted to 
understand why weddings might be such an effective place to do so. The answer I put forth was 
that weddings were key to constituting a broad range of legitimate social relations within 
Jordanian society—moreso than elsewhere. The Chastity Society and its intellectuals clearly said 
as much. However, even their detractors seemed to agree with their basic analysis: they too saw 
the wedding as key to legitimacy, broadly understood. When taken together, the weddings of 
rural tribesmen, the aspiring urban middle class, transnational elites and the Islamic movement 
all evinced what William Roseberry has called a shared “language of contention,” “a common 
material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social 
                                                 
138
 In other words, since marriage is a form of ‘abāda (religious service), which is supposed to bring pleasure to 
Muslims, the Prophet Muhammed loved it and would have approved of these efforts to facilitate it.  
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orders characterized by domination” (1994:361). This common framework was concerned with 
legitimacy, broadly understood, and involved a shared ritual template: the careful and highly 
stylized mediation of the relationship between affines through which husband and wife were 
brought together and, in the process, more or less alienated from their families. It included as 
well a relatively uniform theory of exchange, where powerful networks were believed to 
distribute material rewards (up to and including various forms of sexual access) in return for 
loyalty. This was widely understood to be the grounds for domination. Whether or not it might 
be “legitimate” remained an open question.  
 It was the production of webs of loyalty through weddings, webs of loyalty that 
overflowed and extended beyond direct lines of filiation, which rendered Jordanian weddings 
and their concomitant modes of legitimacy thoroughly political. This political conflict expressed 
itself in a manner that, at first, I found very odd: as a conflict between religion and family. 
This was surprising because, for all of their enthusiasm for ‘domaining’ (Yanagisako and Collier 
1987; Delaney 2004; Cannel and McKinnon 2013), contemporary Americans like myself tend to 
see religion and “family values” as isomorphic, something easy to believe for those in the 
ideological thrall
139
 of nuclear families. However, where larger family units can pose a challenge 
to religious movements in the electoral arena as well as in the competition for adherents and the 
provision of social welfare, antagonisms are bound to surface between them. To emphasize this 
point, Coser borrows an extreme example from Luke (14:16) where Jesus exclaims, “If any man 
come to Me and hate not his father and mother, and wife and children, and brethren and sisters, 
yea, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple.” As I argued in Part two of the dissertation, 
this antagonism between religion and family asserts itself in Islam as well. Leading lights of the 
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 Of course, nuclear families have never made up the majority of American households and have grown less and 
less relevant to the lives of most Americans over time. Conversely, extended families have and remain an important 
safety net for many Americans.  
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Islamic revival like Said Qutb have promoted quotations from the Prophet Muhammed’s era 
which portray pre-Islamic Arabia as a society dominated by warring patrilines, each of which 
served its own God. It was a society in which, ‘the strong among us ate up the weak’—largely 
due to the fact that men allowed themselves to be seduced by an excess of masculine passions, 
falling into the thrall of their patrilines in the process. 
 I would argue that the Abrahamic tradition
140
 has always struggled to work out the 
contradiction between religious and filial organizing principles for communities—at least from 
the perspective of Sunni Islam. Take the three great prophets of the major heavenly religions 
(dīyūn simawī): Musa for Judaism, ‘Issah for Christianity, and Muhammed for Islam. All three 
have a fraught relationship to the patriline and, of course, produced no uncontested lineages of 
male descendants
141. Musa was found in a basket, ‘Issah had no human father at all, and 
Muhammed was an orphan who had many daughters but no sons. When I have shared this 
observation with Jordan’s Muslims, a number have gone so far as to attribute this to divine will: 
the men in question saw it as inconceivable that Islamic religious authority could be completely 
harmonized with patrilineal descent
142
. To be precise, they saw it as inconceivable that 
Muhammed could have ever produced a male heir. 
This attempt to differentiate religious and familial authority places the Islamic Movement 
in Jordan between tribalism and liberalism, criticizing both and, in many ways, contributing to 
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 The term “Abrahamic” itself reflects the tension between filial and confessional conceptions of community 
within much thought about religion in the contemporary world. 
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 Because Muhammed’s only son (Ibrahim) died in childhood, those who sought to graft a dynastic lineage onto 
the late prophet after his death were forced to champion his son-in-law and cousin Ali, leading to the schism that 
generally defines the broad Shia-Sunni split within the Islamic tradition. Aspects of the Jewish tradition that attribute 
two sons to Moses (Gershom and Ezekial) and even (in some cases) a short-lived priestly lineage to Moses’ firstborn 
Gershom are largely absent in the Islamic tradition. There is no sense that Moses was celibate (like Jesus), but any 
progeny of his are largely irrelevant within Islamic cosmology. 
142
 While these statements occurred against the background of the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict, which has become ever-
more vicious since the US-led Iraq invasion descended into sectarian conflict, this merely highlights that the tension 
between religious and familial foundations of authority are quite longstanding in Islam—even if they may assert 
themselves more strongly in certain eras. 
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the destabilization of the grounds of legitimacy for both. Ironically, it destabilizes at the same 
time that this destabilization drives at least some of its own activities—like the Chastity Society. 
As we saw, especially in Dr. Nidal’s presentation, the encounter with “The West” has upset 
much of what was previously taken for granted, forcing people to think more seriously about 
what, in fact, was the ‘grounding conceptualization for knowledge.’ But with the extension of the 
horizon of the possible, people seem not to linger on simplistic narratives of East-versus-West or 
religion versus science but rather set about re-making the grounds of legitimacy in their own 
community through everyday quotidian ritual work. Weddings, in this regard, are simply a ritual 
high point, with the amounts of time, money, and thought invested in the ritual enactment of 
marriage and the concomitant production of families making weddings a privileged site for such 
analysis. 
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Conclusion: Affection and Mercy 
An early formative moment of ethnographic insight came to me, quite unexpectedly, 
while I was still a young Peace Corps volunteer teaching English in a Jordanian public school. 
On this particular day, I was riding home from school with the principal and some teachers, 
including a new teacher who was submitting to the principal’s stern questioning. Was he 
married? Engaged. When was the wedding? A long time from now: Money was tight; the parents 
could only afford so much. The wedding would have to wait. Did his fiancée work? Yes, she was 
a teacher at another school. The questioning and the facts of our new colleague’s biography were 
unremarkable: he was in the same position as the rest of the teachers in the car. But instead of 
simply commiserating, the principal urged the young man to take action. Pointing out what the 
couple’s combined income would be if they both continued to work, the principal urged his new 
colleague to forget about his parents, marry his fiancée now, host a “simple wedding,” and 
lease
143
 an apartment instead of waiting on the house. As things stood, the principal observed 
that the couple ran the risk of being led into temptation and spiritual ruination. The principal 
intoned that it was not natural for a young man to be unmarried and pointed to the dire 
seriousness of the divine retribution that awaits adulterers who have sex outside of wedlock.  
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 The word ista’jar can mean “to rent” or “to lease.” The issue of Islamic finance was not broached, but it goes 
without saying that such a devout community leader would have meant either renting or taking on a Sharia-
compliant lease. In many cases, these leases can be structured to end with the lessee owning the asset, which makes 
these leases quite mortgage-like. The crucial distinction is that, whatever the asking price of the underlying asset tied 
to the Sharia-compliant lease, no matter how exorbitantly greater it may be than the normal market price, it cannot 
be figured as “interest” in the sense of being calculated on the basis of time to repayment and it cannot compound 
(cf. Obaidullah 2005:79-93). 
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In this conclusion, I would like to focus on the dynamics that led some Jordanians to take 
action to change their own family’s marital practices as well as those of their broader 
community. I use the Quranic phrase “affection and mercy” to emphasize the degree to which 
these ideas had little to no need for Western inspiration because they were already so firmly 
embedded within the Islamic discursive tradition—often unconsciously so. However, I also 
suggest that these dynamics run far deeper, actually predating Islam and arising out of much 
more longstanding and widespread forms of kinship structures. I ask what sorts of meanings this 
phrase conjures up and what sorts of lifeworlds it might partake of. Throughout the dissertation I 
have argued that marriage in Jordan serves as a singularly privileged nexus between agnatic kin 
ties, lines of legitimate male filiation, property relations, labor relations, and political authority. 
But I also want to focus on what Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney have called marriage and 
procreation’s “ontological dimension.” As they point out, “Issues of gender and procreation—
marriage, family… are not just about the private, domestic domain, but… the entire 
cosmological order” (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995:9). As I argued in the introduction, the 
relatively recent addition of a Quranic verse
144
 to the marriage contracts of the Jordan’s 
government Sharia Courts indexes a subtle, semi-conscious shift that is afoot in the cosmological 
order for a wide swath of Jordanians. “Affection and mercy” stands in here for an impetus 
championed (although not exclusively) by the Islamic movement to shift the focus away from the 
extended kin group and towards the husband-wife dyad. 
The phrase “affection and mercy” allows me to talk about contemporary notions of 
companionate marriage without ignoring their Islamic precedents or falling back on the more 
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 The Jordanian Sharia Courts made a statement about their (possibly growing) commitment to emphasizing the 
ontological stakes of marriage in 1995 when they added to the top of their form marriage contracts the Quranic 
verse, “And of [God’s] signs is that He created for you from yourselves mates that you may find tranquility in them; 
and He placed between you affection and mercy…” 
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loaded and value-laden idea-concept of romantic love. In fact, the word “affection” (mawida) in 
“affection and mercy” is sometimes translated as love. But the concept of romantic love 
generally implies forms of chivalry and courtship that are much more carnal and immediate than 
what is at stake here. Such forms of desire, which have long been widely disseminated in Jordan 
and throughout the Arab world through poetry and song, no doubt contribute a lot to 
companionate marriage’s allure. Indeed the sense of allure is only heightened by the manner in 
which these media provide free range for fantasy and play by largely ignoring questions about 
the marital household’s division of labor, its finances, and its political representation. Yet these 
are precisely the matters of the greatest import to the constitution of a coherent cosmological 
order by harnessing marriage’s procreative powers.  
This “affection and mercy” was a part of both of the Islamic social engineering projects I 
studied, yet it was not their primary objective. It formed the background, the unremarkable 
wallpaper, for much of my research. Amira Sonbol argues that the phrase has clear, pre-Islamic 
precedents (2008:93). It was part of the formula used to conduct marriage contract signings at the 
courthouse. It was a favorite Quranic adornment to the frontispiece of all manner of books about 
marriage. It was directly invoked in the Chastity Society’s rhetoric around mass weddings. Yet it 
was not merely of these social engineering projects. It pre-dates them by well over 1,000 years 
and, as I will argue, it encompasses a set of concerns that extend far beyond the current purview 
of Jordan’s contemporary Islamic movement. Chief among these is the idea that marriage, 
crucial for forming the lines of multi-generational filial bonds necessary to transmit wealth and 
power from one generation of male agnates to the next, could actually itself come to eclipse 
those broader agnatic kin ties in importance. To allow it to do so would have far reaching 
effects—equal parts quotidian and cosmological.  
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Yet while the more narrowly defined kin formations that embrace this mantra of 
“affection and mercy” challenge the more extended kin groupings that they react against, they 
remain beholden to those extended kin groupings in a number of important ways. The three 
social engineering projects I studied had mixed results when it came to providing young people 
with pathways for disconnecting from their families and thereby hijacking their own procreative 
potential away from the kin groupings from which they had emerged. Despite the best efforts of 
the Sharia Courts, Housing Corporation, and Chastity Society to enlist individuals in their 
projects, the extended kin group retained a good deal of control over the marital prospects of 
most Jordanians I encountered. Families had a disproportionate impact on the choice of spouse, 
when the marriage happened, what the wedding looked like, and the nature of the couple’s 
subsequent housing and employment situation. The latter represented the most enduring and 
material set of linkages and logics that kept couples tied to their families. Housing and 
communal defense repeatedly proved to be key concerns driving people to organize along lines 
of agnatic kinship. This was precisely where the Islamic movement remained the weakest—
although this is beginning to change. One initiative in particular that is worth watching is the 
Jordan Islamic Bank: the major sponsor of the Chastity Society’s mass wedding and one of the 
leading purveyors of Islamic home mortgages, which brings me back to the principal’s 
unorthodox ideas about marriage.  
In retrospect, I should not have been surprised by the principal’s unapologetic attempts to 
undermine parental authority (and the younger man’s future authority as breadwinner) so much 
as his brazenness. Certainly all of his suggestions were possible—desirable even. But how could 
one blithely suggest a simple wedding without considering how the family would ever live down 
the shame? Who could propose renting and sending the wife to work without considering how 
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this would alienate the couple, their resources, and their labor from the extended kin grouping 
anchored to its ancestral lands? How could the extended family survive if younger men started 
taking the initiative, putting their own sexual and spiritual needs first? In short, how could 
someone just casually upend what seemed like thousands of years of painstaking negotiations 
over the transfer of authority and wealth from one generation to the next?  
To be fair, the principal himself had helped put precisely these questions in my head over 
the course of a number of prior conversations as he struggled to understand how I could be so 
nonplussed by the idea of extramarital sex and I struggled to understand the problem. As he 
would urgently ask me, “how else would we know/recognize (na‘rif / na‘tarif ) our fathers 
[without marriage]?” It was only because I had come to take the authority of these patrilineally-
reckoned kin groups over their members so much for granted that I could be shocked by the 
impertinence of an authority figure telling a young man to simply go his own way. But what if 
kinsmen had become fundamentally unable to reinforce the kin group’s authority by following 
its actual dictates and found that they had to disobey those dictates to preserve the broader kin 
group’s authority—and perhaps even its very existence?  
I would argue that it was precisely as a result of this double bind (cf. Bateson 1969; 
Fortun 2001) that these projects tended to gain traction. For all of their modernizing rhetoric and 
enthusiasm for planning, the Housing Corporation, Sharia Courts, and the Chastity Society only 
flourished where they could legitimate pre-existing relationships that were relevant to the sexual, 
property, and labor concerns of larger kin-based collectivities. Especially in the case of the latter 
two projects, their sometimes fraught relations with the extended kin group belied the degree to 
which their whole raison d’être was to further cement the very bonds of male filiation upon 
which the extended kin group was based. In the face of such seeming paradoxes, I want to 
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emphasize that the resulting practices that I hope to highlight here lacked the ideological purity 
or coherence needed to reduce them to a simple outgrowth of either the Islamic revival 
movement, tribalism or, emphatically, Western/colonial liberalization initiatives. Nor were these 
practices reducible to any simple interaction between such rival ideologies. Rather, they emerged 
from the interaction of belief systems with the material constraints that Jordanians encountered 
and the systems of meaning and affinity that they created to overcome those constraints.  
 Part one approached marriage as a fundamentally housed relationship, emphasizing the 
forms of embodiment, spatial practice, labor, property, and gender associated with contemporary 
Jordanian houses. It focused on the diverse and changing nature of the Jordanian marital abode 
and divergent possibilities for its future. In recent decades, forms of dwelling based on the 
collective male defense of land have promised to give way to increasingly independent 
household units that rely on the government to protect their claims. Where kin bonds primarily 
intended to support the communal defense of land do atrophy, those resources and energies can 
be devoted to following consumer fashions—by embellishing the home, for instance. For those 
who embrace this lifestyle, women’s involvement in the workforce becomes an attractive option 
for increasing the household’s purchasing power to better project the image of success and 
respectability that consumerism promises. Yet a repudiation of consumerism, private property, 
and obedience to the state has never quite ceased to be an alternative possibility. Older men in 
particular see the increasing replacement of kin bonds with market relations as a threat to their 
authority. Rural and working class people continue to valorize the strength, endurance, and self-
reliance associated with securing one’s own housing free from state interference or assistance. 
Most importantly, when Jordanians lack the money to secure land through the market, they have 
shown a willingness to unite with their agnates and unrelated neighbors to seize it.  
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Islamic or even mainstream finance could potentially upend this state of affairs—if young 
people, their kin networks, and capital markets were amenable. Already in the “Decent Housing” 
initiative described in part one, two Islamic Banks were available for customers in search of 
Sharia-compliant mortgages. Whether or not Islamic finance will ultimately be successful in 
extending market relations into the very heart of the attempts of families to reproduce themselves 
is another matter. But there are a number of factors that make this an obvious and appealing 
move. As I have argued, marriages—especially where they involve housing—are incredibly 
economically significant events for the finances of the larger extended kin group. While older 
men may not sign over the deed to the land to their children for decades after their marriages
145
, 
dwelling in a house on one’s ancestral lands makes a powerful claim to ownership at the same 
time that it implies a whole host of obligations to one’s senior kinsmen, encompassing demands 
for political allegiance, care, communal defense, and other forms of labor. 
These dynamics around the intergenerational transfer of wealth help to constitute strong 
social norms, enhanced through their association with Islam, which directly militate against the 
elaboration of a thriving market in home mortgages in Jordan. All manner of debts proliferate 
over the course of a couple’s marriage. Yet these remain largely unregulated from the standpoint 
of Islamic finance because such debts are largely limited to kinsmen and, at least ideologically, 
these are gifts, given unconditionally. As I argued in Chapter One, transactions that involve the 
exchange of a smaller amount of money at one point in time for a larger amount of money later 
are considered riba. There is a good deal of social stigma attached to such transactions, even 
though they continue discretely. These sentiments against riba find expression in sayings of the 
prophet like the one that declares that God damns not only the person who takes or “eats” riba 
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 Often, property is only officially transferred from one generation the next via the Sharia Courts as inheritance 
once the original owner is deceased. 
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but also the person who pays it, the two witnesses to the contract, and the scribe. While those 
who study Islamic finance are correct to argue for nuance in understanding words like riba, there 
are nonetheless somewhat specific and well-defined explanations of the concept, like the rather 
concrete definition of the prophet in the hadīth literature, “gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat 
for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt be exchanged, like for like, equal for 
equal and hand to hand; one who demanded extra or paid extra, indulged in riba (interest).” 
(Muslim cited in Islahi 2004: 51). Here, we have an enumeration of the six most important 
commodities in the markets of pre-Islamic Arabia, including the two commodities that most 
closely approximate the abstract money form and four essential foodstuffs for the early Muslim 
community. Were these forms of indebtedness formalized, marketized, and institutionalized 
through the medium of money, a powerful set of forces would arise, struggling against the 
sundering of “individual and local limitations” on the way to direct, promiscuous, and 
increasingly abstracted “money for money” transactions that define unbridled contemporary 
capitalism (cf. Marx 1976:207). 
Market relations are subjected to a rigorous spatiotemporal discipline in Islamic law that 
regulates all associated exchanges. In the case of money, the standards are the most exacting: 
‘like for like, equal for equal, hand to hand.’ These are not pedantic points, either. They are 
common knowledge and people do not need extensive schooling to take them seriously. In some 
cases, Quranic injunctions like, “when you contract among yourselves a debt for a named period 
of time, then write it down” (2:282, quoted in Dresch 1998:118) seemingly have no need 
whatsoever for metaphysical speculation as justification. A farmer friend who decided against 
secondary school rehearsed these points without prompting when I asked him about his dealings 
with Islamic Banks by saying, “the important thing in Islamic finance is that there has to be a 
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particular [concrete] commodity (sala‘a ma‘ayana)… One time, I took a loan from the Jordan 
Islamic Bank for a bedroom [furniture set]. They didn’t give me the money.” So far so good: 
according to the dominant strain of analogical reasoning within Islamic law, they should only 
give him some sort of commodity in exchange for the money or “gold” (in this case, Jordanian 
Dinars) that he would have to repay later on an installment plan. Exchanging money now for 
more money later would be riba. However, he then proceeded to tear into the Islamic Bank on 
exactly this point. He complained, “The employee came with me to the store and stood outside 
while I bought the goods. We came out and he signed the receipt.  You see? It’s all lies.  He 
didn’t see the furniture, its cost, its quality. He didn’t see if I took it. See? It’s all lies.” My 
friend’s outrage was borne of his understanding that, the second one introduces strangers, 
money, and institutional responsibilities into the work of financing social reproduction, the 
complexity of those transactions and their ritual hazards (Keane 1997) are greatly exacerbated. 
Yet with a bit of attention to these strictures that mandate this rigid spatiotemporal 
discipline around the exchange of money, the mavens of Islamic finance could use housing, land, 
and building materials to structure loans that could be assimilated into the categories of 
mainstream finance. As I pointed out in part one, this is already happening on a small scale in 
building material stores across Jordan as those with access to capital leverage their knowledge of 
local kin networks, extending credit to relatives and neighbors in return for selling their wares for 
higher asking prices than urban merchants. For such operations, building materials make a good 
counterpoint to money because, like money, they have a standardized value and form, generally 
tied to the transformation of cement, aggregate, water and rebar into square meters of dwelling 
space. What’s more, from the perspective of finance, housing makes for great collateral: it is 
durable, immovable, hard to hide, and, unlike so many other commodities, its depreciation takes 
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decades rather than years. So, for instance, has been unsurprising to watch the Saudi Al-Rajhi 
group (the largest Islamic investment group in the world) move aggressively into both home 
finance and the production of building materials. Al-Rajhi was one of the first companies to open 
a cement factory in Jordan after liberalization and the company has also been an enthusiastic 
advocate for the enactment of the first mortgage law in its native Saudi Arabia (Khan 2013). 
Yet more remains to be done from the perspective of Islamic Finance. The cost of Sharia-
compliant capital can be quite high and people remain reticent about borrowing from banks. 
When I spoke to Sharia Court judges, many of whom sit on the advisory boards of these banks, 
they blamed the high cost of borrowing on a lack of “political will.” However, there is also a 
question of making sure the loans are eventually repaid—or that the underlying asset can be 
extricated from delinquent borrowers. In the case of the HUDC’s ‘Decent Housing’ initiative, 
when it was time to collect on all the loans, employees complained of supplicants who came to 
them looking for help because, “the bank has no heart.” So while Jordan’s own leading Islamic 
bank has moved aggressively into the mortgage market and proudly publicizes its involvement in 
providing access to housing in its annual Social Justice Report, the JD 236 million in loans for 
housing 2012 only represented about 10 percent of its JD 2.3 billion in investment activities 
(Jordan Islamic Bank 2012:38).  Nonetheless, with over 17,600 beneficiaries of these loans, the 
bank has learned how to entice twice as many people into taking out loans as the “Decent 
Housing” initiative—every year.  
 If these ventures into home finance push the Islamic movement and the larger, 
predominantly Palestinian banking sector into real estate (one of the last bastions of economic 
dominance for East Banker kin networks, cf. Reiter 2004), then the Jordan Islamic Bank’s role in 
hosting mass weddings also seems like a play for the kinds of political dominance that East 
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Banker tribes have worked to reify through their own wedding rites. As I noted in chapter six, 
the mass wedding was heavily branded as being connected to the Jordan Islamic Bank, which 
also earned plaudits from the organizers as they distributed cash gifts to the young couples from 
the stage. The Chastity Society represents one of the largest charitable initiatives of the Jordan 
Islamic Bank, to the tune of 4.6 million Jordanian Dinar (Jordan Islamic Bank 2012:6). By 
offering to house young people, host their weddings, and even teach them about marital etiquette 
and sex, the contemporary Islamic movement is poised to replace many of the most important 
roles that kin play in the lives of young people. Yet it remains to be seen how many young 
people will take them up on the offer. The activities of the Islamic movement are predicated on 
the notion that there is something onerous about having to rely on one’s kin. As we have seen, 
where money is tight or young people’s sexual desire is ignored, this is undoubtedly the case. 
Yet having kin remains an intrinsic good for many, who cannot even imagine the point of a 
wedding if not to embed oneself within complex webs of indebtedness.  
 In contemporary Jordan, an objectified past of tents, communal lands, female seclusion, 
and powerful associations of male agnates persists in the present day in talk, ritual, story-telling, 
and aspects of the built environment. This is despite its logics appearing increasingly inscrutable 
to many young people who dream of disconnecting from their family obligations and becoming 
more independent consumers. For its part, though, we have seen that the Housing Corporation’s 
focus on engineering a housing market instead of providing housing to individual citizens has 
tended to encourage people to rely on agnates—despite their intense concern with registering 
land to individuals. Those working for a more Islamic society—both inside and outside of 
government—have also had fraught relationships with extended kin groups. Islamic facets of the 
Jordanian state like the Sharia Courts have been forced to compromise with extended kin groups 
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and local tradition, altering their procedures to take the prerogatives of extended kin groups into 
account. While the Chastity Society is nongovernmental and independent and hence free of a lot 
of the pressures that have been brought to bear on the Sharia Courts, it remains a significant but 
politically marginal alternative to more powerful regime loyalists who emphasize their tribal 
pedigrees. Historically, it is only in moments of liberalization that the Islamic movement can 
pose a threat to regime-affiliated notables who mobilize agnatic kin as their base of support 
(Baylouny 2008; 2010; Brynen 1994; Peters and Moore 2009). In contrast, the expansion of 
military aid and uncertainty around housing has the potential to bolster networks of agnatic kin. 
If rival state-building projects in neighboring areas continue to send new waves of refugees 
towards Jordan and provoke a more aggressive response from the Jordanian state, the most likely 
beneficiaries will be precisely those extended kin groups that contemporary states are generally 
so concerned with monitoring and managing (through careful attention to property relations, the 
registration of populations, and the organization of patronage networks). No matter what, though, 
Jordanians will likely continue to develop and adopt various institutional initiatives designed to 
free themselves from onerous kin obligations—as they have throughout Jordan’s short history.  
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Appendix: Findings of the Statistical Survey of Marriage Contracts  
 This study would not have been possible without the support of countless employees of 
the Jordanian Sharia Courts who, in keeping with their warm sense of hospitality and their sense 
of religious duty to support scientific research, helped me collect a representative sample of 
Jordanian marriage contracts from two sites. The Supreme Judge granted me permission to 
conduct research in the courthouse and, most generously, allowed me to collect data on marriage 
contracts. The contracts were collected from the Madaba Sharia Courts and the archives at 
Jordan University.  
This choice reflected the exigencies of the organizational structure of the courts. 
Contracts are stored in the nearest courthouse to the bride’s family. For most of the Ottoman 
period, the only court documents consisted of sajilat: a catch-all record-book for marriage, 
divorce, inheritance and anything else that might come before the court in Jerusalem. In the early 
twentieth century, there were various efforts to open new courthouses east of the Jordan River 
and implement some sort of printed contract form, but the procedures were not sufficiently stable 
and formalized to enable a statistical analysis until 1926. This was an important turning point in 
Jordan’s history because it marked Emir Abdullah’s move from Salt to Amman (due to conflicts 
with the Saltiyya) and the intensification of Britain’s investment in the Hashemite monarchy. 
The establishment of a courthouse in Amman responsible for processing all official marriage 
contracts in central Jordan (stretching from the Jordan River to Madaba to Amman to Zarqa) 
represents the condition of possibility for this study. However, by the 1950s, courthouses were 
proliferating. Here, I made the decision to focus on the courthouse nearest to my primary
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fieldsite in Madaba. The total sample includes 877 contracts. However, these must be divided 
into four separate samples which are not fully commensurable: 
1. Amman Courthouse Sample (1926-1953): 377 contracts 
2. Showabka Sample (all contracts from the Amman Courthouse involving the tribe I was living 
with contracted between 1932 and 1936): 67 contracts 
3. Madaba Courthouse Sample (1954-2011): 355 contracts 
4. Extra Madaba Contracts Sample (1954-1981): 78 contracts 
I collected a representative sample in the following manner: all contracts were stored in 
bound volumes—most of which contained 50 contracts each (at the archives these had been 
photographed and stored on microfilm). At the archives, I took the middle contract (either 
contract number xx25 or xx75) from every book. In the Madaba Courthouse, I took the middle 
contract from every other book. To correct for the small pre-1980s sample size, I took the middle 
contract from every book from before 1981 and stored the extra data in a separate spreadsheet. 
This ensured that I had at least thirty contracts per decade for the purposes of showing change 
over time. I chose the middle contract because it was far less likely to be damaged than either the 
first or last contracts in the book.  
The Form 
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The front of a 1920’s era contract 
 
 
1) Number 8 
“Marriage Contract” 
2) That on the Day___ The Occurrence__ Of the month___ Of the year 124_ Concordant with__ Of the month___ Of the year 192_ 
3) With my presence I  
4) Implemented the nuptial contract of [The rational virgin girl Ms. … From] 
5) To her fiancé 
6) For the bridewealth of the quantity of 
7) The remainder from it the total of 
8) And that is obligatory and accepted as legitimate as issued from [The husband and the agent of the wife her father] 
9) Afterwards their acquaintance is a legitimate acquaintance and the verification of the two sides is free of any legitimate and systematic 
objections according to the testimony of the aforementioned witnesses by their demonstration.  
 
10) Completed the witnesses of the agency and the contract The Husband The Agent of the Bride for the contract and the receipt 
[of the bridewealth]  The Judge  
 
Figure 8 
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The back of a 1920s era contract 
 
Record of Marriage Contract 
 
 Name Age Place of Residence Employment Sect 
The Husband      
His Agent      
The Wife      
Her Agent      
The Witnesses      
 
A 2000s Era Contract 
 
Figure 9 
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  In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful    Number 
{And of His signs is that He created for you from yourselves mates that you may find tranquillity in them; and He placed between you affection 
and mercy. Indeed in that are signs for a people who give thought} Trust in God the Mighty 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
The Sharia Courts in _______________        Date of the Contract 
Place of the contract _______________   Stable Copy 
 
 
1 
 Name Father Grand-
father 
Family Place and 
date of birth 
Place of 
Residence 
Citizen
-ship 
Reli-
gion 
Marital 
Status 
Employ-
ment 
National 
Number 
Groom            
Bride            
2 Documents 
3 Bridewealth Upfront  
Delayed  
4 Payment of the bridewealth 
5 Those Present: 
6 Requirements 
7 Witnesses 
8 Agreement of the guardian or permission of the court 
9 Formula 
 I am_______________ [Judge] [Contract-Writer] in_______________ I implemented this contract on the itemized side above after verifying the 
completion of the requirements and without prohibitions 
Witness  Witness  The Groom or his Agent   The Bride or her Agent   The Legal Guardian   The Contract-Writer Certification of the Judge 
  
While the contract has grown in size and become more robust as a tool of data management, 
there is a good deal of overlap between the most recent contracts and the earliest contracts. 
Where possible, I tried to code data using categories that maintained as much of the original 
Figure 10 
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granularity of the data while minimizing issues of commensurability as the form and related 
bureaucratic practices have developed. In fact, the dividing line of 1954 for my two main data 
sets served me well in this regard since the post-independence expansion of the bureaucracy 
proceeded along two axes: a proliferation of courthouses and an elaboration of the form of the 
contract. What follows are two lists of variables. The first lists the variables used to code the 
Amman Courthouse Sample while the second lists the variables used to code the Madaba 
Courthouse Sample. Some of these (Contract Number and Courthouse) were simply collected to 
ensure that the data remained properly structured and . The rest will be handled in the following 
section 
Amman Courthouse Sample Variables 
Contract Number, Courthouse, Month, Year, Contract Writer, Groom’s Age, Groom’s 
Residency, Groom’s Marital Status, Groom’s Occupation, Bride’s Age, Bride’s Residency, 
Bride’s Religion, Bride’s Marital Status, Bride’s Occupation, Bridewealth Word Count, Ottoman 
Lira, Palestinian Lira, Palestinian Guinea, Dinar, Gold (Ottoman Lira), Furniture, Clothes, Other 
Bridewealth, Amount Paid, Mo’jil (divorce insurance: also divided into columns which 
denominate the payment in Ottoman Lira, Ottoman Gold, Palestinian Lira, Palestinian Guinea 
and Dinar respectively), Recipient of the Bridewealth, Bride’s Agent, Groom’s Agent, Number 
of Fingerprints, Number of Stamps, Number of Signatures, Requirements, Ingroup/Outgroup. 
Madaba Courthouse Sample Variables 
Contract Number, Courthouse, Place of Contract, Month, Year, Contract Writer, Groom’s Age, 
Groom’s Place of Birth, Groom’s Residency, Groom's Transience, Groom’s Nationality, 
Groom’s Marital Status, Groom’s Occupation, Bride’s Age, Bride’s Place of Birth, Bride’s 
Residency, Bride's Transience, Bride’s Religion, Bride’s Marital Status, Bride’s Occupation, 
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Bridewealth Word Count, Dinar, Gold, Furniture, Clothes, Other Bridewealth, Mo’jil (divorce 
insurance), Requirements, Requirements Word Count, Autonomous House, Bride Must be 
Allowed to Work, Bride Must Finish University, No Extra Wives, Keep Children from First 
Marriage, Live in Specific Place, Guardian, Number of Fingerprints, Number of Stamps, 
Ingroup/Outgroup.  
The Variables 
 What makes the contracts so interesting is that they can be used in three very different 
ways: 1) as a source of historical data on life in Jordan in the twentieth and early twenty-first 
century 2) as records of unique interactions between families and the state 3) as the product of 
the specific knowledge practices of the Jordanian Sharia courts. As I will argue, the contracts are 
most useful for the latter of the three purposes—although they make contributions to our 
knowledge of Jordan’s history in all three ways. All graphs were made using RStudio.  
Month (ash-shahar) 
Wedding contracts are not evenly distributed over the course of the year. Employees at the 
courthouse note that summer is the busy season while winter is the slow season. Knowing this, I 
specifically scheduled my research at the courthouse in the winter to minimize the degree to 
which I would get in the way of the court’s important work.  
 255 
 
Year (as-sinna) 
Change over time is, of course, one of the most important and compelling variables. However, it 
is also important to understand the ways in which change over time could skew one’s 
interpretation of the data. This is especially true since, due to growing population and greater 
participation on the part of the public, the samples are inevitably weighted towards later time 
periods.  
 
Place of Contract (makan al-'aqd) 
In the early days, there is little evidence of contracts being written in the courthouse itself. 
Initially, contracts were the responsibility of a corps of itinerant contract-writers known as the 
ma’thunun. This was seen as a way to involve the government in the process without forcing 
Figure 11 Figure 12 
Figure 13 Figure 14 
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women to leave the imharem: the protected space of the home. As you can see, the vast majority 
of contracts are conducted in this manner with the father of the bride serving as the most 
common host for such gatherings. In this way, the ma’thun fits seamlessly into the ritual 
presented at the beginning of the chapter on the proposal. For many people, the contract involves 
nothing more than a short break in the festivities surrounding the jaha (delegation) or khatba 
(engagement party) where the relevant parties are brought into a room to sign the paperwork. 
 
 
Table 1: Top Ten Places for Contract Signings (Madaba) 
Place Number  Percent 
Father of the Bride's House 170 45.09% 
Courthouse 101 26.79% 
Madaba 21 5.57% 
Brother of the Bride's House 18 4.77% 
Ma'thun's House 9 2.39% 
Figure 15 
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Father of the Groom's House 5 1.33% 
Ma'thun's Room in the Mosque 5 1.33% 
Madaba Mosque 3 0.80% 
Bride's Father's Brother's House 2 0.53% 
Brother of the Groom's House 2 0.53% 
 
By the 1950s, people had the option of going to the government instead of bringing a 
representative of the government to their house. The courthouse is now the second most common 
place for contracts to happen—far surpassing the homes and shops of other relatives and 
strangers alike. Despite the problems associated with such small per-year sample sizes, a simple 
plot of the frequency of Courthouse contracts over time demonstrates the unmistakable 
emergence of the Courthouse as a ritual site in its own right: 
 
Contract Writer (al-ma'thun) 
The contract writer represents a consequential figure in the history of the development of 
Jordanian marriage contracts. Every book of contracts is the responsibility of that contract writer 
who must fill them out sequentially and, if they retire, turn over the book to the next contract 
Figure 16 
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writer. Far from faceless bureaucrats, these men were respected figures in the community who 
were widely known for their piety and learning. For instance, years after his death, my neighbors 
and friends at the courthouse continue to refer reverently to Mustafa Al-Atrash as a “friend of 
religion” (sahib al-din). During my time in the archives, I came to know the various contract 
writers as individuals: their handwriting, their favored turns of phrase and where they came from. 
In one case, I realized that my daily commute recapitulated the seasonal peregrinations of a 
contract writer. While doing a close reading of some specific contract books, I remember 
marveling at the similar succession of names and places: Showabkah tribe, ‘Ajrami Tribe; 
Jurayna, Mushagar, Hisban and then back again. As you can see, a handful of men if both 
samples have exerted an outsized influence on the process. Most notably, one man (Ahmed 
Fakhr Al-din) was responsible for about one seventh of all contracts stored in the Amman 
courthouse from 1926 to 1953.  
Table 2: Top Ten Most Prolific Contract-Writers (Amman) 
Contract-Writer Number Percent 
Ahmed Fakhr Al-din 55 14.59% 
Mustafa Abud Dhamra 38 10.07% 
Abud Al-Dhamrawi 27 7.16% 
Saleh Ibrahim 27 7.16% 
Muhammed Sa'id Idris 20 5.31% 
Muhammed Abdul-hadi Al-Qadumi 16 4.77% 
Musa Al-Muhatri 16 4.24% 
Riziq Abdullah Al-Hussein 15 3.98% 
Mahmud Saleh 13 3.45% 
Abdullah Sharif 10 2.65% 
 259 
 
 
Table 3: Top Ten Most Prolific Contract-Writers (Madaba) 
Contract-Writer Number Percent 
Jibril 30 8.45% 
Abu Said 30 8.45% 
Al-Hurut 26 7.32% 
Al-Nuwabani 25 7.04% 
Al-Aqtash 24 6.76% 
Showabkeh 23 6.49% 
Abu Asif 20 5.63% 
Khalil Abdul-Hafith Al-Rabuteh 16 4.51% 
Abdul-Qadir Ibrahim 15 4.23% 
Kanana 13 3.66% 
 
Figure 18 
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Age (al-'amr) 
While the issue of spinsterhood looms large in talk about marriage and court records provide a 
window into the challenges that women face if they want to marry after 25, the records provide 
little evidence for rising marriage ages. The median age for men in the two samples is 25 while 
the median age for women has risen from 19 in the Amman sample to 20 in the Madaba sample. 
Various Jordanians proffered a number of explanations for this somewhat strange finding. A 
(female) employee at the archives was convinced that people were simply exaggerating women’s 
ages because the authorities were seen to be disapproving of marriages involving young girls. 
She explained, “they would marry women at the age of fourteen! My mother married at fourteen. 
But they would lie about it to the judge. What could he say?” A (male) friend in the village 
offered a very different explanation: “women were really valuable at that time. You wouldn’t 
Figure 18 
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want to lose a daughter or sister unless you gained another woman in return. So women often 
married late.” This, however, is largely not seen as a problem. At one sitting, a group of men 
explained to me that, “in the past, a lot of men never married. These men were the kind of men 
who don’t deserve the hoof (ma yahuquq al-dhilf). Do you understand? While some men 
honored and given the choicest bits of meat, others are not even given the inedible portions of the 
animal.” It should also be noted that a closer look at the grooms’ ages begins to draw into 
question the facticity of the various numbers that the contracts present: note the way that the 
histogram registers a certain man who purportedly married at the age of 135.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Figure 20 
Figure 21 Figure 22 
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Place of Birth and Residence; Transience (al-makan al-walada wa al-aqama) 
The jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts is determined by the place of residence of the bride so it is 
little surprise that the places of birth and residency tend to cluster closer to the courthouse for 
brides than they do for grooms. This is merely an artifact of the court's regulations. Nonetheless, 
for both genders, the number of unique place-names in both samples is so large as to make any 
attempt to visualize the data difficult. In the Amman sample, there are 94 unique places of 
residence for the groom and 85 for the bride. Amman is listed as the place of residency for a 
plurality of applicants (125 grooms and 120 brides) followed by unknown for brides (46) and 
bayt sha'ar (tent) for grooms (52). The following Table lists the top ten entries for bride and 
groom:  
Figure 23 Figure 24 
Figure 25 Figure 26 
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Table 4: Residency in the Amman Sample  
Bride's Residency Groom's Residency 
Amman (125) Amman (120) 
Unknown (46) Tent (52) 
Al-Zarqa (24) Al-Zarqa (21) 
Tent (20) Wadi Sir (9) 
Wadi Sir (12) Ziyud Tribe (8) 
Sahab (9) Sahab (8) 
Sweileh (8) Sweileh (7) 
Munasir Tribe (8) Mahata, Amman (7) 
Marka (8) Unknown (7) 
Mahata, Amman (8) Munasir Tribe (6) 
 
A Good deal of the remainder of places of residency also index people's status as either nomadic 
or semi-nomadic. For many, the "place" is actually a tribe's name (either specifying "tribe" or 
using the appellation bani/'sons of'), which reflects the migratory circuits the tribe is known to 
follow over the course of the year. The later contracts add another dimension by recording both 
place of residency and place of birth.  
The Madaba sample has a similar diversity of place names although nomadism is obviously 
much less prevalent given the later time period. As one would expect, Madaba figures 
prominently as a place of birth and residence. However, the various surrounding villages are also 
well-represented. There are 80 distinct places of birth listed for the brides along with 113 for the 
grooms. The prominence of Kuwait as a place of birth reflects Madaba's sizeable Palestinian 
population, many of whom were expelled from Kuwait following the first Gulf War in 1990. The 
number of distinct places of residence are somewhat more manageable in the Madaba sample: 39 
for brides and 78 for grooms. 
Table 5: Place of Birth in the Madaba Sample  
Bride's Place of Birth Groom's Place of Birth 
Madaba (149) Madaba (97) 
Amman (31) Amman (33) 
Ma'in (16) Thiban (13) 
 264 
Faisaliyya (11) Ma'in (12) 
Lib (10) Al-Qariyat (10) 
Thiban (8) Lib (8) 
Ghornata (6) Bir Saba' (Palestine) (7) 
Kuwait (6) Ghornata (7) 
Al-Jadida (6) Faisaliyya (6) 
Mushagar (5) Hasban (6) 
 
Table 6: Residency in the Madaba Sample  
Bride's Residency Groom's Residency 
Madaba (256) Madaba (180) 
Ma'in (14) Amman (28) 
Madaba Refugee Camp(10) Ma'in (10) 
Faisaliyya (7) Thiban (10) 
Lib (7) Al-Qariyat (7) 
Ghornata (6) Madaba Refugee Camp (7) 
Hasban (5) Hasban (6) 
Mushagar (5) Al-Zarqa (5) 
Thiban (4) Ghornata (5) 
Al-Jadida (3) Lib (5) 
 
In the Madaba sample, the presence of both a Place of Birth and a Place of Residence for almost 
all of the contract participants allows for a sort of rough index of transience: if the Place of Birth 
and the Place of Residence are the same, one could argue the bride or groom is more "stable" 
while different listings imply that the person is more "transient." In fact, the Madaba sample 
includes 218 stable brides out of 355 and 215 stable grooms out of 355. Those who are transient 
could be economic migrants, or, as alluded to earlier, they could be refugees. The following 
graphs should emphasize that even the more "rural" population represented by the Madaba 
sample has experienced a good deal of deracination over the course of the last half century. 
There seems to be some evidence that people are becoming more transient, although the sample 
sizes for the various years would have to be larger to say anything with certainty.  
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Social [Marital] Status (al-halla al-ijtima'iyya) 
The most revealing aspect of the Social Status category is the enthusiasm with which contract-
writers have sought to record the data for people depending in their gender. In the early 
contracts, there was no dedicated field for this information and, as a result, information on the 
marital status of men is scant bordering on non-existent. This is not the case for women, 
Figure 27 
Figure 28 
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however. Court officials have always been quite diligent about defining the marital status of 
brides. Yet even here, the terminology has grown richer over time. Whereas early contracts for 
the most part simply divide women into the categories of bikr (virgin) and thayyib (previously 
married), more recently the official vocabulary has been expanded to specify those who are 
widowed, divorced, or divorced before the consummation of their marriage.  
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Table 7: Social Status of Grooms (Amman) 
Social Status Number Percent 
Unknown 370 98.14% 
Bachelor 5 1.33% 
Divorced 1 0.27% 
Previously Married (Same Woman) 1 0.27% 
 
Table 8: Social Status of Brides (Amman) 
 
Social Status Number Percent 
Virgin 270 71.62% 
Previously Married 78 20.69% 
Unknown 13 3.45% 
Woman 7 1.86% 
Divorced 2 0.53% 
Girl 2 0.53% 
Previously Married (Divorced) 2 0.53% 
Previously Married (Same Man) 1 0.27% 
Widow 1 0.27% 
Woman of the House 1 0.27% 
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Table 9: The Social Status of Grooms (Madaba) 
 
Social Status Number Percent 
Bachelor 298 83.94% 
Married 35 9.86% 
Divorced 8 2.25% 
Widowed 6 1.69% 
Divorced (Unconsummated) 3 0.85% 
Divorced (Consummated) 2 0.56% 
Divorced the same Fiancee 2 0.56% 
Divorced or Widowed from 
more than one Woman 
1 0.28% 
 
 
Table 10: The Social Status of Brides (Madaba) 
 
Social Status Number Percent 
Virgin 316 89.01% 
Divorced 15 4.23% 
Divorced (Unconsummated) 10 2.82% 
Unknown 3 0.85% 
Widowed 3 0.85% 
Divorced (Consummated) 2 0.56% 
Divorced the same Fiancee 2 0.56% 
Previously Married 2 0.56% 
Formerly Married 1 0.28% 
Single 1 0.28% 
 
 
One of the most striking differences between the four graphs is the much higher number of 
previously married women in the Amman archives sample. Multiple people suggested to me that 
this was the result of the large numbers of widows produced by the two world wars and the 
raiding and tribal clashes which followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, my data 
fails to provide any real evidence either in favor of this hypothesis or against it. Rates of 
previously married women seem to have been higher in the Amman sample without much 
discernible variation over time.  
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Religion (al-din) 
The religion category only covers brides since Muslim women can only marry Muslim men and 
Christians do not use the Sharia Courts. In the Amman sample, 284 women are categorized as 
Muslim and 93 women are not categorized in terms of religion. In the Madaba sample, 156 
contracts list no religion for the woman (as a field on the contract, "Religion" drops out in the 
1950s and only reappears much later). In the absence of a specific field, most contract-writers do 
not bother to list this information. Where my sample does have data to work with, 198 women 
are listed as Muslim and one woman is listed as Christian: an American woman from Ohio.  
Nationality (al-jinsiyya) 
The later Madaba sample also includes data about nationality. The vast majority of applicants are 
Jordanian (347 brides and 342 grooms out of 355), but there are notable exceptions. Among the 
men, there are 5 Saudis, 4 Egyptians, 1 Brazilian, 1 Palestinian, 1 Pakistani and 1 Syrian. Among 
the women, there are 3 Egyptians, 3 Palestinians, 1 Pakistani and 1 American.  
Figure 33 
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Occupation (al-mihni) 
The lists of occupations provide a detailed and amusing look into the development of the 
Jordanian economy over the course of the twentieth century. One notable feature is the way in 
which the record of people's occupations mirrors the gendered assumptions which underlay the 
collection of data about people's social status: whereas early contracts are quite remiss in 
recording the groom's social status, they enthusiastically seek out data about his employment 
status. In comparison, the bride's employment is often ignored completely or merely treated as an 
extension of her husband's: in most cases where there is an attempt to mark the wife's 
employment, it is through the use of ditto marks. There are 56 distinct occupations listed in the 
Amman sample (listed from least to most commonly written): "Appointee in the Airplane 
Company", "Banner Writer", "Blacksmith", "Building", "Car Driver in the Army", "Cattle 
Trader", "Chauffeur", "Clerk", "Coffee Maker", "Craftsman", "Customs Service", "Deputy in the 
Army", "Garage Owner", "Imam", "Iron Foundry", "Iron Laborer in the ? Works", "Kanafa-
maker", "Mechanic Soldier", "Military", "Military Police", "Nothing", "Officer in the Army", 
"Painter", "Police officer", "Police Officer in the Arab Army", "President of The Royal Court", 
"Ruwas/Peasant who operates the irrigation works", "Scribe", "Soldier in the Army", "Soldier 
Officer", "Stucco-Laborer/Qasar", "Student of Knowledge", "Sweeper", "Teacher", "Traveling 
Salesman", "Treasurer in the Jubeihah Inventory", "Baker", "Driver", "Employee of the New 
Railroad", "Industrial Work", "Landowner", "Mechanic", "Carpenter", "Scavenger/Homeless", 
"Shepherd", "Shopkeeper", "Car Driver", "Mason/Stonecutter", "Soldier in the Arab Army", 
"Employee", "Laborer", "Unknown", "Soldier", "Trader", "Farmer", and "Peasant." Needless to 
say, the majority of these occupations are only listed once. Those which are listed more than 
once include: 
 272 
Table 11: The Most Common Occupations for Grooms (Amman) 
 
Occupation Number  Percent 
Peasant 125 33.16% 
Farmer 87 23.07% 
Trader 23 6.10% 
Soldier 21 5.57% 
Unknown 19 5.04% 
Laborer 17 4.50% 
Employee 9 2.39% 
Soldier in the Arab Army 7 1.86% 
Mason/Stonecutter 5 1.33% 
Car Driver 4 1.06% 
Carpenter 3 0.80% 
Scavenger/Homeless 3 0.80% 
Shepherd 3 0.80% 
Shopkeeper 3 0.80% 
Baker 2 0.53% 
Driver 2 0.53% 
Employee of the New Railroad 2 0.53% 
Industrial Work 2 0.53% 
Landowner 2 0.53% 
Mechanic 2 0.53% 
 
Table 12: Occupations for Brides (Amman) 
 
Occupation Number Percent 
Unknown 268 71.09% 
Farmer 47 12.47% 
Peasant 33 8.75% 
Female 9 2.39% 
No Occupation 6 1.59% 
None 3 0.80% 
Seamstress 3 0.80% 
Trader 2 0.53% 
Employee of the New Railroad 1 0.27% 
Laborer 1 0.27% 
Mason/Stonecutter 1 0.27% 
Scavenger/Homeless 1 0.27% 
Shepherd 1 0.27% 
Soldier First 1 0.27% 
 
While it seems as though the woman's occupation is treated in the Amman sample (where it is 
treated at all) as an extension of her husband's occupation, the later Madaba sample creates a new 
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category for the bride rabit bayt (housewife). In fact, the only female-gendered form of 
employment in evidence in the Amman sample is the category of seamstress. By comparison, the 
later Madaba sample reflects women's increased participation in the workforce both in terms of 
the attention to women's employment and the diversity of jobs which women in the sample list as 
their occupations: 
Table 13: Occupations for Brides (Madaba) 
 
Occupation Number Percent 
Housewife 248 69.86% 
Unknown 59 16.52% 
Student 20 5.63% 
Teacher 9 2.54% 
Employee 3 0.85% 
Armed Forces 2 0.56% 
Engineer 2 0.56% 
Bank Employee 1 0.28% 
Civil Service 1 0.28% 
Farmer 1 0.28% 
Government Employee 1 0.28% 
Health Services 1 0.28% 
Housewife and Student 1 0.28% 
Lawyer 1 0.28% 
None 1 0.28% 
Nurse 1 0.28% 
Pharmacist 1 0.28% 
Secretary/Employee 1 0.28% 
University Student 1 0.28% 
 
The diversity of male occupations also increases in the Madaba sample to a total of 71. At the 
same time, the increasingly urban, industrial and commercial character of Jordanian society is 
highly visible in the sample. The category of "peasant" is completely gone. It is replaced by a 
proliferation of specialized occupations and the ever-increasing numbers of men who seek 
employment with the security services. The full list (from most to least common) includes: 
"Farmer", "Employee", "Soldier", "Driver", "Laborer", "Trader", "Armed Forces", "Teacher", 
"Corporal in the army", "Company Employee", "Engineer", "Free Labor", "Military", "General 
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Security", "Government Employee", "Independent Worker", "Mechanic", "Police Officer", 
"Student", "Accountant", "Electrician", "Retired", "Soldier in the Arab Army", "Carpenter", 
"Coiffeur", "Doctor", "Industrial", "Nurse", "Officer", "Police Officer in General Security", 
"Army Sergeant", "Shopkeeper", "Agent in the General Fund", "Army Officer", "Assigned 
Soldier", "[Auto] Body Work", "Captain General Security", "Civil Defense", "Company 
Worker", "Concrete Technician", "Contractor", "Corporal", "Corporal in General Security", 
"Corporal in the Arab Army", "Corporal in the Civil Defense", "Correspondent in General 
Security", "Couch Repairman", "Distributor Sales Representative", "Electrical Engineer", 
"Employee Accountant", "Employee of the Municipality", "First Lieutenant in the Army", 
"Imam and Preacher", "Industrial Qualification", "Lawyer", "Mechanical Engineer", "Painter", 
"Pharmacist", "Plumber", "Private Sector", "Private Sector Employee", "Sergeant General 
Security", "Sales Manager", "Salesman", "Sergeant", "Soldier (Second)", "Soldier in the Armed 
Forces", "Sweet Maker", "Tile layer", "University teacher", "Worker in the Armed Forces." 
Some of the class resonances are peculiar to Jordan: while "worker" signifies working class, 
terms like "employee" and "free labor" denote a middle to upper-middle class status. The top ten 
occupations in the Madaba sample for grooms are: 
Table 14: The Ten Most Common Occupations for Grooms (Madaba) 
 
Occupation Number Percent 
Farmer 62 17.46% 
Employee 48 13.52% 
Soldier 37 10.42% 
Driver 23 6.48% 
Laborer 20 5.63% 
Trader 17 4.79% 
Armed Forces 14 3.94% 
Teacher 11 3.10% 
Corporal in the Army 8 2.25% 
Company Employee 6 1.69% 
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Bridewealth (al-mahr) 
Of all of the fields on the contract, bridewealth encompasses the most diversity of possible kinds 
of discrete information. Depending on the time period, the contract-writer and the circumstances, 
the bridewealth field contains information about the when, what, and for whom of bridewealth 
payments. In the earliest time period, there is simply the category of bridewealth and it either has 
or has not been paid. As with later contracts, there are two lines but they are defined differently: 
as "Bridewealth" and "that which remains" instead of the later "upfront" (ma'jil) and "delayed" 
(mo'jil) (as a result, what might later be considered mo'jil--the delayed payment--is included in 
the bridewealth numbers in figure 27 for some of the earliest contracts from before 1930). As 
table 16 reveals, there are a whole host of intermediate points on the continuum between upfront 
and delayed, between ma'jil and mo'jil, between the pre-wedding gift and what the husband has 
to pay to be relieved of his responsibilities towards his wife: "after a year," "after 4 months," 
"upon her request." In one case, a trader from Amman was bound by his marriage contract to pay 
2000 dinar [extra bridewealth] if he and his household were to leave Amman. Yet for the most 
part, contract writers seem to enforce the following discipline: those seeking a marriage contract 
should be comfortable averring that what has been exchanged has been exchanged and no other 
exchanges need be recognized legally except in case of divorce and the payment of the mo'jil. 
Thus the complexity tends to be limited to producing 2 numbers (the upfront and delayed 
payments), a denomination for those numbers like a currency or some set of objects like 
furniture, clothes or gold.  
One way to analyze the complexity of the Bridewealth field is to look at the word counts. This 
reveals three distinct periodizations. First, there is the pre-independence period where contracts 
almost always specify upfront and delayed bridewealth while adding on some sort of formula 
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about how the bridewealth was "received in the hand of her father her agent with her 
permission." In the 1950s, this formula disappears completely and word counts get shorter. 
Finally, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the length of the bridewealth arrangements begins to 
grow again as people begin to specify furniture, clothes, gold, jewelry and other goods rather 
than simply recording a monetary value. It is almost enough to make up for the very brief entries 
of the 1950s and 1960s--most of which only list some given amount of dinar: the median word 
count for the Madaba sample is 16 and the median for the Amman sample is 19.  
 
 
Figure 34 
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Looking at a plot of the amount of bridewealth received--regardless of currency--is much more 
revealing than one might think. The trend is compelling: after some movement within a tight 
range, bridewealth payments across Jordan settled into an extremely tight band around the 
number 30 during the 1930s. Out of my sample of 377 from Amman, 112 listed the upfront 
bridewealth as 30 of some currency. It really does not seem to matter what the currency is: the 
numbers are clustered around 30 until 1943 when all of a sudden there is an explosion in the 
diversity of numbers being used for bridewealth payments.  
Figure 35 
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So what happens when we divide them up by currency? The five main currencies (Ottoman Lira, 
Ottoman Gold, Palestinian Lira, Palestinian Guinea, Dinar), are each associated with a given 
time. Ottoman money is mostly present in the 1920s and makes occasional appearances 
thereafter as some sort of heirloom. Palestinian Guinea and Lira Both predominate in the 30s and 
40s such that neither one can be associated with either the uniformity of bridewealth pre-1943 or 
its diversity post-1943. Dinar make their appearance with the end of World War II and the 
coming of Jordanian independence.  
Of course, this does not exhaust the diversity of the contractual arrangements in the sample. The 
following bridewealth payments were too unique to fit elsewhere:  
"The Agreed upon",  
"1 Palestinian Lira Gold "  
"10 Ottoman Guinea",  
"10 Palestinian Papers",  
"10 Sheep; 10 black goats; 10 kids; 10 young sheep; camel; bull",  
"10 Silver Dirhams",  
Figure 36 
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"100 Dinar Couch set and the Jewelry after 1 year",  
"12 head wraps ('Am soda)",  
"15 goats; 15 white baby sheep; 15 sheep; 15 kids; 2 cows; 1 lamb; 10 bags of wheat",  
"2 blankets 2 wool mattresses, 2 rugs, 2 wool covers, 4 wool pillows, 10 rings, 2 couples silver bracelets, 2 
bracelets of Ottoman quarters",  
"2 mattresses; 2 blankets; 4 big pillows; 6 chairs; wardrobe; 2 head wraps",  
"2 mattresses; 2 blankets; 4 pillows costing 10 dinar", "2 mattresses; 2 blankets; 4 pillows; 2 carpets; bed",  
"2 mattresses; 2 blankets; 4 pillows; bed; wardrobe; 6 cane chairs",  
"2 mattresses; 2 blankets; 4 pillows; box",  
"2 mattresses; 2 blankets; 4 pillows; cupboard; medium table; half dozen cane chairs",  
"2 mattresses; 4 pillows; 2 blankets; bed; wardrobe; 2 mirrors; 6 chairs",  
"2 pairs of sleeping beds; medium ajami (turkish) rug; 2 blankets; 4 pillows",  
"2 wool mattresses; 2 Cotton blankets; 4 wool pillows, 2 rugs, pair of ottoman gold earrings; 2 gold rings; box",  
"2 wool mattresses; 2 wool blankets; 4 pillows; box; pair of silver platters; 4 silver rings; ",  
"20 head of goats; 20 head of female sheep", "20 Lira new bed, 2 wool mattresses, 3 blankets, 4 pillows for 40 
Lira, 40 Lira carpet; 30 Lira gold bracelet; 20 Lira chairs",  
"20 Lira Palestinian Gold",  
"20 Palestinian Lira (must be paid within the year)",  
"2000 Guinea if they leave Amman",  
"250 currency unspecified",  
"3 big wool mattresses for beds; 3 wool blankets; 3 wool pillows",  
"3 mattresses, 2 blankets, 2 rugs, 4 pillows, ",  
"4 wool mattresses; three blankets; 4 wool pillows; 2 balga cloths; 'ajami carpet; gold ring; box; silver bracelet",  
"5 plots of land rented for 2 years at a price of 16 Lira; 4 Lira of wheat, 20 Lira of brideservice from ma'jil",  
"50 Guinea wardrobe with mirror; 18 Guinea for 6 chairs; 40 Guinea carpet; 10 Guinea bed; 30 Guinea for 2 
wool mattresses, 2 cotton blankets, 4 wool pillows, 3 small tables; 50 Guinea radio; 1 kilo ",  
"55 head of dark goats; pair of ploughing cows; 100 3.5 kilo bags of wheat",  
"6 Suits and a silk belt", "blankets; 4 pillows; spun carpet; wardrobe all costing 50 JD",  
"Clothes and furniture (unspecified)",  
"Furnishings; carpets; wool mattresses; blankets; 4 pillows; box; iron bed",  
"Furniture (value unspecified)",  
"Furniture and clothes (value unspecified)",  
"Gold Ring worth 3 JD; pair of gold earrings worth 3 JD",  
"Mattress; blanket; 2 pillows",  
"Plot of land worth 20 PG 15 head of goat worth 10",  
"Sewing machine; wardrobe; mattress; blanket; six cane chairs; tibrizi carpet",  
"Wardrobe with three mirrors; Karaki carpet; 6 cane chairs; 2 mattresses; blankets; 4 wool pillows; 50 JD " 
 
Color Code For Currencies for the Amman Contracts: 
Ottoman Lira- Green 
Ottoman Gold- Yellow 
Palestinian Lira- Blue 
Palestinian Guinea- Red 
Dinar- Violet 
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The most striking aspect of the mo'jil (delayed) bridewealth in the Amman sample is its absence: 
out of 377 contracts in my sample, 116 did not list any mo'jil. Of those contracts that do list a 
delayed payment, there is a similar but less pronounced trend towards greater diversity in 
bridewealth amounts over time. As with the upfront payment, the currencies seem to correlate 
not with the amount of bridewealth but rather with specific time periods: Ottoman being earlier 
and Dinar being later with Palestinian Lira and Guinea in the middle.  
Color Code For Currencies for the Amman Contracts: 
Ottoman Lira- Green 
Ottoman Gold- Yellow 
Palestinian Lira- Blue 
Palestinian Guinea- Red 
Dinar- Violet 
 
 
 
Figure 37 
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As alluded to earlier, the Sharia Courts were very concerned during the 1920s 30s and 40s with 
recording the hand which received the bridewealth.  Fathers and brothers accounted for the 
majority, but 13% of women in my sample purportedly received their own bridewealth in their 
hands. In other cases, it was divided up between the father and the bride. In two cases, the 
contract writer acted as the woman's agent (see below) and also received the bridewealth. The 16 
cases where it only says "the agent" received the bridewealth are meant to indicate that there was 
no discernible relationship (father, mother's brother, grandfather etc) between that particular 
agent and the bride. This could be based on the contract writer's specification of a kin 
relationship or on a comparison the names of the party to the contract and their agent. Since all 
Arab names contain a unique first name followed by the father and grandfather's name and then 
the name of the tribe, it is often relatively simple to tell the relationship even if the contract-
writer has omitted it.   
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Table 15: Receiver of the Bridewealth (Amman) 
Receiver Number Percent 
Father 160 42.44% 
Brother 75 19.89% 
Her Hand 51 13.53% 
Unknown 21 5.57% 
Father's Brother 19 5.03% 
Agent 16 4.24% 
At the Wedding 9 2.39% 
Upon Request 4 1.06% 
Father's Brother's Son 3 0.80% 
Her Hand at the Wedding 3 0.80% 
Mother's Brother 3 0.80% 
Grandfather 2 0.53% 
Ma'thun 2 0.53% 
Nothing 2 0.53% 
100 for father 18 her hand 1 0.27% 
50 for father 150 her hand 1 0.27% 
After 4 months 1 0.27% 
After a year 1 0.27% 
Mother 1 0.27% 
Wife 1 0.27% 
Figure 39 
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Upon Her Request 1 0.27% 
 
In the Madaba sample, there are no real concerns with the commensurability of the currencies in 
assessing changes to upfront bridewealth payments. The dinar is used throughout and follows a 
relatively stable upward trajectory of inflation. Yet unlike the Amman sample where there seems 
to be an explosion of diverse bridewealth payments, here, a plot of bridewealth payments seems 
to produce a compelling image of social stratification. There seems to be a tendency towards 
relatively rigid tiers of bridewealth payments which increase over time: 1000, 1500, 2000 and 
3000 seem well-established with 5000 now setting the new high point. There also seems to be a 
strong tendency away from the dinar and towards commodities denominated in dinar like 
furniture, gold jewelry, gold, and clothes. One bit of caution: the following plot disaggregates the 
upfront payment into its constituent parts. That means that a contract involving 3000 in furniture 
and 3000 in gold will produce 2 different colored dots on the plot at the level of 3000. In this era, 
there are also a number of contracts which were not particularly fit for coding. Five contracts 
listed furniture but failed to specify an amount. Four contracts listed a Golden Rashidi Lira as 
part of the bridewealth and 5 listed simply "Gold Lira." The following were only found in one 
contract: 
"Bedroom",  
"1 Framed Gold Guinea",  
"10 Golden Rashidi Lira for 45 JD; 2 wool mattresses for 10 JD; 2 wool blankets for 5 JD; 4 pillows for 4 JD; 64 JD 
Total",  
"100 JD for something unspecified",  
"100 JD worth of Rashidi Gold",  
"150 of the 200 now and 50 before the wedding",  
"2 Mubarim (solid gold bracelet molded in the shape of rope) worth 400 JD",  
 "250 JD bedroom; 6 couches worth 60 JD; 4 wool mattresses worth 50 JD; 3 wool blankets worth 50 JD; 4 wool 
Pillows worth 20 JD; cooking tools worth 70 JD; for 600 JD total",  
"300 JD kitchen tools",  
"5 Rashidi gold coins word 30 JD; pair of beds worth 7 JD; formica cabinets on three sides worth 40 JD; 2 wool 
mattresses worth 10 JD; gold bracelet and ring worth 20 JD; six chairs worth 25 JD; 4 wool pillows worth 4 JD; 
wool blankets worth 5 JD; For a total of 141 JD",  
"5 Rashidi gold coins worth 22 JD",  
"6 saliyat (gold)",  
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"80 JD of the bridewealth must be a wardrobe and gold",  
"Gold" (value unspecified),  
"Lira of gold worth 50 JD",  
"Mubarim (solid gold bracelet molded in the shape of rope); 60 3 kilo bags of wool" 
 
Color Code For Types of Bridewealth for the Amman Contract 
 
Dinar- Red 
Gold- Orange 
Furniture- Green 
Clothes- Blue 
Jewelry- Indigo 
Bedroom- Violet 
 
 
 
 
Unlike the upfront payment for the Madaba sample, which is proffered as a range of goods 
denominated in Jordanian Dinar, the delayed payment is inevitably given in dinar only. 
Nonetheless, the delayed payment shows the same tendency as the upfront payments in the 
Madaba contracts towards relatively rigid tiers. The most common bridewealth amounts are 2000 
Dinar (63/433), 3000 Dinar, (63/433), 5000 Dinar (61/433), 0 Dinar (50/433), 1000 Dinar 
Figure 40 
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(50/433). These five amounts account for 287 of the 433 contracts. Other common amounts 
include 50 Dinar (24/433), 4000 Dinar (19/433), 200 Dinar (17/433), 100 Dinar (16/433) 50 
Dinar (14/433), 1500 Dinar (14/433), 300 Dinar (10/433) and 400 Dinar (7/433). Other amounts 
are represented no more than twice in the combined Madaba Contracts and Madaba extras 
sample.  
 
 
Agent (wakil) and Guardian (wali) 
As discussed in the chapter on the proposal, the category of "agent" (wakil) has become much 
more delimited over time. While the father of the bride has always been the most common agent, 
in earlier times there was no concern with some other senior male serving that function. In a full 
42 out of 377 cases, there is no discernible kinship relationship between the bride and her agent. 
In other words, it is none of her close patrilineal relations including father, brother, father's 
brother, father's brother's son or grandfather (based on a comparison of the names). Even men 
availed themselves of agents in the early contracts--although this practice was never particularly 
Figure 41 
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common with only about 12% of men using an agent in the Amman sample. The practice of 
agents for men seems to have quickly fallen into disuse with men being urged to act on their own 
behalf in court rituals. Over time, however, the agent (wakil) has lost standing in favor of the 
guardian (wali) who is defined as the bride's father and, in his absence, her brother, and father's 
brother, moving along the bride's patriline by degrees of separation.  
 
Table 16: Agent of the Bride (Amman) 
Agent of the Bride Number Percent 
Father 189 50.13% 
Brother 79 20.95% 
No Apparent Relation 42 11.14% 
Father's Brother 29 7.69% 
Herself 17 4.51% 
Mother's Brother 6 1.59% 
Father's Brother's Son 5 1.33% 
Grandfather 3 0.80% 
Father and Herself 2 0.53% 
Herself/ Father as Guarantor 2 0.53% 
Ma'thoon 2 0.53% 
Brother and Herself 1 0.27% 
Figure 42 
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Table 17: Agent of the Groom (Amman) 
 
Agent of the Groom Number Percent 
Himself 331 87.80% 
No Apparent Relation 19 5.04% 
Father 16 4.14% 
Brother 8 2.12% 
Father's Brother 1 0.27% 
Father's Brother's Son 1 0.27% 
Sheikh 1 0.27% 
 
The greater insistence of contemporary contract-writers on the prerogatives of the guardian 
(wali) as opposed to the agent (wakil) is apparent in preponderance of Madaba contracts which 
list some combination of father and brother as the agent. Such contracts account for well over 
two thirds of the sample. Even the definition of the field is different in the post-1950s contracts. 
Whereas early contracts simply enquire, " And that is obligatory and accepted as legitimate as 
issued from," later contracts ask for, "agreement of the guardian or permission of the court." 
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Table 18: Who Agreed or Granted Permission? (Madaba) 
Permission/Agreement from: Number Percent 
Father 267 70.82% 
Brother 39 10.34% 
Father and Court 28 7.43% 
Father's Brother 4 1.06% 
Herself 4 1.06% 
Brother and Court 4 1.06% 
Brother and Herself 2 0.53% 
Father and Herself 2 0.53% 
Brother and Father 1 0.27% 
Father's Brother and Court 1 0.27% 
Grandfather 1 0.27% 
Her Guardian and Herself 1 0.27% 
Herself and Court 1 0.27% 
Mother's Brother 1 0.27% 
 
Requirements (shurut) 
Requirements are incredibly uncommon. Out of all 877 contracts, only 14 show evidence of 
requirements. Only one of these comes from before independence (the previously mentioned 
contract which stipulates 2000 Guinea in extra bridewealth to be paid if the Husband moves the 
Figure 44 
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family away from Amman). The remaining 17 include 6 which stipulate and autonomous house 
(bayt mustaqil), 2 which stipulate that the bride be allowed to work, 2 which stipulate that the 
bride be allowed to finish university, 1 which stipulates that the woman be allowed to keep her 
children from her first marriage and none which forbid the man from taking more wives. Seven 
stipulate something about the disposition of the house. One stipulates "Stone House," which is to 
say, not a tent. One stipulates that the bride live 'far from the other wife.' This one is particularly 
amusing because it used a word for "second wife" from the local dialect which also means 
enemy (dhirra). Two specify that the couple live in Madaba (the bride's hometown) while one 
stipulates the couple live in Qatrana (a village about an hour south of Madaba). One contract 
stipulates that the woman live with her husband in his hometown of Tabuk in Saudi Arabia.  
Signature (tawqiyy'ah) 
There are three main forms of indexical linkage between the contract and its participants: 
signature, stamp and thumbprint. In the Amman/pre-independence sample, there are blanks for 
the [two] witnesses, 'the wife or her agent', and 'the husband' for a total of four distinct marks in 
most contracts. In the later Madaba/post-independence sample, there are blanks for the two 
witnesses, 'the wife or her agent', 'the husband or his agent' and the 'legal guardian' for a total of 
five distinct marks. Some caution is necessary in analyzing the following graphs--especially in 
the Amman sample. Signatures do not necessarily mean that the person was literate--nor do 
stamps mean a person was illiterate. Stamps, in fact, were generally issued by the authorities to 
specific people to whom the British and Ottomans tried to outsource local administrative duties. 
Signatures, in turn, are not necessarily the work of the person whose name is listed on the 
contract. Rather than engage in the forensic work of determining which signatures were 
"authentic," I have chosen to use this field as a rough metric of social position vis-à-vis the state. 
 290 
Those with government stamps were held in the highest esteem and exercised the most power 
while those with signatures held a more intermediary position. Those who used a thumbprint 
occupied the lowest status. I first became aware of this association between the use of 
thumbprints and the loss of dignity when my host refused to have any guest of his 'dirty himself' 
by providing fingerprints to the local police department (as is required of those hoping to obtain 
an extended 3-month tourist visa). Surprisingly, I was able to renew my visa five times without 
ever providing fingerprints to the authorities. Just as I was able to avoid providing my 
fingerprints because of my privileged status, many in the Amman sample were able to avoid 
providing fingerprints in similar ways. As far as I can tell, this only holds for the Amman 
sample.  
Color Code for Marks on Contracts: 
Red- Stamp 
Blue- Signature 
Green- Thumbprint 
 Figure 45 
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Ingroup/Outgroup 
The category of ingroup/outgroup is a synthetic category I have created that must be used with a 
good deal of caution and caveats. I designed it to get at the issue of "close" marriages. However, 
these resist simple definition. As explained earlier, Arabic names contain within themselves a 
record of patrilineal relations so one could compare the names of bride and groom and record 
whether or not they came from the same tribe. Yet this tells us nothing about possible matrilineal 
ties. Instead, I opted to compare the places of births for the couple to approximate this variable. 
The obvious problem is that, with so many people living in specific urban centers, there are 
likely to be plenty of people in "close" marriages who are not relatives. Here, I have simply 
chosen to define "close" more in terms of physical proximity than kinship. Yet nonetheless, the 
category is an imperfect gloss on a complex phenomenon. One sign that it is a robust category, 
however, is the fact that "close" marriages seem to be becoming less common in the Madaba 
Figure 46 
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sample despite the obvious trend towards urbanization, which could conceivably mask such an 
effect.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 47 
Figure 48 
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Documentation: 
 
All figures were produced using RStudio and the R programming language. R is an open-source 
project. Its creators conceive of it as a “data visualization environment.” 
 
R can be downloaded from http://cran.r-project.org/ 
 
RStudio can be downloaded from www.rstudio.org 
 
Ultimately, all data was stored in four files for manipulation in the R environment: 
 
mdata.csv: A spreadsheet of all of the data from the Madaba courthouse 
mcontracts.csv: A spreadsheet of the data from the 25
th
 or 75
th
 contract collected from every-
other book of fifty contracts in the Madaba courthouse. 
mextras: A spreadsheet of the data from the 25
th
 or 75
th
 contract from before 1980 collected 
from the other pre-1980s book of fifty contracts in the Madaba courthouse. This was a response 
to the way population growth could warp results by biasing the sample towards contemporary 
contracts. Mainly, this data is used to increase the sample size of early contracts for the purposes 
of investigating change over time. 
archives.csv: A spreadsheet of the sample of the data from the 25
th
 or 75
th
 contract from the 
Amman courthouse archives at Jordan University.  
 
 
Figure 11: Distribution of Contracts by Month (Amman) 
 
>hist(archives$Month, main="Distribution of Contracts by Month (Amman)", xlab="Month", 
ylab="Frequency") 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of Contracts by Month (Madaba) 
 
>hist(mcontracts$Month, main="Distribution of Contracts by Month (Madaba)", xlab="Month", 
ylab="Frequency") 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of Contracts by Year (Amman) 
 
>hist(archives$Year, main="Distribution of Contracts by Year (Amman)", xlab="Year", 
ylab="Frequency") 
 
Figure 14: Distribution of Contracts by Year (Madaba) 
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>hist(mcontracts$Year, main="Distribution of Contracts by Year (Madaba)", xlab="Year", 
ylab="Frequency") 
 
Figure 15: Where Contracts Happened (Madaba) 
 
> p <- tapply(mcontracts$Courthouse, mcontracts$Place.of.Contract, length) 
> psort <- sort(p, decreasing =FALSE) 
> dotchart(psort, labels=row.names(psort),cex=.5, main="Where Contracts Happened 
(Madaba)") 
 
Figure 16: The Increasing Use of the Courthouse for Marital rituals 
 
year <- c(mdata$Year) 
court <- ifelse(mdata$Place.of.Contract=="Courthouse", "Court", "Not Court") 
courthouse <- cbind(year,court) 
court_sort <- courthouse[order(courthouse[,1]),] 
court_sort1 <- unique(unlist(court_sort[,1])) 
court_frame <- cbind(court_sort1, matrix(0,58,2)) 
for(i in 1:58) 
 +   {court_year <- court_frame[i,1]  
    indx = which(court_sort[,1]==court_year) 
    court_frame[i,2] <- sum(I(court_sort[indx,2]=="Court")) 
    court_frame[i,3] <- sum(I(court_sort[indx,2]=="Not Court"))} 
court_frame1 <- apply(court_frame, 2, as.numeric) 
court_ratio <- court_frame1[,2]/(court_frame1[,2]+court_frame1[,3]) 
plot(court_frame1[,1], court_ratio, main="The Increasing Use of the Courthouse for Marital 
Rituals", xlab="Year", ylab="Frequency of Courthouse Contracts") 
 
Figure 17: A Ranking of the Most Prolific Contract-Writers (Amman) 
 
> Ma.thoon_freq <- tapply(archives$Courthouse, archives$Ma.thoon, length) 
> Ma.thoon_sort <- sort(Ma.thoon_freq, decreasing =FALSE) 
> dotchart(Ma.thoon_sort,labels=row.names(Ma.thoon_sort),main="A Ranking of the Most 
Prolific Contract-Writers (Amman)", cex=.5) 
 
Figure 18: A Ranking of the Most Prolific Contract-Writers (Amman) 
 
> Ma.thoon_freq <- tapply(mcontracts $Courthouse, mcontracts$Ma.thoon, length) 
> Ma.thoon_sort <- sort(Ma.thoon_freq, decreasing =FALSE) 
> dotchart(Ma.thoon_sort,labels=row.names(Ma.thoon_sort),main="A Ranking of the Most 
Prolific Contract-Writers (Madaba)", cex=.5) 
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Figure 19: The Distribution of Grooms by Age (Amman) 
 
> hist(archives$G.Age, main="The Distribution of Grooms by Age (Amman)", xlab="Age") 
 
Figure 20: The Distribution of Grooms by Age (Amman) 
 
> hist(mcontracts$G.Age, main="The Distribution of Grooms by Age (Amman)", xlab="Age") 
 
Figure 21: The Distribution of Brides by Age (Amman) 
 
> hist(archives$B.Age, main="The Distribution of Brides by Age (Amman)", xlab="Age") 
 
Figure 22: The Distribution of Brides by Age (Madaba) 
 
> hist(mcontracts$B.Age, main="The Distribution of Brides by Age (Madaba)", xlab="Age") 
 
Figure 23: Median Age of Marriage for Women (Amman) 
 
> bcount_by_year <- with(archives, split(B.Age, Year)) 
> bmedian_by_year <- sapply(bcount_by_year, median, na.rm=TRUE) 
> fix(bmedian_by_year) 
> b_age_median <- c(18, 25, 19, 22, 22, 20, 20, 19, 21.5, 20, 18, 22.5, 18, 18.5, 18.5, 18, 18, 18, 
17.5, 18, 18.5, 19, 18, 20, 18, 18, 19, 24.5, 20) 
> years <- c(1926:1953,1959) 
plot(years, b_age_median, main="Median Age of Marriage for Women (Amman)", xlab="Year", 
ylab="Median Age") 
> regression<- lm(b_age_median~years) 
> abline(regression) 
 
Figure 24: Median Age of Marriage for Men (Amman) 
 
> gcount_by_year <- with(Archives, split(B.Age, Year)) 
> gmedian_by_year <- sapply(gcount_by_year, median, na.rm=TRUE) 
> fix(gmedian_by_year) 
> g_age_median <- c(25, 25, 25, 20, 25, 25, 27.5, 29, 25, 30, 27, 25, 30, 25, 25, 25, 25, 22, 25, 
22, 30, 25, 21, 26, 25, 25, 25, 23.5, 30) 
> years <- c(1926:1953,1959) 
plot(years, g_age_median, main="Median Age of Marriage for Women (Amman)", xlab="Year", 
ylab="Median Age") 
> regression<- lm(g_age_median~years) 
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> abline(regression) 
 
Figure 25: Median Age of Marriage for Women (Madaba) 
 
> bcount_by_year <- with(mdata, split(B.Age, Year)) 
> bmedian_by_year <- sapply(bcount_by_year, median, na.rm=TRUE) 
> fix(bmedian_by_year) 
> b_age_median <- c(17.5, 17, 18, 17, 15.5, 16.5, 16, 16, 18, 18.5, 18, 18, 17, 18, 17, 17, 17, 17, 
16.5, 18, 16, 16.5, 16, 17.5, 18, 21, 27, 17, 19, 18.5, 21.5, 19, 24, 19, 19, 22, 20.5, 21, 18.5, 20, 
16, 20, 20, 22, 20, 23, 22, 22, 22, 24, 21.5, 21.5, 20, 22.5, 22, 27.5, 22.5, 21) 
> years <- c(1954:2011) 
>plot(years, b_age_median, main="Median Age of Marriage for Women (Madaba)", 
xlab="Year", ylab="Median Age") 
> regression<- lm(b_age_median~years) 
> abline(regression) 
 
Figure 26: Median Age of Marriage for Men (Madaba) 
 
> gcount_by_year <- with(mdata, split(G.Age, Year)) 
> gmedian_by_year <- sapply(gcount_by_year, median, na.rm=TRUE) 
> fix(gmedian_by_year) 
> g_age_median <- c(29, 21, 25, 20, 31.5, 22.5, 20, 25, 23, 21, 22, 25, 25, 22, 23, 25, 20, 21.5, 
24.5, 22, 20, 21.5, 23, 25, 23, 25, 36, 24, 24, 26, 25.5, 22.5, 25, 24, 25, 22.5, 22.5, 23, 25.5, 23, 
26, 25.5, 23.5, 31, 25, 26, 29.5, 32, 28, 31, 26, 30.5, 22, 25.5, 30.5, 27.5, 29, 29) 
> years <- c(1954:2011) 
>plot(years, g_age_median, main="Median Age of Marriage for Men (Madaba)", xlab="Year", 
ylab="Median Age") 
> regression<- lm(g_age_median~years) 
> abline(regression) 
 
Figure 27: The Stability of Brides 
 
>year <- c(mdata$Year) 
>btrans <- c(mdata$B.Transience) 
>btmatrix <- cbind(year,btrans) 
>bt_sort <- btmatrix[order(btmatrix[,1]),] 
>bt_sort1 <- unique(unlist(bt_sort[,1])) 
>bt_frame <- cbind(bt_sort1, matrix(0,58,2)) 
>for(i in 1:58) 
    {bt_year <- bt_frame[i,1]  
           indx = which(bt_sort[,1]==bt_year) 
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           bt_frame[i,2] <- sum(I(bt_sort[indx,2]==1)) 
           bt_frame[i,3] <- sum(I(bt_sort[indx,2]==2))} 
>bt_ratio <- bt_frame[,2]/(bt_frame[,2]+bt_frame[,3]) 
>plot(bt_frame[,1], bt_ratio, main="The Stability of Brides", xlab="Year", ylab="Frequency of 
'Stable' Brides") 
 
Figure 28: The Stability of Grooms 
 
>year <- c(mdata$Year) 
>gtrans <- c(mdata$G.Transience) 
>gtmatrix <- cbind(year,gtrans) 
>gt_sort <- gtmatrix[order(gtmatrix[,1]),] 
>gt_sort1 <- unique(unlist(gt_sort[,1])) 
>gt_frame <- cbind(gt_sort1, matrix(0,58,2)) 
>for(i in 1:58) 
    {gt_year <- gt_frame[i,1]  
           indx = which(gt_sort[,1]==gt_year) 
           gt_frame[i,2] <- sum(I(gt_sort[indx,2]==1)) 
           gt_frame[i,3] <- sum(I(gt_sort[indx,2]==2))} 
>gt_ratio <- gt_frame[,2]/(gt_frame[,2]+gt_frame[,3]) 
>plot(gt_frame[,1], gt_ratio, main="The Stability of Grooms", xlab="Year", ylab="Frequency of 
'Stable' Grooms") 
 
Figure 29: The Social Status of Grooms (Amman) 
 
>gstatus <- tapply(archives$Courthouse, archives$G.Soc..Status, length) 
>gstatus_sort <- sort(gstatus, decreasing =FALSE) 
>dotchart(gstatus_sort,labels=row.names(gstatus_sort),main="The Social Status of Grooms 
(Amman)", cex=.5) 
 
Figure 30: The Social Status of Brides (Amman) 
 
>bstatus <- tapply(archives$Courthouse, archives$B.Soc..Status, length) 
>bstatus_sort <- sort(bstatus, decreasing =FALSE) 
>dotchart(bstatus_sort,labels=row.names(bstatus_sort),main="The Social Status of Brides 
(Amman)", cex=.5) 
 
Figure 31: The Social Status of Grooms (Madaba) 
 
>gstatus <- tapply(mcontracts$Courthouse, mcontracts$G.Soc..Status, length) 
>gstatus_sort <- sort(gstatus, decreasing =FALSE) 
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>dotchart(gstatus_sort,labels=row.names(gstatus_sort),main="The Social Status of Grooms 
(Madaba)", cex=.5) 
 
Figure 32: The Social Status of Brides (Madaba) 
 
>bstatus <- tapply(mcontracts$Courthouse, mcontracts$B.Soc..Status, length) 
>bstatus_sort <- sort(bstatus, decreasing =FALSE) 
>dotchart(bstatus_sort,labels=row.names(bstatus_sort),main="The Social Status of Brides 
(Madaba)", cex=.5) 
 
Figure 33: The Prevalence of Previously Married Women (Amman) 
 
>year <- c(archives$Year) 
>virginity <- ifelse(archives$B.Soc..Status=="Virgin", "Virgin", "Not Virgin") 
>bss <- cbind(year,virginity) 
>bss_sort <- bss[order(bss[,1]),] 
>bss_sort1 <- unique(unlist(bss_sort[,1])) 
>bss_frame <- cbind(bss_sort1, matrix(0,29,2)) 
>for(i in 1:29) 
 +   {bss_year <- bss_frame[i,1]  
    indx = which(bss_sort[,1]==bss_year) 
    bss_frame[i,2] <- sum(I(bss_sort[indx,2]=="Not Virgin")) 
    bss_frame[i,3] <- sum(I(bss_sort[indx,2]=="Virgin"))} 
>bss_frame1 <- apply(bss_frame, 2, as.numeric) 
>bss_ratio <- bss_frame1[,2]/(bss_frame1[,2]+bss_frame1[,3]) 
>plot(bss_frame1[,1], bss_ratio, main="The Prevalence of Previously Married Women 
(Amman)", xlab="Year", ylab="Frequency of Previously Married Women") 
 
Figure 34: Bridewealth Word Count (Amman) 
 
>plot(archives$Year, archives$Bridewealth.Word.Count, main="Bridewealth Word Count 
(Amman)", xlab="Year", ylab="Word Count") 
 
Figure 35: Bridewealth Word Count (Madaba) 
 
> plot(mdata$Year, mdata$Bridewealth.Word.Count, main="Bridewealth Word Count 
(Madaba)", xlab="Year", ylab="Word Count") 
 
Figure 36: Amount of Bridewealth Received 
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> plot(archives$Year, archives$Paid, main="Ammount of Bridewealth Received", xlab="Year", 
ylab="Received (regardless of currency)") 
 
Figure 37: Color Coding of Upfront Bridewealth by Currency (Amman) 
 
>plot(archives$Year, archives$Palestinian.Lira, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
main="Color Coding of Upfront Bridewealth by Currency (Amman)", col="Blue") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Palestinian.Guinea, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
col="Red") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Ottoman.Lira, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
col="Green") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Gol..Ottoman.Lira, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
col="Yellow") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Dinar, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", col="Violet") 
 
Figure 38: Color Coding of Delayed Bridewealth by Currency (Amman) 
 
>plot(archives$Year, archives$Mojil.PL, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
main="Color Coding of Delayed Bridewealth by Currency (Amman)", col="Blue") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Mojil.PG, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
col="Red") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Mojil.OL, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
col="Green") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Mojil.OG, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
col="Yellow") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Mojil.JD, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Cash", 
col="Violet") 
 
Figure 39: According to the Contracts, who Received the Upfront Bridewealth Payment? 
 
> receiver <- sort(tapply(archives$Courthouse, archives$Received.by, length), decreasing 
=FALSE) 
> dotchart(receiver, labels=row.names(receiver),cex=.5, main="According to the Contracts, who 
Received the Upfront Bridewealth Payment?") 
 
Figure 40: Color Coding of Upfront Bridewealth by Type (Madaba) 
 
>plot(mdata$Year, mdata$Dinar, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Dinar", main="Color 
Coding of Upfront Bridewealth by Type (Madaba)", col="Red") 
>points(mdata$Year, mdata$Gold, col="Orange") 
>points(mdata$Year, mdata$Furniture, col="Green") 
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>points(mdata$Year, mdata$Clothes, col="Blue") 
>points(mdata$Year, mdata$Jewelry, col="Indigo") 
>points(mdata$year, mdata$Bedroom, col="Violet") 
 
Figure 41: Delayed Bridewealth Payment 
 
>plot(mdata$Year, mdata$Mojil, xlab="Year", ylab="Bridewealth in Dinar", main="Delayed 
Bridewealth Payments (Madaba)") 
 
Figure 42: Who Served as Agents for Women? 
 
> b_agent <- sort(tapply(archives$Courthouse, archives$Bride.s.Agent, length), decreasing 
=FALSE) 
> dotchart(b_agent, labels=row.names(b_agent),cex=.5, main="Who Served as Agents for 
Women?") 
 
Figure 43: Who Served as Agents for Men? 
 
> g_agent <- sort(tapply(Groom.s.Agent, length), decreasing =FALSE) 
> dotchart(g_agent, labels=row.names(g_agent),cex=.5, main="Who Served as Agents for 
Men?") 
 
Figure 44: Who Agreed or Granted Permission? (Madaba) 
 
> agent <- tapply(mcontracts$Courthouse, mcontracts$Father.s.Permission,length) 
> agent_sort <- sort(agent, decreasing =FALSE) 
> dotchart(agent_sort, labels=row.names(agent_sort), main="Who Agreed or Granted 
Permission? (Madaba)") 
 
Figure 45: Color Coding of How People Signed Contracts (Amman) 
 
>plot(archives$Year, archives$Signatures, xlab="Year", ylab="Number of marks", main="Color 
Coding of How People Signed Contracts (Amman)", col="Blue") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Stamps, xlab="Year", ylab="Number of marks", col="red") 
>points(archives$Year, archives$Fingerprints, xlab="Year", ylab="Number of marks", 
col="Green") 
 
Figure 46: Color Coding of How People Signed Contracts (Madaba) 
 
>plot(mdata$Year, mdata$Signatures, xlab="Year", ylab="Number of marks", main="Color 
Coding of How People Signed Contracts (Madaba)", col="Blue") 
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>points(mdata$Year, mdata$Stamps, xlab="Year", ylab="Number of marks", col="red") 
>points(mdata$Year, mdata$Fingerprints, xlab="Year", ylab="Number of marks", col="Green") 
 
Figure 47: Frequency of 'Ingroup' vs. 'Outgroup' Marriages (Amman) 
 
> year <- c(archives$Year) 
> io <- c(archives $Ingroup.Outgroup) 
> iomatrix <- cbind(year,io) 
> io_sort <- iomatrix[order(iomatrix[,1]),] 
> io_sort1 <- unique(unlist(io_sort[,1])) 
> io_frame <- cbind(io_sort1, matrix(0,29,2)) 
> for(i in 1:58) 
 {io_year <- io_frame[i,1]  
  indx = which(io_sort[,1]==io_year) 
 io_frame[i,2] <- sum(I(io_sort[indx,2]==1)) 
 io_frame[i,3] <- sum(I(io_sort[indx,2]==2))}  
io_ratio <- io_frame[,2]/(io_frame[,2]+io_frame[,3]) 
plot(io_frame[,1], io_ratio, main="Frequency of 'Ingroup' vs. 'Outgroup' Marriages (Amman)", 
xlab="Year", ylab="'Ingroup' Marriages") 
 
Figure 48: Frequency of 'Ingroup' vs. 'Outgroup' Marriages (Madaba) 
 
> year <- c(mdata$Year) 
> io <- c(mdata$Ingroup.Outgroup) 
> iomatrix <- cbind(year,io) 
> io_sort <- iomatrix[order(iomatrix[,1]),] 
> io_sort1 <- unique(unlist(io_sort[,1])) 
> io_frame <- cbind(io_sort1, matrix(0,58,2)) 
> for(i in 1:58) 
  {io_year <- io_frame[i,1]  
  indx = which(io_sort[,1]==io_year) 
  io_frame[i,2] <- sum(I(io_sort[indx,2]==1)) 
  io_frame[i,3] <- sum(I(io_sort[indx,2]==2))}  
> io_ratio <- io_frame[,2]/(io_frame[,2]+io_frame[,3]) 
> plot(io_frame[,1], io_ratio, main="Frequency of 'Ingroup' vs. 'Outgroup' Marriages (Madaba)", 
xlab="Year", ylab="'Ingroup' Marriages") 
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